Ce mémoire examine le thème des causes finales dans l’Éthique (1677) de Spinoza. À l’aide d’une classification quadripartite des types de discours sur les causes finales, il identifie d’abord en le finalisme théologico-métaphysique la cible philosophique visée par la critique de l’Appendice de la première partie de cet opus magnum. Radicalisant le postulat épistémologique cartésien voulant que la volonté divine ne puisse servir de principe explicatif aux phénomènes naturels, Spinoza rejette complètement l’idée selon laquelle le rapport entre Dieu et sa création puisse être conçu sous le mode de la cause finale et élabore, à l’ombre de cette critique, une conception de la causalité divine selon laquelle la production du monde est le résultat nécessaire de l’essence de Dieu. Ensuite, notre mémoire se penche sur le concept de conatus qui se situe à l’intersection de la philosophie naturelle et de l’ontologie. Nous explorons, selon trois hypothèses convoquées tour à tour pour comprendre son fonctionnement, la possibilité de dynamiques téléologiques dans la nature malgré la critique de l’Appendice. Finalement, la dernière partie de notre mémoire tente de faire la lumière sur l’articulation entre, d’une part, la philosophie naturelle et l’ontologie de Spinoza et, d’autre part, sa philosophie pratique. Nous démontrons ainsi l’utilité de faire appel aux causes finales pour expliquer sa conception de la psychologie humaine et pour rendre compte de la dernière station de son éthique, à savoir la beatitudo. De cette façon, nous entendons reconstruire le rapport qu’entretiennent les différents volets de la philosophie spinoziste avec la question des causes finales. / This paper examines the theme of the final causes in Spinoza’s Ethics (1677). Using a quadripartite classification of the types of discourse on the final causes, we define theological-metaphysical finalism as the main philosophical target of Spinoza’s critics. Radicalizing the epistemological Cartesian postulate according to which the divine will cannot serve as an explanatory principle for natural phenomena, Spinoza completely rejects the idea that the relationship between God and his creation can be conceived under the mode of the final cause and elaborates, in the shadow of this criticism, a conception of divine causality that presents the production of the world as a necessary result of God’s essence. Then, we briefly look at the concept of conatus, which is at the intersection of natural philosophy and ontology. We explore, according to three hypotheses, the possibility of teleological dynamics in nature. Finaly, the last part of our thesis tries to shed light on the articulation between, on the one hand, Spinoza’s natural philosophy and ontology and, on the other hand, his practical philosophy. We thus demonstrate the usefulness of using the final causes to explain human psychology and to account for the last station of the spinozist ethics, the beatitudo.

Das Buch argumentiert, dass Descartes seine Metaphysik von Körpern durch ein zweistufiges Argument begründet hat: Ersteres (letztendlich auf der Theorie der Ideen beruhend) soll beweisen, dass Körper erweiterte Substanzen sind; Letzteres (das die gesamte Naturphilosophie von Descartes nutzt) sollte beweisen, dass Körper nichts anderes als erweiterte Substanzen sind. Das Buch zeigt, dass es für Descartes keine Argumente aus der „ersten Philosophie“ gibt, die beweisen könnten, dass Körper nichts als erweiterte Substanzen sind. Es zeigt, dass Descartes’ Argument, alle „realen Qualitäten“ und „wesentlichen Formen“ der Scholastiker zu eliminieren, letztendlich ein Argument für die beste Erklärung ist, die auf ontologischer Sparsamkeit beruht. Mit anderen Worten, ein Rasiermesser. Insbesondere war es die Visionstheorie, den Paradigmenfall für Descartes’ Ontologie materieller Substanzen zu liefern. Die Arbeit kam zu dem Schluss, dass – entgegen der Behauptung praktisch aller kartesischen Gelehrten – die These, dass Körper nichts als erweiterte Dinge sind, nicht der Ausgangspunkt von Descartes’ Physik ist, sondern ihre Krönung. / The work argues that Descartes established his metaphysics of bodies by means of a two-step argument: the former (ultimately grounded on the theory of ideas) being intended to prove that bodies are extended substances; the latter (which takes advantage of Descartes’ entire natural philosophy) aimed at proving that bodies are nothing but extended substances. It shows that for Descartes there are no arguments from ‘first philosophy’ that could prove that bodies are nothing but extended substances. The work shows that Descartes’ argument to eliminate all “real qualities” and “substantial forms” of the Scholastics is ultimately an argument to the best explanation driven by ontological parsimony. In other words, a razor. More in particular, it was the theory of vision to provide the paradigm case for Descartes’ ontology of material substances. The work concluded that, contrary to what claimed by virtually all Cartesian scholars, the thesis that bodies are nothing but extended things is not therefore the starting point of Descartes’ physics, but its crowning achievement.

This dissertation examines how the chaotic social space of post-civil war England inspired new ideas of the ideal social structure and its ability to create social and political stability. Focusing on three non-fiction prose tracts, Margaret Cavendish’s Worlds Olio (1655), Thomas Traherne’s Christian Ethicks (1675), and Gerrard Winstanley’s Law of Freedom (1652), I use the concept of “space-making,” or “how texts aided readers in producing the space in which they understood humanity to be living” (Sauter 47), to engage three distinct perspectives on social cohesion. I situate my study within the larger context of the scientific revolution, and what Michael Sauter calls the “spatial reformation,” whereby humanist thinkers embraced Euclidean geometry to “make” space in a manner akin to God. I argue that, through their writing, Cavendish, Traherne, and Winstanley structure theoretical space to control, guide, or influence how social beings relate to one another and to the state. In doing so they make social space heterogeneous. The authors create theoretical spaces in which alternatives to England’s social structure are outlined. These alternatives reflect the subjectivity and interests of the space-maker, and while each author wishes to establish social cohesion in post-civil war England, the spaces they create reveal unique perspectives on social responsibility, free will, and self-preservation, leading readers to question the benefits and drawbacks of social cohesion. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This dissertation examines three works of non-fiction prose by Margaret Cavendish, Thomas Traherne, and Gerrard Winstanley, all of whom were seventeenth-century writers. I examine the ways that social structure in post-civil war England in fact rejects the geometric premise popular among canonical natural philosophers that all space (including the spaces we inhabit as human beings) was homogeneous. Instead, I argue that homogeneous space is oppressive in a social context, while also acknowledging that heterogeneous social spaces (spaces that are divided and have distinct "parts") also tended to limit the free will of social actors, particularly those in the lower classes. I examine themes related to free will, self-interest, and subjectivity, specifically with respect to how these themes can both create or detract from social cohesion.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcelo Martins Bueno.pdf: 642296 bytes, checksum: f5683cd88801763d6a1fe266d2de9a1d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-05-21 / We intend with this work to offer an analysis and an interpretation of the origin of the concept of freedom in Thomas Hobbes's thought, at the beginning of science in the 17th century. The text gives a scenery of the history of science, distinguishing the Aristotelian physics main ideas that will be the objective of the new science, going by the medieval age up to the Scientific Revolution. In this aspect, we will analyze exclusively in the physics field and, more precisely, in the movement as understood in Galileu Galilei's thought and Descartes that Hobbes will take as paradigm for his philosophy. Our work will start with the appropriation of the tradition of the modern science, more specifically the reflections on the movement that resulted in the inertia principle and we will identify the main ideas in the English philosopher's political theory, mainly the ones which refer to the conception of freedom, as being shaped in the ideals of that new way of facing knowledge. For that reason we begin with the reading of the author's commentators to verify, in a first moment, if Hobbes was influenced or not by the new discoveries of the science of that period and with this premise we try to understand how the problem of freedom was treated in the theoretical English politician's works. With the new science as paradigm, we will show how the concept of freedom is in syntony with the conception of movement of that period, as freedom, for Hobbes, means the absence of opposition, identifying in this way, the genesis of this concept as a result of the reflections that happened in the movement in the 17th century. Distinguishing the concept of freedom and understanding it as a complex theme, we intend to understand as the author will deal with men's life in society, with all limitations imposed by a State that necessarily needs to have its unlimited power to guarantee peace and safety and even so assure the individual freedoms. With this view in mind we try to understand that, for Hobbes, State is a human creation, that is, artificial and necessarily needs to have its power so that society is organized and the freedom guaranteed. Then, the monarchic and unlimited power proposed by Thomas Hobbes should be understood as a result of a general will, that is, it is not treated here the individuals' will, but that the political representatives acted to accomplish the will of the individuals, in other words, State should be understood as the individuals' creation for their representation. Therefore, the political theory proposed by the thinker should be understood not only in an absolutist manner, but as a true theory of supreme power / Pretende-se, com o presente trabalho, oferecer uma análise e uma interpretação da origem do conceito de liberdade no pensamento de Thomas Hobbes, à luz da ciência nascente do século XVII. O texto se inicia dando um panorama da história da ciência, destacando os principais pontos da física aristotélica, que será o grande alvo da nova ciência, passando pelos medievais até culminar com a Revolução Científica. Neste aspecto, realizar-se-á um recorte exclusivamente no campo da física e, mais precisamente ainda, na conceituação de movimento no pensamento de Galileu Galilei e Descartes que Hobbes tomará como paradigma para sua filosofia. Da apropriação da tradição da ciência moderna, mais objetivamente das reflexões sobre o movimento que resultou no princípio de inércia, serão identificados os principais pontos na teoria política do filósofo inglês, principalmente no que se refere à concepção de liberdade, como sendo moldada nos ideais daquela nova maneira de encarar o conhecimento. Para tanto, a partir da leitura de comentadores do autor, verificar-se-á, num primeiro momento, se Hobbes foi ou não influenciado pelas novas descobertas da ciência setecentista, que em tese admite-se que sim, e desta premissa compreender como foi tratado o problema da liberdade nas obras do teórico político inglês. Tendo a nova ciência como paradigma, será demonstrado como o conceito de liberdade está em sintonia com a concepção de movimento daquele período, uma vez que liberdade, para Hobbes, significa a ausência de oposição, identificando, desta forma, a gênese deste conceito como resultado das reflexões que ocorreram sobre o movimento no século XVII. Destacando o conceito de liberdade e entendendo-a como um tema complexo, objetivase compreender como o autor dará conta da vida dos homens em sociedade, com todas as limitações impostas por um Estado, que necessariamente precisa ter seus poderes ilimitados para garantir a paz e a segurança e mesmo assim assegurar as liberdades individuais. E nesta perspectiva, compreender que, para Hobbes, o Estado é fruto da criação humana, ou seja, artificial, e necessariamente precisa-se ter um poder maior para que de fato a sociedade seja organizada e a liberdade garantida. Assim, o poder monárquico e ilimitado proposto por Thomas Hobbes deve ser entendido como resultado de uma vontade geral, isto é, não se trata aqui de realizar a vontade dos indivíduos, mas que os representantes políticos agissem para realizar a vontade da unidade dos indivíduos, ou seja, o Estado deve ser compreendido como criação dos indivíduos para sua representação. Por isso, a teoria política proposta pelo pensador deve ser entendida não simplesmente como absolutista, pois trata-se de uma verdadeira teoria da soberania

Dans le sillage des révolutions intellectuelles qui marquent l’avènement de l’époque moderne, Sir Kenelm Digby, catholique anglais, poursuit avec ardeur la connaissance du monde matériel et spirituel au gré des événements politiques qui ponctuent son époque tourmentée. À Londres comme à Paris où il est exilé, mais aussi au fil de ses nombreux voyages, Digby communique inlassablement des livres, échange des idées, et correspond sans relâche avec les savants de son époque comme Descartes, Hobbes, et Mersenne. Au sein du vaste réseau européen que constitue la jeune République des Lettres, il occupe une place de choix qui lui permet de produire une synthèse des idées en vogue. Digby participe à la sensibilité baroque que l’on définit non seulement par l’expression d’une crise liée à l’instabilité du monde et à la contradiction des choses mais aussi par la tentative de surmonter cette crise. Par ses intérêts variés pour l’alchimie, l’atomisme, la logique et la métaphysique, il tente de rendre compte, de façon baroque, du fonctionnement du monde et de l’homme afin d’en permettre la maîtrise et le gouvernement. Dans Two Treatises, il adopte et adapte l’hypothèse atomiste qui lui permet de dépeindre un monde fondamentalement chaotique, en changement permanent et agité d’une myriade de collisions invisibles qui expliquent la gravité et le magnétisme, mais aussi la reproduction ou la sympathie. Son approche démonstrative se veut un rempart contre la crise sceptique de son temps, et il ne cesse d’affirmer que la certitude est atteignable par les seuls moyens humains. Soucieux de prosélytisme, il met en relief la qualité orale de la tradition catholique et justifie la résurrection des corps, amenant au premier plan le sujet et ses perceptions, mais aussi la métamorphose comme principe explicatif clé. / In the wake of the intellectual revolutions of the early modern period, Sir Kenelm Digby, an English Catholic, endeavoured to increase the knowledge of the world, both physical and spiritual, against a backdrop of political turmoil. From London as from Paris, where he was in exile, the well-travelled Sir Kenelm sent books, communicated, and discussesd ideas tirelessly with the main thinkers of the time such as Descartes, Hobbes and Mersenne. His prominent place within the dense network of the incipient Republic of Letters allowed him to produce a seminal synthesis of the ideas then in circulation.Digby partook in the baroque sensitivity that we can define as the expression of a crisis linked to instability and contradiction, as well as the attempt to overcome it. Delving into alchemy, atomism, logic, and metaphysics, he strove to account for the secret workings of the world and of man in order to enable their mastery and government. In Two Treatises, he adopted and adapted the atomist hypothesis that allowed him to depict a deeply chaotic world, ridden with permanent change and fraught with innumerable and invisible clashes that explained all physical phenomena such as gravity, magnetism, generation, and sympathy. He aimed to proceed in a demonstrative manner so as to stave off the rampant crisis of scepticism, and he hammered through the idea that certainty was achievable by mere human means. In a proselyte effort, he tackled burning issues in the wake of the Reformation, promoting the oral quality of the Catholic tradition and the resurrection of bodies, while bringing forward the thinking individual and his perceptions, as well as the concept of metamorphosis, as key explanatory principles.

By examining five types of astronomical and celestial phenomena—comets, constellations, the zodiac, planets, and the music of the spheres—this thesis posits not only that early modern dramatists were influenced by established and emerging natural philosophy as habits of thought that manifested in their writing, but also that astronomical phenomena operate within the drama, performance, and in the theatre as elements for creating and developing a distinctly spatial dramaturgy. Using theories from the spatial turn, this thesis maps the positions, edges, disturbances, and motions of celestial properties within the imaginary and physical space of early modern drama and theatre. It argues that the case study plays examined within this thesis demonstrate a period-wide engagement, rather than an authorial-, company-, theatre-, or even genre-specific practice. Dramatists developed techniques using astronomical phenomena as dramatic methods that occasionally underscored early modern astronomical thought. However, in many cases constructed plots, characters, visual and sound effects, and movements transgressed astronomical expectations. Dramatists broke down constellations, inserted new stars in the heavens, created zodiacal females, launched pyrotechnical comets, moved planets unexpectedly across the stage, and played (and refrained from playing) celestial "music" for the audience. Recognising composite and often contradictory astronomical constructions within the drama, this thesis moves the critical discussion away from an intellectual history of natural philosophy and gravitates toward an active astronomical dramaturgy.

La thèse se propose d’étudier le développement des traités de dialectique à la Renaissance, en suivant un parcours chronologique qui mène de Lorenzo Valla à Pierre de La Ramée. Ces auteurs ne sont pas seulement abordés pour leur contribution aux arts du langage, il s’agit également de mettre en évidence la conception de l'esprit humain qu’ils défendent afin de mieux saisir la philosophie de l'esprit que les anime. En cela, notre réflexion ne saurait se limiter à réinsérer ces quelques auteurs majeurs dans la multitude, bien réelle, des traités dialectiques de l’époque. Définie comme « science des sciences », la dialectique présente, à la Renaissance, de fortes affinités avec la rhétorique. Il s'agit donc de comprendre comment l'analyse du langage à la Renaissance, largement tributaire du latin des auteurs classiques, s’oriente vers une topique de l’esprit consacrée aux formes multiples de raisonnement. En développant la discussion sur la dialectique, la thèse prend ainsi le parti d’insister sur le rôle de la théorie de la connaissance / The research proposes to study the development of the dialectical treatises during the Renaissance. In order to achieve this objective a path was chosen, going from Lorenzo Valla to Pierre de La Ramée. These authors are approached not only as offering a reflexion on language, but rather to detect the conception of the intellect they highlight. Having said that, it will not be the case to simply reinsert these authors, central for the understanding of the topic, in the actual swarm of dialectical treatises during the time, but rather to grasp the reflexion concerning the operations of the intellect, that animate them. During the Renaissance, Dialectic and Rhetoric will be brought closer and their cooperation worked in many different ways, the text will thus discuss how the analysis of the language set forth during the time, strongly supported by the Latin of classic authors, will be shifted toward a topic of the intellect, dedicated to multiples forms of reasoning. This 'dialectical' movement was not an uniform one, nevertheless, the works here consulted can be placed within the framework of a growing participation of the theory of knowledge in the discussions about dialectic, understood as the science of sciences

Cette thèse présente la première monographie française sur le grand écrivain russe et sibérien Victor Astafiev. Peu traduite en français, son œuvre importante (15 volumes) est généralement considérée par la critique comme s’inscrivant dans la veine de la prose rurale qui se développa en Russie à partir des années 70. Cependant, la biographie de l’écrivain et la multiplicité des thèmes qu’il aborde (société, guerre, musique, sons et nature) impose une remise en question de cette interprétation. L’auteur de la thèse s’attache à analyser finement les textes mis en contexte, à étudier l’évolution et la spécificité linguistique de leur écriture pour situer Astafiev dans la tradition de la grande littérature russe et faire apparaitre la profondeur et l’actualité de ses écrits. Le volume II livre une série de traductions inédites, annotées et commentées, ainsi que les versions reconstituées de chansons dont les textes révèlent un trésor de la culture populaire de l’époque. / This thesis presents the first French monograph on the great Russian and Siberian writer, Viktor Petrovich Astafiev. His important work (15 volumes), little-translated into French, is generally praised by critics as taking place within the same framework of the Village Prose, which started growing in Russia from the seventies onwards. However, the biography of the writer and the multiple themes which he takes up (society, war, music, sounds and nature) call into question this interpretation. The thesis author attempts to carry out a shrewd analysis of the texts placed within their context and to study the linguistic development as well as the specificity of Astafiev writings in order to situate him in the tradition of the great Russian literature and to highlight the depth and the topicality of his work. The second volume delivers a whole series of unpublished translations, duly annotated and commented as well as restored versions of songs, the texts of which reveal a treasure of the popular culture in the context of that time.

In 13th century Europe, the German bishop and scholastic philosopher Albertus Magnus was one of the most influential writers on the natural world and theology. This thesis investigates the relationship between humans and animals in his Quaestiones super de animalibus and De animalibus. In writings on medieval history the theologically enforced boundary between humans and animals is both emphasized and treated as a given. This study nuances the picture presented by previous scholars by highlighting an alternative natural philosophical discourse on humans and animals. Using discourse analysis, I argue that the differences that Albertus used to differentiate humans from animals were based on an understanding of similarities rather than opposites. To Albertus, the human was one species in the animal kingdom, thus sharing many basic functions with other animals. His understandings entailed a theory of essential differences between species but also allowed for divisions based on gradation and relativity. This study sheds new light on the complex relationship between humans and animals in medieval Europe.

This dissertation focuses on mid-eighteenth-century British periodicals and their claims to educate middle-ranked women in natural philosophy, modern history, and vernacular literature. I argue that articles published in female-penned periodicals are comparable to articles in male-penned periodicals and therefore allowed women to pursue an informal education through reading. I propose that female periodicals also illustrate how women formed counterpublics of learning through correspondence that rivaled the conversations that took place in the male-dominated public spheres, such as in coffee houses and meeting halls. As formal classical education was reserved for elite men, women learned through reading books and periodicals, and through conversation. Given the cost of books, periodicals became the main source for informal learning for middle-ranked women. I call attention to the periodical form that allowed women to complete feasibly short lessons between their daily domestic duties and amusements. Female-penned periodicals encouraged women to diversify their interests by deploying literary depictions of the moral pitfalls of women’s focus on the beautification of the body. Driven by the financial and social rise of the merchant class, middling-ranked women with small dowries sought to gain advantage in the marriage market by distinguishing themselves as suitable wives for merchant or even gentry husbands. Periodicals thus made an economic as well as a moral case for their single female readers to balance fashionable amusements with intellectual pursuits. By examining not only how mid-century female-penned periodicals defined themselves in relation to male-penned periodicals but also the impact of broader changes in formalized education, my thesis uncovers an important and under-discussed aspect of the rise of the middling ranks in eighteenth-century Britain. I show how female-penned periodicals encouraged women's involvement in discussions about the development of the modern disciplines of education. My thesis is organized chronologically and follows the work of three notable periodical editors and authors with chapters on Eliza Haywood's The Female Spectator (1744-46), Frances Brooke's The Old Maid (1755-56), and Charlotte Lennox's The Lady's Museum (1760-61). The purpose of my thesis is not only to chart the changes in representations of women's learning over time, but also to reveal how Haywood, Brooke, and Lennox propose that women share their proto-disciplinary knowledge beyond their counterpublics in order to encourage intellectual discussions between like-minded males and females in the public spheres.