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Much attention has recently been given to K-12 educators and their use of social media. This quantitative study surveyed a targeted sample (n = 543) of known social media users to learn about K-12 educators’ use of social media, their legal knowledge of the First Amendment as it relates to free speech and education, and their dispositions toward the First Amendment. Survey respondents self-reported levels of social media use, completed a legal knowledge section, and responded to a series of items used to gauge their disposition toward the First Amendment. These were analyzed through various demographic and contextual factors in addition to analyses of variance, correlations, and a regression analysis. Findings identified a critical mass of K-12 educators are using social media, and some use social media to a great degree. This sample also reported an overall lack of legal knowledge of the First Amendment as it relates to free speech and education. Additionally, whether or not one had been questioned or chastised about his or her social media use, whether or not one worked for an administration that was “extremely supportive” of social media use, whether or not one had administrative responsibilities, and one’s disposition toward the First Amendment were significant predictors of social media use for the educators in this sample. Findings in this study suggest schools should train and use administrators to educate their K-12 employees about social media use, the First Amendment, and related school policies. Additionally, school policies should not focus on social media use; instead, they should address particular behaviors. Finally, schools intending to embrace social media should seek to employ administrators who are “extremely supportive” of social media use.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-03-15T13:33:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 André Vinícius Seleghini Franzin.pdf: 1557469 bytes, checksum: e477e83ba22bbec7731c88e610492af7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-15T13:33:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 André Vinícius Seleghini Franzin.pdf: 1557469 bytes, checksum: e477e83ba22bbec7731c88e610492af7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-21 / The aim of this work is to present common sense as a fundamental category of knowledge and as an epistemological criterion of legal thinking. We start by presenting some of the key meanings that the expression "common sense" has assumed in the history of philosophy, and then delineates the fundamental notes of a concept that recognizes the alethic value of common sense, in accordance with the investigation of the Italian philosopher Antonio Livi. We analyse, then, from the same philosophical context, the structure of legal knowledge, seeking to discern its formal object and its own purpose. Finally, we examine how – and to what extent – the common sense thus conceived can offer an adequate epistemic foundation to legal knowledge / O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar o senso comum como categoria fundamental do saber e como critério epistemológico do conhecimento jurídico. Partiremos da apresentação de alguns dos principais sentidos que a expressão “senso comum” assumiu na história da filosofia, delineando, em seguida, as notas fundamentais de um conceito que reconheça o valor alético do senso comum, inserindo-o em um contexto metafísico e gnosiológico realista, com esteio nas investigações do filósofo italiano Antonio Livi. Analisaremos, em seguida, a partir desse mesmo contexto filosófico, a estrutura do conhecimento jurídico, buscando discernir o seu objeto formal e a sua finalidade própria. Finalmente, ponderaremos de que maneira – e em que extensão – o senso comum assim concebido pode oferecer uma adequada fundação epistêmica ao conhecimento jurídico.

L’émergence de discours sur la judiciarisation et la juridicisation de la médecine atteste de la place croissante du droit, appréhendée telle une contrainte par le médecin. D’abord, si l’encadrement juridique de l’activité médicale est nécessaire, le foisonnement de règles juridiques est assimilé à une ingérence. Ensuite, si l’application du principe de responsabilité à la médecine est indiscutable, le médecin entrevoit le procès comme une épée de Damoclès. Nous avons pu établir que le recours aux modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits et l’usage de procédés pédagogiques constituent des voies possibles de guérison. Elles demeurent toutefois insuffisantes puisqu’elles ne permettent pas de se détacher définitivement d’une vision contraignante du droit. En effet, l’ignorance du médecin en cette matière ne lui permet pas d’entrevoir le droit autrement que sous un angle coercitif. Le droit ne représente qu’une portion congrue de la formation initiale et continue alors même qu’il est devenu incontournable dans l’exercice médical. Pour résoudre cette contradiction, nous nous sommes attachés à rechercher un paradigme d’alliance constructive entre droit et médecine. Nous avons défini une forme d’accès du corps médical à la connaissance juridique. Le médecin doit bénéficier d’une formation juridique adaptée à son exercice. La création d’un Pôle médecine et droit doit faciliter l’accès du médecin au droit par la mise à disposition d’outils pédagogiques. Le droit est alors envisagé comme une ressource dans l’action du médecin. / The emergence of discourses on the judicialization and legalization of medical matters is evidence of the growing importance of law, understood as a constraint by the doctor. First, though a legal framework is indeed necessary for medical activity, the proliferation of legal rules is deemed akin to downright interference. Then, though applying the principle of responsibility to medicine is indisputable, practitioners see the trial as a sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. We have established that resorting to alternative dispute resolution and the use of pedagogical methods are all possible ways of healing. And yet, these remain insufficient, because they do not make it possible to depart definitely from a constraining vision of law. In fact, doctors’ ignorance in this matter does not enable them to approach law from an angle other than coercive. Law is only a small portion of medical initial and continuing training, even though it has become essential in medical practice. To solve this contradiction, we are committed to seek a paradigm based on the constructive alliance between law and medicine. We have defined a form of access to legal knowledge by the medical community. The physician must receive training that is appropriate to his/her legal practice. Creating a Pole clustering medicine and law should facilitate doctors’ access to law, via making teaching means available to them. Henceforth, law will be regarded as one more resource supporting the physician's action.

« Lorsque, à l’occasion d’une instance en cours devant une juridiction, il est soutenu qu’une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d’Etat ou de la Cour de cassation… ». Le nouvel article 61-1 de la Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 a ouvert un champ contentieux inconnu en France : celui de la constitutionnalité de la loi en vigueur. Le pouvoir de révision constitutionnelle a renforcé et étendu la compétence d’une institution à caractère juridictionnel, le Conseil constitutionnel, bénéficiant d’une qualité spécifique d’attribution tirée de la source constitutionnelle. Dans un vocabulaire juridique largement admis, le juge constitutionnel est distinct d’autres catégories de juges : « juges ordinaires », ou « internationaux ». La question initiale est alors la suivante : pourquoi peut-il être fondé juridiquement de penser et de promouvoir le postulat, selon lequel le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois doit s’exercer de façon concentrée ? Parce qu’il apparaît qu’en France, le discours sur le juge constitutionnel et la justice constitutionnelle procède non d’un discours interne au système juridique (discours du droit) mais sur un discours externe (discours sur le droit), celui des juristes savants et de la prétention à connaître de façon scientifique l’objet juridique.Faisant le choix d’un paradigme herméneutique pour la connaissance juridique, le présent travail propose de traiter la question de la spécificité de l’office juridictionnel dans l’opération d’application du droit qui s’y rattache. La spécificité de la norme constitutionnelle fonde celle d’une fonction constitutionnelle au sein de l’ordre juridique, permettant de modéliser la voie d’un espace processuel de résolution éthique des conflits d’interprétation constitutionnelle. / “If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a legislative provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil d’État or by the Cour de Cassation to the Constitutional Council…”The new article 61-1 of the Constitution of October 4th, 1958, strengthens the constitutional review of laws in France. For that purpose, the jurisdictional remit of the Constitutional Council has been extended. By its constitutional habilitation, this institution would be in a position to benefit from the recognition of a special authority. In the prevailing legal vocabulary, to describe a legal system such as the French one, the constitutional judge is singled out from other judges (“ordinary” judges for example, etc.).Therefore, the first question to be asked is: why should it be legally founded to think and promote the basic premise which is that the constitutional review of laws shall be exercised by a single body? In France indeed, developments about the constitutional judge or constitutional justice don’t stem from an internal perspective of the juridical system but originates from the external discourse of learned lawyers who ambition to scientifically approach law.With a hermeneutical paradigm for legal knowledge, this study tries to deal with the question of a judicial office through a process of normative concretization. In this view, the characteristics of the constitutional norm found a constitutional function into the legal order. Then, it seems to be possible to imagine a processual space allowing the ethical resolution of interpretative conflicts.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:17:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 22 / Nenhuma / As transformações ocorridas no Direito, provocadas pelo constitucionalismo contemporâneo estabelecem novas funções ao jurista, em razão destas novas funções, o jurista prescinde de novas habilidades, que o tornem apto ao exercício destas novas funções. O desenvolvimento destas habilidades, por meio do ensino jurídico, o qual necessita adotar um caráter transdisciplinar, disposto a consolidar uma formação que desenvolva no bacharelando um horizonte teórico que possibilite a ele a construção de uma nova prática, constitucionalmente adequada. Neste intuito, a produção de conhecimentos jurídicos pode ser um instrumento importante, a medida que colabora na construção de uma nova cultura jurídica, embasada pela dinâmica constitucional, sua proposta ético-política e seu projeto de sociedade. Esta nova cultura jurídica de orientação constitucional, evoca uma nova prática jurídica, a qual irá refleti-la no cotidiano da vida jurídica. Em razão deste esforço em trazer a Constituição para a atuação prática, é que a produ / The occurred transformations in the Law, provoked for the contemporary constitutionalism establishes new functions to the jurist, in reason of these new functions, the jurist dispense with new abilities that become it apt to its exercise of these new functions. The development of these abilities, by means of legal education, which needs to adopt a transdicipline character, prepared to consolidate a formation that develops in bachelor a theoretical horizon that makes possible it a construction of a new practical, constitutionally adjusted. In this intention the production of legal knowledge can be an important instrument, the measure that of its contribution in the construction of a new legal culture, based for the constitutional dynamics, its proposal ethical-politics and its project of society. This new legal culture of constitutional orientation evokes a new legal practical, which will go reflect it in the daily of the legal life. In reason of this effort in bringing the Constitution for its effectiveness,

The aim of this study was to investigate newly graduated social workers and soon to be graduated students of social work and their experiences regarding legal knowledge as practitioners working in individual and family care. The study was carried out with the help of a qualitative method. The material was collected through semi-structured interviews with social workers working in different areas such as child and family-care, financial assistance and addiction-intervention care. The interviewees presented their experiences of differences and gaps, confidence in their own legal knowledge, the inevitable possibility to interpret, time during education, further development of legal knowledge, and promotional and inhibiting factors for learning. The theory being used is Aristotle's theory of knowledge and its further development of Kant and Ryle. The study consistently contains a professional-theoretical perspective. In addition, previous research has been used to link the results with both the theoretical perspective and the interviewees' statements. The result shows that there is a difference and a gap between studies and working life and that a large part of the legal knowledge comes from the work. The majority considered that they had acquired basic legal knowledge from their education but they wanted more in-depth knowledge. They also considered that the work as a social worker is complex, as the different areas within the law they work with leave a great deal of room for individual interpretations. Half of all interviewees also described a need for further development. A large part of previous research correlates with what emerged from the study's results. According to the interviewees, a large part of their knowledge derives from practical experience while there is an imminent desire to combine the practice with the theory. / Studiens syfte var att undersöka nyexaminerade socionomers och snart utexaminerade socionomstudenters upplevelser av sina juridiska kunskaper som myndighetsutövare inom området individ- och familjeomsorg. Studien genomfördes med hjälp av en kvalitativ metod och materialet samlades in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med socialsekreterare som arbetade inom områdena barn- och familj, ekonomiskt bistånd samt missbruk. Intervjupersonerna återgav sina erfarenheter av skillnader och glapp, förtroendet till den egna juridiska kunskapsnivån, det oundvikliga tolkningsutrymmet – en utmaning, tiden på socionomprogrammet, vidareutveckling av juridiska kunskaper samt främjande och hämmande faktorer för inlärning. Den teori som har använts är Aristoteles kunskapsteori samt dess vidareutveckling av Kant och Ryle. Studien innehåller genomgående ett professionsteoretiskt perspektiv. Därtill har tidigare forskning använts för att knyta samman resultatet med både teorin och intervjupersonernas utsagor. I resultatet framgår det att det finns en skillnad och ett glapp mellan studier och arbetsliv och att en stor del av den juridiska kunskapen kommer från arbetet. Majoriteten ansåg att de fått med sig grundläggande juridiska kunskaper från socionomprogrammet men att de önskat mer fördjupning. De ansåg även att arbetet som socialsekreterare är komplext då lagtexterna de arbetar med lämnar ett stort utrymme för individuella tolkningar. Hälften av alla intervjupersoner beskrev därtill ett behov av vidareutveckling. En stor del av tidigare forskning korrelerar med det som framkom i studiens resultat. Enligt intervjupersonerna härstammar en stor del av deras kunskaper ifrån praktiska erfarenheter och det finns ett överhängande önskemål om att kombinera praktiken med teorin.

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The fastest growing field of law is undoubtedly that of Medical Law with the civil and disciplinary cases flowing from it. Globalization, international communication, development and evolution of Law as well as Medicine, cause this worldwide rising medical litigation. Humanitarian rights, post-modern scepticism and even iconoclastic attitudes contribute to this phenomenon. Medico-legal litigation and disciplinary complaints rise (in South Africa) up to 10 per cent per year. To assist the courts and legal profession, in medico-legal issues, helping the parties where the plaintiff has the burden of proof and the defendant for rebuttal, a medical expert witness must be used. The dilemmas and pitfalls arise, in that although knowledgeable medical experts could be used to guide the courts to the correct decision, the lack of a legal mind setting, court procedure and legal knowledge could affect the relevance, credibility and reliability, making the medical evidence of poor quality. The legal profession, deliberately, could “abuse” medical expert witnesses with demanding and coercion of results, which have unrealistic and unreasonable expectations. “Case building” occurs, especially in the adversarial systems of law, making the medical expert vulnerable under cross-examination, when it is shown that the witness has turned into a “hired gun” or is unfair. Thus, lacunae develop, making reasonable cases difficult and a quagmire of facts have to be evaluated for unreasonableness, credibility and appropriateness, compounded by the fact that seldom, cases are comparable. The danger is that the presiding officer could be misled and with limited medical knowledge and misplaced values, could reach the wrong findings. Several cases arguably show that this has led to wrongful outcomes and even unacceptable jurisprudence. The desire to “win” a case, can make a medical witness lose credibility and reasonableness with loss of objectivity, realism and relevance. With personality traits and subjectivity, the case becomes argumentative, obstinate and could even lead to lies. The miasmatic, hostile witness emerges, leading to embarrassing, unnecessary prolongation of court procedures. The medical expert witness should be well guided by the legal profession and well informed of the issues. Medical witnesses should have legal training and insight into the legal and court procedures. At the time of discovery of documents, via arbitration or mediation, medical experts should strive to reach consensus and then present their unified finding, helping the parties fairly and expediting the legal procedure and processes. / Private Law / LLM

The fastest growing field of law is undoubtedly that of Medical Law with the civil and disciplinary cases flowing from it. Globalization, international communication, development and evolution of Law as well as Medicine, cause this worldwide rising medical litigation. Humanitarian rights, post-modern scepticism and even iconoclastic attitudes contribute to this phenomenon. Medico-legal litigation and disciplinary complaints rise (in South Africa) up to 10 per cent per year. To assist the courts and legal profession, in medico-legal issues, helping the parties where the plaintiff has the burden of proof and the defendant for rebuttal, a medical expert witness must be used. The dilemmas and pitfalls arise, in that although knowledgeable medical experts could be used to guide the courts to the correct decision, the lack of a legal mind setting, court procedure and legal knowledge could affect the relevance, credibility and reliability, making the medical evidence of poor quality. The legal profession, deliberately, could “abuse” medical expert witnesses with demanding and coercion of results, which have unrealistic and unreasonable expectations. “Case building” occurs, especially in the adversarial systems of law, making the medical expert vulnerable under cross-examination, when it is shown that the witness has turned into a “hired gun” or is unfair. Thus, lacunae develop, making reasonable cases difficult and a quagmire of facts have to be evaluated for unreasonableness, credibility and appropriateness, compounded by the fact that seldom, cases are comparable. The danger is that the presiding officer could be misled and with limited medical knowledge and misplaced values, could reach the wrong findings. Several cases arguably show that this has led to wrongful outcomes and even unacceptable jurisprudence. The desire to “win” a case, can make a medical witness lose credibility and reasonableness with loss of objectivity, realism and relevance. With personality traits and subjectivity, the case becomes argumentative, obstinate and could even lead to lies. The miasmatic, hostile witness emerges, leading to embarrassing, unnecessary prolongation of court procedures. The medical expert witness should be well guided by the legal profession and well informed of the issues. Medical witnesses should have legal training and insight into the legal and court procedures. At the time of discovery of documents, via arbitration or mediation, medical experts should strive to reach consensus and then present their unified finding, helping the parties fairly and expediting the legal procedure and processes. / Private Law / LLM