nÃo hà / O tema central desta Tese à a representaÃÃo do incondicionado dentro da CrÃtica da RazÃo Pura. Defende-se uma funÃÃo imprescindÃvel do incondicionado para elaboraÃÃo das atividades lÃgica e transcendental da razÃo especulativa. Encontra-se aqui, sob uma nova Ãtica, a apresentaÃÃo da defesa de algumas teses acerca dos seguintes temas secundÃrios: 1) a origem de conceitos transcendentes de modo necessÃrio no pensamento; 2) a definiÃÃo de aparÃncia transcendental; 3) a elaboraÃÃo e soluÃÃo da antinomia da razÃo pura; 4) a definiÃÃo de liberdade transcendental; 5) a exposiÃÃo da funÃÃo da razÃo especulativa no estabelecimento do conhecimento cientÃfico. Os temas (1) e (2) sÃo abordados no primeiro capÃtulo atravÃs da exposiÃÃo da funÃÃo da representaÃÃo do incondicionado no desenvolvimento da derivaÃÃo subjetiva das ideias transcendentais realizada por Kant na CrÃtica da RazÃo Pura de A293/B349 a A338/B396. Os temas (3) e (4) sÃo tratados no segundo capÃtulo, mais precisamente na apresentaÃÃo dos resultados da investigaÃÃo do A Antinomia da RazÃo Pura, segundo capÃtulo do segundo livro da DialÃtica Transcendental, de A405/B432 a A568/B596. O tema (5) à encontrado no terceiro capÃtulo e serà apresentado atravÃs da defesa da tese, obtida a partir do estudo do ApÃndice da DialÃtica Transcendental, de A642/B670 a A705/B733, que a razÃo especulativa tem uma funÃÃo imprescindÃvel para o conhecimento cientÃfico. Defender-se-Ã, em Ãltima anÃlise, que todos esses temas sÃo fundamentados em uma tese de fundo que perpassa toda DialÃtica Transcendental, a saber, que o incondicionado pode ser determinado como elemento transcendental com um uso empÃrico regulativo de toda experiÃncia para o estabelecimento de uma unidade sistemÃtica de todo conhecimento objetivo. / The main theme of this PhD thesis is the representation of the unconditioned in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued an essential function of the unconditioned for the preparation of logical and transcendental activities of speculative reason. There is in this work, in a new light, the defense of exposition of some theses about the following sub-themes: 1) the origin of transcendent concepts necessary mode in consciousness; 2) the definition of transcendental appearance; 3) the development and solution of the antinomy of pure reason; 4) the definition of transcendental freedom; 5) the exposition of the function of speculative reason in the establishment of scientific knowledge. Themes (1) and (2) are covered in the first chapter through the exposition of the function of representation of the unconditioned in the development of subjective derivation of transcendental ideas carried out by Kant, of A293/B349 to A338/B396, in the Critique of Pure Reason. Themes (3) and (4) are treated in the second chapter, specifically in the presentation of the results of the research about The Antinomy of Pure Reason, in the second chapter of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, of A405/B432 to A568/B596. The theme (5) is found in the third chapter and it is presented by the defense of the thesis that the speculative reason has a vital role to scientific knowledge, it is obtained from the study about Appendix of the Transcendental Dialectic, of A642 / B670 to A705 / B733. It is defended here, ultimately, that all these issues are based on a fundamental thesis that permeates all Transcendental Dialectic, namely that the unconditioned can be determined as a transcendental element with a regulative empirical use of all experience to establish a systematic unity of all objective knowledge.

Kant is famous for his use of transcendental arguments in the transcendental deduction. This thesis examines how such a transcendental argument is used within Kant’s methodological framework. Following the work of Henrich and Walker, the paper asks whether transcendental arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason are compatible with Kant’s methodology in general. We find that these arguments and Kant’s methodology are compatible, and that transcendental arguments are indeed very weak arguments by Walker’s standards. However, the entire transcendental deduction should be understood as a deduction writing that uses transcendental arguments particularly effectively according to Kant’s own methodological standards.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Valmir de Costa.pdf: 845356 bytes, checksum: b2dcc944aeefba44d5650627ccdeb72a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-11-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This thesis aims to contribute to the deepen uhe understanding of immnence in the thought of Husserl, its length and constituition, fundamentally, from descriptive psychology (1900) and transcendental philosophy (1913). Phenomenology is characterized by the free exercise of reason, which through its own research method, performs ideal self apprehension of pure objects in consciousness. The immanence designates a region to be in those objects that assume the conditions of possibility of a pure manifestation, constituting the very identity of phenomenology as the theory of knowledge. Conceptually, at the beginning of phenomenological research, the immanence of psychic acts is opposed to all kinds of transcendent objects to those acts, which turns out to phenomenology as science of ideal objects (First and Second Chapters). His method of investigation, as determined by the specificity of its object, differs totally from the method of the natural sciences. Phenomenology, by the method of reduction and intuition, investigates the region to be the transcendent consciousness to the world with their pure and ideal objects, which, by their levels of incorporation and links actually the philosophical discourse to a rigorous science. The natural sciences, the empirical and deduction methods, are immanent to the world and constitute a 'real' objective relationship with his research object, therefore relative (Third Chapter). It will be seen that the immanence of the status of the position of pure object is consolidated, conversely, by the suspension of the entire thesis of the world, as opposed by epistemological phenomenology to empiricism. Husserl, in his way of consolidation of phenomenological research, constitutes, according to the evolution of his thinking, different levels of description of the acts of consciousness. He leaves thus the origin of a real immanence (Real), the logical inheritance and psychologism, through immanence 'Reell', referring to the descriptive psychology, to reach its highest level of development, with the pure immanence. If the level of last description that aims to phenomenology is achieved only when it comes to the transcendental, as a definitive break from all order of nature, the 'reduction' is the inaugural gesture that takes place every phenomenological analysis (Four Chapter). The immanence seeks to resolve a problem which, in the phenomenological theory, breaks the link with the world, is indispensable to the establishment of its meaning, manifested only by an absolute being. The apprehension of being in the world is only possible as well, in suspension and consequent denial. Phenomenology becomes thus a strict science of pure objects held by the inaugural gesture of epoché in the world, reduced their intentional manifestation, it consists, for an idea of time itself, transcendentally in consciousness (Fifth Chapter). The immanence of the statute is effected itself in the psychology which turns into pure phenomenology, and this to transcendental philosophy / A presente tese pretende contribuir para o aprofundamento da compreensão da imanência no pensamento de Husserl, sua extensão e constituição, fundamentalmente, da psicologia descritiva (1900) à filosofia transcendental (1913). A fenomenologia se caracteriza pelo exercício livre da razão, que através de um método de investigação próprio, executa a autoapreensão ideadora de objetos puros na consciência. A imanência designa uma região de ser em que os objetos assumem as condições de possibilidade de sua manifestação pura, constituindo a própria identidade da investigação fenomenológica como teoria do conhecimento. Conceitualmente, no início de sua investigação, a imanência dos atos psíquicos se contrapõe a toda ordem de objetos transcendentes a tais atos, o que acaba por constituir a fenomenologia como ciência de objetos ideais (Primeiro e Segundo Capítulos). Seu método de investigação, determinado pela especificidade de seu objeto, se distingue totalmente do método das ciências da natureza. A fenomenologia, pelo método da redução e da intuição, investiga a região de ser da consciência transcendente ao mundo, com seus objetos puros e ideais, em que, pelos seus níveis de constituição e verdade, vincula o discurso filosófico a uma ciência de rigor. As ciências da natureza, pelo método empirista e da dedução, são imanentes ao mundo e constituem uma relação objetiva real de investigação com seu objeto, por isso relativa (Terceiro Capítulo). Ver-se-á que a posição do estatuto da imanência de objetos puros se consolida, inversamente, pela suspensão de toda tese do mundo, como contraposição epistemológica da fenomenologia ao empirismo. Husserl, em seu percurso de consolidação da investigação fenomenológica, constitui, conforme a evolução de seu pensamento, níveis distintos de descrição dos atos de consciência. Parte, assim, na origem, de uma imanência real (Real), herdeira da lógica e do psicologismo, passando pela imanência Reell , referente à psicologia descritiva, até chegar a seu nível mais alto de elaboração, com a imanência pura. Se o nível de descrição último que visa à fenomenologia é alcançado somente quando se chega ao transcendental, como ruptura definitiva de toda ordem de natureza, a redução é o gesto inaugural em que se realiza toda análise fenomenologia (Quarto Capítulo). O estudo da imanência procura dirimir um problema, de que, na teoria fenomenológica, a ruptura do vínculo com o mundo é indispensável à constituição de seu sentido, manifestada, unicamente, por um ser absoluto. A apreensão do ser do mundo só é possível assim, por sua suspensão e consequente negação. A fenomenologia torna-se, desse modo, uma ciência estrita de objetos puros, realizada pelo gesto inaugural da epoché, em que o mundo, reduzido a sua manifestação intencional, é constituído, por uma ideia de tempo própria, transcendentalmente na consciência (Quinto Capítulo). O estatuto da imanência é o próprio resultado em que a psicologia se transforma em fenomenologia pura, e esta em filosofia transcendental

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

This thesis examines the interpretive tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā in the context of the schools of Tehran and Qum. Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendental philosophy (al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿālīyah or ḥikmat) avails itself to a number of readings; however, this thesis focuses on the philosophical and mystical (ʿirfānī) readings in terms of their development, transmission and their impact on how ḥikmat is understood in the modern Iranian seminary (ḥawza). The way in which a text is read in the ḥawza has great implications for the development of ideas, as the ḥawza uses a text based system to train students in a particular field. While both readings were studied by the majority of transcendental philosophers (ḥukamāʾ) in the school of Tehran, the school of Qum saw a greater separation between the readings and I show that for a number of reasons, including the introduction of seminal texts written by ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī, a preference developed for a more philosophical reading of transcendental philosophy. I examine evidence for the different preferences of the ḥukamāʾ for either a more philosophical or ʿirfānī reading of ḥikmat through an examination of their writings on the subjects of existence (wujūd), guardianship (walāyah) and resurrection (maʿād) which act as case studies. The theoretical implications of both approaches are examined in each chapter as well as their interdependence. The schools of Tehran and Qum built on Mullā Ṣadrā’s framework and provided new interpretations of important issues. Apart from the intricate discussions on the core aspects of ḥikmat, Muḥammad Riżā Qumshihī’s masterful examination of the Seal of the Saints and ʿAlī Mudarris Zunūzī’s philosophy of bodily resurrection are examples of a thriving interpretive tradition in Iran and constitute significant developments of important philosophical and ʿirfānī concepts from the ideas of their predecessors.

Submitted essay is an inquiry into J. G. Fichte's early philosophy focused particularly on Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre as a central work of his early period. Interpretation is based on assumption that its principal aim consists in manifestation of the way leading to emergence of our commonsense and ordinary understanding with reference to both world and ourselves. This approach carries Fichte's affilation with tendency inherent to transcendental philosophy of his era not only in its search for the origin of empirical knowledge, but for the origin of aprioristic structures of our experience especially. His transcendentally laden search manifests itself as so called "pragmatic history of the human mind", the principal object of our inquiry. Here we can find an attempt to reconstruct just transcendental, but not "real", temporally sequential, genesis of our mind from original state of feeling to our common representation both about independently existing things and ourselves as free cognizing subjects. Application of this philosophical method allows him to genetically derive and justify basic forms of our experience and its aprioristic components like space, time, substantiality or causality. The first part of essay introduces fundamental principles of Fichte's philosophical system and...

Ce travail dans le domaine de la « neuropsychanalyse » propose une spéculation théorique sur la structure physiologique de l’inconscient psychanalytique en recoupant les observations expérimentales et cliniques des deux cadres. L’écoute clinique indique une insistance de phonèmes récurrents dans ce qui fait conflit, appelés « phonèmes fantômes ». En effet, tel un membre fantôme, le signifiant refoulé est investi d’une intention mais son articulation est bloquée. Or, du fait de la structure ambiguë du langage, un même mouvement d’articulation peut radicalement changer de signification. C’est ce mécanisme qui donne lieu au retour du refoulé dans le signifiant et permet la survie de fantômes phonémiques qui tisseraient la structure linguistique de l’inconscient. Cette question du signifiant est présentée en écho à une question plus fondamentale, celle de l’émergence du psychique en réponse à la contrainte de l’organisme de faire la distinction entre intérieur et extérieur. Pour cette distinction, il faut supposer l’existence d’un système d’inhibition ciblé puisqu’il doit faire ressortir précisément ce qui dans la façon d’appréhender le monde extérieur n’a pas été anticipé. Cette précision est offerte par le modèle sensorimoteur des copies d’efférence, qui présentifie le mouvement avant qu’il ne se fasse et montre comment l’inhibition est condition de la représentation, constitutif du psychique. Pour l’humain la nécessité de la distinction intérieur-extérieur est impérieuse du fait précisément du langage qui rend complexe l’identification du lieu d’où ça parle. Elle mène au mouvement de refoulement, qui par inhibition fait apparaitre les fantômes phonèmiques comme les représentations en négatif des fragments de paroles refoulés. Cette réflexion théorique est précédée d’une mise en contexte élaborée dans l’histoire et l’épistémologique parfois controversée de la neuropsychanalyse et revendique pour sa méthodologie une approche transcendantale. / This study in the domain of « neuropsychoanalysis » proposes a theoretical speculation on the physiological structure of the psychoanalytic unconscious by cross-checking the experimental and clinical observations from both domains. Clinical listening indicates the insistence of recurring phonemes when it comes to conflictual topics, called “phonemic phantoms”. Indeed, as is the case in a phantom limb, the repressed signifier is invested by an intention while its articulation is blocked. However, due to the ambiguous structure of language, a same articulation movement can radically change signification. It is this mechanism that causes the return of the repressed in the signifier and allows for the survival of phonemic phantoms which are thought to weave the linguistic structure of the unconscious. The question of the signifier is presented as an instantiation of a more fundamental question, the emergence of the psychic realm in response to the constraint of the organism to distinguish interior from exterior. For this distinction, the existence of an accurate system of inhibition must be postulated since it has to be able to delineate precisely what in the way of apprehending the world was not anticipated by the organism. This precision is allowed by the sensorimotor model of efference copies, which presentifies the movement before its realisation and shows how inhibition is a condition for representation. For humans, the necessity of the interior-exterior distinction is imperious due to language which renders complex the identification of the locus from where speech is initiated (from where “id” speaks). This necessity leads to the movement of repression, which by inhibition induces phonemic phantoms in the form of negative representations of repressed speech. This work is preceded by an introduction which contextualises the theoretical reflexion in the sometimes controversial history and epistemology of neuropsychoanalysis and which claims a transcendental approach for its methodology.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FIL - Edson Dognaldo Gil.pdf: 1469522 bytes, checksum: 93803423295828ce6d57adf7e6ced90d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-19 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The aim of this dissertation is to present and toanalyse the first principle of Fichteʹs Doctrine of Science, namely, that of the self‐position of the I, in the same way the German idealist philosopher expounds it in the firstparagraph of his masterpiece Grundlage der gesammten issenschaftslehre [Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge], published in 1794‐1795. The historical presentation situates Fichteʹs issue in the context of the modern philosophy in general, and of German idealism in particular. Remarks are provided on the relation and mutual influence of German thinkers, especially on the continuity between the transcendental philosophy of Kant and that of Fichte, pointing out, however, the originality of the project of the Doctrine of Science. Some attention is also given to the current state of the Fichte‐Forschung. The systematic analysis, wish constitutes the core of the work, concentrates on the thorough reading of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, pointing out its implications to the question of the relation between being and thinking, morespecifically, the respective transcendental transformation of the Cartesian cogito. Thus, the I, in so far as it is (characterized as) pure intelligence, is the genetic, originary and pre-predicative Act (Tathandlung). Therefore, it is previous toboth discursive thought and objective consciousness (ofa substantiated Cartesian subject), and yet it is accessible by means of an intuitive method; it is nonetheless purely intellectual and authentically meditative meditative philosophy, philosophy as art (ars). There is enclosed a reproduction of the original text of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, as well as the respective translation, of my authorship. There is also a small glossary of the most important terms used by Fichte translated from German into Portuguese / O escopo desta dissertação consiste em apresentar e analisaro chamado Primeiro Princípio da autoposição do Eu da Doutrina da Ciência de Johann Gottlieb Fichte, tal qual o idealista alemão o expõe no primeiro parágrafo de sua obra‐prima Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschriftfür seine Zuhörer [Fundamento de toda a Doutrina da Ciência como manual para seus ouvintes], publicada em 1794‐1795. A apresentação histórica visa a situar a problemáticafichteana no contexto da filosofia moderna, em geral, e, em particular, do idealismo alemão. Tecem‐se considerações sobre a relação e a influência mútua dos pensadores alemães, especialmente sobre a continuidade entre a filosofia transcendental deKant e a de Fichte, destacando‐se porém a originalidade do projeto da Doutrina da Ciência. Dedicam‐se, além disso, algumas palavras ao estado atual da Fichte‐Forschung. A análise sistemática, que constitui o cerne do trabalho, concentra‐se na leitura minuciosa do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, destacando‐se suas implicações no que respeita à questão da relação entre ser e pensar, mais especificamente, a respectiva transformação transcendental do cogito cartesiano. Conclui‐se que, para Fichte, o eu, enquanto inteligência pura, é Ato genético, originário (Tathandlung), pré‐predicativo e, portanto, anterior ao pensamento discursivo e à consciência objetiva (de um sujeito hipostasiado, cartesiano), ao qual se tem acesso por meio de um método intuitivo, mas puramente intelectual, autenticamente meditativo filosofia meditativa, filosofia como arte (ars). Como anexos, seguem‐se a reprodução do texto original do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, bem como a respectiva tradução, de minha autoria. Além disso, um pequeno vocabulário, alemão‐português, dos termos mais importantes utilizados por Fichte

La philosophie critique de Kant entretient un rapport ambigu à la question du langage. Bien que le système critique ne semble pas contenir de théorie du langage à proprement parler, les effets du registre transcendantal sur la façon d’appréhender le langage en philosophie semblent aussi massifs que souterrains. Pour envisager ce paradoxe, une hypothèse nouvelle est formulée : la philosophie kantienne serait l’expression paradoxale mais particulièrement paradigmatique d’une crise du langage de grande ampleur observable en Allemagne autour de 1800. Ce n’est qu’en replaçant le système critique dans ce contexte de crise que l’on pourra saisir sa portée pour traiter des problèmes du langage. Cela engage paradoxalement à saisir les effets positifs de la mise entre parenthèses du langage. Pour cela, la philosophie critique est d’abord située dans la crise épistémologique de grande ampleur qui accompagne autant un changement de paradigme des théories du langage (de la grammaire générale à la grammaire comparée), que la naissance d’une linguistique « scientifique ». Elle est ensuite située dans un faisceau de symptômes convergeant vers une crise du langage étudiée successivement à travers les exemples des crises poétique, métacritique et de la crise de la langue philosophique. Ces deux contextualisations permettent de poser à nouveaux frais les raisons systématiques qui expliquent un tel travail souterrain du langage par la philosophie critique. La lecture du système kantien comme modélisation topique de la subjectivité permet alors de rendre compte du statut nouveau qu’acquiert le langage et en particulier l’idée de langue naturelle dans le sillage de la philosophie transcendantale. / Kant’s critical philosophy maintains an ambiguous relationship with language. Even though no proper theory of language seems to be found in the critical system, the transcendental method of the Critique has both highly and unexpectedly influenced the philosophical approach to language. Such a paradox can be accounted for by the following hypothesis: Kantian philosophy is the expression of a major language crisis occurring in Germany at the turn of the 18th century, in a paradigmatic but paradoxical way. It is necessary to put the critical system in this context to understand the far-reaching consequences of setting aside language as a philosophical issue. This will lead to analyse the positive effects of Kant’s attitude on new way to deal with language issues. Three steps will be taken in this purpose. The first one examines the meaning of Kant’s critical philosophy in the light of an epistemic crisis mainly embodied by the theoretical shift from “general grammar” to “comparative grammar” and the emergence of scientific linguistics. The second step sheds light on the place of critical philosophy within the framework of a broader language crisis, which will be studied in three fields: 1) Poetry, 2) “Metacritique”, 3) Philosophical language. Systematic reasons for the strong influence of critical philosophy on language will emerge from this double contextualisation. Indeed, understanding the Kantian system as a topical modelling of subjectivity enables to account for the new status of language – and more specifically, for the concept of natural languages – in the wake of transcendental philosophy.