During much of the 20th century, the national party systems of Western Europe remained largely unchanged. However, beginning in the 1970s, these frozen party systems slowly started to melt. As the number of parties has increased, the question of what explains new party entrance has also attracted more scholarly interest. Despite this increased attention, the study of new political parties still suffers from a structuralist bias. The implication is that the fates of new parties are decided almost exclusively by external factors. Some scholars focus on the institutional environment; others emphasize sociological explanations, such as the formation of new cleavages in society. Yet such non-actor-centred perspectives risk being excessively deterministic. They also struggle to explain why some parties succeed in gaining entrance to legislatures while others, seemingly under the same external circumstances, fail. In this thesis, therefore, a new way to study parties and their path to parliament is proposed. Starting with the notion that external conditions alone cannot explain new party entrance, the thesis takes an agency-based perspective. Three sets of strategies are identified as being important means for a party to influence its chances of getting into parliament. They concern the party's resources, its political project and its external relations. In what ways can supply and management of resources, policies and relations with other parties affect the potential for becoming a parliamentary party? Through four in-depth case studies of new entrants into the Swedish national parliament, the Riksdag, the thesis concludes that there are some important commonalities in their paths to parliament. Especially with regard to their resources and their political project, the empirical evidence supports the initial premise: new party entrance is unthinkable without successful strategic behaviour.

The aim of this essay is to show if and how group identities are being constructed in maindocuments from three political parties in the Swedish parliament, focusing on class, genderand ethnic identities. The three parties who’s documents are being analyzed are theModerate Party, the Sweden Democrats and the Left Party. The conclusion of the essay isthat the Moderate Party is so focused on the individual that they are not promoting groupidentity based on class, gender or ethnicity. The Sweden Democrats are mostly discussing,and therefore creating a discourse of, cultural identity, where Swedish, Nordic, Europeanand Western culture are being created as the ‘us’, and others are being created as ‘them’.They are also promoting difference between men and women, therefore dividing the sexesin groups. The Left Party are focused on class, and are dividing people in working class (themajority) and the elite (the minority). They are also creating a ‘us’ and ‘them’ whilediscussing the patriarchy, a system in which the man is superior and the woman is inferior.

Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka Sverigedemokraternas kriskommunikativa försvar efter kritiken som uppkom mot partiet i samband med högerextremisten Anders Behring Breiviks massmord på Utöya 2011. I detta har jag ur ett narrativt perspektiv undersökt partiledaren Jimmie Åkessons förklaring till krisen och hur denna samspelar med partiets interna berättelse. Den första delen av resultaten visar att Åkesson strukturerar ett narrativ där uppkomsten av krisen för Sverigedemokraterna förklaras genom att det bedrivs en häxjakt på partiet. Den andra delen av resultaten visar att Åkesson genom dikotomisering använder den uppkomna krisen för att förstärka Sverigedemokraternas roll som antietablissemangsparti. I hans krisberättelse tillskrivs kritikerna och Breivik liknande egenskaper, vilket betyder att de står som en gemensam bov i narrativet. Detta i motsats till Sverigedemokraterna som i istället får rollen som en hjälte - demokratins beskyddare i Sverige. / This paper examines the communicative crisis defense of the Sweden democrats after the criticism that appeared after the mass murder by the right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik at Utöya in 2011. In this analysis a narrative examination is made of the party leader Åkessons explanation to why the crisis emerged and how his apology interacts with the party’s internal story. The first part of the results shows that Åkesson structures a narrative where the society’s witch hunt on the party stands as an explanation to why the crisis has emerged. The second part of the analysis shows that Åkesson uses the crisis to strengthen the role of the Sweden democrats as an anti-establishment party by using dichotomies. In his crisis narrative he attributes similar characteristics to his critics and Breivik. The consequence of this is that the two actors stand as a collective villain in the narrative. To the contrary, the Sweden democrats became a hero in the narrative - the protector of democracy in Sweden.

Abstract Title: Konstruktionen av sverigedemokraternas väljare Author: Magnus Persson & Max Lindberg Tutor: Leonor Camauër Course: Bachelor thesis, Media and communication.   The aim of this essay is to use a Critical Discourse Analytical (CDA) approach to analyse the construction of the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) voters in news articles to see if and how they are separated as a group from the Swedish democratic community. This aim is broken down into two questions. How are the Sweden Democrats (SD) voters constructed in news articles in Dagens Nyheter (DN) and Aftonbladet (AB) regarding the aftermath of the national elections? What differences are there between the portrayal of the Sweden Democrats voters and the agents that are used as opposition to them? To answer these questions we have used CDA. We have taken our approach from a modified version of Teun Van Dijks CDA model for analysing news articles. Theoretically we have a CDA approach, we also use theory regarding “the other”. The methodological tools we have used are primarily analysis for Global and Local Coherens, analysis of lexicalization and Faircloughs analysis of Framing. We have also analysed the thematic and schematic structures of the news articles. The analysis is based on a schema and from that schema we have analysed nine news articles selected from a time period of seven days after the Swedish national elections in 2010. Four of the articles come from AB and five from DN. From our analyses we have identified three themes. The first one is common for both DN and AB. It is a theme where the SD voters are consistently portrayed as being dissatisfied both on a political and a social level. AB has also had a tendency to enter articles from a position that expects to find that SD is dependent on a climate of conflict between different social groups to be able to grow regionally. In DN we have found a theme where SD voters are portrayed as less politically aware and generally less knowledgeable than those who vote for the other parties of the Swedish parliament. Keywords: Critical discourse analysis, Sweden Democrats, Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, the others, political, right wing, populism.

This paper is a case study of the Sweden Democrats with the aim to better understand the nature of the immigrant-critical nationalist parties, often referred to as right-wing extremist, right-wing populist etc. who has had success in several countries, and their ideological roots. A comparative descriptive analysis has been done of the ideas of the Sweden Democrats' ideology, with the aim to identify and examine the presence of fascism ideas in SD's ideology. On the basis of the existing research has an ideal type been formulated what fascism most basic ideas are. With this idealtype as an analytical tool has SD's party platform, political speeches, SD-kuriren and Jimmie Åkesson's book, etc. been analyzed. It has been possible to demonstrate the similarities and differences between the SD's and fascist ideas. Ideas of SD which is also a typical feature of fascism is the opposition to the conduct of immigration policy and to stop or limit immigration which appears as the party's most prominent idea that is also a typical feature of fascism. The myth of the betrayed people's home “Folkhemmet” appears to be a typical "mystical core" in the SD's thinking which is similar to the example stab-in-the-back legend of Nazism. The idea about the third way and a excluding nationalism that sees diversity as a threat is common within fascism while the differences is that the SD profess democracy and denounces anti-democratic ideas. SD is like the fascists not pacifists but has not, moreover, any typical fascist ideas on the war in its program. The multicultural society is considered a threat, which is similar to the ideas of fascism, and SD considers that a culture war is going on, especially with Islam. SD has some ideas in common with fascism that indicates continuity from the interwar fascism. Other ideas differ from the ideas of fascism, which shows that the party has been partly done up with its ideological roots. The type of thought structures identified in the analysis of the Sweden Democrats have several ideas in common with the fascist discourse, but there are also similarities with the humanist Enlightenment discourse in the affirmation of democracy.

The Sweden Democrats has become the third largest party in Sweden after the parliamentary elections in 2014. Ever since the party was founded in 1988, debates regarding the party’s policy has been of great interests but also the party’s ideological affiliation whether to classify it as a populist radical right party or not. Furthermore, many scientists have arrived at the conclusion that the Sweden Democrats should be seen as a populist radical right party. This conclusion makes it interesting to further investigate what ideological affilitation the party should identify itself with since the party itself argues to be a social conservative party with a nationalist ethos. With this in mind, the purpose of this study is to examine if the party has populist radical right fundamentals in its recent policy program through the use of the method idea analysis and through the use of creating an ideal type of the theory populist radical right. In addition, it has thus been possible to confirm or to deny the Sweden Democrats as a populist radical right party. The result of this thesis has shown that the policy program does consist of populist radical right elements. Hence, it has been concluded that the Sweden Democrats should be categorized as a populist radical right party.

This thesis investigates how a change in the municipal asylum seeker share affects voting for the Sweden Democrats (SD), a far-right anti-immigration party, in both national Parliament and Municipal Council elections in Sweden. To circumvent the endogeneity problem, I use an instrumental variables strategy where the share of available apartments in Allmännyttan is used as an instrument for the municipal share of asylum seekers living in Migration Agency provided accommodation (ABO). I have exploited municipal level panel data on municipality characteristics, allocations of asylum seekers and national elections. I am not able to find support for any effect of a change in the municipal share of asylum seekers on voting for the Sweden Democrats. Consequently, I cannot provide any support for either the group position theory or the contact hypothesis.

The focus of this thesis lies on tracing the similarities and differences between Liberal conservatism, Christian democracy and National conservatism, its relationship to the Moderates, Christian Democrats and Sweden Democrats' parties’ own interpretations of conservatism with a further ambition to discuss the ideological preconditions of a conservative parliamentary coalition. This study is based on the assumption that differences and similarities between various types of conservatism depend on relationship between political ideas and political practice. This relationship explains by a model that divides conservatism into fundamental and operative elements. The fundamental element of conservatism is an idea of human imperfection which leads to political skepticism, traditionalism and organicism. Operative elements are identified with support in the classical literature that describes the meaning of each type of conservative practice in a particular context. Furthermore, a typology of three ideal types of conservatism derives from fundamental and operational elements. Based on this typology, the parties' own manifesto is analyzed. The results show that the parties' own interpretations of conservatism contain both similarities that correspond to the fundamental elements and differences that are explained by the contextdependent operative elements. The thesis then opens up for a discussion about how those ideological similarities and differences affects possibilities for a conservative parliamentary coalition.

This essay researches the link between populism and political trust by comparing the development of these two phenomena in Sweden and Italy. Populism is defined as a political strategy in which one appeals to the people and uses anti-establishment rhetoric. The purpose of the study is to analyze if voters that are less politically trustful are also more prone to vote for anti-establishment populist candidates. By using a temporal comparative analysis with a historical perspective in mind, the development and linkage of political trust and populism is analyzed in the cases’ most recent four elections.  The Swedish case is distinguished by relatively high levels of political trust but have in the latest decade seen an ever-growing proportion of their electorate turning to the right-wing populist Sweden Democrats. Italy, comparatively, is currently distinguished for low levels of political trust and has seen populist politicians thrive in the electorate ever since the 1990s ‘Mani Pulite’ scandal, and over a majority voted for the two populist parties Lega Nord and Five Star movement. The main research findings suggest that political trust, while not being a crucial determinant for contemporary populist successes, certainly helps populist parties gain attention and attraction. It also shows indications that the relation between populism and political trust can go in two directions. Sweden resembles a case where increased support for the SD have led to decreased political trust. In contrast, Italy’s political scandals, volatile voters and drastic decreases in political trust seems to have sparked increased support for populists.

This study investigates the connection between refugee reception in Swedish municipalities and support for the Swedish right-wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats. Using panel data of electoral support for the Sweden Democrats in the elections 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018 and the number of refugees received per municipality in the years since the preceding election, I find a positive and significant association between support for the Sweden Democrats and number of refugees received. This result is consistent across different models, including models utilising municipality-fixed and year-fixed effects. In order to test different theories on the connection between immigration and support for right-wing populists, I also utilise several different interaction effects between refugee intake and urbanity, native unemployment, income, immigrant unemployment and existing immigrant stock. Through this, I find some evidence for a connection between economic circumstance and response to refugee reception, supporting a theory of refugees being perceived as an economic threat, but only very weak support for a connection between political response to refugee reception and cultural fears or native contact with refugees.