<p>The issue of humanitarian intervention presents a perennial conundrum and is one of the hottest topics in contemporary international relations. It contains aspects of both idealism and realism and is largely an issue born out of the end of the Cold War. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical evaluation of this normative shift in interstate affairs.</p><p>The vast growing body of human rights law serves as one indication that international law is changing in terms of a shift of focus, away from states, and towards the international community made up of individuals. However, in absence of a formal agreement on how and to what scope international law has changed, conclusions can only be made based on the emerging, limited and fragile body of state and UN practices. If such a shift were to be accompanied by a corresponding empirical transformation, it would undoubtedly represent a huge leap forward towards a more solidarist underpinned world order. The present trends within international relations represent at least an aspiration towards some more clearly envisioned solidarity. As international actors interact, they generate new norms, but one must remember that the actors and their practices are themselves products of older norms. The present structures of international society are not ready to accommodate such change.</p><p>Human rights are important, not only because they become embedded in institutions and create new coalitions between actors, but also because they help states redefine their national interests and identities, as well as help them to choose among conflicting priorities such as sovereignty and humanity. Under the present global system, any discussion of the international protection of human rights and humanitarian intervention implies changes in both norms and practices. The theoretical part of this paper provides a framework for assessing these recent developments by determining first, how and why values are shared, and what these values need to be in order for international society to be categorized as solidarist. The empirical part, then moves on to assess state and UN practice in order to conclude if solidarism is a reality in today’s international society.</p><p>In this paper, I argue that there is an international consensus in terms of a right to humanitarian intervention in cases of threats against international peace and security and where the UN S.C has given its authorization. Furthermore, even though not clearly establishing any such right to intervention, cases like East Timor, northern Iraq and Kosovo points to a normative shift where the redefinition of the concept of sovereignty might become a reality. This new consensus is a product of mainly three recent developments: a more expansive interpretation of the S.C on what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the revolution of information technology that has heightened awareness of conflict and suffering, and the increased robustness of international human rights norms. While diversity continues to characterize the 21st century, there is a greater degree of consensus on the meaning of sovereignty and human rights today than most pluralists suggest. Nevertheless, the practical behaviour of the international community shows that the commitment to solidarism remains minimal.</p>

Master thesis in Political Science by Alexander Gaber, 2015, ‘Evidence of the BenevolentState?- The Case of the R2P’ The study sets out to analyze the validity of the soldiarist prescriptive hypothesis that a shared understanding amongst the society of states can induce a circumstance where states will act selflessly by willingly subordinating their rights and sovereign prerogatives for the sake of individual rights. For this purpose the R2P legal doctrine is analyzed genealogically to generate an inference on if the dominant consensus within the society of states on the doctrine has generated this circumstance. The analysis concludes that the R2P doctrine has neither in customary - or codified international law enabled the individual’s right to protection to hold precedence over the right and sovereignty of the state. The case study, conclusively does not serve to validate the hypothesis, but neither does it invalidate it as the R2P constitutes a representative case. The intermarriage of the genealogical method with the English School framework is deemed fruitful and new insights into, specifically, the concept of sovereignty is generated which serves to evolve and reinforce the theoretical framework of English School Solidarism.

The issue of humanitarian intervention presents a perennial conundrum and is one of the hottest topics in contemporary international relations. It contains aspects of both idealism and realism and is largely an issue born out of the end of the Cold War. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical evaluation of this normative shift in interstate affairs. The vast growing body of human rights law serves as one indication that international law is changing in terms of a shift of focus, away from states, and towards the international community made up of individuals. However, in absence of a formal agreement on how and to what scope international law has changed, conclusions can only be made based on the emerging, limited and fragile body of state and UN practices. If such a shift were to be accompanied by a corresponding empirical transformation, it would undoubtedly represent a huge leap forward towards a more solidarist underpinned world order. The present trends within international relations represent at least an aspiration towards some more clearly envisioned solidarity. As international actors interact, they generate new norms, but one must remember that the actors and their practices are themselves products of older norms. The present structures of international society are not ready to accommodate such change. Human rights are important, not only because they become embedded in institutions and create new coalitions between actors, but also because they help states redefine their national interests and identities, as well as help them to choose among conflicting priorities such as sovereignty and humanity. Under the present global system, any discussion of the international protection of human rights and humanitarian intervention implies changes in both norms and practices. The theoretical part of this paper provides a framework for assessing these recent developments by determining first, how and why values are shared, and what these values need to be in order for international society to be categorized as solidarist. The empirical part, then moves on to assess state and UN practice in order to conclude if solidarism is a reality in today’s international society. In this paper, I argue that there is an international consensus in terms of a right to humanitarian intervention in cases of threats against international peace and security and where the UN S.C has given its authorization. Furthermore, even though not clearly establishing any such right to intervention, cases like East Timor, northern Iraq and Kosovo points to a normative shift where the redefinition of the concept of sovereignty might become a reality. This new consensus is a product of mainly three recent developments: a more expansive interpretation of the S.C on what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, the revolution of information technology that has heightened awareness of conflict and suffering, and the increased robustness of international human rights norms. While diversity continues to characterize the 21st century, there is a greater degree of consensus on the meaning of sovereignty and human rights today than most pluralists suggest. Nevertheless, the practical behaviour of the international community shows that the commitment to solidarism remains minimal.

Tout entier empreint de la question de la relation entre volontarisme et justice contractuelle, le droit des contrats a forgé son édifice sur le principe d’équilibre. La tentative de conciliation trouve ses limites : les notions d’économie du contrat ou de contrats relationnels ont fait leur apparition. Certaines notions prennent plus d’importance telles les obligations essentielles, la protection de la partie faible ou encore la bonne foi. Pour intéressantes qu’elles soient, en ce qu’elles proposent une conception plus poussée de l’équilibre, ces approches sont-elles satisfaisantes ? L’analyse des mutations jurisprudentielles et législatives conduit sans cesse à remettre l’ouvrage sur le métier. Ces évolutions ne seraient-elles que de surface ? Ne traduisent-elles pas la nécessité de revisiter plus profondément le droit des obligations ? La question est posée : qu’est-ce qu’un contrat ? Pragmatiquement et sans dogmatisme, il s’agit d’une relation donnant-donnant. Sous cet angle, la relation contractuelle appelle l’équivalence et non l’équilibre. Ainsi, l’équilibre ne serait que l’abstraction de l’équivalence, conçue comme une donnée concrète. L’objet de l’étude consiste à interroger la place de l’équivalence dans le droit des contrats. Plus, il s’agit de savoir comment de postulée, elle peut se transfigurer en notion opérationnelle. / As far as the question of the relationship between voluntarism and contractual justice is concerned, contract law has built its structure on the principle of balance. Attempts at conciliation has its limits: the notions of economy of contracts and relational contracts have appeared. Some notions take on more importance such as essential obligations, protection of the weaker party or even good faith. However interesting they are, in that they propose a more in depth notion of balance, are these approaches satisfactory ? The analysis of jurisprudential and legislative changes constantly leads to re-workings being done. Are these developments only superficial? Do they not convey the need to re-examine in more detail the law of obligations? The question is asked: what is a contract? Pragmatically and without dogmatism, it is a two-way relationship. From this perspective, the contractual relationship calls for equivalence and not balance. In this way, balance would only be an abstract of equivalence, conceived as a concrete fact. The object of this study is to ask the place of equivalence in contract law. Furthermore, it is to know how it can be transformed from the hypothetical to an operational notion.

The thesis aims to address criticisms of cosmopolitanism that characterise it as an elite discourse, by exploring the role that it might play in Third World resistance movements. In doing so, it complicates the landscape of international normative theory, which has traditionally been mapped as a debate between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Part I of the thesis argues that cosmopolitanism and communitarianism can function as languages in which First and Third World states respectively justify exercises of power that impede the self-determination of Third World societies. These discourses of power frame the condition of postcoloniality, which might be understood – borrowing the terminology of International Society theorists – as an entrapment of Third World societies between 'coercive solidarism' and 'authoritarian pluralism'. A normative worldview committed to enhancing the scope for self-determination of such societies must be critical of the production of both external and internal environments that are hostile to the enjoyment of self-determination by Third World peoples. Part II of the thesis explores the political challenges of sustaining such a critique by studying four theorists of resistance who perceive themselves as manoeuvring between hostile external and internal environments. It analyses the political thought of Rabindranath Tagore and Edward Said, who were both leading figures of anti-colonial nationalist movements but also fierce critics of nationalism. It also studies the activism of two leaders in the field of 'anti-globalisation' protest – Subcomandante Marcos of the Zapatistas in Mexico and Professor Nanjundaswamy of the Karnataka State Farmers' Association in India – who struggle against both national elites and global capital. Part II concludes that if resistance in the condition of postcoloniality must grapple simultaneously with both a hostile 'outside' and 'inside', it must speak in mixed registers of universalism and particularity. Cumulatively, the thesis demonstrates that the language of common humanity operates in ways that are both oppressive and emancipatory, just as the language of community is a source of both repression and refuge. Normative theory that does not seek to hold both in tension fails the needs of our non-ideal world.

A l’aune d’une réforme du droit des obligations, et alors que les relations contractuelles se complexifient et ont vocation à durer, le contrat a parfois besoin d’être protégé. Le respect de la parole donnée par les contractants, en raison de la confiance que les parties se sont mutuellement accordées, n’est pas toujours chose aisée pour les parties et un risque d’extinction du contrat sans satisfaction pèse sur les parties. La nullité du contrat, pour défaut de validité, mais surtout les risques d’inexécution, qui peuvent conduire à la résolution ou à la caducité du contrat, menacent l’existence du contrat qui doit pouvoir être sauvé. Une telle survie du contrat, qui a vocation à permettre la réalisation de l’objectif contractuel, est envisageable par la mise en place de remèdes aux défaillances du contrat et, plus généralement, de traitements en cas de risques d’inexécution. Ce droit des remèdes, déjà présent en droit positif, doit pouvoir être étendu, par une systématisation de la survie, qu’il est possible d’intégrer dans une conception renouvelée du contrat.Pour cela, il est indispensable qu’une obligation préexistante dont l’exécution est possible soit maintenue, afin de dépasser la menace d’inexécution. Ce préalable posé, une application extensive destinée à préserver la satisfaction du créancier est envisageable. De la période précontractuelle à l’extinction intégrale des obligations, autrement dit, le droit à l’exécution mais également la protection des obligations post-contractuelles une survie doit pouvoir être mise en place. Mais à quel prix ? La systématisation de la survie du contrat doit permettre de fixer les limites du mécanisme. Puisque les difficultés d’exécution doivent pouvoir être traitées par une modification, par une atteinte à l’intangibilité du contrat. Or, cette atteinte est parfois synonyme de protection de la force obligatoire et de la sécurité juridique des contractants. La loyauté et la bonne foi imposent parfois certains abandons au créancier, mais permettront la réalisation de l’objectif contractuel. Toutefois, des garde-fous doivent être intégrés pour préserver les intérêts d’un créancier, qui n’a pas à subir indéfiniment la situation contractuelle douloureuse. / From a reform of law of obligations standpoint, and while contractual relationships become evermore complex and are meant to last, the contract may need to be protected. Respect for the word given by the contractors, due to the trust that the parties have mutually granted, is not always an easy task for the parties, who may see the contract be extinguished without any satisfaction.The nullity of the contract, by way of invalidity, but especially the risk of default, which can lead to the resolution or the lapse of the contract, threatens the existence of the contract that must be saved. Such survival of the contract, which is intended to enable the achievement of the contractual objective, is foreseen by implementing remedies for the deficiencies of the contract and, more generally, the risk of treatment failure. This right to remedies, already present in positive law, must be extended by a systematization of survival so that it may be possible to integrate a remedy into a new version of the contract.For this, it is essential that preexisting obligation, for which execution is possible, be maintained in order to overcome the threat of default. This prior condition, extensively applied and designed to preserve the satisfaction of the creditor, is possible. From the pre-contractual period to full termination of obligations, including post contractual obligations, through the preservation of the execution, then survival is possible. But at what price?The systemization of contract survival can fix the limits of the mechanism. Implementation difficulties must be addressed by a change, for a breach of the inviolability of the contract, but this achievement is sometimes synonymous with protection of binding and legal security contractors. Loyalty and good faith sometimes provide some ways out for the creditor, but will achieve the contractual objective. However, limits should be incorporated to protect the interests of creditors, whom should not have to endure the painful contractual situation.

This thesis examines the policies, positions, and perspectives of developing countries on the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War, focusing on the period between 1991 and 2001. In doing so, it questions the role of opposition that conventional wisdom has allotted to them as parochial defenders of sovereignty. Instead, the thesis reveals variation and complexity, which militates against defining the South, or the issues that humanitarian intervention raises, in simplistic either-or terms. Part I draws on insights about ‘sovereignty as what states make of it’ to break the classic pluralism-solidarism impasse that has otherwise stymied the conversation on humanitarian intervention and confined the South as a whole to a ‘black box’ labelled rejectionism. It reconstructs the empirical record of developing countries at large on six cases of military intervention (northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, and East Timor), revealing variation that defies easy categorization. It also charts a cumulative and dynamic trend within the South towards a grey area between pluralism and solidarism that shows how these were not diametrically opposed positions. Following from that, Part II looks in-depth at India and Argentina. Whereas Argentina accepted the idea of humanitarian intervention, India remained reluctant to countenance it and persistently objected to the development of a new rule in its favour. Part II argues that the level of congruence between the emerging norm and the two countries’ prevailing values, aspirations, and historically constructed ways of thinking played a key role in determining the different levels of acceptance that the idea found with them. Part III delves deeper into the substance of their views. It shows how neither country constructed mutually exclusive choices between pluralism and solidarism, sovereignty and human rights, and intervention and non-intervention. Rather, both exhibited an acute awareness of the dilemmas of protecting human rights in a society of states, and a wariness of yes-no answers. Cumulatively, this thesis thus points away from thinking about the South itself as a given category with clear, shared or pre-determined ideas, and towards a more nuanced and inclusive conversation on humanitarian intervention.

Sous le régime du Code civil du Bas-Canada, le devoir d’exécuter le contrat de bonne foi était une condition implicite de tout contrat suivant l’article 1024 C.c.B.C. Le 1er janvier 1994, ce devoir a toutefois été codifié à l’article 1375 du Code civil du Québec. Parallèlement à ce changement, le contrat a subi plusieurs remises en question, principalement en raison des critiques émises contre la théorie de l’autonomie de la volonté. En réponse à ces critiques, la doctrine a proposé deux théories qui supposent une importante coopération entre les contractants durant l’exécution du contrat, à savoir le solidarisme contractuel et le contrat relationnel. La notion de bonne foi a aussi évolué récemment, passant d’une obligation de loyauté, consistant généralement en une abstention ou en un devoir de ne pas nuire à autrui, à une obligation plus active d’agir ou de faciliter l’exécution du contrat, appelée devoir de coopération. Ce devoir a donné lieu à plusieurs applications, dont celles de renseignement et de conseil. Ce mémoire étudie la portée et les limites du devoir de coopération. Il en ressort que le contenu et l’intensité de ce devoir varient en fonction de critères tenant aux parties et au contrat. Une étude plus particulière des contrats de vente, d’entreprise et de franchise ainsi que des contrats conclus dans le domaine informatique indique que le devoir de coopération est plus exigeant lorsque le contrat s’apparente au contrat de type relationnel plutôt qu’au contrat transactionnel. Le créancier peut, entre autres choses, être obligé d’« aider » son débiteur défaillant et même de renégocier le contrat devenu déséquilibré en cours d’exécution, bien que cette dernière question demeure controversée. Le devoir de coopération n’est cependant pas illimité parce qu’il s’agit d’une obligation de moyens et non de résultat. Il est également limité, voire inexistant, lorsque le débiteur de cette obligation est tenu à d’autres obligations comme un devoir de réserve ou de non-ingérence, lorsque le cocontractant est de mauvaise foi ou qu’une partie résilie unilatéralement le contrat ou décide de ne pas le renouveler. / The duty of good faith in the performance of the contract was an implied condition of any contract under article 1024 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada. On January 1st 1994, however, this duty was codified at article 1375 of the Civil Code of Québec. In parallel to this change, the traditional understanding of “contract” based on the doctrine of the autonomy of the parties has come to be challenged. In response to this critique, two theories emphasizing the importance of collaboration between contractual parties during the performance of a contract have been suggested, namely, “contractual solidarism” and “relational contract” have been suggested. The notion of “good faith” has also recently evolved. It was originally limited to a duty of loyalty, consisting mainly in an abstention or in the duty not to harm anyone. Today, good faith also refers to a more active obligation which may require a party to act or to facilitate the performance of the contract. This general “duty to cooperate”, as it is called, has given rise to many applications, including the duty to inform or to advise. This paper examines the extent and limits of the duty of the contracting parties to cooperate during the performance of the contract. The content and intensity of this duty are influenced by factors pertaining to the characteristics of the contract or the contracting parties. Our study of the Québec jurisprudence focused on contracts of sale, contracts of enterprise, franchise agreements and contracts in the field of computers. It suggests that the duty of the parties to cooperate is greater in relational contracts than in transactional ones. For example, the creditor may, inter alia, be bound to “help” its defaulting debtor or to renegotiate the agreement when an unforeseen event has changed the initial contractual equilibrium. However, this last issue is still highly controversial. This duty to cooperate is not itself without limits. Firstly, it is an obligation of means, not one of result. It is also limited, even inexistent, when the debtor is bound by other duties such as a duty of “reserve” or of non-interference, when the other party is acting in bad faith or when a party unilaterally terminates a contract or does not renew it.

No description available.

Le corps humain n’a pas échappé au mouvement de contractualisation protéiforme qui se généralise. En ce sens, notre thèse a permis de démontrer l’existence d’une nouvelle catégorie juridique : celle du contrat portant sur le corps humain. Il s’agit d’un genre contractuel qui abrite de nombreuses espèces. La spécificité de ces contrats et l’hétérogénéité des règles qui les gouvernent n’est pas un obstacle à leur systématisation : le contrat portant sur le corps humain est un accord de volontés par lequel l’une des parties met son corps à disposition de l’autre pour l’exécution de la prestation convenue entre elles. En vertu de ce contrat, le cocontractant exerce un pouvoir matériel sur le corps mis à sa disposition. La prestation peut se réaliser sur ou par le corps mis à disposition. Un régime commun a pu être mis à jour. En effet, le législateur prévoit des obligations d’information pour éclairer le consentement de la partie faible, des droits potestatifs extinctifs lui sont également attribués afin que son consentement soit toujours révocable et un encadrement de la sécurité corporelle est nécessairement assuré. Cette étude a conduit à l’élaboration d’une classification des espèces contractuelles, ce qui permet de bénéficier d’une vision d’ensemble de ces contrats et de comprendre que chacun d’entre eux doit s’apprécier suivant l’acte envisagé et le corps mis à disposition. Dès lors, des règles spécifiques s’appliquent, lesquelles sont entièrement dédiées à la protection du corps et, partant, de la dignité humaine. / The human body has not escaped the movement of protean contractualization that is becoming more widespread. In this sense, our thesis made it possible to demonstrate the existence of a new legal category: that of the contract relating to the human body. It is a contractual genus that houses many species. The specificity of these contracts and the heterogeneity of the rules governing them is not an obstacle to their systematization: the contract relating to the human body is an agreement of will by which one of the parties makes his body available to the other for the performance of the service agreed between them. Under this contract, the contracting partner exercises material power over the body placed at his disposal. The service can be performed on or through the body provided. A common regime has been updated. Indeed, the legislator lays down information obligations to enlighten the consent of the weaker party, extinctive potential rights are also granted to him so that his consent can always be revoked and a framework for bodily safety is necessarily ensured. This study led to the elaboration of a classification of contractual species, which allows us to benefit from an overview of these contracts and to understand that each of them must be assessed according to the act envisaged and the body made available. As a result, specific rules apply, which are entirely dedicated to the protection of the body and, therefore, of human dignity.