Os depositantes, ao aplicarem seus recursos nos bancos, delegam a estes a função de monitoramento dos tomadores de empréstimos e, com isso, podem concentrar seus esforços em monitorar a instituição bancária. A disciplina de mercado ex-post é exercida na eventualidade de os bancos assumirem riscos excessivos, e de os depositantes, ao serem informados de tal fato, serem capazes de agir no sentido de disciplinar os bancos, seja pela requisição de taxas de juros mais elevadas, seja pelo saque de seus depósitos. A disciplina de mercado ex-ante é exercida sobre os gestores dos bancos que, conhecedores das conseqüências de assumirem riscos excessivos para suas instituições, preferem não tomar essa atitude. Um dos veículos de informação para o exercício do monitoramento, e subsídio para as ações de disciplinamento, são os demonstrativos contábeis divulgados periodicamente. A aplicação dos princípios contábeis faculta ao gestor o exercício da discricionariedade na apuração das acumulações contábeis, accruals. Essa possibilidade permite que a discricionariedade seja exercida de forma oportunística, prática conhecida genericamente na literatura contábil como manipulação contábil / gerenciamento de resultados, com o propósito de iludir o usuário da informação contábil e levar à obtenção de benefícios tanto para os bancos como pessoalmente para seus gestores. O objetivo desta tese foi verificar a existência de evidências empíricas de que as acumulações contábeis discricionárias influenciam o exercício da disciplina de mercado exercida pelos depositantes dos bancos brasileiros. O estudo efetuou a separação das acumulações contábeis não-discricionárias e discricionárias por meio da utilização das variáveis de despesas e saldo de provisão para créditos de liquidação duvidosa, saldo e sua variação das operações de crédito, saldo e sua variação das operações em atraso, operações registradas como prejuízo e, além disso, inova com a consideração do risco das operações de crédito por meio da utilização, como proxy do risco, da taxa de juros das operações de crédito. Utiliza modelos econométricos para avaliar a influência das acumulações contábeis discricionárias na disciplina de mercado, por meio da utilização das variáveis de taxa de juros e variação dos volumes de depósitos, índice de alavancagem, despesas de provisão para créditos de liquidação duvidosa, despesas de pessoal, razão das receitas de prestação de serviço e outras despesas administrativas, retorno dos ativos e seu desvio da média amostral e liquidez, além de variáveis de controle. Quanto à formulação teórica, recorreu-se, sob o aspecto econômico, à teoria do monitoramento delegado; sob o aspecto contábil, à abordagem positiva da contabilidade; e, por fim, sob o aspecto econométrico, ao método generalizado dos momentos sistêmico (GMM-sis). Obtiveram-se dados públicos e próprios do Banco Central do Brasil, relativos a 102 bancos, os quais foram tratados para contemplar os efeitos de escala das instituições por meio de normalizações pelos ativos totais e créditos totais, onde aplicável e, também, os efeitos inflacionários, por meio do deflacionamento pelo IPCA. Nos resultados obtidos, foram encontrados indícios da existência da prática de disciplina de mercado por parte dos depositantes, conforme estudos já realizados no Brasil. Também foram encontrados indícios de que a prática de manipulação contábil efetuada por meio das acumulações contábeis discricionárias tem influência no exercício da disciplina de mercado, no sentido de reduzir as taxas de juros negociadas entre os bancos e os depositantes, ocasionando transferência de renda dos depositantes para os bancos. Isso significa que os gestores dos bancos logram êxito ao manipularem os resultados contábeis, por meio da utilização das acumulações contábeis discricionárias, e iludem os depositantes ao obterem taxas de juros inferiores às que deveriam ser pagas. Isto sugere que o mercado não é eficiente para tratar as informações contábeis publicadas pelos bancos. / When the depositors invest their money in the banks they delegate the monitoring function of the borrowers to the bank and can concentrate their efforts in monitoring the banks. The market discipline ex-post occurs in the event of the bank taking excessive risks and, knowing that, the depositors can act in the sense of disciplining the banks by requiring greater interest rates or withdrawing their deposits. The market discipline ex-ante occurs when the bank managers, knowing the consequences of assuming excessive risks, decide not take them. One of the vehicles of information to exercise such monitoring, and subside the actions to discipline the banks, are the accounting reports periodically published. The use of the accounting principles allows the managers to calculate the accruals discretionary. This possibility facilitates the use of the discretionarity in an opportunistic way, known in the literature as accounting manipulation / earnings management, with the objective to mislead the user of accounting information and obtain benefits to the bank or to its managers. The objective of this study is to verify the existence of empirical evidence that the discretionary accruals influence the exercise of the market discipline practiced by the depositors of Brazilian banks. The study separates the accounting accruals non-discretionary and discretionary using the variables of allowance and provision for loan losses, outstanding loans and its changes, non-performing credits and its changes, and credit write-offs. Also, it innovates by considering the risks of credit operations through the use of the loans interest rate as credits risk proxy. It utilizes econometric models to evaluate the influence of the discretionary accruals in the market discipline, by using variables of the deposits interest rates and volume changes, leverage index, provision for loan losses, payroll expenses, the ratio services revenue and other administrative expenses, return on assets and its deviation from sample average and other control variables. The theoretical approach utilizes the theory of delegate monitoring in the economics aspects, the positive accounting approach in the accounting aspects, and the systemic generalized method of moments (GMM-sis) in the econometric aspects. Banco Central do Brasils public and private data on 102 banks was used and processed to contemplate institutions scale effects, which were normalized by dividing them by total assets or by total loans where applicable and, to contemplate the inflations aspects, by deflating the data by consumer price index, IPCA. And in fact it were found evidence in the results obtained that there is a depositors market discipline practice, confirming studies done in Brazil, and that the accounting manipulation, through discretionary accruals, influence the market discipline in the sense of lowering the interest rates negotiated between the banks and the depositors, and thus allowing a transfer of wealth between them. This means that the banks managers are successful in manipulating the accounting results through discretionary accruals and mislead the depositors, which get interest rates lower than should be paid. This suggests that the market is not efficient to process the banks published accounting information.

市場自律是保險市場監管的重要部分之一，可有效提高監管效率，保障整個保險業持續健康發展。在大陸第二代償付能力監管體系下, 已正式將建設市場自律機制提上日程，以充分發揮市場自律之作用。所以目前大陸保險市場是否存在市場自律是個值得研究的議題。 本研究以2010年至2015年間大陸產壽險公司數據為樣本，通過分析償付能力充足率、保險投訴等变数與保費收入、退保率間的關係，來衡量大陸保險業是否存在市場自律。實證結果發現各变数對保費收入有一定影響，對退保率無明顯影響，且關於風險變動對保險需求變動影響之結果最不理想，即消費者對風險變動狀況的敏感性並不高，表明大陸存在一定程度的市場自律，但作用較弱。 / Market discipline is one of the important parts of insurance supervision, which can effectively improve the efficiency of supervision and guarantee the sustained and healthy development of the insurance industry. Under the China Risk Oriented Solvency System, the construction of market discipline has been formally put on the agenda to give full play to it. Therefore, the existence of market discipline in China’s insurance market is a topic worthy of study. In this study, to measure the existence of the market discipline, we use the data of the property and life insurance companies from 2010 to 2015 to analyze the relationship between the solvency margin ratio, insurance complaints, etc. and the premium income and termination rate. The empirical results show that those explanatory variables have a certain influence on the premium income, but do not have significant effect on the termination rate. Additionally, the result regarding the impact of a change in risk on the insurance demand is not as predicted, namely insurance consumers are not sensitive to the change of risk. The empirical findings indicate that the insurance market of China has a certain degree of market discipline, but the effect is not very significant.

This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, titled "Aggregate Risk and Bank Risk-Taking", I propose a general equilibrium model in which strategic interactions between banks and depositors may lead to endogenous bank fragility and a drop in investment and output. With some opacity in bank balance sheets, depositors form expectations about bank risk-taking and demand a return on bank deposits according to their risk. This creates strategic complementarities and possibly multiple equilibria: in response to an increase in funding costs, banks may optimally choose to pursue risky portfolios that undermine their solvency prospects. In a bad equilibrium, bank lending is crowded out by risky asset purchases and weak economic fundamentals lead to a banking crisis. Policy interventions face a trade-o¤ between alleviating banks' funding conditions and strengthening their risk-taking incentives. Due to this trade-off, liquidity provision to banks may eliminate the good equilibrium when it is not targeted. Targeted interventions have the capacity to eliminate the bad equilibrium. The second chapter, titled "Gambling Traps", analyzes macroeconomic dynamics under this framework in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I show that self-fulfilling expectations about high bank risk-taking may lead to 'gambling traps' associated with slow recovery from crises. In a gambling trap, high bank funding costs hinder the accumulation of bank net worth, leading to a prolonged period of financial fragility and a persistent decline in economic activity. I bring this model to bear on the European sovereign debt crisis, in the course of which under-capitalized banks in default-risky countries experienced an increase in funding costs and raised their holdings of domestic government debt. The model is quantified using Portuguese data and accounts for macroeconomic dynamics in Portugal in 2010-2016. Finally, I show that subsidized loans to banks, similar to the European Central Bank's longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) may perpetuate gambling traps. The third chapter, titled ''Shadow Banking and Market Discipline on Traditional Banks'', is joint work with Matthieu Darracq-Paries, Christo¤er Kok, and Dawid · Zochowski. In this chapter, we present a general equilibrium banking model in which shadow banking arises endogenously and undermines market discipline on traditional banks. We show that depositors' ability to re-optimize in response to crises imposes market discipline on traditional banks: these banks optimally commit to a safe portfolio strategy to prevent early withdrawals. With costly commitment, shadow banking emerges as an alternative banking strategy that combines high risk-taking with early liquidation in times of crisis. We bring the model to bear on the 2007-09 financial crisis in the United States, during which shadow banks experienced a sudden dry-up of funding and liquidated their assets. We derive an equilibrium in which the shadow banking sector expands to a size where its liquidation causes a fire-sale and exposes traditional banks to liquidity risk. Higher deposit rates in compensation for liquidity risk also weaken threats of early withdrawal and traditional banks pursue risky portfolios that may leave them in default. Financial stability is achieved with a tax on shadow bank profits or collateralized liquidity support to traditional banks.

Along this dissertation I propose to walk the reader through several macroeconomic<p>implications of information asymmetries, with a special focus on financial<p>issues. This exercise is mainly theoretical: I develop stylized models that aim<p>at capturing macroeconomic phenomena such as self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups,<p>the rise and the fall of securitization markets, and the creation of systemic risk.<p>The dissertation consists of three chapters. The first one proposes an explanation<p>to self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. The second chapters proposes a formalization<p>of the concept of market discipline and an application to securitization<p>markets as risk-sharing mechanisms. The third one offers a complementary<p>analysis to the second as the rise of securitization is presented as banker optimal<p>response to strict capital constraints.<p>Two concepts that do not have unique acceptations in economics play a central<p>role in these models: liquidity and market discipline.<p>The liquidity of an asset refers to the ability for his owner to transform it into<p>current consumption goods. Secondary markets for long-term assets play thus<p>an important role with that respect. However, such markets might be illiquid due<p>to adverse selection.<p>In the first chapter, I show that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up<p>on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of<p>non-productive but liquid assets; (2) this hoarding behavior worsens adverse selection and dries up market liquidity; (3) such liquidity dry-ups are Pareto inefficient<p>equilibria; (4) the government can rule them out. Additionally, I show<p>that idiosyncratic liquidity shocks à la Diamond and Dybvig have stabilizing effects,<p>which is at odds with the banking literature. The main contribution of the<p>chapter is to show that market breakdowns due to adverse selection are highly<p>endogenous to past balance-sheet decisions.<p>I consider that agents are under market discipline when their current behavior<p>is influenced by future market outcomes. A key ingredient for market discipline<p>to be at play is that the market outcome depends on information that is observable<p>but not verifiable (that is, information that cannot be proved in court, and<p>consequently, upon which enforceable contracts cannot be based).<p>In the second chapter, after introducing this novel formalization of market<p>discipline, I ask whether securitization really contributes to better risk-sharing:<p>I compare it with other mechanisms that differ on the timing of risk-transfer. I<p>find that for securitization to be an efficient risk-sharing mechanism, it requires<p>market discipline to be strong and adverse selection not to be severe. This seems<p>to seriously restrict the set of assets that should be securitized for risk-sharing<p>motive.<p>Additionally, I show how ex-ante leverage may mitigate interim adverse selection<p>in securitization markets and therefore enhance ex-post risk-sharing. This<p>is interesting because high leverage is usually associated with “excessive” risktaking.<p>In the third chapter, I consider risk-neutral bankers facing strict capital constraints;<p>their capital is indeed required to cover the worst-case-scenario losses.<p>In such a set-up, I find that: 1) banker optimal autarky response is to diversify<p>lower-tail risk and maximize leverage; 2) securitization helps to free up capital<p>and to increase leverage, but distorts incentives to screen loan applicants properly; 3) market discipline mitigates this problem, but if it is overestimated by<p>the supervisor, it leads to excess leverage, which creates systemic risk. Finally,<p>I consider opaque securitization and I show that the supervisor: 4) faces uncertainty<p>about the trade-off between the size of the economy and the probability<p>and the severity of a systemic crisis; 5) can generally not set capital constraints<p>at the socially efficient level. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette thèse est composée de trois articles d’économie bancaire empirique. Le premier article traite de l’impact des conditions d’octroi de crédit sur l’accession à la propriété et les prix immobilier. Il propose une stratégie d’identification d’effets de causalité utilisant la politique du Prêt à Taux Zéro. Il conclut qu’un relâchement des conditions d’octroi de crédit permet à des ménages au revenu relativement plus faible de devenir propriétaire mais augmente significativement les prix immobilier. Le second article traite de l’effet des exigences en capital sur l’octroi de crédit des banques aux sociétés non financières. Il isole la composante des exigences en capital exogène aux conditions macroéconomiques grâce au système de notation du superviseur bancaire français. Il montre que les mesures de la qualité de la gouvernance et de la stratégie des établissements sont des contributeurs importants aux exigences en capital. En traçant l’effet de celles-ci sur les ratios de capital des établissements puis sur l’octroi de crédit, il montre qu’augmenter les exigences en capital réduit l’offre de crédit. Le troisième article analyse la prise en compte du risque de crédit sur le marché interbancaire européen entre 2011 et 2015 et comment celle-ci est modifiée par les ajustements de la politique monétaire sur la période. Il se concentre sur le risque inhérent à la détention d’actifs situés dans les pays périphériques de la zone euro. Il montre que l’accès au marché et les taux d’intérêt payés par les emprunteurs réagissent à cette détention. La nature et l’importance de cette réaction dépendent des interventions de politique monétaire. / This thesis is made up of three empirical essays in banking economics. The first paper analyses how credit supply conditions impact access to homeownership and real estate prices.We propose an identification strategy of causal effects based on the French Interest-Free Loan policy. We find loosenning credit conditions allows households with a relatively lower income to access homeownership but significantly increases real estate prices. The second paper looks for the effect of capital requirements on credit supply to non-financial companies.We identify movements in capital requirements exogenous to the macroeconomic environment thanks to the French banking supervisor rating system. We show governance and strategy quality measures significantly contribute to capital requirements setting. Followingtheir effects onto banks capital ratios and credit supply, we show raising capital requirementsreduces credit. The third article analyses credit risk management on the European interbankmarket between 2011 and 2015 and how it is modified by monetary policy adjustments overthe period. We focus on credit risk associated with holdings of assets located in peripheral Europe countries. We show market access and interest rates served to borrowers react to their holdings of such assets. The direction and size of this reaction depends on monetary policy interventions.

This dissertation collects four essays on banks, firms and real effects of bank lending. Owing to the appliance of different econometric methods on several datasets, insights in the behav-ior of and the impacts from financial markets and market participants are generated. In the first chapter, our results uncover a so far undocumented ability of the interbank market to distinguish between banks of different quality in times of aggregate distress. We show empirical evidence that during the 2007 financial crisis the inability of some banks to roll over their interbank debt was not due to a failure of the interbank market per se but rather to bank-specific shocks affecting banks’ capital, liquidity and credit quality as well as revised bank-level risk perceptions. Relationship banking is not capable of containing these frictions, as hard information seems to dominate soft information. In detail, we explore determinants of the formation and resilience of interbank lending relationships by analyzing an extensive da-taset comprising over 1.9 million interbank relationships of more than 3,500 German banks between 2000 and 2012. The second chapter examines the relationship between central bank funding and credit risk-taking. Employing bank-firm-level data from the German credit registry during 2009:Q1-2014:Q4, we find that banks borrowing from the central bank rebalance their portfolios to-wards ex-ante riskier firms. We further establish that this effect is driven by the ECB’s maturi-ty extensions and that the risk-taking sensitivity of banks borrowing from the ECB is inde-pendent of idiosyncratic bank characteristics. Finally, we show that these shifts in bank lend-ing are associated with an increase in firm-level investment and employment, but also with a deterioration of bank balance sheet quality in the following year. Once we analyze the relationship of banks as lenders vis-à-vis banks as borrowers and banks as lenders vis-à-vis non-financial companies as borrowers, we enlarge the understand-ing of non-financial companies not only in terms of being simply borrowers, respectively sub-jects exhibiting of credit risks. Instead, we try to understand the inner working of those com-panies more generally and analyze their quality not only in terms of a bank’s risk assessment but also in terms of the overall market assessment. However, this in turn can generate infor-mation useable to assess the quality of a bank’s credit portfolio in dimensions that so far are not taken into account by the current regulatory framework. Moreover, a better understanding of banks and non-banks beyond the standard lens of the banking and corporate finance litera-ture might promote new scopes for future research connecting those discrete subjects. In this regard, the third chapter analyzes the dependence of price reactions to corporate insider trad-ing on several measures of corporate governance quality. Our results strongly support the view that first, higher corporate governance levels seem to prevent or discourage insiders from engaging in insider trading as means of opportunistic rent extraction. Second, results confirm the notion of buy and sell trades not being just two sides of the same coin. That is, a higher level of corporate governance leads to a better pre-event information environment which results in less positive abnormal returns after insider buy trades as the incremental posi-tive information revealed by the trade is smaller. In contrast, sell trades in firms with better corporate governance are perceived to convey more valuable and most importantly negative information to the capital market so that prices adjust more for companies with better govern-ance schemes. Third, we show that institutional ownership even on an aggregate level is a sufficient measure to proxy a company’s corporate governance level. Hence, as information on companies’ bylaws and on investors’ investment dedication and type for example are scarce, respectively associated with higher costs because one has to gather that information one can refrain from that and instead proxy the governance level with the aggregate measure of institutional ownership. The latter result is important for carrying out future analyses merg-ing and extending the findings of the first two chapters. Last, the fourth chapter abstracts from borrowers as subjects of credit risk, as well, and most importantly extends the analysis of banks, firms and their interactions effecting each other by a macroeconomic perspective of the real effects of bank lending. That is, as capital flows and real estate are pro-cyclical, and real estate has a substantial weight in economies’ income and wealth Chapter 4 studies the role of real estate markets in the transmission of bank flow shocks to output growth across German cities. In this regard, real sector firms play a central role in the transmission mechanism we uncover. More specifically, the empirical analysis relies on a new and unique matched data set at the city level and the bank-firm level. To measure bank flow shocks, we show that changes in sovereign spreads of Southern Eu-ropean countries (the so-called PIGS spread) can predict German cross-border bank flows. To achieve identification by geographic variation, in addition to a traditional supply-side varia-ble, we use a novel instrument that exploits a policy assigning refugee immigrants to munici-palities on an exogenous basis. We find that output growth responds more to bank flow shocks in cities that are more exposed to tightness in local real estate markets. We estimate that, during the 2009-2014 period, for every 100-basis point increase in the PIGS spread, the most exposed cities grow 15-2 basis points more than the least exposed ones. Moreover, the differential response of commercial property prices can explain most of this growth differen-tial. When we unpack the transmission mechanism by using matched bank-firm-level data on credit, employment, capital expenditure and TFP, we find that firm real estate collateral as measured by tangible fixed assets plays a critical role. In particular, bank flow shocks in-crease the credit supply to firms and sectors with more real estate collateral. Higher credit supply then leads firms to hire and invest more, without evidence of capital misallocation.

Les hedge funds sont devenus des acteurs incontournables des marchés financiers et, pourtant, ils demeurent toujours inconnus ou «mal connus» à la fois par le grand public, les régulateurs et les juristes. À l’heure du bilan de la directive AIFM qui avait pour ambition de proposer une réglementation ambitieuse de l’industrie des hedge funds au sein de l’Union européenne, il convient de revenir sur ces entités dont l’histoire, les stratégies, le statut juridique, les caractéristiques et le régime juridique demeurent, encore, flous. La thèse vise à proposer une définition et un portrait-robot précis des hedge funds via leur identification par leurs caractéristiques, qu’elles soient propres ou empruntées à d’autres entités. Un hedge fund n’est pas un fonds de gestion collective ni une forme juridique à part entière. Un hedge fund peut revêtir tout type de forme sociale et sera communément considéré comme tel dès lors que l’entité s’emploiera à adopter certaines stratégies d’investissement et disposera d’une structure de rémunération et organisationnelle particulière. Ces dernières sont des indices permettant la caractérisation d’un hedge fund dont la nature juridique est quasi-exclusivement celle d’un fonds.Le hedge fund en tant que fonds est, selon le droit français, dépourvu, à tort, de la personnalité juridique alors même qu’il dispose de tous les attributs juridiques nécessaires à une telle reconnaissance. La présente étude démontre que le législateur français a ôté la personnalité juridique à la forme sociale originelle du hedge fund en droit français alors que les arguments en faveur de cette reconnaissance étaient plus convaincants. Un hedge fund en tant que fonds s’apparente davantage à une société hybride qu’à un numéro de compte. Cette théorie s’appuie principalement sur l’argument selon lequel il existe une personnalité morale embryonnaire où la personnalité juridique serait graduelle selon l’entité concernée. / Hedge funds have become key players in financial markets and are still unknown or « poorly known » by the general public, regulators and lawyers. At the time of the review of the AIFM directive which aimed to propose an ambitious regulation of the hedge fund industry within the European Union, it is necessary to return to these entities whose history, strategies, legal status, characteristics and legal regime remain, still, unclear. The thesis aims to propose a definition and an accurate robot portrait of hedge funds through their identification by their characteristics. These characteristics are both specific to hedge funds and borrowed from other entities. A hedge fund is not a collective fund or a legal form in its own right. A hedge fund can take any legal form and will be commonly considered as such when the entity strives to adopt certain investment strategies and will have a particular compensation and organizational structure. These characters are clues allowing the characterization of a hedge fund whose legal nature is almost exclusively that of a fund. However, the hedge fund as a fund is, under French law, wrongly deprived of legal personality even though it has all the legal attributes necessary for such recognition. The present study demonstrates that the French legislature removed the legal personality from the original social form of the hedge fund in French law while the arguments in favor of this recognition were more convincing. A hedge fund as a fund is more like a hybrid company than an account number. This theory is based mainly on the argument that there is a cohabiting legal personality where the legal personality is gradual depending on the entity concerned.