Efter en rad uppmärksammade redovisningsskandaler världen över har utredningar huruvida en kod för näringslivet ska lagstiftas eller inte accelererat. Förtroendekommissionen har tagit fram en svensk kod för bolagsstyrning som företagen på A- och O-listan antingen ska följa eller förklara avvikelsen. Syftet är att bygga upp aktiemarknadens och näringslivets förtroende för de noterade bolagen i Sverige. Målet är att alla bolag på svenska börsen ska omfattas av regelverket i framtiden. Stockholmsbörsens chef Jukka Ruuska hoppas att många av bolagen som inte är tvungna att följa Koden gör det av fri vilja ändå. Är företag villiga att tillämpa något som är frivilligt? Hur ställer sig medelstora företag som inte är noterade på börsen till implementeringen av bolagskoden? Syftet med denna uppsats är att ta reda på vilken inställning medelstora företag i Sverige har till implementeringen av Koden samt undersöka vilka effekter som företagen tror att Koden ger. Undersökningen baseras på en kvalitativ forskningsansats med inslag av sex intervjuer. Vi har valt att avgränsa oss till medelstora företag i Sverige med 17-500 anställda och som inte är noterade på svenska börsen. Undersökningen har visat att deltagande företag anser att det finns ett behov av reglering av bolagsstyrning i Sverige. Företagen tror att ökad rapportering påverkar förtroendet för bolagsstyrningen positivt. Efterlevnaden av Koden bör, enligt intervjuobjekten, dokumenteras som ett bevis på efterlevnad. Deltagande företag var svagt insatta i kodens olika delar men ansåg att medelstora företag bör tillämpa delar av Koden. Vi tror på ökad informationsgivning från både Kodgruppens sida samt stöd och kunskap från revisorernas håll. / After a series of observed accounts scandals in the world examinations have accelerated about whether a code for the business world shall be legislated or not. Trust Commission have set up a Swedish code for corporate governance that corporate on the A and O-list either shall comply or explain the divergence. The purpose is to build up the stock markets and the business world’s trust for the noted companies in Sweden. The goal is that all companies in the Swedish stock exchange shall implement the rule agency in time. The chief of Stockholm stock exchange Jukka Ruuska is hoping that many of the companies that are not required to follow the code will do that of free will. Are companies willing to apply something, which is voluntary? What attitude do middle -bracket companies have, which are not noted on the stock exchange to the realization of the code? The purpose with this composition is to find out what attitude middle -bracket companies in Sweden have to the realization of the code and to investigate which effects the companies believe the new code will bring. The study is based on a qualitative research approach with element of six interviews. We have chosen to demarcate us to middle -bracket companies in Sweden, which have 17-500 employees and are not noted on the Swedish stock exchange. It has been shown in the study that participating companies consider that there is a need of corporate governance in Sweden. The companies believe that increased accounting affect the faith for the corporate governance positive. Observance of the code should, according to the interviewees, be documented as a proof on observance. Participating companies were vaguely initiated in the different parts of the code, but are of the opinion that middle-bracket companies should apply parts of the code. We believe that more information should be given from both Kodgruppen’s side and also support and knowledge from auditor’s range.

Inledning: Under 2000-talet har olika slag av bolagsskandaler uppmärksammats inom företags- och finansvärlden, som har kommit att påverka ekonomin och redovisningen en hel del. Bland dessa finns bland annat energibolaget Enron, telecombolaget Worldcom samt svenska bolaget Skandia. Effekterna av bolagsskandalerna är många och i värsta fall kan företagsledarna få handskas med fängelsestraff.  Syfte: Syftet med studien är att granska begångna regelbrott i stora bolag samt jämföra de med varandra för att se vilka likheter och samband som finns kring bolagsskandalerna som uppstått. Teori: I den teoretiska referensramen beskrivs teorier om bolagsstyrning, Svensk kod för bolagsstyrning, den svenska modellen för bolagsstyrning, agentteorin samt Sarbanes Oxley Act.  Metod: Insamlingen av kvalitativ data har skett via sekundär datainsamling, exempelvis via artiklar, tidigare studier, Internet samt böcker.  Slutsats: Det finns tydliga mönster mellan de begångna bolagsskandalerna som har undersökts i denna studie. Ett av de dessa är att ledningen i de flesta fall håller i trådarna. Motivet till de flesta brotten ligger i grund och botten på att rädda bolaget från att gå med förlust eller till och med i konkurs, eller att leva upp till ställda förväntningar på exempelvis Wall Street.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted as a response to some of the most egregious accounting scandals in history. Since SOX’s inception, experts continue to debate the costs and benefits associated with the act. Prior research suggests that some of the benefits associated with the Act may actually be attributable to other concurrent events such as firms’ reactions to the negative publicity. This paper investigates the effect that a firm’s publicity level has on the firm’s likelihood to issue a financial restatement. This study suggests that some of the benefits associated with SOX can actually be attributed to what I call the publicity effect. I find that although high publicity firms are more likely to issue a financial restatement post-SOX relative to low publicity firms, this difference is mitigated by the publicity effect. The empirical model suggests firms that are classified as having low publicity prior to SOX’s enactment are more likely to respond to the adverse publicity of the major accounting scandals. This study suggests that the benefit of more reliable financial statements is a combination of the stringent SOX regulations as well as the market’s reaction to negative publicity. My findings suggest that future cost-benefit analyses of SOX should attempt to capture the publicity effect.

<p>Senare års skandaler inom näringslivet har allvarligt skadat allmänhetens förtroende för bolagsstyrningen. Som ett svar på detta togs i USA en detaljerad lagstiftning fram, i form av SOX. I Sverige, har som en av de sista länderna i Europa istället arbetats fram en svensk kod för bolagsstyrning. I och med detta har bolagsstyrning och intern kontroll fått ett ökat fokus och tanken är att den finansiella informationen från bolagen skall bli mer tillförlitliga.</p><p>Syftet med denna rapport är att identifiera förväntade effekter av hur de nya kraven på bolagsstyrning kommer att påverka de externa revisorernas arbete. Speciellt var det gäller samarbetet med internrevisionen och säkerställandet av den finansiella rapporteringen.</p><p>Vi har valt en kvalitativ metod, med djupintervjuer av semistrukturerad art. Respondenterna i undersökningen är både extern och internrevisorer med gedigen erfarenhet, samt FARs ordförande. Dessa valdes för att få en djupare förståelse för våra frågeställningar om förväntade effekter.</p><p>De slutsatser som vi gjort är att samarbetet mellan intern- och externrevisionen förväntas öka genom samplanering och minimering av dubbelarbete, speciellt inom intern kontroll. När det gäller externrevisionens arbete så kommer revisionsinsatsen att öka genom en ökad testning av intern kontroll och dokumentation av dessa tester. Organisationsförändringar med revisionsutskott/kommitté förväntas också höja oberoendet för externrevisionen som får ett bättre samarbete med styrelsen istället för bolagsledningen.</p>

This study investigates whether disclosures of material weaknesses in a firm’s internal control over financial reporting are associated with lower investor perceived earnings quality. I measure investor perceived earnings quality by a market returns based representation of earnings quality called e-loading developed by Ecker et al. (2006). My empirical tests use sample firms that disclosed at least one material weakness from August 2002 to October 2005. The cross-sectional univariate analysis shows that firms disclosing internal control material weaknesses have lower investor perceived earnings quality than matched firms that disclose no internal control problems. However, further cross-sectional multivariate regression analysis reveals that after controlling for firm characteristics, only disclosures of company-level material weaknesses have an incremental impact on investor perceived earnings quality, while disclosures of the less pervasive account-specific material weaknesses do not have a measurable effect on perceived earnings quality. From intertemporal within-firm analysis, I find no evidence that firms experienced a change in their perceived earnings quality after their first disclosure of internal control material weaknesses as per SOX 302 or 404. In contrast, I find that firms experienced an increase in perceived earnings quality after they received their first unqualified SOX 404 audit report indicating remediation of previously disclosed material weaknesses. This suggests that, although investors did not find the initial SOX disclosures of internal control weaknesses to be incrementally informative, the legislation motivated firms to remediate weak controls; moreover, the SOX-induced improvement in weak internal controls enhanced investors’ perception of the offending firms’ financial reporting quality. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2009-12-17 11:41:11.323

This dissertation is a series of study on CEO turnover, succession, and compensation, which consists of three essays. In essay 1, I investigate how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) affects CEO tenure and the characteristics of CEO turnover. I do not find a significant relation between financial reporting and CEO turnover even though SOX enforces accurate financial reporting and personal responsibilities. However, I find SOX affects CEO turnover via the changes to corporate boards. I provide some evidence supporting the idea that intensified monitoring significantly reduces CEO tenure. Specifically, I find SOX significantly affects the relation between CEO tenure and the independence of the board. I find that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is higher in the post-SOX period. I also document that intensified monitoring increases the likelihood of forced turnover, specifically, I find CEO power concentration, institutional ownership, negative news, and shareholder governance proposals significantly affect the odds of forced turnover. I also provide some evidence supporting the hypothesis that firm performance is inversely related to forced CEO turnover. I document that the average number of audit committee meetings significantly increased in the post-SOX period, and the interaction between the number of audit committee meetings and firm performance significantly increase the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Overall, the results support the notion that SOX affects boards' decisions on CEO turnover. I do not find that the proportion of outside directors significantly affects the odds ratio of forced turnover, indicating outside dominated boards may not be effective in removing CEOs. Managerial discretion defines the working environment of a manager and could potentially affect a board's choice of a successor CEO. In essay 2, I hypothesize that boards tend to appoint younger (older) CEOs in firms with high (low) managerial discretion. I further propose that the relation between managerial discretion and successor CEO age may be moderated by the age of board members, the origin of the successor, and the successor's designated heir status. Using a sample of 629 successions occurring between 1994 and 2005, I find empirical evidence that supports my first hypothesis for the total sample and the sample of successions with voluntary turnover. Board age, successor origin, and the successor's designated heir status do not moderate the results for the total sample. However, I find that board member age and designated heir status moderate the relation between managerial discretion and CEO age following forced turnover. Following voluntary turnover, successor origin and designated heir status moderate the result. The above mentioned three board and CEO characteristics may either strengthen or weaken the link between managerial discretion and CEO age depending on how the incumbent CEO leaves the CEO position. In addition, several other factors also statistically affect boards' decisions regarding CEO age, including governance, CEO board tenure, and titles held by the successor. In essay 3, I examine the role of managerial discretion in setting CEO pay at succession. Using a sample of 656 successions from 1994-2005, I provide evidence that a successor CEO's pay level is positively and significantly associated with the level of managerial discretion. However, outside succession moderates the link between managerial discretion and pay level. I further find that the moderating effect of a successor's origin is contingent upon the bargaining power of the board of directors for the total and forced turnover samples. As for the pay structure of a successor, the results of the total sample and forced turnover subsample provide evidence that managerial discretion positively relates to the proportion of risk-based pay and outside succession has a moderating effect on this relation; and the moderating effect depends on the board bargaining power. As for the voluntary turnover sample, the pay structure of the new CEO is mainly determined by the pay structure of the predecessor, firm performance, and the board bargaining power. This study enriches existing research on managerial discretion and succession by linking CEO bargaining power at succession with the theory of managerial discretion.

Submitted by Diogo Azevedo Barros (diogoab2207@gmail.com) on 2011-06-06T18:41:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Diogo_Barros.pdf: 961401 bytes, checksum: 925c0dfded593b520a184ca86719136f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vitor Souza(vitor.souza@fgv.br) on 2011-06-06T18:49:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Diogo_Barros.pdf: 961401 bytes, checksum: 925c0dfded593b520a184ca86719136f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-07-19T17:10:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Diogo_Barros.pdf: 961401 bytes, checksum: 925c0dfded593b520a184ca86719136f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-31 / This paper analyzes the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the return of the ADRs of Brazilian companies listed in the United States. For the present study we used an initial sample of 96 Brazilian companies in a daily data window during 2002. / Este trabalho analisa o impacto da lei Sarbanes-Oxley sobre o retorno dos ADRs das empresas brasileiras listadas nos Estados Unidos. Para o estudo em questão foi utilizada uma amostra inicial de 96 empresas brasileiras em uma janela de dados diários durante o ano de 2002.

M.Com. (Computer Auditing) / In the wake of the economic catastrophes and corporate disgraces such as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, and other corporations at the turn of the 21st Century, the United States Senate adopted the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act, which became known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter the SOX Act). The concluding bill, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, was accepted and approved by the United States Senate on July 25, 2002. The primary motive of the SOX Act is to safeguard shareholders of public corporations by improving, cultivating and ultimately ensuring the reliability and accuracy of corporate disclosure of financial and non-financial information. More than a decade later, many corporations have enhanced their compliance capabilities and competencies, having learned from prior experience and/or earlier SOX fiascos. The envisioned benefits of the SOX Act were to provide the charter and contextual information needed to implement, monitor and review operational and financial processes, reinforce internal controls, and enhance corporate financial reporting. Since the SOX Act forces corporations to conform and comply, the question is; whether SOX compliance can essentially benefit the company’s everyday business as it affects virtually every line of work with the unequivocal purpose of reinstating public confidence in the disclosures included in annual financial statements. The study focuses on how to approach the rudimentary SOX compliance checklist and possibly transform it into an actual value added service for stakeholders and furthermore, how to leverage off the knowledge garnered through complying with the SOX Act – ultimately creating a more effective and resourceful corporation in all financial spheres. By aligning the SOX compliance process with the actual improvement of internal controls, financial processes and ultimately financial reporting, an unprejudiced ambition to identify and manage “real world” risks can be achieved. Ultimately, to comply with the SOX Act might not be an option for public corporations; however, being SOX compliant doesn’t have to be without substantial benefit to a corporation, Senior Executive Management and eventually and ultimately the shareholders.

No description available.

V práci se jedná o roli interního auditu v organizacích a zvlášť v českém bankovnictví, o rozvoji interního auditu. Jednou z kapitol je právní a písemná úprava interního auditu; stručný popis zákonů a Standardů, kterými se praxe interního auditu řídí. Značnou části je podrobný rozbor činnosti následujících institucí: finančního arbitra ČR, bankovního ombudsmana České spořitelny, bankovního ombudsmana Komerční banky. Práce také zahrnuje průzkumy trhu, které byly uskutečněné společnostmi Ernst&Young a PricewaterhouseCoopers.