[pt] A tese toma como problema central discutir a possibilidade de ruptura da ordem constitucional por meio do estado de exceção, compreendido a partir das leituras de Carl Schmitt e Walter Benjamin. Propõe-se refletir sobre o estado de exceção não tanto como um conceito jurídico, mas como um momento que tem a possibilidade de romper ou não com a ordem jurídica até então vigente. Sendo assim, a hipótese defendida por este trabalho consiste na premissa da existência de um ponto cego no constitucionalismo liberal — uma forma de pensar o direito que, em linhas gerais, garante aos indivíduos, primeiramente, a não interferência do Estado nas relações privadas e, em segundo lugar, a possibilidade de participar do processo decisório -, qual seja: o estado de exceção. Carl Schmitt e Walter Benjamin - autores situados em extremos opostos do espectro político - compreendem a exceção nesse sentido, ou seja, como uma incapacidade do constitucionalismo liberal para tratar da possibilidade da ruptura da ordem. Por não tratar dessa fissura a partir da qual se inicia o direito, também não discute a violência que o funda e o mantém. Em outras palavras, o constitucionalismo liberal não enfrenta a exceção porque ela minaria sua própria existência e seu pressuposto. O estado de exceção, pensado tanto como mecanismo garantidor da ordem quanto como momento de ruptura, abala tais pressupostos, desnudando o constitucionalismo liberal. Para corroborar tal hipótese, o trabalho será dividido em três capítulos. No primeiro deles, expõe-se um rápido quadro histórico do momento de Weimar para contextualizar o surgimento de tais teorias. Em seguida, trata-se de aproximar e afastar Walter Benjamin e Carl Schmitt nos pressupostos que irão levar os autores a pensar o estado de exceção: a teologia política, a social-democracia e a crítica à técnica. No segundo capítulo, levanta-se a hipótese de que Schmitt teme a exceção como momento de ruptura que desencaderia o caos, por isso sua defesa de uma constituição autoritária. Para tanto, o capítulo divide-se em quatro partes. Na primeira delas, aborda-se a relação entre sujeito romântico e liberalismo. Na segunda, a tensão entre política e direito. Adiante, aborda-se soberania, política e democracia e, por último, a questão da ruptura. O último capítulo trata de pensar o direito a partir de Walter Benjamin, em especial no que diz respeito à lei e à soberania. Primeiramente, a análise centra-se na questão da soberania, para em seguida, desenvolver as concepções metodológicas e políticas de história que levaram Benjamin a pensar em um permanente estado de exceção. / [en] This thesis takes as its central problem the discussion on the possibility of rupture of the constitutional order by means of the state of exception, as understood by Carl Schmitt s and Walter Benjamin s readings. It proposes the comprehension of the state of exception not so much as a legal concept, but as a moment that can or cannot break the actual juridical order. Thus, the hypothesis assumed by this thesis is that there is a blind spot in liberal constitutionalism — a point of view on law that, in general terms, assures the individual, firstly, the nonintervention of the State on private affairs, and, secondly, the possibility of taking part in the decision-making process —, that is, the state of exception. Both Carl Schmitt and Walter Benjamin — authors who hold opposite positions on the political spectrum — understand exception according to this meaning, that is to say, as the impossibility of liberal constitutionalism to deal with an eventual break of the order. Since it does not treat on this fissure from which law begins, it also does not discuss the violence that founds it and keeps it. In other words, the liberal constitutionalism does not faces exception because it would undermine its very existence and premises. The state of exception, considered both as a guarantor of order and as a moment of rupture, unsettles those premises, exposing liberal constitutionalism. In order to corroborate this hypothesis, this thesis is divided in three chapters. In the first one, a brief historical background of the Weimar Moment is presented, in order to contextualize the emergence of those theories. Then, it deals with the accords and discords between Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt concerning the assumptions that move both authors to think of the state of exception: political theology, social democracy, and critique of technique. In the second chapter, it is proposed the hypothesis that Schmitt would be afraid of exception as a moment of rupture that could initiate chaos, hence his defense of an authoritarian constitution. For this purpose, the chapter is divided in four parts. The first one treats on the relation between romantic subject and liberalism. The second, on the tension between politics and law. Further on, it treats on sovereignty, politics and democracy, and, finally, the issue of rupture. The last chapter thinks Legal Studies on the basis of Walter Benjamin s ideas, especially those concerning law and sovereignty. First, the analysis is centered on the question of sovereignty, and, next, it develops the methodological and politic conceptions of history that moved Benjamin to think of a permanent state of exception.

Univ., Diss.--Sheffield, 2000. / Literaturverz. S. [309] - 353.

Nous examinons d’abord les aspects de la souveraineté politique sur la scène shakespearienne. À la lumière des analyses consacrées par Walter Benjamin au drame baroque, en 1928, et de la réaction de Carl Schmitt dans Hamlet ou Hécube (1956), nous montrons que Shakespeare met en scène la mortalité des corps politiques et la souveraineté nouvelle de l’intrigant dans le temps terrestre. Sommé de maîtriser l’art et le tempo de l’intrigue, le Prince est néanmoins impuissant à empêcher la décomposition de l’État. En prenant appui sur le drame élisabéthain, notamment sur le vertige mélancolique et sceptique d’Hamlet, nous interrogeons alors l’effort contemporain en vue de l’ordre et de la synchronisation dans la cité. La théorie hobbesienne de la représentation politique et juridique moderne rompt avec la conception mystique de l’unité politique et toute écriture inspirée des lois, tandis que la scène civile y est dédiée à la paix du commerce entre les individus afin de garantir les conditions d’une autonomie réelle dans la sphère privée. Réciproquement, cette autonomie doit pérenniser les solutions à la mélancolie et au scepticisme conceptualisées dans Léviathan. Tout en entérinant la tragédie de l’existence humaine et de tout savoir déjà mise en scène par Shakespeare, Léviathan évite d’emblée l’exaltation schmittienne ainsi que la violence « pure » logée, selon Benjamin, dans l’état d’exception de la subjectivité. À travers les spectres qui, chez Hobbes, n’ont plus droit de cité, la scène shakespearienne défait cependant les mécanismes de l’ordre et de la synchronisation continus, cela sans congédier le droit ni le projet de l’autonomie. / First, we examine the aspects of the political sovereignty on the Shakespearean stage. In the light of Walter Benjamin’s Origin of the German baroque drama (1928) and of Carl Schmitt’s answer to Benjamin in Hamlet or Hecuba (1956), we show that Shakespeare stages the mortality of the political bodies and the new sovereignty of the plotter. Urged to master the art and the tempo of the plot, the prince is nonetheless unable to prevent the decomposition of the state. Then, drawing on the Elizabethan drama, and especially on Hamlet, we question the contemporary effort towards order and synchronization within the city. Hobbes’s theory of political and juridical representation breaks with the mystical conception of political unity and with any inspired legislation, whereas the civil scene is dedicated to the peace between individuals in order to ensure the possibility of a real autonomy in the private sphere. Reciprocally, this autonomy must consolidate the solutions to the problems of melancholy and skepticism conceptualized in Leviathan. While endorsing the tragedy of human condition and of knowledge already put on stage by Shakespeare, Leviathan prevents Schmitt’s exaltation as well as the « pure » violence which, according to Benjamin, lies in the subject’s state of exception. Yet, through the ghosts that Leviathan cannot tolerate within the public sphere, the Shakespearean stage unravels the mechanisms of perpetual order and synchronization without rejecting the law and the project of autonomy.

Le concept de totalitarisme élaboré par Hannah Arendt à partir de 1951 est aujourd'hui une référence incontournable. Son examen critique, ici proposé, commence par resituer cette théorie arendtienne dans l'histoire des idées juridiques. Ce faisant, il apparaît que non seulement la terminologie, mais également une partie des arguments et des conclusions de la philosophe ont été élaborés dès les années 1920 par la doctrine juridique, aussi bien anti- que pro-totalitaire.Dans un second temps, la théorie du droit, qui a nourri les réflexions de Hannah Arendt, est utilisé comme un instrument pour la critique. En particulier, la thèse la plus polémique défendue par la philosophe - à savoir qu'il n'y eut que deux régimes totalitaires, l'Allemagne nazie et l'Union soviétique – ne résiste guère à l'examen juridique et théorique.À travers ce dialogue historique et critique entre le droit et la philosophie, cette thèse interroge l'idée d'un droit totalitaire, qu'il s'agisse de sa nature, de ses conditions de possibilité ou de sa distinction avec l'Etat de droit. / The concept of totalitarianism developed by Hannah Arendt from 1951 is a major reference today. Its critical review, proposed here, begins by re-placing this arendtian theory in the history of legal ideas. In doing so, it appears that not only the terminology, but also some of the arguments and conclusions of the philosopher were developed from the 1920's by the theory of law, anti- and pro-totalitarian as well.In a second step, the theory of law, which nourished Hannah Arendt's reflections, is used as an instrument for criticism. In particular, the most controversial thesis defended by the philosopher - namely, that there were only two totalitarian regimes, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union - can hardly withstand a legal and theoretical scrutiny.Through this historical and critical dialogue between law and philosophy, this thesis questions the idea of a totalitarian law, its nature, its conditions of possibility and its distinction with the rule of law.

Cette thèse interroge le destin de Judas chez cinq écrivains : Paul Claudel (Mort deJudas), Marcel Pagnol (Judas), Jean Ferniot (Saint Judas), Armel Job (Judas le bien-aimé)et Eric-Emmanuel Schmitt (L’Évangile selon Pilate). Passant du cadre général à celuiparticulier, la recherche se propose d’envisager la figure de Judas dans les transpositionsbibliques contemporaines et d’évaluer les nouvelles visions que le siècle a inventées.L’analyse comprend des approches s’appuyant sur les contributions du domaine du mythe,de l’exégèse biblique, historique, de la sociologie, de la psychanalyse. La plupart des récitscontemporains font de Judas un sujet moderne très complexe : il devient figure de l’artiste,du philosophe et de l’acteur.Les problématiques d’ordre social et politique se révèlent primordiales : dans uncontexte succédant à l’Holocauste, Judas renoue avec l’univers judaïque. Retranscrivant lemythe du Juif errant, Judas devient figure de la scission, du départ et de l’errance ; lesrelations au sein de la famille sont vivement remises en cause. La figure du traître devientaussi le support d’une parole restitutive. L’idiotie de filiation dostoïevskienne attribuée àJudas fait bon ménage avec le contexte littéraire contemporain ainsi qu’avec celuilégendaire réévalué.Constamment hésitant entre la réhabilitation de Judas proposée par Pagnol, Ferniot,Job, Schmitt et la réprobation du personnage par Claudel, le parcours propose un richeréseau construit autour de thématiques communes mais différemment évaluées. / This doctoral dissertation questions Juda's destiny in five authors: Paul Claudel(The Death of Juda), Marcel Pagnol (Juda), Jean Ferniot (Saint Juda), Armel Job (TheBeloved Juda) and Eric-Emmanuel Schmitt (The Gospel according to Pilate). Fromgeneral to specific, this research aims at outlining the image of Judas within thecontemporary biblical renditions and to evaluate new perspectives on it. This analysistouches upon myth, biblical and historical exegesis, sociology and psychoanalysis. Mostcontemporary stories make Juda a very complex and modern subject: he embodies theartist, the philosopher, the actor.Social and political issues prove to be crucial: in a context which follows theHolocaust, Juda reconnects with the Judaic universe. By rewriting the myth of thewandering Jew, Juda becomes the figure of the scission, of the departure and of the roving;family relationships are strongly questioned. Furthermore, the figure of the traitor becomesthe repository for a restitutive speech. The idiocy, in the Dostoievskian sense, associatedwith Judas, blends well both with the contemporary literary context as well as with thereconsidered mythical one.Constantly hesitating between Judas' redemption that Pagnol, Ferniot, Job andSchmitt adopt and the condemnation of Claudel's character, this thesis focuses on aconvoluted network built around common themes that are tackled differently.

[pt] Esta dissertação tem como escopo a interpretação da obra jurídico-política de Jürgen Habermas à luz dos problemas e desafios formulados por Carl Schmitt. A hipótese inicial, confirmada ao longo da exposição, versa sobre o caráter de modelo negativo que a obra weimariana de Schmitt adquiriu para Habermas. Trata-se de um trabalho que se propõe a ocupar a intercessão entre a teoria política e a filosofia do direito. O pensamento do político e das condições normativas da democracia articula-se com um determinado conceito de filosofia do direito - enquanto pensamento que não admite o esquecimento da questão da legitimidade do direito. Atua, ainda, num registro marcadamente contemporâneo. São as exigências, os problemas, as crises do mundo de hoje que norteiam as leituras de Schmitt, a compreensão da experiência de Weimar e dos elementos fundamentais da obra de Habermas nos anos 90. / [en] This research aims to interpret the legal-political work of Jürgen Habermas in light of the problems and challenges indicated by Carl Schmitt. Initial hypothesis, confirmed later, affirms that Schmitt s Weimar work has a negative model function in the Habermasian theoretical perspective. The present work places itself in the interdisciplinary field of philosophy of law and political theory. The thought of the political and the normative conditions of democracy interweave into a certain concept of philosophy of law - as a thought that does not allow itself to forget the issue of legal legitimacy. It works yet in the contemporary register. Requirements, problems and crises of the current world are those which guide the readings of Schmitt, the comprehension of the Weimar experience, and of the fundamental elements of the work of Habermas in the 90 s.

Mémoire (M.A.)--Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2005. / Comprend des réf. bibliogr.: f. 103-106. Également disponible en format microfiche et PDF.

Este estudo tem como objetivo compreender o mal-estar contemporâneo partindo da experiência clínica. Traduz um verdadeiro testemunho da autora enquanto pesquisadora, psicoterapeuta e supervisora. Parte de inquietações desalojadoras experienciadas na clínica e utiliza como objeto de reflexão teórica a Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa, mais especificamente, a Terapia Centrada no Cliente. Realiza uma leitura crítica da teoria da Terapia Centrada no Cliente, analisando a concepção de ciência e a trajetória conceitual empreendida por Carl Rogers. Partindo dessa analise, aponta para a insuficiência dos conceitos de Tendência Atualizante e Angústia para acolher e dar passagem ao mal-estar contemporâneo, indicando a necessidade de uma outra via de acesso que apreenda a condição fundamental e originária do homem. Por fim, apresenta o conceito de angústia de Heidegger enquanto possível contribuição para fecundar e re-significar a prática clínica. Como resultado do percurso empreendido, a autora revela o momento de trânsito em que se encontra, encaminhando-se para uma clínica psicológica enquanto cuidar (Sorge), vinculada a uma teoria do existir humano que pode ser lida como uma ética de aceitação da finitude, da transitoriedade, e dos conflitos. Tal teoria enseja uma prática clínica, que envolva um ato de criação, como abertura de acolhimento para algo que não se conhece, com disponibilidade para se lançar nas complexidades do ser-aí. Aponta que, apesar de ter encontrado algumas respostas para as inquietações desalojadoras que motivaram o presente estudo, a temática abordada, pela sua complexidade e dinâmica própria, esteve e estará sempre aberta a novos olhares e leituras / Departing from clinical experience, this study aims to comprehend the contemporary uneasiness. It shows the author's true testimony not only as a researcher, but also as a psychotherapist and supervisor. This research is based on disruptive clinical experiences by taking into account, as object for theoretical reflection, within the Person-Centered Approach, the Client-Centered Therapy. It makes a critical overview of the Client-Centered Therapy theory by analyzing Carl Rogers' concept of science as well as his conceptual path. Such analysis points to an insufficiency of the Actualizing Tendency and Anguish concepts toward sheltering and, at the same time, to promote a passage for the contemporary uneasiness. Thus, it indicates the need of another way to access and comprehend the fundamental and original human condition. Finally, this study presents Heidegger's anguish concept as a possible contribution to fertilize and re-signify the clinical praxis. As a result of such path, the author reveals her transitional moment of theoretical reflection, directing herself toward a psychological conception of clinic as "care" (Sorge), linked to a human existence theory conceived as an ethics of finitude acceptance, of transivity and conflicts. Such a theory demands a clinical praxis by conceiving a creation act as an opening to shelter something unknown, plenty of availability to carry forward onweself towards the "being-there complexity. The author manifests that, in spite to have found some possible answers to her dislodged inquietude experience that motivated this actual work, its approached thematic, by its own complexity and dynamic involved, implies in an always present openness that instigate new sights and reflections, thus deserving further re-readings

Orientador: Roberto Romano / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T07:16:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bianchini_FernandoNovelli_M.pdf: 1389137 bytes, checksum: 00828ecf31df4523661005da345ea174 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: O presente trabalho objetiva analisar, por um lado, as críticas desenvolvidas pelo jurista e filósofo Carl Schmitt à democracia parlamentar representativa, expostas em suas obras publicadas no período compreendido entre as duas guerras mundiais, bem como tenciona elucidar a proposição, pelo autor, de resposta ao problema político e jurídico que é levantado, mediante a construção de um Estado totalitário. Debate o retorno de tais críticas no atual contexto brasileiro e global e introduz os princípios e os instrumentos da democracia participativa, por outro lado, como possível solução para a problemática que hoje é reavivada, sem sugerir, entretanto, a obliteração da democracia representativa. Analisa os fundamentos e mecanismos da democracia participativa, baseada historicamente na liberdade comunal, invocando as lições do jurista e filósofo Alexis de Tocqueville, especialmente quanto à distribuição de poder político. Debate a justiça coletiva e a importância para o pacto federativo nesse contexto, finalizando, assim, a dissertação / Abstract: The following work intends to analyze, in one hand, the criticisms developed by the jurist and philosopher Carl Schmitt to the parliamentary representative democracy, exposed in his works published in the period between the two world wars, and aims to clarify the proposal, made by the author, in response to the political and legal problem that is exposed, by building a totalitarian state. Discusses the return of such criticism in the current brazilian and global contexts and introduces the principles and instruments of the participatory democracy, on the other hand, as a possible solution to the problem which is now revived, without suggesting, however, the obliteration of representative democracy. After that, analyses the foundations and mechanisms of participatory democracy, historically based on communal freedom, invoking the lessons of the jurist and philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville, especially concerning to the distribution of political power. Debate the importance of the collective justice and the federative pact in this context, ending, after that, the dissertation / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

<p>A diverse variety of liberal thinkers agree that the peace, order, stability, and well-being of government and society rest upon a fundamental bedrock of shared opinion, sentiment, sympathies, meanings, understandings, beliefs, etc. They appear largely correct in making this supposition, for the requirement is built into the very logic of liberal democratic thinking. And yet, the very plausibility of such a shared political background has come into question particularly acutely for the present generation, and, in large part, as a result of the twin forces of pluralism and polarization.</p><p>The two central questions engaged by this study are: (a) is it still conceptually plausible to presuppose such a background, and if so, (b) under what terms does it make sense; in what way should this background be understood?</p><p>This study tackles this set of questions by means of a critical analysis of select and especially prominent, representative intellectual schools of the twentieth century, for which the theme of pluralism is meaningfully central: (a) John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas (as exemplars of the political liberal project), (b) Michel Foucault and contemporary North American neo-Foucauldians (of the discourse of difference), and (c) Carl Schmitt (of the reactionary politics of meaning). The three Parts of the study are dedicated to these three schools.</p><p>The guiding hypothesis of the study is the contention that political order is always already premised upon a shared political Leitkultur (guiding cultural horizon), that is, some sort of implicitly understood cultural formation, whose structure is mis-described as being either freestandingly postmetaphysical; strictly the work of completely self-transparent, pure human reason; or a subtle vehicle for pernicious normalization. As such, pluralism and polarization is always already bounded within this guiding cultural horizon. Presupposing that the three selected schools are meaningfully representative of the intellectual, pluralist alternatives available in the early twenty-first century, the critical analysis of these three schools bears out the study's central hypothesis.</p> / Dissertation