<p>I och med det svenska bidraget till NATO missionen i Afghanistan samt den nyupprättade bergsplutonen på Arméns JägarBataljon i Arvidsjaur så har frågor kring taktik i bergsterräng även blivit aktuellt för Sverige. Då svenska utbildningarna och doktriner i huvudsak saknar problematiseringen kring att strida eller verka i bergsterräng så kan man där av ställa sig frågan hur ska vi få kunskap om detta? Detta arbete syftar därför till att jämföra den av USA använda taktiken i Afghanistans bergsterräng och den Sovjet har använt sig av. Frågan som arbetet försöker besvara är dels vad skillnaden har varit mellan taktiken hos stormakterna samt vad som varit den största framgångsfaktorn och begränsningen i respektive lands konflikt. Arbetet bygger på ett underlag främst från litteratur samt artiklar om operationer genomförda i Afghanistan.</p><p>Arbetets resultat kan sammanfattas med att de faktorer som mest har påverkat dessa länders lösande av uppgift har varit hur ledarskapet har varit inom deras förband, och då främst hur i vilken utsträckning dessa har använt sig av uppdragstaktik. Flexibilitet, samordning av den indirekta elden och valet av understödsförmågor har även dessa varit viktiga faktorer som påverkat lösandet av uppgiften.</p> / <p>Due to the Swedish contribution to the by NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the newly established Mountain Platoon at the Swedish Army Ranger Batalion in Arvidsjaur have the question about mountain warfare started to be of interest for Sweden. Because of the lack of discussion of mountain warfare and how to act in the mountain terrain in the Swedish military doctrine and education the question is how to get knowledge of this? The purpose of this paper is to compare the tactics used by the U.S. and the Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan. The question this paper is trying to answer is what the different between the two countries tactics and what have been the most important factor for success and the biggest limitation in the countries tactics in the conflict. The basis for the comparison was received from literature and articles about operations conducted in Afghanistan.</p><p>The results of the essay can be summarized in that the most prominent factor have been the leadership used by the units, and mainly to what extent they have used mission type tactics, Flexibility, coordination of the indirect fire and what support they have chosen to use have also been an important factor that affected the outcome.</p>

I och med det svenska bidraget till NATO missionen i Afghanistan samt den nyupprättade bergsplutonen på Arméns JägarBataljon i Arvidsjaur så har frågor kring taktik i bergsterräng även blivit aktuellt för Sverige. Då svenska utbildningarna och doktriner i huvudsak saknar problematiseringen kring att strida eller verka i bergsterräng så kan man där av ställa sig frågan hur ska vi få kunskap om detta? Detta arbete syftar därför till att jämföra den av USA använda taktiken i Afghanistans bergsterräng och den Sovjet har använt sig av. Frågan som arbetet försöker besvara är dels vad skillnaden har varit mellan taktiken hos stormakterna samt vad som varit den största framgångsfaktorn och begränsningen i respektive lands konflikt. Arbetet bygger på ett underlag främst från litteratur samt artiklar om operationer genomförda i Afghanistan. Arbetets resultat kan sammanfattas med att de faktorer som mest har påverkat dessa länders lösande av uppgift har varit hur ledarskapet har varit inom deras förband, och då främst hur i vilken utsträckning dessa har använt sig av uppdragstaktik. Flexibilitet, samordning av den indirekta elden och valet av understödsförmågor har även dessa varit viktiga faktorer som påverkat lösandet av uppgiften. / Due to the Swedish contribution to the by NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the newly established Mountain Platoon at the Swedish Army Ranger Batalion in Arvidsjaur have the question about mountain warfare started to be of interest for Sweden. Because of the lack of discussion of mountain warfare and how to act in the mountain terrain in the Swedish military doctrine and education the question is how to get knowledge of this? The purpose of this paper is to compare the tactics used by the U.S. and the Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan. The question this paper is trying to answer is what the different between the two countries tactics and what have been the most important factor for success and the biggest limitation in the countries tactics in the conflict. The basis for the comparison was received from literature and articles about operations conducted in Afghanistan. The results of the essay can be summarized in that the most prominent factor have been the leadership used by the units, and mainly to what extent they have used mission type tactics, Flexibility, coordination of the indirect fire and what support they have chosen to use have also been an important factor that affected the outcome.

This essay is a product of the author’s interest in silent films from Soviet, especially, documentary films. Before the 1920’s documentary filmmaking had mostly been limited to newsreels and short scenes. Only occasional feature-length documentaries had been made. During the 1920s, documentary film achieved new status, not only because of its use as propaganda; it was also identified as artistic cinema. Discussions how to use this genre were taking place all over Europe, and in the US. In France, many different journals on cinema were started. In Soviet the discussions later became politicised. It was a good climate for groundbreaking cinema, and Esfir Shub was one of the film pioneers in Soviet. The ambition with the essay is to give Esfir Shub theoretical approach to non-fiction film a greater acknowledgement. The thesis is how Esfir Shub combines titles and pictures with cutting in The Fall of the Romanov Dynasty (1927) and to theorise the film with Shub’s own conceptual ideas. The method is close reading of the film and the articles written by Shub. The conclusions made by the author, is that Shub uses titles and pictures, in a dynamic cross-cutting between the oppressor and the oppressed. She is faithful to her own theories. She is only using authentically material and not played scenes; otherwise she would distort historical facts. The montage is built in two different ways. Firstly Shub use an ironic tone in the titles when she introduces the oppressors from the old regime, and comment these images widely. Secondly she uses pictures of typical symbols of capitalism and does not need to comment in such matter as earlier, because the film material she had captured speaks for itself.

This essay is a qualitative study on the tv series Chernobyl and examines how Soviet is portrayed through the character of Boris Shcherbina and the environment in which the series takes place. For many, the series is a first acquaintance with the nuclear accident and Soviet in the 80’s. Due to the fact that Soviet was a relatively closed society, series like this can have a wider effect than usual, since there haven't been many other sources of information available. The study examines material regarding a historical event that had a global influence. The historical context of the cold war and previous stereotypical portrayals of Soviet makes for an interesting backdrop as the study examines what is being communicated about Soviet through the visuals. By conducting a semiotic analysis on selected scenes and thereafter using Robert Entman’s framing theory to analyze the empirical material this study has found that the series portrays Soviet negatively. Soviet is framed as a controlling and somewhat claustrophobic state, where persecution and inspection seem common. It is further portrayed as a state one does not question or go against, and the citizens seem to lack independence in relation to the state. The communist society is depicted as very hierarchical, with highly regarded leaders, such as Shcherbina, and with citizens living in simplicity and facing oppression. The environments in the series are often grey, dark and gloomy, which contributes to the portrayal of Soviet as a somber state.

Many acknowledge the lack of studies addressing military logistics, yet the issue persists. While existing research predominantly examines western contexts, this study seeks to enrich our understanding by delving into the less-explored realm of military logistics in Eastern settings. The primary objective of this study is to enhance understanding of the logistical dynamics during the Soviet–Afghan war by examining the Soviet logistics. Using Moshe Kress's theoretical framework on operational and structural logistics, this research endeavors to illuminate this historical case. Employing a case study methodology coupled with qualitative text analysis, the study examines the Soviet logistics in the Soviet–Afghan conflict. The findings underscore the challenges the Soviets encountered in managing their logistics, particularly in ensuring the security of their communication lines. The study attributes many of these challenges to the inadequate road infrastructure and the hostile terrain of the region.

<p>1979 till 1989 pågick en sovjetisk militär insats i Afghanistan vars syfte var att bedriva upprorsbekämpning för att stödja den afghanska marionettregeringen. Efter 9/11 2001 blev Afghanistan återigen ett insatsområde för en amerikanskledd koalition vars syfte var att störta talibanerna och sätta en ny regering till makten. Som en följd av detta genomfördes flera markoperationer för att rensa upp de sista talibanska fästena. En av dessa operationer var Operation Anaconda. Men fanns och finns det fortfarande erfarenheter som från Sovjets insatser som kunde haft en effekt på denna operation samt liknande operationer? Syftet med denna uppsats är att utgå från de sovjetiska operationer Afghanistan 1979-1989 och påvisa framgångsfaktorer som kan användas på markoperationer inom ramen för upprorsbekämpning. Uppsatsen slutsatser pekar på att det finns framgångsfaktorer att dra av de sovjetiska erfarenheterna i områdena: Indirekt eld, den afghanska terrängen och lokalt understödjande förband, ledning, operationssäkerhet och principen för överraskning.</p> / <p>Between 1979 and 1989 there was an on going soviet military intervention which purpose was to battle insurgents in favour of the, by the Soviets, supported puppet government. After 9/11 2001 Afghanistan was once again a stage, bur for an American led coalition which purpose was to over throw the Taliban regime and install a new government. Because of this, several ground operations were conducted to clear out the last of the Taliban remnants. One of these operations was Operation Anaconda. But were there any experiences from the soviets operations that could have an effect on this and other operations? The purpose of this essay is to start from Soviet operations from 1979-1989 in Afghanistan and point out criteria’s of success that could be used on ground based operations within the context of counterinsurgency. The result of the essay points out that there is criteria’s of success to be found in the experiences from the Soviets operations in the fields of: Artillery, Afghan terrain and local supportive units, command and control, operational security and the principle of surprise.</p>

1979 till 1989 pågick en sovjetisk militär insats i Afghanistan vars syfte var att bedriva upprorsbekämpning för att stödja den afghanska marionettregeringen. Efter 9/11 2001 blev Afghanistan återigen ett insatsområde för en amerikanskledd koalition vars syfte var att störta talibanerna och sätta en ny regering till makten. Som en följd av detta genomfördes flera markoperationer för att rensa upp de sista talibanska fästena. En av dessa operationer var Operation Anaconda. Men fanns och finns det fortfarande erfarenheter som från Sovjets insatser som kunde haft en effekt på denna operation samt liknande operationer? Syftet med denna uppsats är att utgå från de sovjetiska operationer Afghanistan 1979-1989 och påvisa framgångsfaktorer som kan användas på markoperationer inom ramen för upprorsbekämpning. Uppsatsen slutsatser pekar på att det finns framgångsfaktorer att dra av de sovjetiska erfarenheterna i områdena: Indirekt eld, den afghanska terrängen och lokalt understödjande förband, ledning, operationssäkerhet och principen för överraskning. / Between 1979 and 1989 there was an on going soviet military intervention which purpose was to battle insurgents in favour of the, by the Soviets, supported puppet government. After 9/11 2001 Afghanistan was once again a stage, bur for an American led coalition which purpose was to over throw the Taliban regime and install a new government. Because of this, several ground operations were conducted to clear out the last of the Taliban remnants. One of these operations was Operation Anaconda. But were there any experiences from the soviets operations that could have an effect on this and other operations? The purpose of this essay is to start from Soviet operations from 1979-1989 in Afghanistan and point out criteria’s of success that could be used on ground based operations within the context of counterinsurgency. The result of the essay points out that there is criteria’s of success to be found in the experiences from the Soviets operations in the fields of: Artillery, Afghan terrain and local supportive units, command and control, operational security and the principle of surprise.

Abstrakt Målet med denna kunskapsöversikt är att kartlägga tidigare forskning i synen på sovjetkommunism och Sovjetunionens roll under kalla kriget och hur det skildras i historieundervisningen. Översikten kommer även att kartlägga forskning i hur och varför detta ämne skiljer sig i länder som i dagsläget är icke-kommunistiska baserat på skillnader i historiekulturer från 1933 till nutid. Majoriteten av de källor som använts i denna kunskapsöversikt har tagit utgångspunkt i tre perspektiv: historieläroböcker, lärare och historieundervisning, samt historiekulturer. Databaserna som användes för att hitta källor var följande: Swepub, EBSCO, Libguide och DIVA. Databaserna användes i syfte att hitta både engelska och svenska källor eftersom källorna inom detta område var mycket begränsade och källor skrivna på engelska skulle öppna upp för ett mer internationellt perspektiv. Slutsatsen som kan dras av denna kunskapsöversikt är att synen på sovjetkommunism och den roll som Sovjetunionen spelade under kalla kriget skiljer sig mellan länder som i dagsläget inte är under kommunistiskt styre. Både synen på kommunism och Sovjetunionens roll i kalla kriget kommer med en viss tvetydighet vilket skildras i kunskapsöversikten. Vidare påverkas historieläroböckerna av politik och tenderar att vara mindre analytiska än historielärarna. Historielärarnas syn på kommunism och kalla kriget påverkas av historiekultur som kan visa ett lands historiska koppling till kommunism och sovjetkommunism.

The dissertation in hand is about the theological researches about the mission of the German Mennonite - Brethren - Church in Karaganda I Kasachstan from 1956 to 2000. The existing socialism with its atheistical values affected adversely the lives of the Christians and prevented them from missionary work. In spite of that mission was able to be practised. Experienced preachers and teachers in the church prepared the missionary work by instructing the Christians to be effective witnesses for the Lord. This was achieved by the training of young preachers. regular pronouncements of the Gospel and the work with children and young persons. The Christians retained this method until the middle of the 70ies when the regid laws concerning the missionary work were mitigated. Commited brothers. young persons, preachers and singers visited lonely Christians and churches in remote villages, had personal conversations with unbelievers and organized evangelizations. Members ofthe church were sent out as missionaries to erect parishes and carry out evangelizations / Missiology / M.Th.

<p>The economic development and industrialization that has taken place in many parts of the world during the past century has brought about a huge increase in economic welfare. During this process, it has repeatedly been debated whether the gains from economic development are shared by everyone or just a few. In the field of economics, vast research has been conducted on this particular subject ever since the 1950’s. The most famous contribution might be said to be Simon Kuznets article, Growth and Income Inequality from 1955 and the ”inverted U”-hypothesis that was formulated on the basis of that article. The essence of the hypothesis is that a country, during its development, moves from agricultural to industrial production. At first, income inequality increases and then, at the end of the process, decreases.</p><p>The aim of this paper has been to investigate the relationship between income distribution and economic development in a particular region, namely the countries of the former Soviet Union, during 1992-2003. Also, we have tested whether Kuznets theory and the “inverted U”-hypothesis hold true for our sample. The investigations method is a survey, which uses secondary data collected from the World Bank’s database of World Development Indicators. Regression-analysis has been employed to conduct cross-sections between 20 countries over 4 periods in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The number of observations equals to 62. The variables that we use are: the Gini index, GDP per capita and the agricultural sector’s share of GDP.</p><p>The results of the regression do not indicate any resemblance to the pattern of the “inverted U”-hypothesis. The curve we get is that of a “positive U”. Countries with high GDP per capita as well as countries with low GDP per capita have high income inequality. Countries with mediate GDP per capita levels have low income inequality. Our analysis concludes that the countries in our sample might have had a very unique economic development following the fall of the Soviet Union. Only 7 countries partly follow the Kuznets theory if tested individually. Since these seven countries seem to have a reversed development with increasing agricultural sector and the remainder of the countries show increasing income inequality, we reject the “inverted U”-hypothesis and question the ability of Kuznets’ theory to explain income distribution for our sample.</p>