Esta dissertação tem como objetivo encontrar a relação entre a unidade de Deus conceituado por Spinoza e a pluralidade de possibilidades de ação humana. Para chegar a tal ponto, é analisado o problema denominado por alguns comentadores como a passagem dos modos e atributos infinitos (de Deus) para os modos finitos. Este ponto se dá por não existir uma clareza nas partes finais da primeira sessão da Ética de Spinoza, deixando em aberto diversas interpretações possíveis. De posse desta análise são apresentados os conceitos chaves para o trabalho que foi realizado, entre eles a teoria da informação e análises matemáticas sobre o infinito, culminando na apresentação do conceito de entropia, que consiste na energia da possibilidade. O trabalho demonstra, com uma abordagem na teoria da ação, como é possível a partir de um Deus, através da lei da entropia, existir um mundo de infinitos modos (coisas) finitos. Conclui-se por fim, que da mesma forma da existência finita dos modos, as ações humanas estão em um reino do possível, não sendo totalmente determinadas, mas todas com causas possíveis e previsíveis, seja em Deus, seja nos afetos humanos. / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico, CNPq. / This dissertation aims to find the relationship between the unity of God as conceived by Spinoza and the plurality of possibilities of human action. To reach this point, the problem called by a few commentators as the passage from infinite modes and atributes (of God) to finite modes is analyzed. This is because there is no clarity in the final parts of the first session of the Ethics, leaving several possible interpretations. The second part presents the key concepts for the work that has been done, among them information theory and mathematical analyzes on infinity, culminating in the presentation of the concept of entropy, which consists of the energy of possibility. The essay demonstrates, with an approach on action theory, how it is possible from one God, through the law of entropy, to exist a world of infinite finite modes (things). In conclusion, in the same way as the existence of finite modes, human actions are in a realm of the possible, not being totally determined, but all with possible and foreseeable causes, whether from God or from the human's affections.

Esta pesquisa busca trazer subsídios para a construção teórico-metológica da Educação Ambiental a partir da aproximação do pensamento de Espinosa, em especial o conceito de potência de agir do filósofo, da experiência educativa deflagrada pelo Coletivo Educador Ambiental de Campinas (COEDUCA)/SP/Brasil, que se pautou pela Política Pública de Coletivos Educadores do Departamento de Educação Ambiental do Ministério do Meio Ambiente brasileiro (DEA/MMA). A investigação foi desenvolvida com o uso de elementos da pesquisa qualitativa e procedimentos do estudo de caso. Buscou-se identificar elementos do processo educativo socioambiental supracitado que convergissem com o conceito de potência espinosano, de modo a contribuir com a edificação de processos formativos de educadores ambientais que possibilitem um aumento da potência de indivíduos e grupos ´pré-ocupados` com a sustentabilidade local, regional e planetária. / This research seeks to provide subsidies for the theoretical and methodological construction of Environmental Education, towards the approach to the Spinoza\'s thought, especially the philosopher potency of action concept, triggered by the educational experience of the Environmental Educator Collective of Campinas (COEDUCA) - SP/Brazil, which was guided by the Public Policy of Educator Collective of the Environmental Education Department of the Brazilian Environment Ministerial (DEA/MMA). The investigation was developed with elements of qualitative research and case study procedures. There was an intention of identify elements of the socialenvironmental educational process mentioned above, that could converge with the Spinoza´s concept of potency, in order to contribute to the edification of the formative processes of environmental educators, that could increase individuals and groups potency \'pre-occupied` with local, regional and global sustainability.

In this project I examine pantheistic views in the history of philosophy and advocate for pantheism as a philosophical position in contemporary philosophy of religion. I take pantheism to be the view that everything that exists constitutes a unity, and that that unity is divine. My contention is that what I call <i>rationalistic pantheism</i>, sufficiently articulated with the help of historical figures, is a position worthy of consideration in contemporary philosophy of religion and metaphysics and not merely as an historical artifact. Pantheism is usually not even considered as an alternative to the belief in the God of perfection theism, a perfect personal God. Often people see atheism as the only alternative to the perfect God of traditional theism. A primary aim of this project is to articulate a version of pantheism that is distinct both from perfection theism and atheism. I discuss in what way the rationalistic pantheist sees all of existence as forming a unity, and what it is about this unity that warrants calling it divine or God. Pantheism has a powerful tradition in the history of philosophy, and the rationalistic pantheism that I develop is based on the views of Spinoza, Herder, and Hegel. In the first three chapters I consider the views of each of these philosophers as distinct but closely related versions of pantheism. I attempt to provide a systematic and charitable account of each of their views while also considering objections to those views from various directions. In the final chapter I provide the basis for what I take to be the most plausible version of pantheism resulting from this historical analysis, which I call rationalistic pantheism. According to this view, God, or the divine, should be conceived of as an all-encompassing unity that exists necessarily, is radically independent, is structured in accordance with rational principles, and provides an explanatory basis for everything that exists. In addition, the recognition of the rational principles of existence on the part of rational agents such as human beings constitutes one of the highest achievements of this divine unity. I briefly consider additional argumentative resources that could support such a view, as well as what I take to be the distinct philosophical advantages of rationalistic pantheism over perfection theism. Ultimately, I think pantheism is worthy of serious consideration as a viable position both in philosophical debates, as well as in discussions of religion at large, providing a refreshing middle ground between traditional theism and atheism.

Spinoza hat durch die mathematische Form, in der er sein Hauptwerk, die ''Ethica'', abfaßte, der in seiner Zeit viel bedachten, aber kaum diskutierten Frage der philosophischen Methode einen Angriffspunkt gegeben. Sehr zum Nachteil für seine Lehre, denn schon in der zeitgenössischen Rezeption bildete sich das später (bei Christian Wolff beispielsweise) herrschende Urteil, in der ''Ethica'' würden atheistische Thesen unter dem Schutz einer exakten Methode für wahr ausgegeben. Die Widerlegungen des Spinozismus bemühten sich demzufolge entweder auf dem Feld der Beweise und Voraussetzungen um den Nachweis der Fehlerhaftigkeit oder sie hielten die Argumentation für unangreifbar und schten den atheistischen Charakter einzelner Lehrsätze aufzuzeigen. Beide Verfahren der Zurückweisung des Spinozismus basierten auf der Unanfechtbarkeit des methodischen Ideals (das man in einem Fall für falsch angewendet, im anderen für unwiderleglich durchgeführt sah). Spinozas Philosophie ist in der Tat (nicht nur der äußeren Form der Ethica nach) mit dem Problem der philosophischen Methode beschäftigt, wie es die Schrift aus den frühen sechziger Jahren, der ''Tractatus de intellectus emendatione'', beweist. Dort findet sich eine allgemeine Theorie der Methode als Philosophie. Spinoza thematisiert die Idee der Methode und deren Form also von Beginn an auf einer anderen Ebene als zu seiner Zeit etwa Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes oder die Autoren der ''Logique de Port-Royal'', Arnauld und Nicole. Jene haben die philosophische Methode mit den Verfahren der Analyse und Synthese (Descartes), oder unter logischen und rhetorischen Gesichtspunkten (Pascal) diskutiert, beziehungsweise beide Standpunkte beisammen abgehandelt (Arnauld und Nicole). Einzig Hobbes kommt mit seinem Entwurf eines Wissenschaftssystems mit mathematischer Ordnung dem Ideal Spinozas nahe. Den historischen Kontext, wie er hier kurz skizziert ist, nimmt die folgende Unternsuchung zum Anlaß, sich eingehend mit dem Problem der Methode in der Philosophie Spinozas zu beschäftigen. Sie berücksichtigt dazu vor allem den unvollendeten ''Tractatus''. Von dessen Definitionslehre nimmt sie ihren Ausgang, weil diese als Kernstück der Methodologie eine Frage aufwirft, deren Lösung Spinoza in der ''Ethica'' versucht. Zudem ist Spinozas Theorie der Definition noch nicht zusammenhängend erläutert worden. Die ''Überständigkeit'' der im ''Tractatus'' formulierten Frage (einer philosophischen Methode), der auch die Erkenntnistheorie der ''Ethica'' keine endgültige Antwort gibt, lenkt die Untersuchung zum Abschluß auf eine Erklärung des mos geometricus, dessen philosophische Relevanz erst vor dem Hintergrund des ursprünglich methodologischen Problems erkennbar werden kann.

The current enthusiasm for the original and radical democratic nature of Spinoza’s political philosophy is not easy to justify, given the elusive character of his few systematic remarks on democracy. But the Ethics as well as the political writings contain a substantial political theory centered on the figure of the multitudo (or people) that proves useful for current theorizing. It can help to conceive of democracy not only as form-of-state but as form-of-life; it might serve as the starting point for a conception of non-identitarian, “heterogeneous democracy”; and it can provide a model for understanding political philosophy as political ontology.

Starting from the experience of watching the role of the teacher turn into a bureaucrat, this work examines the factors dominating current education systems. It identies Human Capital Theory as a main inuence on policy and prioritization decisions in education. A central tension that results from this inuence is the fact that economic theory assumes consumer sovereignty, which dismisses many ideological and political aspects of education as paternalism. This inherent conict between economic theory and educational theory leads to an overemphasis on positional goods, goods that are limited by scarcity, over nonpositional goods, such as knowledge. Educating for positional goods is contrasted to the Spinozistic ideal of education for freedom and for increased conatus. It is then discussed how current assessment practices play a central role in cementing the current hegemony in education as governed by economic concerns. Assessment practices are found to both contribute to current trends in education as well as stabilizing the system overall making transformative change less likely. This is more specically illustrated by two particular assessment practices, namely standardized testing and assessment for learning. It concludes with a search for possible paths to meaningful change in education.

<p>There is longstanding interpretive dispute between commentators over Spinoza’s commitment to <i>necessitarianism</i>, the doctrine that all things are metaphysically necessary and none are contingent. Those who affirm Spinoza’s commitment to the doctrine adhere to <i>the necessitarian interpretation</i> whereas those who deny it adhere to what I call <i>the semi-necessitarian interpretation</i>. As things stand, the disagreement between commentators appears to have reached an impasse. Notwithstanding, there seems to be no disagreement among commentators on the question of necessitarianism’s philosophical plausibility as a metaphysical view: the doctrine is wildly untenable. This consensus view is more relevant to the interpretive debate than few have recognized, since leading semi-necessitarian commentators take the doctrine’s alleged absurdity to be one of the most compelling reasons (if not <i>the</i> most compelling reason) to prefer their reading over the necessitarian interpretation: for, as a matter of methodological principle, great philosophers like Spinoza should not be ascribed ridiculous views in the absence of better evidence. </p> <p>This dissertation seeks to defend Spinoza’s commitment to necessitarianism on both the interpretive and philosophical fronts. I argue not only that the necessitarian interpretation of Spinoza is more plausible than the semi-necessitarian interpretation on textual grounds, but that Spinoza’s necessitarianism is a serviceable philosophical view whose tenability has been almost entirely overlooked and perfunctorily rejected. The principal basis upon which I build this defense is Spinoza’s rich and fascinating view of essences—what I simply refer to as his <i>essentialism</i>. Spinoza’s essentialism forms the bedrock of his metaphysics and is significant not least because it underlies and informs doctrines like his necessitarianism. Spinoza’s essentialism supplies resources to answer not just interpretive problems associated with necessitarianism, but philosophical challenges to the plausibility of the doctrine. My defense of Spinoza’s necessitarianism on philosophical grounds also offers a novel way of getting past much of the current interpretive impasse among commentators by effectively undercutting the methodological motivation for the semi-necessitarian reading. In addition to my defense on the interpretive front, then, my defense on the philosophical front provides supplementary reason to <i>a fortiori</i> favor the necessitarian reading of Spinoza.</p>

[pt] Democracia formas de governo em Espinosa e Maquiavel: outra perspectiva sobre a Modernidade analisa os meios através dos quais a tradição espinosano-maquiaveliana, uma alternativa a outras vertentes teóricas da Modernidade, compreende os fundamentos jurídico-constitucionais que sustentam as formas de governo e, particularmente, a democracia, bem como suas estratégias de conservação. Pretende-se responder ao seguinte questionamento: em que medida esta tradição oferece alternativas para a compreensão dos alicerces das formas de governo e, em particular, da democracia, de modo permitir o entendimento dos meios necessários à conservação daqueles princípios constitucionais que sustentam o Estado de Direito? Acredita-se, como hipótese, que a duração de uma forma de governo instituída exige a incorporação da dinâmica conflitiva dos afetos às estruturas que promovem a gestão dos assuntos comuns do Estado, o que permitiria a canalização da potência constituinte e, consequentemente, ofereceria meios para o aperfeiçoamento da própria forma de governo. Este estudo alinha-se à vertente das pesquisas de caráter eminentemente compreensivo, uma vez que se volta a um exame qualitativo dos conceitos traçados a partir da teoria crítica da fortuna. Ante a variação das circunstâncias, a conservação da dinâmica afetiva de um governo democrático requer um retorno aos princípios para promover a reintrodução do desejo de liberdade, uma vez que a república deve estar aberta à participação e livre de meios que concentrem as decisões a gestão dos assuntos comuns do Estado, mantendo-as sempre abertas as discussões, bem como os próprios canais de decisão à população. / [en] Democracy and forms government by Spinoza and Machiavelli: another perspective of the Modern Era analyzes the means by which the Spinoza- Machiavelli tradition presents itself as an alternative to the mainstream constitutional thought developed after their works. The understanding of the constitutional foundations that support not only democracy, but the other forms of government as well intends to demonstrate its conservation strategies by answering the following question: to what extent does this tradition offer alternatives to improve the understanding of the forms of government and, in particular, of democracy? In order to allow an understanding of the means necessary for the conservation of those constitutional principles that maintain the rule of law, it is believed that every government needs to incorporate the conflictive dynamic of the affects to its structures and, therefore, promote a plural management of the political affairs. This is the basis which would offer means for the improvement of the form of government itself. Methodologically, this study develops a qualitative examination of the concepts drawn from the critical theory of fortune in order to comprehend the varying circumstances that allow the preservation of that democratic dynamics that governments require. In this matter, a return to those principles experienced by past democratic experiments should clarify the means to the reintroduction of the desire for freedom. Throughout the opening to the participation that involves the absence of means that concentrate decisions in the just a few people, every form of government keeps power in its population hands.

Ce mémoire interroge la présence de Spinoza dans la production littéraire de Clarice Lispector. La philosophie spinoziste, que la jeune écrivaine a étudiée avant même de composer son premier roman, Près du cœur sauvage (1943), a profondément marqué sa pratique littéraire ainsi que ses préoccupations existentielles. Dans le cadre d’une réflexion sur la présence explicite et implicite de la pensée spinoziste dans ses écrits, ce mémoire porte plus précisément sur les manifestations de la nature dans l’œuvre de Lispector. Parmi les nombreuses assertions fracassantes de L’Éthique, la plus marquante est sans doute celle où Spinoza affirme que Dieu est immanent à la nature, d'après la célèbre formule « Deus, sive Natura », qui suggère que les deux termes sont interchangeables. Ce mémoire examine les articulations de cette idée dans l’écriture de Lispector. La première moitié du mémoire s’attache à montrer que la présence de la philosophie spinoziste dans l’œuvre de l’écrivaine va bien au-delà de l’intertextualité ou de la simple reprise conceptuelle. Elle prend la forme d’une quête d’écriture, qui questionne la possibilité d’exprimer cette vision « spinoziste » de la nature : comment écrire la fusion entre l'esprit humain et la nature dont il fait partie, quand le langage suppose une division entre soi et le monde, une séparation entre sujet et objet ? La seconde partie du mémoire s’intéresse au rôle du langage et aux diverses stratégies d’écriture employées par Lispector dans ses récits et nouvelles. Une analyse des différents procédés littéraires au moyen desquels l’écrivaine met en scène le rapport de l’esprit humain à la nature souligne l’importance de la littérature comme modalité de la pensée. / This study questions the presence of Spinoza in the literary work of Clarice Lispector. Spinoza’s philosophy, which the young writer studied even before composing her first novel, Near the Wild Heart (1943), permeated her literary practice as well as her existential concerns. As a reflection on the explicit and implicit presence of Spinozism in her writings, this study focuses more specifically on the manifestations of nature in Lispector’s literary work. Among the many groundbreaking assertions of the author of The Ethics, the most striking deals with Spinoza’s assertion that God is immanent in nature, according to the famous "Deus, sive Natura", a formula suggesting that the two terms are interchangeable. The first half of the thesis aims to show that the presence of Spinozist philosophy in the work of the writer goes well beyond mere intertextuality or conceptual repetition, but questions the possibility of expressing this "Spinozist" vision of nature in language: how does one write the fusion between human mind and nature, of which it is a part, when language presupposes a division between the self and the world, a separation between subject and object? The second half examines the place of language in the expression of this vision and the various writing strategies used in Lispector’s short stories and novels. An analysis of the different literary processes by means of which the writer stages the relationship between the human mind and nature underscores the importance of literature as a modality of thought.

Cette thèse propose de suivre la lecture deleuzienne de Spinoza afin de montrer comment Deleuze inscrit sa philosophie de la différence dans l'histoire de la philosophie et de la métaphysique. Loin d'être condescendant envers l'histoire de cette discipline, Deleuze légitime sa conception bi-univoque de la différence à l'aide du parallélisme entre la Nature naturante et la Nature naturée de Spinoza. La différenciation de l'actuel (les modes, l'événement) se fait dans la différentiation du virtuel et c'est en procédant de la sorte que Deleuze participe de plain-pied à la tradition immanentiste de la philosophie où l'être se dit seulement de la différence qu'il exprime. Plus encore, cette thèse explique comment Deleuze reprend les principes de cette métaphysique immanentiste pour établir sa conception de la subjectivité. Là aussi, sa lecture de Spinoza est essentielle, car en affirmant la non-substantialisation de l'âme comme le fait Spinoza, Deleuze peut attaquer, à la racine, les fondements épistémologiques des philosophies du sujet de son époque (existentialisme et phénoménologie en tête). Pour Deleuze, cette conception modale de l'âme et de la subjectivité appuie, métaphysiquement parlant, une épistémologie fondée sur la passivité du sujet. Loin d'être le fondement de la vérité des idées, la conscience d'un moi dans l'âme est, pour Deleuze, un résultat synthétisé, jamais une fonction synthétisante. En ce sens, l'ultime réduction de la philosophie n'est plus l'ego cogito cartésien, mais consiste à reconnaître la fêlure du Je. Deleuze construit ainsi, en envisageant la place de l'imagination dans la puissance de connaître l'âme, une autre épistémologie que celle du sujet fondateur transcendantal ou transcendant. Pour lui, le constat est clair : comment pouvons-nous croire que nous sommes responsables de l'idée que nous formons de nous-mêmes (et s'établir sur celle-ci pour fonder, épistémologiquement, nos idées sur les choses) si nous ne savons même pas ce que peut notre corps, ni comment celui-ci peut affecter et être affecté par notre âme ? Ce principe de « l'inconnu du corps » relativise l'éminence de l'âme et inscrit Deleuze à la fois dans l'une des plus importantes batailles philosophiques de la Modernité (celle de Spinoza contre Descartes) et dans la crise de la subjectivité qui caractérise la pensée française au moment des années soixante. Mots clés : Deleuze ; Spinoza ; Descartes ; histoire de la philosophie ; métaphysique ; épistémologie ; subjectivité ; différence ; actuel ; virtuel ; Je fêlé ; corps ; imagination ; éthologie.