O nosso trabalho consiste na tradução e no estudo do De Ira do filósofo estoico e político romano Lucio Anêu Sêneca. A obra é endereçada ao seu irmão Novato que, supostamente, o indaga como conter essa paixão. Assim, nos 3 livros, o filósofo apresenta a gênese dessa paixão e os males causados por ela para, por fim, apresentar meios para extirpa-la da alma. A defesa dos ensinamentos do Estoicismo ecoa explicitamente nos diversos exemplos dados pelo filósofo quando contraposta com as demais escolas filosóficas da época. Assim, a ira é tratada como a paixão mais danosa dentre todas as paixões do homem. / Our dissertation consists in the translation and study of De Ira from the Stoic philosopher and Roman politician Lucious Annaeus Seneca. The book is addressed to his brother Novato who supposedly inquires him how to restrain this passion. Thus, in three books, the philosopher presents the genesis of that passion and the evils caused by it to finally introduce ways to extirpate it from the soul. The defense of the Stoicism\'s teachings explicitly echoes in several examples given by the philosopher when contrasted with other philosophical schools of the time. So wrath is treated as the most damaging passion among all human passions.

O estoicismo de Sêneca apresenta traços que refletem sua condição pessoal de homem novo, de ator na história do Império Romano e de um pensador bastante livre. As linhas de seu pensamento, que se pode chamar de estóico-senequiano, estão presentes em toda sua obra: de maneira explícita, nas epístolas e nos diálogos; e implícita, na tragédia Hércules no Eta. Para essa tragédia, Sêneca buscou, como modelo principal, As Traquínias de Sófocles, cujas personagens recebem um tratamento tal, que se pode ler, em suas palavras e em suas ações, a expressão das virtudes e dos vícios nos três níveis: cósmico, imperial e individual. A relação entre essas três instâncias é garantida, principalmente, pela tensão sujeito-objeto e pela analogia como processo de conhecimento. Em seu pensamento bipolar, pode-se ler a presença dos princípios que perpassam toda a Natureza: o ativo (do lado do sujeito) e o passivo (na vertente do objeto). A expressão máxima do princípio ativo é, no universo, o Logos; no Império, a razão do príncipe, que constitui sua alma; no homem, a razão diretriz. O vício é o desequilíbrio em qualquer uma das instâncias, e consiste numa inversão que deixa a Razão fora do lugar que lhe cabe segundo a perfeição da Natureza. O reequilíbrio, no âmbito do Universo, se faz pela \"conflagração universal\"; no Império, pelo comando de um príncipe virtuoso; no indivíduo, pela prática da virtude, sob o comando da razão. Como no indivíduo, a virtude, que é igual à sabedoria, à felicidade, à liberdade, é conquistada paulatinamente, o homem, em relação a ela, pode ser um stultus, um uacillans, um proficiens ou um sapiens. No Hércules de Hércules no Eta, convivem as três instâncias: a cósmica na conflagração universal, a do Império Romano, nas alusões político-históricas, e a do indivíduo, na trajetória exemplar do herói rumo à sabedoria e à apoteose. Sua trajetória, dividida entre um velho e um novo Hércules, promove, ainda, a passagem do tempo mítico para o tempo legal, do herói marcado pela hybris para o marcado pela uirtus. / Seneca\'s stoicism presents features that reflect his personal condition as new man, as an actor in the Roman Empire History and as a free thinker. His lines of thought, which can be named as estoico-senequiano, are in all of his works: explicitly, in his epistles and dialogues; and implicitly, in his tragedy Hercules on Oeta. As main source of inspiration to this tragedy, Seneca used Sophocles\' The Trachiniae, in which can be read, through its characters\' words and attitudes, the expression of vice and virtue in three levels: cosmic, imperial and individual. The relationship between these three levels is granted, mainly, by the tension subject-object and by analogy as a process of knowledge. In Seneca\'s bipolar thought, one can notice the presence of principles that go beyond all nature: the active (subject\'s side) and the passive (that concerns the object). The major expression of the active principle is, in the universe, Logos; in the Empire, the prince\'s reason, which constitutes his soul; in men, the guideline reason. Vice is the disequilibrium in any of these instances, and is defined as an inversion that takes reason out of its proper place in accordance with nature\'s perfection. The equilibrium is recovered again, in the universe\'s scope, through universal conflagration; in the Empire\'s scope, through a virtuous prince\'s command; in the individual scope, through practicing virtue under the control of reason. Since in human beings, the virtue, which is considered the same as knowledge, happiness, and freedom, is gained gradually, the men in relation to it can be a stultus, a uacillans, a proficiens, or a sapiens. In Hercules from Hercules on Oeta, the three instances are together: the cosmic through the universal conflagration, the one from Roman Empire through the historical and political allusions, and the individual one, through the hero\'s brilliant way to knowledge and apotheosis. His way, divided into an old and a new Hercules, promotes the passage from a mythical time to a legal time, from the hero marked by hybris to the one marked by uirtus.

The modern principle of freedom of subjectivity sets a moral standard which radically departs from Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean: modern moral agents, exemplified by the rising middle class, are granted the right to develop extreme dispositions towards goods like honour and wealth. Given that Aristotle considers such goods divisible in the sense that when one person gets more another gets less―the basic definition of distributive injustice―it isn’t surprising that modern philosophers like Kant have trouble reconciling this right with duty to others. Failing to resolve this dilemma satisfactorily in ethical terms, Kant and others turn to aesthetics, but Kant, at least, takes no account there of moral agents’ interest in the actual existence of goods. In this respect, the alternative to the Kantian aesthetic response I document in my dissertation is more Stoic than modern. This response, the modern mediocre-artist narrative, features a mediocre artist who fails to achieve the new standard of distributive justice and a genius who ostensibly succeeds. Though other critics discuss the ethical dimension of mediocre-artist narratives, they don’t consider the possibility that the mediocre artist’s failure might be due to the ethical dilemma just described. They therefore tend to uphold uncritically the narratives’ negative judgments of mediocrity, ascribing the latter’s failure to egotism. By contrast, I examine the genius’ artistic efforts for evidence of a similar failure. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the genius does indeed fail, albeit less spectacularly, arguing on this basis that egotistical characterizations of mediocrity are unjust. But the mediocre aren’t the only victims: in “concealing” genius’ failure, mediocre-artist narratives ignore unmet claims on its fruits. Finally, I invoke Derrida’s notion of the “lesser violence” to outline a new genre that recognizes the unattainability of the modern standard of justice. I call this genre morally progressive, rejecting Jürgen Habermas’ view that freedom of subjectivity has hit a dead end, and that we must backtrack to a philosophical turning indicated but not taken by Hegel, namely, the path of intersubjective freedom. / Arts, Faculty of / English, Department of / Graduate

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This thesis examines Epictetus' view on Cynic philosophy, as it is being expressed in chapter 22 of the third book of Diatribai ("The Discourses"). The chapter has traditionally been seen as an idealized and deceitful portrait of the Cynic, and has been questioned as an intended justification of stoics and Cynics in the overall view on the history of philosophy. This thesis, however, attempts a different approach on the matter, based upon a thorough discussion regarding the field of research, as well as on different ways to read and understand the text at hand, in order to seek out a view that goes beyond the traditional distinction between practice and theory. The thesis thus challenges the view where the philosophy of Epictetus is seen as an instrumental practice of stoic theory, isolated to the field of ethics.   The reading of the chapter focuses mainly on the philosophical purpose of the text and its intended practice, and finds that much of the stoic ascetic practice is not only taught through instructions, but also performed in the lecture and Epictetus' way of speaking. Epictetus' portrait of the philosophical Cynic is thus understood, not only as an extreme end that serves as an ascetic role-model, but also as a basic archetype of what it actually means to practice a philosophical way of thinking, that is of central importance to Epictetus philosophy. This sheds a new light on both the traditional distinction between stoic theory and practice, and on much of the research performed on the field of stoicism this far, as well as on that of Cynicism.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Stoic philosophy taught along with the other prominent philosophical schools of the Hellenistic Era (i.e. the Academics, the Peripatetics and the Epicureans) that the goal or final end (telos) of human existence is our well-being or happiness (eudaimonia). The Stoics provided various definitions of this telos, the most famous being “living in agreement with nature” (ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ) or “living according to nature” (secundum naturam vivere) and this goal essentially comes down to living according to perfect reason and virtue. The purpose of this study is to investigate how Seneca presents the Stoic doctrines regarding this topic in his Epistulae Morales (“Letters on Morality”) and to determine whether he managed to make the theoretical framework, proposed by the Stoics for the attainment of a happy life, more easily applicable in practice without compromising orthodox Stoic teachings. The orthodoxy of Seneca‟s philosophy may be judged by comparison with the doctrines of the early Stoic teachers, which is why this study will first look at the traditional Stoic teachings concerning the definition of the telos as well as the theory behind the attainment thereof. Thereafter it will be investigated how true Seneca stayed to these traditional teachings and whether he managed to make the Stoic telos more realistically attainable by the practical advice he offers in his letters. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Stoïsynse filosofie voer aan soos die ander prominente filosofiese skole van die Hellenistiese era (d.w.s. die Akademie, die Peripatetiese skool, en die Epikureërs) dat die einddoel (telos) van die mensdom welsyn of geluk (eudaimonia) is. Die Stoïsyne het verskillende definisies van die telos verskaf; die mees bekende is “om in ooreenkoms met die natuur te leef” (ηὸ ὁκνινγνπκέλσο ηῇ θύζεη δῆλ) of “om volgens die natuur te leef” (secundum naturam vivere) en hierdie einddoel kom in wese daarop neer om volgens volmaakte rede of deug te leef. Die doel van hierdie studie is om te ondersoek hoe Seneca die Stoïsynse leerstellings oor hierdie onderwerp in sy Epistulae Morales (“Briewe oor Moraliteit”) behandel en om te bepaal of hy dit makliker gemaak het om die teoretiese raamwerk, wat deur die Stoïsyne vir die bereiking van 'n gelukkige lewe voorgestel is, in die praktyk toe te pas sonder om die ortodokse Stoïsynse leerstellings te kompromitteer. Die ortodoksie van Seneca se filosofie kan beoordeel word deur dit met die leerstellings van die vroeë Stoïsyne te vergelyk. Hierdie studie begin dus met „n ondersoek na die tradisionele Stoïsynse leerstellings aangaande die definisie van die telos, sowel as die teorie oor die bereiking daarvan. Daarna word ondersoek hoe getrou Seneca was aan die tradisionele leerstellings en of hy deur die praktiese raad in sy briewe dit makliker gemaak het om die Stoïsynse telos te bereik.

Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) was one of the leading figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, an influential eighteenth-century moral and political philosopher, as well as a professor of ethics at the University of Edinburgh from 1764 to 1785. There has been a wealth of scholarship on Ferguson in which central themes include his role as a political theorist, sociologist, moral philosopher, and as an Enlightenment thinker. One of the most frequent topics addressed by scholars is his relationship to ancient philosophy, particularly Stoicism. The ease with which scholars identify Ferguson as a Stoic, however, is problematic because of the significant differences between Ferguson‟s ideas and those of the „schools‟ of classical antiquity, especially Stoicism. Some scholars interpret Ferguson‟s philosophy as a derivative, unsystematic „patchwork‟ because he drew on various ancient sources, but, it is argued, did not adhere to any particular system. The aim of my thesis is to suggest an alternative interpretation of Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient philosophy, particularly to Stoicism, by placing Ferguson in the context of the intellectual history of the eighteenth century. The first section of this thesis is an examination of Ferguson‟s response to the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, modern eclecticism and the experimental method to demonstrate how Ferguson‟s approach to and engagement with ancient philosophy is informed by these intellectual contexts. The second section is a close analysis of the role that ancient schools play in his discussion of the history of philosophy as well as the didactic purpose found in his lectures and published works thereby determining the function of ancient thought in his philosophy. The third section is a re-examination of Ferguson‟s concept of Stoicism and his engagement with Stoic ethics in his moral philosophy re-interpreting his relationship to the ancient school. With a combination of a new understanding of Ferguson‟s methodology and new assessment of his engagement with ancient thought, a new interpretation of Ferguson‟s moral philosophy demonstrates his unique contribution to eighteenth-century thought.

Étroitement liée à l’expérience des voyages, où elle trouve tout à la fois ses intensités et sa diversité, la culture perceptive de Flaubert doit être comprise comme une véritable éducation sentimentale. Si le jeune écrivain se donne pour but l’apprentissage du «bien écrire », c’est en concevant l’esthétique d’abord en son sens premier comme un art de la sensation qui nécessite l’apprentissage d’un « bien voir ». Dans le travail de conversion du regard que Flaubert accomplit sur lui-même entre 1845 et 1851, on peut donc parler d’un véritable « primat de la perception ». La présente recherche doctorale, fondée sur une approche phénoménologique, examine la façon dont l’ « homme-plume » a résolument investi dans son art une leçon du sensible en intégrant toutes les découvertes liées à l’approfondissement de son expérience perceptive. Loin de s’achever dans un formalisme désincarné, le nouveau système esthétique qui permet à Flaubert de passer de l’écriture de jeunesse aux œuvres de la maturité est un dispositif qui totalise un itinéraire sensoriel : la connaissance, les idées et les facultés d’abstraction y ont été corrigées, réévaluées et redéfinies à la mesure d’un « bien sentir » qui devient capable de réformer l’art d’écrire et la délimitation de son véritable objet. / Intimately associated to the travelling experience, during which it meets at the same time its intensities and diversities, Flaubert’s perceptive culture should be understood as a truly sentimental education. If the young writer imposes himself the “well writing” learning as a goal, it’s done before anything else, by interpreting the aesthetics, in its primary meaning, as a sensation art that requires a “well seeing” learning. In relation to the conversion work of the look that Flaubert gives over himself between 1845 and 1851, it’s possible to talk, this way, of a true “primate of perception”. This doctorate research, based on a phenomenological approach, explores the decisively way in which the penman invested a lesson of the sensible in his art, integrating all the findings related to the deepening of his perceptual experience. Far from reducing itself to a disincarnate formalism, the new aesthetical system that allows Flaubert to go from the young writings to the maturity works is a device that completes a sensorial itinerary: along this itinerary, the knowledge, the ideas and the abstraction faculties were corrected, reevaluated and redefined for the purpose of a “well feeling” that is able to reshape the art of writing and the delimitation of its true object.

This thesis will explore whether Augustine of Hippo altered his theological views and what influences might have precipitated the alleged modifications. Augustine’s early "De libero arbitrio" argued for an individual’s ability to respond freely to God while his later anti-Pelagian writings rejected any human ability to believe until God infuses grace creating belief as his gift. Does his theology exhibit continuity or discontinuity? Four commonplace assertions within Augustinian studies are questioned in this thesis: 1.) Augustine changed his theology in AD 396; 2.) while he was writing the letter to Bishop Simplicianus (Simpl.); 3.) with his transition occurring through reading scripture (Rom.7, 9;1 Cor.15); 4.) which he developed through merely modifying prevalent doctrines. No scholarly work has researched Augustine’s entire corpus from AD 386–430 specifically analyzing his theology in the five final doctrines of: 1.) God giving initial faith as a gift, 2.) inherited damnable reatus from Adam, 3.) the gift of perseverance, 4.) unilateral pre-determination of persons’s eternal destinies independently of foreknowledge, and 5.) God’s neither desiring nor providing for the salvation of all persons. Only a comprehensive methodological approach—reading systematically, chronologically, and comprehensively through his entire corpus—can legitimately demonstrate changes. Did a Patristic consensus exist regarding post-Adamic free choice? What was Augustine’s contribution to this theology? To what degree did the combination of Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and Manichaeism contribute to his liberum arbitrium captivatum? Chapters include an introduction followed by chapters on free choice versus determinism in the: 1.) ancient philosophical-religious world, 2.) Christian authors AD 95–215, 3.) Christian authors AD 216–430, 4.) Augustine’s works AD 386–395, 5.) Augustine’s works AD 396–411, 6.) Augustine’s works AD 412–426, 7.) Augustine’s works AD 427–430, 8.) sermons and epistles, 9.) Augustine’s exegesis of scripture, and 10.) conclusion. Conclusions will be established via extensive primary quotations and references with supporting secondary sources.

O objetivo desta dissertação é apresentar uma tradução dos três primeiros livros do diálogo filosófico De Re Publica, de Marco Túlio Cícero, e uma leitura da obra. A interpretação parte do pressuposto que a obra política de Cícero é construída com base em preceitos estoicos, ou seja, Cícero fundamenta seus conceitos políticos na natureza, pois é essa que permite a vida política ao dotar os homens de razão e de linguagem. Pela linguagem, os homens se associam, ou seja, fundam uma república, deliberam em assembleias e documentam os feitos passados, ou seja, escrevem a sua história. Examina-se, neste trabalho, a relação entre natureza e política e entre política e história, por meio de dois argumentos centrais, a saber: a fundação e a construção contínua da república romana. Isso nos permite observar que Cícero tem uma visão do curso dos acontecimentos segundo a qual a fundação não proporciona, de uma só vez, tudo o que a república necessita. Assim, abre-se espaço para que os homens continuem a agir virtuosamente, pois é necessário que os homens construam a república continuamente para que continuem realizando a sua natureza na natureza. / The aim of this dissertation is to translate the philosophical dialogue De Re Publica, of Marcus Tullius Cicero, and present a reading of the work. The interpretation assumes that Cicero´s political work is built on stoic precepts. In other words, Cicero founds his political concepts in nature, because is this that allows political life by endowing men with reason and language. Through the language the men are associated, that is, they founded a republic, they resolve in assembly and document past deeds, writing their history. We examine in this work, the link between nature and politics and between politics and history, through two central arguments: the foundation and solid construction of the Roman republic. This allows us to observe that Cicero has a point of view of the course of events in wich the foundation not afforded, at once, of all republic needs. Thus, opens up space for men to continue to act virtuously, because it is necessary that men build a continually republic in order to keep doing their nature in nature.