Demokratiseringens tillbakagång i nutida Ryssland har väckt en rad frågor angående de olika orsaker som kan ha påverkat den. Ämnet är intressant eftersom Ryssland har varit på det spåret med demokratiseringen av landet och även försökt etablera demokratiska institutioner. Men det visade sig att efter Mikhail Gorbatjovs och Boris Jeltsins tid har demokratiseringen gått tillbaka i samband med Vladimir Putins ankomst till makten. Den nya presidenten införde en rad reformer inom politiken, men framförallt påverkade detta de mänskliga rättigheterna i landet. Syftet med detta arbete var att utöka förståelsen för den ryska politiken och den tillbakadragna demokratiseringen som drabbat landet, samt hitta samband med den tillbakadragna yttrandefriheten. För undersökningen har valts att fokusera på de olika orsakerna till demokratiseringens tillbakagång, sådana som nationalism, religiös fundamentalism, den auktoritära nostalgin och även den civila arenan som behandlar frågor om medborgarnas och ledarens attityder mot demokrati. Slutsatserna har påvisat att det finns ett starkt samband mellan den ökade nationalismen och fundamentalismen, och den yttrandefrihetens tillbakagång.

This paper addresses the question of whether Russia’s role conception changed after the annexation of Crimea. Research on role conceptions has a solid standing within foreign policy analysis, but information on role change and what it is that affects it has not been given the necessary attention. The paper’s theoretical framework contains earlier theoretical definitions of role conceptions and role change. In conjunction with the theoretical approach, process tracing and systematic text analysis with a focus on narratives are used as methodological tools. Relevant findings are then generated through the study of elite-expressions of the Russian master role from, firstly, the period between 2012 and late 2013, and, secondly, 2014. In brief, the results indicate that no major change occurred. Rather the role conception remained stable throughout both sequences. This suggests that the ramifications of the annexation of Crimea did not challenge the Russian master role and that it was not perceived as a crisis by Putin and his colleagues. Moreover, it is possible that role change more likely occurs when exceptional circumstances arise unexpectedly and when they fundamentally challenge ingrained role conceptions.

The diploma thesis examines why did the non-systemic opposition in Russia between 2011 and 2016 fail to reach any significant success. Even though during 2011 and 2012 Russia witnessed mass anti- government protests the non-systemic opposition was not able to enforce any relevant change in the regime, obtain representation in the state institutions or induce larger public dissatisfaction with the regime. The study analyses problematic internal features of the non-systemic opposition (lack of public support, coalition potential, election programs and campaigns, party financing) and external repressive means of the Vladimir Putin's regime against the opposition (legislation, direct confrontation, judicial trials, elections and means of rigging). The thesis offers a complex insight into the functioning of the non-systemic opposition in Russia in the observed period and accentuates the authoritarian character of the Russian regime. Based on the evaluation of the key variables the study concludes that the repressive policies of the regime cardinally affected the weakness and fragmentation of the non-systemic opposition which moreover was not able to overcome the internal conflicts and gain broader public support.

Neoclassical realism has the ability to advance our understanding of foreign policy responses through the recently designed neoclassical realist model. However as international relations have proven, a theory is not a concrete motionless design. Improvements can be made and the fluidity of theory allows social sciences to adapt and advance. This thesis introduces developments to neoclassical realism by stating that the individual factors and intervening variables hold varying degrees of importance that alter between each foreign policy decision. There is no overarching set of instructions for 'foreign policy', rather an adaptable model that takes into consideration the geopolitical arena, the state and the statesman. The case study chosen for this thesis is the Russian foreign policy response to annex Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Analysis and comparisons of the variables resulted in three factors standing out as most significant. The most important influence within the systemic stimuli was the nature of the strategic environment and the window of opportunity that arose in Crimea due to Ukrainian political and military instability. The intervening variable leader images proved to be the decisive factor, as the consolidation of power by Vladimir Putin allowed the annexation to be completed...

Vladimir Putin has been President of Russian Federation for almost 20 years. Powerful politicians of that importance and duration warrant research to understand their personal beliefs in a variety of topics. This study sets out to understand Putin’s opinions on a range of subjects such as multiculturalism, patriotism, and ethnicity to determine “What kind of nationalist is Vladimir Putin?” This question is answered by using four distinct ideal types of nationalism; civic, ethno-cultural, multicultural, and religious. Most of the research material consists of primary texts or articles written by Vladimir Putin, five in total, and two excerpts from answers given by Putin in press conferences. The reason for choosing these specific sources is because they provide direct information on Putin’s opinions and beliefs. After analysis the author of this article has concluded that Vladimir Putin closely resembles the civic nationalism ideal type; however, Putin is also very to the close ethno-cultural nationalism and to some extent multiculturalism with insignificant overlap with religious nationalism. The main reason for this conclusion is because of Putin’s reoccurring encouragement of patriotism through loyalty to the Russian state. Putin has also expressed ethno-cultural statements such as viewing Russian people as the “state building people” in Russia and seeing Russian culture and language as the dominant culture for Russia, not in the sense of stating the fact that majority of Russia is Russian, but also that it should continue being dominant. Not just by language and culture but also by prohibiting nationalist-regionalist political parties.

In recent years, Russia’s nuclear weapons program has been widely discussed among policymakers, think-tank analysts, and academics. Some argue that Russia pursues an increasingly assertive weapons policy and has lowered its threshold of using them in conflict. On the other end of the spectrum, there are scholars who argue that Russia’s nuclear weapons modernization is proceeding at a normal pace, and in extension, that there is little reason to be concerned about Moscow’s at times confrontational nuclear rhetoric. This thesis seeks to contribute to that debate by addressing to central questions: (1) How has Russia’s nuclear weapons policy evolved in the last two decades? (2) What explains the evolution in Russia’s nuclear weapons policy? Towards that end, the thesis first conducts a historical analysis, which provides a detailed overview of the changes and continuities that have characterized Russia’s nuclear weapons policy in the last 20 years. Building on this, the thesis then seeks to explore the underlying drivers and objectives of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy via the lenses of offensive realism, defensive realism, and constructivism. The thesis concludes that the evolution of Russia’s nuclear weapons policy is best explained by two factors: the attempt to uphold a secure- second-strike capability (defensive realism) and an attempt to defend its status as a major global power (constructivism).

For about a decade, the Russian opposition politician Aleksej Navalnyj has been a topic in the Swedish news media. Particularly since the end of august 2020, when suspected of having been poisoned with the neurotoxin novitjok. Often described as a freedom fighter in the Swedish press, Navalnyj, however, has a quite varied background in both liberal and nationalist groups. Since the poisoning, however, questions have been raised about Navalnyjs past, who he actually is, and what he wants to achieve. Yet, he tends to be described as a freedom fighter in most texts. In this essay we aim to examine not the narrative of Navalnyjs fight against Vladimir Putin's Russia, but how he is framed in the Swedish news press. To do so, we combine a quantitative digital text analysis with a qualitative frame analysis. By applying a theoretical framework based on acknowledged media theories such as framing and priming theory combined with earlier studies on the topic, we find that Navalnyj tends to be framed as a kind of antithesis to the Russian regime and Putin. Also, it seems the conflict is not limited to the borders of Russia, nor to the Russian people. The European Union is reported to take interest in the conflict, for example, taking Navalnyjs side. A logical explanation may be found in the view on Russia in the Swedish society, which is employed as a frame in the media and hence gets reproduced into society.

The master thesis called Security of the Russian Federation: (de)securitization of the U.S. by Russian representatives deals with the security of Russia from the top representatives points of view. The analyzed time is determined by the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev (2008 - April 2012). The aim of the thesis is to find out, why the U.S. was (de)securitized during the Medvedev's presidential term and confirm or disprove the predefined hypothesis. President, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs create the foreign politics of Russian federation. Their speeches and interviews are the main source of the data. The basic security terms and the theories (de)securitization are discussed in the first part of the thesis. The Russian point of view of security is defined in the following part. There are analyzed oficial documents focusing on definition of the national security, foreign policy and military field. There are also discussed the Russian media discourse since 90s of the 20 century and Russian- American relations. The last empirical part analyzes the interviews and speeches of the president Medvedev, of the prime minister Putin and of the minister of foreign affairs Lavrov in terms of their attitudes to the U.S.

Comment se constitue un pouvoir politique réputé "absolu" là où dans la séquence historique immédiatement antérieure le chef de l’Etat ne jouissait pas d’une position prééminente ? Norbert Elias avait placé cette énigme au cœur de ses réflexions dans La société de cour. L’ambition de cette thèse est de la reprendre à partir d’un tout autre contexte socio-historique et sur une temporalité plus courte : en s’inspirant de la démarche éliasienne mais aussi de la sociologie pragmatique et de certains apports de l’ethnométhodologie, il s’agit de comprendre, d’une manière sociologique, comment, en l’espace d’à peine deux décennies, un rapport de domination politique particulièrement marqué a pu s’instaurer en Russie entre le chef de l’Etat et les magnats de l’économie. Pour répondre à cette question, la thèse se centre sur une forme particulière de cérémonial où la déférence à l’égard du chef de l’Etat peut être observée publiquement - les interviews télévisées avec des membres des élites économiques - et développe trois arguments. Fondé sur l’analyse d’un corpus d’émissions diffusées sur la chaîne de télévision publique Rossiya 24 et sur celle, « indépendante », Dozhd, aussi bien que sur les entretiens « exégétiques » avec les intervieweurs de deux chaînes, l’enquête démontre que la domination du chef de l’Etat repose pour une part essentielle sur la croyance collective, partagée au sein des élites, en un ensemble de règles – le pacte – qui prescrivent de quelle façon il convient de traiter la personne du Président dans l’espace public. La thèse montre ensuite la place centrale qu’occupent les médias dans la reproduction de l’ordre politique aujourd’hui en Russie. Ceux-ci se présentent comme le théâtre où se constitue la croyance des élites dans le pouvoir « absolu » du président. Afin de le montrer la thèse étudie, à l’aide d’entretiens réalisés avec les journalistes et les responsables des deux chaînes de télévision concernées, le dispositif matériel et organisationnel de ces chaînes. Finalement, à travers l’analyse d’un corpus de données de presse et de documents audiovisuels, la thèse montre que l’effort de soumission au chef de l’Etat, que les membres des élites économiques russes manifestent de plus en plus nettement dans certaines situations publiques à partir des années 2010 s’explique par la transformation de la sensibilité et de l’habitus psychique propre au groupe social des oligarques – transformation elle-même liée à l’évolution de la « balance des pouvoirs » au sein des élites au cours de la décennie 2000. / How a political power deemed “absolute” is established where during the previous historical period the chief of the state could not not enjoy such a pre-eminent position? Norbert Elias had placed this question at the heart of his reflections in The court society. The idea of this thesis is to apply the Eliasian question to a different socio-historical context. Drawing inspiration from the Eliasian approach, but also from pragmatic sociology and ethnomethodology, this thesis aims to understand how a system of the relations of domination between the head of the state and the tycoons could form in Russia in less than twenty years. To answer this question, the thesis focuses on a particular form of publicly observable ceremonial of deference towards the head of the state - television interviews with members of the economic elites. The thesis develops three arguments. Based on the analysis of a corpus of programs broadcasted on the public television channel Rossiya 24 and on the "independent" channel Dozhd, as well as on the "exegetical" interviews with interviewers of two channels, the thesis demonstrates that the domination of the head of the state is based on the collective belief, shared among the members of elites, in a set of rules which prescribe how the person of the president should be treated in the public space. Secondly, the thesis shows the central role played by the media in the reproduction of the political order in Russia. The media can be seen as the theater where the belief in the "absolute" power of the president is formed. In order to show this, the thesis studies the organization of the two television channels through interviews with journalists and officials of these channels. Finally, through the analysis of a corpus of press and audio-visual documents, the thesis shows that the effort of submission to the head of the State, that the members of the Russian economic elites manifest more and more clearly in certain public situations in recent years, can be explained by the transformation of their psychic habitus and sensibility. This transformation is related to the evolution of the "balance of powers" within the elites during this decade.

This thesis explores the prerequisites for peace in Ukraine from a typology of the conflict’s constituent elements. The material examined consist of accounts from open sources and official statements from the warring parties. The thesis concludes that the high intensity combat between two state parties and the ostensible lack of veto-players warrants a conflict with a shorter duration and relatively good prerequisites for solution. Underpinning territorial aspects and general scale of conflict together with lingering features of Russian strategic culture points to a longer and more intractable conflict. The western support for Ukraine contributes both to scale and intensity, but also induces a risk for horizontal escalation.