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The Best Foreign Policy Money Can Buy? An Investigation of Foreign Lobbying and U.S. Foreign PolicyFreeman, Benjamin J. 2009 December 1900 (has links)
Does foreign lobbying affect foreign aid? In this dissertation I provide compelling evidence the answer is yes. Prior scholarship has almost unequivocally focused on international bargaining as an exchange of public goods such as military, economic, or political concessions. Foreign lobbying represents a fundamentally different form of international bargaining. It is the exchange of a private good for an international policy concession. I develop a theory of foreign lobbying and foreign policy that views foreign policy formation as a function of political actors weighing public goods alongside the benefits they receive from foreign lobbyist contributions. I utilize a Heckman selection model to test this theory and find compelling evidence that foreign lobbying influences U.S. foreign aid allocations.
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The Best Foreign Policy Money Can Buy? An Investigation of Foreign Lobbying and U.S. Foreign PolicyFreeman, Benjamin J. 2009 December 1900 (has links)
Does foreign lobbying affect foreign aid? In this dissertation I provide compelling evidence the answer is yes. Prior scholarship has almost unequivocally focused on international bargaining as an exchange of public goods such as military, economic, or political concessions. Foreign lobbying represents a fundamentally different form of international bargaining. It is the exchange of a private good for an international policy concession. I develop a theory of foreign lobbying and foreign policy that views foreign policy formation as a function of political actors weighing public goods alongside the benefits they receive from foreign lobbyist contributions. I utilize a Heckman selection model to test this theory and find compelling evidence that foreign lobbying influences U.S. foreign aid allocations.
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Proving Their Worth : Does Ukrainian battlefield success increase Western military aid commitments?Elmberg, Arvid January 2023 (has links)
On the 24th of February 2022, interstate war on a scale unseen since World War II returned to Europe, causing devastating suffering and loss of human life. As of writing, Ukraine’s ability to demonstrate battlefield success is frequently cited as key to sustain Western political willpower to send military aid. This study aims to test presumptions of a positive feedback loop between military assistance and its successful implementation with a mixed-method approach. Regression models analyze time-series data tracking a year of 33 countries’ military aid commitments to Ukraine using random effects (RE) to control for unobserved, country-specific and varying mediating variables. Based on German aversiveness to military solutions, a least-likely case debate analysis analyzes three Bundestag debates to uncover lawmakers’ justifications for approving or rejecting military aid proposals. Applying a theory-generating analysis framework, battlefield successes are confirmed as recurring arguments used to enforce pro-aid narratives, but do not necessarily overcome factors constraining military aid commitments. The RE regression finds a statistically significant positive relationship between Ukrainian battlefield success and military aid commitments. This raises immense implications for Ukrainian decisionmakers, who may be compelled to prioritize short-term military gains to secure future Western support.
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Post Arab Spring Examination of American Foreign Aid: Libya and EgyptDickerson, Andrew Robert 01 September 2017 (has links)
No description available.
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"For Training Purposes Only": West German Military Aid to Nigeria and Tanzania, 1962-1968Erich Wilhelm Drollinger (8698872) 17 April 2020 (has links)
Amidst the confrontation between the East and the West Bloc during the Cold War, the decolonization of Africa created an entirely new ideological battlefield for these two sides to compete with one another for power and influence. The Federal Republic of Germany, having been allowed to rearm its military less than a decade prior, sought to gain influence in Nigeria and Tanzania by providing them with military aid. However, in both cases it failed to fulfill its promises of aid. Through the examination of these case studies, this study argues that the Federal Republic’s ability to provide effective military aid to non-NATO countries was limited due to the combination of its cautious foreign policy and the dynamic political landscape of the countries to which it offered aid. Formerly classified government documents and newspaper articles constitute the majority of this study’s source material. While current historiography focuses on the impact of the Cold War superpowers in regions outside of Europe, less attention has been given to the important roles that smaller powers such as the Federal Republic have played. By analyzing a smaller global player, the goal of this study is to complicate the notion of the Cold War being binary in nature. Furthermore, it aims to illustrate the political tightrope that the Federal Republic walked when conducting military aid which stemmed from the legacy of its violent past and its status as a divided nation.
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The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in French Indochina, 1950-1956Weber, Nathaniel R. 2010 December 1900 (has links)
This thesis examines the American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) sent to French Indochina, from 1950 to 1956, when the United States provided major monetary and material aid to the French in their war against the communist Viet Minh. MAAG observed French units in the field and monitored the flow of American materiel into the region. Relying upon primary research in the National Archives, the thesis departs from previous interpretations by showing that MAAG held generally positive assessments of France‟s performance in Indochina. The thesis also argues that MAAG personnel were more interested in getting material support to the French, than in how that material was used, to the point of making unrealistic assessments of French combat abilities. By connecting primary research with the greater history of Cold War American military assistance, the thesis contributes to the scholarship on American involvement in Vietnam.
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Sovětská hospodářská a vojenská pomoc Egyptu v 60. a 70. letech 20. století / Soviet Economic and Military Aid to Egypt in 1960's and 1970'sČáp, Jiří January 2013 (has links)
This diploma thesis deals with relations between Soviet Union and Egypt in 1960's and 1970's, with focus on Soviet economic and military aid to this Arabian country. Soviet Union is perceived as a protector superpower, while Egypt is a client state, which receives generous financial and material aid. This work maps particular pe-riods of Soviet economic aid since early 1960's, when some great economic projects were gradually realized (Aswan Dam, Helwan metallurgic complex), the attention is also decicated to arms supplies and modernization of Egyptian army. The first break point influencing mutual relations is Egyptian defeat in Six-Day War in 1967, after which president Nasser was willing to deepen relations with Moscow and even to grant durable Soviet military presence on the Egyptian territory. The period after the inauguration of new president Anwar Sadat in 1970 can be characterized as gradual worsening of mutual relations. The aim of this thesis is to describe particular aspects of Soviet aid and evaluate it in scope of broader political and strategic interests of USSR.
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Trade follows Hallstein?Gülstorff, Torben 04 November 2016 (has links)
Die deutsche Außenpolitik zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges stellt in historischer wie politikwissenschaftlicher Hinsicht einen Gegenstand dar, der mit gutem Gewissen als wissenschaftlich erschlossen bezeichnet werden kann. Zahlreiche Aufsätze, Artikel und Bücher sind in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten erschienen, welche die deutsche Außenpolitik in Europa, Afrika, Asien, Ozeanien, Amerika, oder auch gleich der Welt als Ganzem, in den Blick genommen haben. Dies gilt sowohl für die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als auch für diejenige der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Früh – wenn nicht sogar von Beginn an – kam hierbei eine zentrale These, eine Kernthese, zum Vorschein, die, ohne auf Widerstand zu stoßen, Eingang in den historischen und politikwissenschaftlichen Forschungskanon fand und ihn bereits nach kurzer Zeit zu dominieren begann. Die Rede ist von der die deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten angeblich bestimmenden Hallstein-Doktrin und dem mit ihr in engem Zusammenhang stehenden deutsch-deutschen Gegensatz. In dieser Arbeit wird dieser Kernthese, diesem ''Mythos'' der deutschen Außenpolitik, vehement widersprochen. Weder die Hallstein-Doktrin, noch der deutsch-deutsche Gegensatz, sondern nationale ökonomische und internationale geostrategische Interessen haben die deutsche Außenpolitik – und darüber hinaus auch die gesamten deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten, der BRD wie der DDR – maßgeblich bestimmt. Zur Stützung dieser Gegenthese werden in der vorliegenden Studie die staatlichen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Aktivitäten West- und Ostdeutschlands in neun zentralafrikanischen Staaten zwischen 1945 und 1975 kritisch dargelegt, umfassend analysiert und im Hinblick auf mehrere zentrale Thesen zu den deutschen Auslandsaktivitäten ausgewertet. / For decades articles and books have been published on the history of German foreign policy during Cold War. Regardless of whether Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, America or the world as a whole, the foreign affairs of the Western Federal Republic of Germany and the Eastern German Democratic Republic have been researched and analysed in context of a broad variety of locations. However, even though the list of publications continues to grow, the topic''s theses–especially its main thesis–do not show much progress. Already at an early stage, a central thesis–a core thesis–came to light, met no resistance and entered history''s and political science''s research canons on German foreign policy. This thesis reads: Inner German issues and the non-solved German question were so powerful, they dominated West and East German foreign affairs nearly right from the start. German foreign policy, that was the so-called Hallstein doctrine, that was the so-called German-German contradiction. And all studies–whether of history or political science, whether designed as a case study or as a global approach–confirm this thesis, use it as an integral part of their work–until today. But be that as it may. This study contradicts this thesis, this ''myth'' of German foreign policy. Instead it argues that neither the Hallstein doctrine nor the German-German contradiction, but national economic and international geostrategic interests dominated German foreign policy and German foreign activities–regarding the FRG, the GDR, and Germany as a whole. To proof this thesis, West and East German activities–of the two states, their economies and their societies–in nine Central African states between 1945 and 1975 are observed and analysed. More than a million file pages out of more than a dozen German archives were read to tackle this task–and shed some refreshing new light on the foreign policies of the two German states during Cold War.
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