銀行是商業金融活動中不可或缺的一環，其經營管理的良窳直接與經濟、財政之穩定息息相關。近年來，銀行經營環境丕變，業務日趨龐雜，不論是金融界或監理機關，都已意識到作業風險管理的重要性。對於銀行業這樣一個關乎國計民生的重要產業，深入了解其作業風險應有之程序，以及其進行作業風險管理時之內控作為，應有見微知著之管理意義。 新版巴塞爾資本協定(The New Basel Capital Accord，亦稱”Basel II”)已於2004年6月底正式定案，預計2006年底開始實施，其中進階方法將在2007年底適用，Basel II的修訂範圍頗大，將對各國銀行業及金融監理機關產生重大影響，各國為因應新巴塞爾資本協定的實施也早已開始進行各項研究評估及法案研擬。我國金管會為使國內銀行資本適足性管理及風險管理能力符合國際水準，已於民國九十三年九月二十一日發函通知銀行，參照國際規範修訂我國「銀行資本適足性管理辦法」及「銀行自有資本與風險性資產計算方法說明」等規定，預定將與國際同步於民國九十五年底正式實施新巴塞爾資本協定，因此各家銀行必須及早規劃以因應新巴塞爾資本協定相關措施，並建立妥善風險管理機制，以確保法規遵循及提昇競爭力。 而美國國會為強化證券市場之監控及公司治理，亦已於2002年7月30日公布SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002(沙氏法案)，為美國自30年代推行公司治理架構以來，影響最為重大之財經改革法案。沙氏法案針對公司治理提出一系列的要求，為避免企業在資訊揭露方面造假或扭曲，特別針對內部控制的建立、維持及其有效性，要求企業管理階層必須負起責任，同時亦要求企業必須出具對有關財務報導之內部控制有效性的評估報告。 Basel II與沙氏法案有其相異之處，前者係對全世界銀行業者之規範，後者則係美國針對公開發行等級以上公司所作之規範，舉凡已屬公開發行之公司，其任何資訊揭露均足以影響投資人決策，而發行公司任何不實或虛偽資訊揭露，均可能影響資本市場，使廣大投資人權益受損。雖然Basel II著眼在銀行，沙氏法案重點在證券市場公司之治理，然則兩者均著重有系統的由內而外、由上而下的控制機制，不獨要求業者必須建立良好之控制機制，同時在各項控制機制上亦必須有書面做為佐證，而兩項規範亦均導入外控機制，在Basel II為第三支柱之市場紀律，在沙氏法案則為會計師對企業內控有效性之意見，兩者自有其神似之處。 作者任職於美商銀行從事後台管理工作多年，擬藉本論文之撰寫及探討，補強銀行業者對銀行作業風險及控制自評全貌之了解。

Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised. In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not. In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time stochastic modeling and optimization is required. The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

Many analysts believe that problems in the United States housing market initiated the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. In this regard, the subprime mortgage crisis (SMC) shook the foundations of the financial industry by causing the failure of many iconic Wall Street investment banks and prominent depository institutions. This crisis stymied credit extension to households and businesses thus creating credit crunches and, ultimately, a global recession. This thesis specifically discusses the SMC and its components, causes, consequences and cures in relation to subprime mortgage origination, data as well as bank bailouts. In particular, the SMC has highlighted the fact that risk, credit ratings, profit and valuation as well as capital regulation are important banking considerations. With regard to risk, the thesis discusses credit (including counterparty), market (including interest rate, basis, prepayment, liquidity and price), tranching (including maturity mismatch and synthetic), operational (including house appraisal, valuation and compensation) and systemic (including maturity transformation) risks. The thesis introduces the IDIOM hypothesis that postulates that the SMC was largely caused by the intricacy and design of subprime agents, mortgage origination that led to information problems (loss, asymmetry and contagion), valuation opaqueness and ineffective risk mitigation. It also contains appropriate examples, discussions, timelines as well as appendices about the main results on the aforementioned topics. Numerous references point to the material not covered in the thesis, and indicate some avenues for further research. In the sequel, the banks that we study are subprime interbank lenders (SILs), subprime originators (SORs), subprime dealer banks (SDBs) and their special purpose vehicles (SPVs) such as Wall Street investment banks and their special structures as well as subprime investing banks (SIBs). Furthermore, the primary subprime agents that we consider are house appraisers (HAs), mortgage brokers (MBs), mortgagors (MRs), servicers (SRs), trustees, underwriters and credit enhancement providers (CEPs). Also, the insurers involved in the subprime market are originator mortgage insurers (OMIs) and monoline insurers (MLIs). The main components of the SMC are MRs, the housing market, SDBs/hedge funds/money market funds/SIBs, the economy as well as the government (G) and central banks. Here, G either plays a regulatory, bailout or policymaking role. Most of the aforementioned banks and agents are assumed to be risk neutral with SOR being the exception since it can be risk (and regret) averse on occasion. The three main aspects of the SMC - subprime mortgage origination, data and bailouts - that we cover in this thesis and the chapters in which they are found are outlined below. In Chapter 2, we discuss the dynamics of SORs' capital, information, ratings, risk and valuation under mortgage origination. In particular, we model subprime mortgages that are able to fully amortize, voluntarily prepay or default and construct a discrete-time model for SOR risk and profit incorporating costs of funds and mortgage insurance as well as loan losses. Furthermore, a constrained optimal valuation problem for SORs under mortgage origination is solved. In addition, we show how high loan-to-value ratios curtailed the refinancing of subprime mortgages, while low ratios imply favorable house equity for subprime MRs. Chapter 2 also explores the relationship between Basel capital regulation and the SMC. This involves studying bank credit and capital under Basel regulation. Further issues dealt with are the quantity and pricing of subprime mortgages as well as credit ratings under Basel capital regulation. A key problem is whether Basel capital regulation exacerbated the SMC. Very importantly, the thesis answers this question in the affirmative. Chapter 3 contains subprime data not presented in Chapters 2. We present other mortgage data that also have connections with the main subprime issues raised. In Chapter 4, a troubled SOR's recapitalization by G via subprime bank bailouts is discussed. Our research supports the view that if SOR is about to fail, it will have an incentive not to extend low risk mortgages but rather high risk mortgages thus shifting risk onto its creditors. Here, for instance, we analyze the efficiency of purchasing toxic structured mortgage products from troubled SORs as opposed to buying preferred and common equity. In this regard, we compare the cases where SORs' on-balance sheet mortgages are fully amortizing, voluntarily prepaying (refinancing and equity extraction) and involuntarily prepaying (defaulting). If bailing out SORs considered to be too big to fail involves buying assets at above fair market values, then these SORs are encouraged ex-ante to invest in high risk mortgages and toxic structured mortgage products. Contrary to the policy employed by G, purchasing common (preferred) equity is always the most (least) ex-anteand ex-post-efficient type of capital injection. Our research confirms that this is true irrespective of whether SOR volunteers for recapitalization or not. In order to understand the key results in Chapters 2 to 4, a working knowledge of discrete-time stochastic modeling and optimization is required. The work presented in this thesis is based on a book (see [103]), 2 peer-reviewed international journal articles (see [51] and [105]), 2 peer-reviewed chapters in books (see [104] and [110]) and 4 peer-reviewed conference proceedings paper (see [23], [106], [107] and [109]). / Thesis (Ph.D. (Applied Mathematics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

1999年新巴塞爾協定規定鼓勵銀行採用內部信用評等法(internal ratings based approach)，以衡量貸款者無法償還之風險以計提最低資本。為因應此一授信風險控管之需要，銀行亟需建立一套有效之財務危機預警系統，以判定銀行授信客戶發生財務危機之機率。 本研究運用羅吉斯迴歸分析(logistic regression analysis)與離散時間涉險分析(discrete-time survival analysis)分法於三種相互具有巢狀式關連性之財務危機預測模型，逐步加入財務、非財務及公司治理變數，以便在同一種分析方法下比較三種模型，以及在同一種模型下比較兩種分析方法。實證結果顯示，就樣本期間內而言，同一種分析方法下模型之財務危機預測能力，隨著不同種類解釋變數之加入而逐步提高。然而，就樣本期間外而言，同一種分析方法下模型之財務危機預測能力，並未隨著不同種類解釋變數之加入而逐步提高，但分類能力皆十分優良；而在同一種模型下離散時間涉險分析方法之整體分類能力皆高於羅吉斯迴歸分析方法。 / The 1999 Basel II Accord suggests banks measure the impossibility of reimbursement of debtors to calculate capital minimums by internal ratings-based approach. To reduce the credit risk, it is important that banks construct accurate financial distress prediction systems to determine the probability of financial distress of debtors. This study employs logistic regression and discrete-time hazard analysis to construct nested models to which the financial, non-financial, and corporate governance corporate variables are added step by step. I therefore make comparison of the performance of three models under logistic regression and discrete-time hazard analysis, respectively. Meanwhile, the comparison of the performance of logistic regression and discrete-time hazard analyses under each of three models is also made. The empirical results show that the in-sample predictive ability of financial distress is enhanced by gradually incorporating different kinds of variables in both analyses. Although the out-of-the-sample predictive ability of financial distress is not improved by gradually incorporating different kinds of variables in one analysis, the model performance is quite well overall. The entire discriminability of discrete-time hazard analysis is better than logistic regression under each model.

Submitted by Thiago de Freitas Cardoso (thiago.freitas.cardoso@gmail.com) on 2014-02-27T01:33:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação V2.3.pdf: 8043122 bytes, checksum: af3c70ed549fef3e566045da69276b07 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2014-02-27T11:48:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação V2.3.pdf: 8043122 bytes, checksum: af3c70ed549fef3e566045da69276b07 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-02-27T12:32:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação V2.3.pdf: 8043122 bytes, checksum: af3c70ed549fef3e566045da69276b07 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-05 / The credit market is constantly gaining more space in the Brazilian economy. Credit risk, which attempts to measure the loss on loans, is paramount and in this context, the expected loss is undoubtedly key issue. Usually, the relative expected loss, EL (%), is modeled with the product of the risk parameters PD (probability of default) and LGD (loss given default), assuming their independence. Recently, studies have showed that could be opportunities to improve the fit with the joint modeling of the loss, and the removal of the strong assumption of independence of these factors. This work uses the inflated beta distribution, model BEINF of the GAMLSS class, to adjust the relative expected loss through a real database provided by Serasa Experian. / O mercado de crédito vem ganhando constantemente mais espaço na economia brasileira nos últimos anos. Haja vista isto, o risco de crédito, que tenta medir a perda com operações de crédito, tem fundamental importância e, neste contexto, a perda esperada é, sem dúvida, tema chave. Usualmente, a perda esperada relativa, EL (%), é modelada como o produto dos parâmetros de risco PD (probabilidade de default) e LGD (perda dado o default) pressupondo a independência dos mesmos. Trabalhos recentes mostram que pode haver oportunidade em melhorar o ajuste com a modelagem conjunta da perda, além da retirada da forte premissa de independência dos fatores. O presente trabalho utiliza a distribuição beta inflacionada, modelo BEINF da classe GAMLSS, para o ajuste da perda esperada relativa através de uma base de dados reais disponibilizada pela empresa Serasa Experian. Os resultados mostram que o modelo traz um bom ajuste e que há oportunidade de ganhos em sua utilização na modelagem da EL(%).O mercado de crédito vem ganhando constantemente mais espaço na economia brasileira nos últimos anos. Haja vista isto, o risco de crédito, que tenta medir a perda com operações de crédito, tem fundamental importância e, neste contexto, a perda esperada é, sem dúvida, tema chave. Usualmente, a perda esperada relativa, EL (%), é modelada como o produto dos parâmetros de risco PD (probabilidade de default) e LGD (perda dado o default) pressupondo a independência dos mesmos. Trabalhos recentes mostram que pode haver oportunidade em melhorar o ajuste com a modelagem conjunta da perda, além da retirada da forte premissa de independência dos fatores. O presente trabalho utiliza a distribuição beta inflacionada, modelo BEINF da classe GAMLSS, para o ajuste da perda esperada relativa através de uma base de dados reais disponibilizada pela empresa Serasa Experian. Os resultados mostram que o modelo traz um bom ajuste e que há oportunidade de ganhos em sua utilização na modelagem da EL(%).

The master thesis deals with the issue of the development of regulation and supervision of the financial systems in the US and the EU. The thesis is primarily focused on the regulatory and supervisory bodies and the area of capital adequacy in both, the US and the EU and changes in these areas in response to the global financial crisis. In order to meet the theses objectives the thesis is divided into three chapters, which are logically and chronologically connected. The first chapter covers the period before the financial crisis. This chapter analyzes American and European system of regulation and supervision in the period before the crisis, as well as Basel I and Basel II and the reaction of the US and the EU on these agreements. The second chapter focuses on the period of the financial crisis. Chapter analyzes the causes that led to this crisis and also its actual progress. Next section of the second chapter analyzes the US and the EU response to the crisis and the steps which the US and the EU have taken in an effort to save their financial systems. The last chapter covers the post-crisis period. This chapter is devoted mainly to the new concept Basel III and its implementation in the US and the EU. The conclusion of the thesis will be devoted to an overall summary and to comparison of obtained information.

The subject of this diploma thesis is managing credit risk in banks, as the most significant risk faced by banks. The aim of this work is to define the basic techniques, tools and methods that are used by banks to manage credit risk. The first part of this work focuses on defining these procedures and describes the entire process of credit risk management, from the definition of credit risk, describing credit strategy and policy, organizational structure, defining the most used credit risk mitigation tools to the regulatory requirements for credit risk management. The second part gives a more detailed view to credit risk measurement and evaluation and possibilities of credit risk hedging. Last part presents credit risk management in practise illustrated by the example of chosen bank.

Abstracts in English, Zulu and Southern Sotho / The advent of Basel II Capital Accord has revolutionised credit risk measurement (CRM) to the extent that the once “perceived riskier bank assets” are now accommodated for lending. The Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector has been traditionally perceived as a riskier and unprofitable asset for lending activity by Commercial Banks, in particular. But empirical studies on the implementation of the Basel II internal-ratings-based (IRB) framework have demonstrated that SME credit risk is measurable. Banks are still finding it difficult to forecast SME loan default and to provide credit to the sector that meet Basel’s capital requirements. The thesis proposes to construct an empirical credit risk measurement (CRM) model, specifically for SMEs, to ameliorate the adverse effects of SME credit inaccessibility due to high information asymmetry between financial institutions (FI) and SMEs in Zimbabwe. A well-performing and accurate CRM helps FIs to control their risk exposure through selective granting of credit based on a thorough statistical analysis of historical customer data. This thesis develops a CRM model, built on a statistically random sample, known-good-bad (KGB) sample, which is a better representation of the through-the-door (TTD) population of SME loan applicants. The KGB sample incorporates both accepted and rejected applications, through reject inference (RI). A model-based bound and collapse (BC) reject inference methodology was empirically used to correct selectivity bias inherent in CRM domain. The results have shown great improvement in the classification power and aggregate supply of credit supply to the SME portfolio of the case-studied bank, as evidenced by substantial decrease of bad rates across models developed; from the preliminary model to final model designed for the case-studied bank. The final model was validated using both bad rate, confusion matrix metrics and Area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) curve to assess the classification power of the model within-sample and out-of-sample. The AUROC for the final model (weak model) was found to be 0.9782 whilst bad rate was found to be 14.69%. There was 28.76% improvement in the bad rate in the final model in comparison with the current CRM model being used by the case-studied bank. / Isivumelwano seBasel II Capital Accord sesishintshe indlela yokulinganisa ubungozi bokunikezana ngesikweletu credit risk measurement (CRM) kwaze kwafika ezingeni lapho izimpahla ezazithathwa njengamagugu anobungozi “riskier bank assets” sezimukelwa njengesibambiso sokuboleka imali. Umkhakha wezamaBhizinisi Amancane naSafufusayo, phecelezi, Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) kudala uqondakala njengomkhakha onobungozi obukhulu futhi njengomkhakha ongangenisi inzuzo, ikakhulu njengesibambiso sokubolekwa imali ngamabhange ahwebayo. Kodwa izifundo zocwaningo ezimayelana nokusetshenziswa nokusetshenziswa kwesakhiwo iBasel II internal-ratings-based (IRB) sezikhombisile ukuthi ubungozi bokunikeza isikweletu kumabhizinisi amancane nasafufusayo (SME) sebuyalinganiseka. Yize kunjalo, amabhange asathola ukuthi kusenzima ukubona ngaphambili inkinga yokungabhadeleki kahle kwezikweletu kanye nokunikeza isikweletu imikhakha enemigomo edingekayo yezimali kaBasel. Lolu cwaningo beluphakamisa ukwakha uhlelo imodeli ephathekayo yokulinganisa izinga lobungozi bokubolekisa ngemali (CRM) kwihlelo lokuxhasa ngezimali ama-SME, okuyihlelo elilawulwa yiziko lezimali ezweni laseZimbabwe. Imodeli ye-CRM esebenza kahle futhi eshaya khona inceda amaziko ezimali ukugwema ubungozi bokunikezana ngezikweletu ngokusebenzisa uhlelo lokunikeza isikweletu ababoleki abakhethekile, lokhu kususelwa ohlelweni oluhlaziya amanani edatha engumlando wekhasimende. Imodeli ye-CRM ephakanyisiwe yaqala yakhiwa ngohlelo lwamanani, phecelezi istatistically random sample, okuluphawu olungcono olumele uhlelo lwe through-the-door (TTD) population lokukhetha abafakizicelo zokubolekwa imali bama SME, kanti lokhu kuxuba zona zombili izicelo eziphumelele kanye nezingaphumelelanga. Indlela yokukhetha abafakizicelo, phecelezi model-based bound-and-collapse (BC) reject-inference methodology isetshenzisiwe ukulungisa indlela yokukhetha ngokukhetha ngendlela yokucwasa kwisizinda seCRM. Imiphumela iye yakhombisa intuthuko enkulu mayelana namandla okwehlukanisa kanye nokunikezwa kwezikweletu kuma SME okungamamabhange enziwe ucwaningo lotho., njengoba lokhu kufakazelwa ukuncipha okukhulu kwe-bad rate kuwo wonke amamodeli athuthukisiwe. Imodeli yokuqala kanye neyokugcina zazidizayinelwe ibhange. Imodeli yokugcina yaqinisekiswa ngokusebenzisa zombili indlela isikweletu esingagculisi kanye negrafu ye-Area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) ukulinganisa ukwehlukaniswa kwamandla emodeli engaphakathi kwesampuli nangaphandle kwesampuli. Uhlelo lwe-AUROC lwemodeli yokugcina (weak model) lwatholakala ukuthi luyi 0.9782, kanti ibad rate yatholakala ukuthi yenza i-14.69%. Kwaba khona ukuthuthuka nge-28.76% kwi-bad rate kwimodeli yokugcina uma iqhathaniswa nemodeli yamanje iCRM model ukuba isetshenziswe yibhange elithile. / Basel II Capital Accord e fetotse tekanyo ya kotsi ya mokitlane (credit risk measurement (CRM)) hoo “thepa e kotsi ya dibanka” ka moo e neng e bonwa ka teng, e seng e fuwa sebaka dikadimong. Lekala la Dikgwebo tse Nyane le tse Mahareng (SME) le bonwa ka tlwaelo jwalo ka lekala le kotsi e hodimo le senang ditswala bakeng sa ditshebetso tsa dikadimo haholo ke dibanka tsa kgwebo. Empa dipatlisiso tse thehilweng hodima se bonweng kapa se etsahetseng tsa tshebetso ya moralo wa Basel II internal-ratings-based (IRB) di supile hore kotsi ya mokitlane ya SME e kgona ho lekanngwa. Leha ho le jwalo, dibanka di ntse di thatafallwa ke ho bonelapele palo ya ditlholeho tsa ho lefa tsa diSME le ho fana ka mokitla lekaleng leo le kgotsofatsang ditlhoko tsa Basel tsa ditjhelete. Phuputso ena e ne sisinya ho etsa tekanyo ya se bonwang ho mmotlolo wa kotsi ya mokitlane (CRM) tshebetsong ya phano ya tjhelete ya diSME e etswang ke setsi sa ditjhelete (FI) ho la Zimbabwe. Mmotlolo o sebetsang hantle hape o fanang ka dipalo tse nepahetseng o dusa diFI hore di laole pepeso ya tsona ho kotsi ka phano e kgethang ya mokitlane, e thehilweng hodima manollo ya dipalopalo ya dintlha tsa histori ya bareki. Mmotlolo o sisingwang wa CRM o hlahisitswe ho tswa ho sampole e sa hlophiswang, e leng pontsho e betere ya setjhaba se ikenelang le monyako (TTD) ya batho bao e kang bakadimi ba tjhelete ho diSME, hobane e kenyelletsa bakopi ba amohetsweng le ba hannweng. Mokgwatshebetso wa bound-and-collapse (BC) reject-inference o kentswe tshebetsong ho nepahatsa tshekamelo ya kgetho e leng teng ho lekala la CRM. Diphetho tsena di bontshitse ntlafalo e kgolo ho matla a tlhophiso le palohare ya phano ya mokitlane ho diSME tsa banka eo ho ithutilweng ka yona, jwalo ka ha ho pakilwe ke ho phokotseho ya direite tse mpe ho pharalla le dimmotlolo tse hlahisitsweng. Mmotlolo wa ho qala le wa ho qetela e ile ya ralwa bakeng sa banka. Mmotlolo wa ho qetela o ile wa netefatswa ka tshebediso ya bobedi reite e mpe le mothinya wa Area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) ho lekanya matla a kenyo mekgahlelong a mmotlolo kahare ho sampole le kantle ho yona. AUROC bakeng sa mmotlo wa ho qetela (mmotlolo o fokotseng) e fumanwe e le 0.9782, ha reite e mpe e fumanwe e le 14.69%. Ho bile le ntlafalo ya 28.76% ho reite e mpe bakeng sa mmotlolo wa ho qetela ha ho bapiswa le mmotlolo wa CRM ha o sebediswa bankeng yona eo. / Graduate School of Business Leadership / D.B.L.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Magali Aparecida Camazano.pdf: 740899 bytes, checksum: a0beef09f1c292595d15bc89e031aaca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-14 / Deregulation and globalization of financial services allied with the sophisticated technology used to perform financial operations have increased the complexity of banking activities resulting in the subsequent exposure of financial corporations to operational risk. Several cases of huge losses related to operational risk have been reported in the last 10 years as the bankruptcy of the traditional Barings Bank in England. Therefore, the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), published by the Basel Committee in 2004, established that internationally active banks are required to allocate capital to cope with operational risk (just as required for credit and market risks). The Brazilian Central Bank, following the demands as established by the Basel II Accord has also determined that Brazilian financial corporations are required to allocate regulatory capital to face operational risk as well as implement an operational risk management framework. At the same time, losses related to operational risk occurred in different segments of the economy where American corporations as Enron and WorldCom perpetrated huge accounting frauds resulting in their subsequent bankruptcy in 2001 and 2002 respectively. These events led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. On account of the importance of operational risk management for the soundness of the financial market and the close relation existing between such risk and the requirements mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, such as the enhancement of accounting internal controls and corporate governance attributes, this paper intends to study the influence as set forth by the American Act over the operational risk management within the Brazilian financial corporations that are required to comply with this Act such as Bradesco, Itaú and Unibanco. Thus, a comparison was made between the framework established by the Basel Committee for the banking operational risk management and the mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This study disclosed that both, either the Basel Committee framework as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act focus on the same purposes, that is, control and mitigate the events likely to result in operational risk. Sarbanes-Oxley enables the enhancement of both, accounting internal controls and corporate governance practices, as it will serve as an additional tool for the management of operational risk, cooperating with and supplementing the Basel Committee framework. Therefore, Sarbanes-Oxley allows the Brazilian financial corporations to lower the capital allocation for operational risk due to their decreasing exposure to related risk / A desregulamentação e a globalização dos serviços financeiros associadas à sofisticação das tecnologias financeiras têm aumentado a complexidade das atividades bancárias e a conseqüente exposição dos bancos ao risco operacional. Casos diversos de perdas catastróficas relacionadas ao risco operacional se fizeram presentes nos últimos 10 anos, a exemplo da quebra do tradicional Barings Bank, na Inglaterra. Por decorrência, o Novo Acordo de Capital da Basiléia (Basiléia II), divulgado pelo Comitê da Basiléia em 2004, introduziu a necessidade de alocação de capital para risco operacional (tal qual para os riscos de crédito e de mercado) pelos bancos internacionalmente ativos. O Banco Central do Brasil, à luz do Acordo Basiléia II, igualmente instituiu a necessidade de alocação de capital regulatório para o risco operacional por parte das instituições financeiras brasileiras, bem como a implementação de estrutura de gerenciamento do risco operacional. Paralelamente, prejuízos relacionados ao risco operacional ocorreram em outros segmentos da economia, destacando-se os escândalos contábeis e falências das empresas americanas Enron e WorldCom em 2001 e 2002, respectivamente, culminando na promulgação do Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002. Face à importância do gerenciamento do risco operacional para a solvência do mercado financeiro e à estreita relação existente entre tal risco e os requerimentos impostos pelo Sarbanes-Oxley, tais como o aprimoramento de controles internos contábeis e de aspectos de governança corporativa, este trabalho teve por objetivo estudar a influência das exigências da Lei americana sobre o gerenciamento do risco operacional das instituições financeiras brasileiras sujeitas à sua observância, a saber: Bradesco, Itaú e Unibanco. Para tanto foi adotado o método de procedimento comparativo, tendo sido realizado cotejo entre o marco regulatório do Comitê da Basiléia para o gerenciamento do risco operacional bancário e as exigências do Sarbanes-Oxley Act, cujo resultado revelou a existência de convergência entre ambos, pois possuem a mesma base conceitual de propósitos, qual seja, controlar os fatores de consubstanciação do risco operacional. O Sarbanes-Oxley proporciona o aperfeiçoamento dos controles internos contábeis e das práticas de governança corporativa, caracterizando-se como um instrumento adicional ao gerenciamento do risco operacional, contribuindo e complementando o marco regulatório do Comitê da Basiléia. Outrossim, o Sarbanes-Oxley propicia a redução de alocação de capital para risco operacional, pelas instituições financeiras brasileiras, haja vista seu potencial de redução à exposição ao referido risco

近年來，由於金融產業的進步與科技的日新月異，越來越多樣的衍生性金融商品被廣泛使用，此類具有高獲利高槓桿的金融商品固然有避險的功能，另一方面也提高了銀行業的經營風險。巴塞爾委員會有鑑於此，大幅更動了早期巴塞爾資本協定的內容，稱為Basel II。 Basel II 的資本適足管制雖能避免金融機構發生倒閉之危機，但卻也影響金融機構之產出結構及品質，改變了金融機構之效率表現，因此，瞭解 Basel II 對金融機構效率表現之影響程度是本文目的之ㄧ，此外，有鑑於衍生性金融商品的高風險特性，本研究也將此變數加入，探討此兩項變數對本國銀行經營效率的影響為何。 本研究以資本適足率與衍生性商品使用量作為外生變數，以國內32家銀行為樣本，利用民國九十七年底之資料，採取三階段資料包絡分析法探討此兩項變數對銀行經營績效的影響。首先求算第一階段效率值，接下來考量資料截斷的特性，採用 Tobit 迴歸模型，計算差額變數並做調整，在第三階段排除其影響力，使所有決策單位在同一起跑點上再進行效率評估。 實證結果發現，資本適足率對於銀行效率的影響是有利的，而衍生性金融商品使用量則為不利因素，第一階段與第三階段的效率值在利用Wilcoxon 符號等級檢定之後的結果顯示第一階段與第三階段的效率值分布在0.5%的顯著水準下是不相同的，可進一步推論資本適足率與衍生性金融商品的使用量對銀行經營效率的影響十分顯著。