Topic of this thesis is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine that has become very current at the present time because of its use in legitimising the operation of NATO and other countries during the uprising in Libya in 2011. Apart from a number of sympathetic opinions, it has caused a wave critique, which has been of two types. Some criticised even the fact itself that the UN Security Council had labelled the Libya situation as a case suited for the application of this doctrine. There were also those who had agreed wholeheartedly with this designation, but who were disappointed by how the operation that followed had proceeded. This section of critics claims that NATO and other states that took part in the operation overstepped the mandate granted to them by the Security Council and thereby caused at least a partial delegitimising of R2P.

By agreeing to The Responsibility to Protect doctrine (R2P) at the United Nations World Summit in 2005, and later adopting a resolution reaffirming the support, the Russian federation accepted a responsibility of the international community to protect populations of other states, if the state itself manifestly fails to protect its own populations. However, Russia has acted in an inconsistent way by exercising its commitment to the R2P principle occasionally. The purpose of this study is to give an answer to the question of why Russia has acted in an inconsistent way to The Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Analyzing the inconsistency puzzle through the realist, liberal and constructivist lens, questioning why Russia has accepted an R2P intervention regarding Libya to halt ongoing mass atrocities, but repeatedly has vetoed against R2P interventions regarding Syria and recently regarding Venezuela, the study concludes that a combination of the three approaches is needed to explain and understand Russia’s inconsistent reaction. Second, it concludes that Russia acted inconsistently because President Medvedev was affected by, and agreeing with, international norms, thereby accepting an R2P into Libya, while President Putin was affected by, and wanted to hold on to the Russian identity. By rejecting R2P interventions in the Syria and Venezuela cases, Putin thereby secured Russian national interests, using a liberal narrative as a pretext for the actions.

The topic of this master thesis is the Relationship of the Federal Republic of Germany to the intervention in Libya. The aim of this master thesis is to answer the research question: "Why did not Germany support the intervention in Libya?". After the abstention on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, Germany was for not continuing human rights protection. The decision, to reject the intervention, has confirmed that Germany is still very skeptical regarding the involvement of its military personnel and assets abroad. The decision of the Security Council is not only a milestone in German history, but also a milestone for the international community. For the first time has the United Nations Security Council agreed to use military forces against a functioning state with the aim of protecting civilian population. This master thesis is a single case study; through which the author examines a very specific situation when Germany decided not to participate in the voting process regarding the intervention in Libya. The theoretical part of the thesis is based on the constructivist theory, furthermore the thesis focuses also on the concepts of civilian power, multilateralism, culture of restraint, and the protection of human rights. All these terms have significant influence on German foreign...

Diploma thesis Relation between the concepts of humanitarian intervention and regime change: the case of Libya is concerned with the study of military interventions after 1989 in the context of current theoretical discourse. It's main goal is assessing the 2011 NATO operation Unified Protector. The key question of thesis is, whether the intervention, due to the extensive reading of UNSC Resolution 1973, mandate still can be described in the terms of humanitarian intervention concept (in accordance with international law paradigm of R2P), or whether it rather had been a regime change. Based on primary data analysis, the paper shows that actors (most significantly the USA, France and Great Britain) contributing with a theoretically impartial military force, despite the immediate positive humanitarian outcome, helped significantly to overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Due to the specifics of the operation, it can rather be described as a hidden regime change - a definition is also offered in the thesis. Based on the theoretical framework created by Michael Reisman, the author also assesses legitimacy of such deeds. The text is divided into three main chapters. Chapter one gives an account of broader context of just war theories, humanitarian intervention and regime change concepts. In the second...

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Russian Federation plays an important role in the debate over humanitarian interventions. These are defined by the Responsibility to Protect principle that allows international military intervention into internal political crisis of other countries in case the security of civilian population is in danger. Russia sent its army to Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 referring to this principle. However, it was Russia's reluctance to approve any intervention that governed the diplomatic negotiations during the Libyan civil war in 2011. The importance of the problem of various understanding of the R2P principle by different world powers is still crucial and is also clearly visible on the ongoing conflict in Syria. This thesis focuses on the approach of the Russian Federation to the Responsibility to Protect principle. It determines general factors that influence the issue of humanitarian intervention in the framework of Russian foreign policy, and puts Russian attitude to the overall context of the discussion about this principle. The thesis confirms the assumption that the R2P principle has become a Russian foreign policy instrument, which has been misused within the Russian sphere of interest and used to obstruct the interventions initiated by the...

Denna uppsats har som syfte att besvara frågeställningen: Vilken roll spelade det humanitära inslaget som en motiverande faktor för Sveriges deltagande i Libyenkonflikten mellan den 2 april 2011 och den 24 oktober 2011? Fallstudie: Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:81. Detta kommer att göras genom att olika analysmetoder appliceras på de tal som finns representerade i Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:81. De analysmetoder som används är politisk diskursanalys (PDA), kvalitativ innehållsanalys, samt kritisk diskursanalys (CDA). Genom utförandet av dessa kommer uppsatsen att besvara i vilken utsträckning riksdagsledamöter använde humanitära aspekter i sin debatt om Sveriges beslut att delta i den internationella militära interventionen med namn Resolution 1973. Genom att utföra en PDA och en kvalitativ innehållsanalys kan vi finna de viktigaste argumenten samt påståendena för dessa i texten Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:81. Därefter kommer en CDA att genomföras. Genom att göra detta kan den debatt som analyseras samt det resultat vi kom fram till genom utförandet av en PDA och en kvalitativ innehållsanalys placeras i en kontext. På så sätt kan en bedömning av politikernas argument och påståenden som de använde för att motivera Sveriges deltagande i Libyenkonflikten även granskas och jämföras med den kontext som rådde innan och under tidpunkten för debatten. Genom PDA och en kvalitativ innehållsanalys kommer uppsatsen att fastställa att de humanitära aspekterna var av stor betydelse och var den främsta motiverande faktorn i debatten om Sveriges deltagande i Libyenkonflikten. Genom implementeringen av en CDA kommer denna debatt att sättas i en kontext. En kontext där en stor mediakampanj mot den dåvarande Libyska ledaren Muammar Gaddafi skedde, och där flera framstående politiker tycktes påverka FN att implementera Skyldigheten att skydda (R2P) och interventionen mot Libyen, Resolution 1973. Baserat på debatten och den offentliga information som finns tillgänglig verkade det som att media, samt högt uppsatta politiker var en bidragande faktor till Resolution 1973. Därmed verkar det som att olika maktrelationer starkt påverkade den politiska arenan och de politiska beslut som togs i och med Libyenkonflikten 2011.

<p>In this thesis I argue that it is an implication of the acceptance of the human right to water and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) that violations of the human right to water can invoke the Responsibility to Protect. Extreme violations of the right to water can invoke the responsibility to react, and ultimately the responsibility to prevent and rebuild. Although this is the case, I argue that the human right to water is unlikely to invoke R2P on its own. Instead, water issues are more likely to compound with issues of poverty, weak political institutions, poor leadership and social tension to create situations that have the potential for mass atrocity. Furthermore, I provide an analysis of the actions that will need to be taken before, during and after an intervention to fulfill the responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild and the actors that can and/or should take such action.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

The “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) doctrine was created with the purpose of providing an implementation mechanism for the international community to halt and prevent mass atrocity conflicts, however, it is not a legally binding framework, and requires the UNSC’s engagement for its successful implementation. Whilst R2P is a rhetorically compelling international norm, it falls apart in practice. The lack of consistency in its implementation and the UNSC’s inaction to various cases of mass atrocity, which are, in principle, applicable to the doctrine, has sparked controversy. This thesis examines conflicts in which R2P has been utilized and one conflict of similar dimensions in which the principle wasn’t applied, discussing the factors that could explain the question ‘why has the application of R2P been inconsistent at halting atrocity conflicts?’. By juxtaposing two theoretical lenses, Realism and English School, and applying a comparative analysis to these three cases, the thesis establishes that state behavior is driven by preserving power and resources, when it converges with upholding international norms and values. Thus, the thesis concludes that members of the Security Council will support R2P implementation and uphold shared norms and values, only when it serves their national interests.

La « responsabilité de protéger », concept politique adopté en 2005 pour prévenir et mettre fin aux atrocités criminelles, repose sur un premier pilier —l'obligation de l'Etat de protéger ses populations— dont le consensus apparent a conduit à un manque d’analyse institutionnelle dans sa double dimension constitutionnelle comparée et internationale. Or, l’obligation de l’Etat incombe enparticulier au chef d'Etat. Son obligation de protéger est un élément commun de définition de sa fonction, mais aussi un critère essentiel de différenciation —selon que le chef d’Etat relève d’un modèle étatiste, privilégiant la protection de l’Etat quitte à suspendre le droit, ou d’un modèle libéral, privilégiant la protection de la Constitution et la soumission permanente de l’action politique au droit. La thèse analyse d'abord les sources de l'obligation de protéger du chef d’Etat,successivement théorisée, constitutionnalisée et internationalisée, puis l'exécution de cette obligation résultant de prérogatives, d'immunités et de contrôles de la protection. Les sources de l’obligation révèlent que le chef d’Etat, à l’interface des ordres juridiques interne et international, aune obligation spécifique, non réductible à celle de l’Etat ou de l’individu, qui comporte à la fois une dimension négative (ne pas commettre de crimes contre la population) et une dimension positive(empêcher la commission de tels crimes) et dont l’internationalisation permet de combler les lacunes des Constitutions. Si l’exécution par le chef d’Etat de son obligation de protéger, par la mise en oeuvre de ses prérogatives de protection, est soumise à un contrôle croissant, tant politique que juridictionnel, ce processus reste néanmoins inachevé, faute d'une responsabilité politique internationale, systématique et institutionnalisée. La thèse conclut à l’utilité d'une individualisation de la « responsabilité de protéger » et à l’enrichissement de ce concept par le contrôle de l’obligation de protéger du chef d’Etat. / The political concept of the “responsibility to protect” was adopted in 2005 to prevent and p ut anend to criminal atrocities. The apparent consensus over its first pillar, the State’s obligation to protect its populations, has resulted in a lack of institutional analyses regarding its combined comparative constitutional and international aspects. Importantly, the State’s obligation rests in particular with the Head of State. The obligation to protect is common to all heads of state, but it also differentiates among them, depending on whether their obligation is State-oriented (with the aim to protect the State, even if that requires the suspension of the rule of law) or Rule-of-law oriented (with the aim to protect a liberal constitutional order while always subjecting political actionto the rule of law). The thesis begins with an analysis of the sources of law relating to the Head of State’s obligation to protect, as it was successively theorised, constitutionalised and internationalised. It then turns to the execution of this obligation, which derives from the Head of State’s prerogatives, the relevant immunities involved and available institutional review over his orher activities. The study of the sources reveals that the Head of State (at the interface between the domestic and the international legal orders) is bound by a specific obligation, which exceeds the confines of the obligations of either the State or the individual. This obligation is both negative and positive as it requires both not to commit crimes against the population, and to prevent and put an end to such crimes. Its international dimension supplements the missing parts in the Constitutions.The execution of this obligation, by the implementation of the Head of State’s prerogatives, is subject to an increasing political and judicial control. However, this control remains under construction due to a lack of systematic and institutionalized international political responsibility. The thesis concludes that the “responsibility to protect” could be usefully “individualized” and enriched by institutional supervision and judicial review of the Head of State’s obligation to protect.

This dissertation scrutinises two related claims that were particularly heightened in 2009 as the European Union (EU) was celebrating the first tenth anniversary of its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the implementing arm of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). First, the two policy frameworks allegedly embodied sufficient added value for bettering EU intervention for human protection purposes in third places. Second, the ESDP supposedly enabled the EU to make a difference in its response to two bloody wars that broke out in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) successively in 1996 and 1998. This thesis argues that the alleged added value and difference have been overstated at best. While various studies have taken a similar position, they have important shortcomings for at least four reasons: lack of a comprehensive account of the CFSP motives, capacities, and response; exclusive focus on civil and military operations; focus on the post-Second Congo War period; and a lack of conceptual clarity regarding two key terms – ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘peacebuilding’. This thesis goes beyond generalisation and undertakes a forensic examination of the CFSP statements, decisions, and actions precisely through the lens of Conflict Resolution (CR): a specific subject area of study with its own normative, theoretical, and practical advantages and shortcomings; and with a more comprehensive and indeed seminal conceptualisation of peacebuilding. The outcome is a far more nuanced assessment of failure and success of the EU’s peace endeavours in this context than can be obtained through a broad-brush approach to analysis.