192 f. / Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2013-06-12T18:36:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MARIA ELISA VILLAS-BÔAS PINHEIRO DE LEMOS.pdf: 1233974 bytes, checksum: 4e7336d5612fc52a18a1a5aba04ffd45 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura(anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2013-06-12T18:37:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MARIA ELISA VILLAS-BÔAS PINHEIRO DE LEMOS.pdf: 1233974 bytes, checksum: 4e7336d5612fc52a18a1a5aba04ffd45 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-06-12T18:37:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MARIA ELISA VILLAS-BÔAS PINHEIRO DE LEMOS.pdf: 1233974 bytes, checksum: 4e7336d5612fc52a18a1a5aba04ffd45 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / O presente estudo versa sobre o cotejo entre o discurso jurídico-constitucional de proteção à saúde e as dificuldades à efetivação desse direito. Cuida-se de desafios que cada vez mais frequentemente batem às portas do Judiciário, requerendo respostas que o Direito nem sempre se encontra aparelhado a dar, seja por empecilhos ideológicos (como a resistência à aplicabilidade imediata e à eficácia dos direitos sociais), seja por óbices fáticos (como a escassez material), com notáveis reflexos na gestão de recursos limitados para necessidades ilimitadas e tendencialmente crescentes. Nessa seara, destaca-se a discussão dos mecanismos aptos a contribuírem para uma melhor solução desse impasse, enfatizando, especialmente, a importância da racionalização da atuação judicial efetivadora e do conhecimento e análise dos processos éticos de alocação, tanto no âmbito da macroalocação de recursos, realizada na esfera das políticas públicas, quanto no âmbito da microalocação individual de recursos. Como pressuposto lógico, avaliam-se a evolução e as características dos direitos humanos e fundamentais, em que se situa o direito à saúde, e das políticas públicas na área, bem assim a interpretação dada às normas programáticas de direitos sociais, à luz dos novos paradigmas do pós-positivismo. Apontam-se e enfrentam-se os argumentos mais comumente esgrimidos contra a judiciabilidade do direito à saúde, analisando sua inserção no contexto de um mínimo existencial, indissociável da própria dignidade humana, mas que, por outro lado, encontra limites na reserva do possível real, fator que não pode ser desconsiderado sequer quando da alegação de urgência nos pleitos liminares, donde se demandar a discussão de balizas coerentes e equilibradas para a ponderação desses pedidos. A esses requisitos se soma a indicação de conhecimento crítico de critérios éticos, a nortear o pensamento da matéria, para o que se mostra pertinente o estudo pontual da Bioética e da Teoria da Justiça, embasando a avaliação dos parâmetros de razoabilidade, isonomia e equidade na alocação de recursos escassos em saúde. Intenta-se, com isso, promover a busca ao maior grau de efetivação possível do referido direito fundamental, respeitando e ampliando a condição de dignidade humana, bem assim garantindo a concreção do texto constitucional, sem desconsiderar as contingências da realidade. / Salvador

Thomas Hobbes está preocupado com as consequências do desacordo moral que, segundo ele, impedem as sociedades de viverem em paz, a qual é condição necessária para a garantia uma vida confortável a todos. Para apresentar uma solução a esse problema, o autor começa estudando a condição natural dos humanos, que, sem um poder soberano, vivem em condição de guerra. Depois de alcançar essa conclusão, Hobbes nos mostra como é possível constituir corretamente uma república. Apesar de apresentar o argumento do estado de natureza como sendo o ponto de partida para a instituição da soberania, ele está focado principalmente no seu significado para a estabilidade da república. Hobbes afirma, assim, estar consciente de que as pessoas sempre desejam viver juntas e de que elas têm vivido assim desde sempre. Seu principal interesse está, na verdade, em demonstrar como as pessoas podem viver juntas em paz ao longo do tempo. Hobbes mostra aos seus leitores que a paz só é possível quando os cidadãos conhecem as leis de natureza e estão corretamente motivados a segui-las. Essa tese tem dois objetivos principais: (i) discutir como Hobbes desenvolve sua teoria moral, e como ele conecta essa teoria à lei civil, e (ii) debater sua teoria sobre a natureza humana e a possibilidade de ensinar os cidadãos sobre a necessidade de obedecer ao soberano. Os principais tópicos discutidos e as contribuições que essa tese pode proporcionar estão relacionados à questão da normatividade das leis de natureza e ao impacto que ela pode ter no restante da teoria política de Hobbes, com particular destaque à relação, em uma república, entre moralidade e educação, pois a segunda motiva os cidadãos a seguirem a primeira. / Thomas Hobbes is concerned with the consequences of moral disagreement as, according to him, they prevent societies from living in peace, which is a necessary condition to guarantee a comfortable life to everyone. In order to present a solution to this problem, Hobbes starts studying the natural condition of humans, who, in the absence of a sovereign power, live in a state of war. After reaching this conclusion, Hobbes shows us how it is possible to correctly institute a commonwealth. Despite presenting the argument concerning the state of nature as a starting point to the institution of the sovereignty, he is focused mainly on the state of nature’s meaning to the stability of the commonwealth. Hobbes hence asserts that he is aware that people always desire to live together and have always lived like that. His main interest is actually to demonstrate how people can live together in peace over time. Hobbes shows his readers that peace is only possible when citizens know the laws of nature and are correctly motivated to follow them. This paper has two main aims (i) to discuss how Hobbes advances his moral theory and how he connects it to the civil law, and (ii) to reflect his theory about human nature and the possibility of teaching citizens about the need of obeying the sovereign. The main topics discussed and the contributions this paper may make concern the normativity of the laws of nature and the impact it may have on the rest of Hobbes’s political theory, with particular emphasis on the relation, in a commonwealth, between morality and education, as the latter motivates citizens to follow the former.

Thesis title: Contractual liability and its limitation The aim of the thesis is to assess the options of parties to a contract when settling liability rules diversify from the standards of Czech Civil Code (Act. 89/2012 Coll). The author provides introduction of multiple ways of how the parties can limit their contractual liability and emphasize that the aim of any liability is to motivate subjects to pay attention to the opposite party's rights and assets, but in the context of Civil Code its main function is to repair damages and satisfy the injured party. The subject which is in breach of its duties therefore gets new or alternated duties, as well as the injured party gains more rights on its side. For the scope of liability, it is important to define the content of the contract as the parties see it in the moment of the contract's conclusion. The content does not consist only of rights and duties connected to the fulfilment of the contract object matter, but it also consists of duties to respect other interests of the opposite party, so the status quo in respect to matters not connected with the fulfilment of the obligations remain untouched. Such a protective aim arises out of strengthened confidence of the relation between contractual parties and can be mainly seen as a duty of prevention and...

Partant du constat de la récente consécration de la notion d’acte juridique par le code civil, cette thèse s’interroge sur les conséquences de cet avènement par rapport à la notion de contrat. L’auteur commence par montrer que cette adjonction de l’acte juridique au contrat est nécessaire. En effet, comme le montre nettement l’étude de la relation médicale que l’auteur prend comme point de départ, le contrat rencontre des faiblesses techniques et psychosociales, rendant impossible son application dans certaines situations.D’où l’importance, au-delà du contrat, de disposer d’un autre outil : l’acte juridique. Pour que ce dernier soit efficace, il est nécessaire d’approfondir sa définition et de le doter d’un régime propre, distinct du contrat. D’après cette étude, l’acte juridique se définit désormais comme un acte volontaire reconnu dans un ordre juridique comme créant des normes. Plusieurs propriétés de l’acte juridique ont été mises à jour, notamment l’existence de conditions de validité propres tenant à l’exigence d’une volonté non viciée de l’auteur de l’acte et à la licéité des motifs. Bien que ces propriétés aient été dégagées à partir du droit des contrats, il a été vérifié qu’elles pouvaient s’appliquer à l’ensemble des actes juridiques, en passant du consentement de la victime en droit pénal, au mariage, au jugement ou à la loi. / On the acknowledgment of the recent consecration of the notion of legal act by the Frencg civil code, the purpose of this thesis is to reflect on the consequence of this evolution on the notion of contract.The author first starts by demonstrating that the addition of the legal act to the contract is necessary. Indeed, a close study of the medical relation shows that the contract has technical and psychosocial weaknesses which make it impossible to be used in some situations. Henceforth the importance of having another tool at one’s disposal, the legal act, likely to take over from the contract. In order to enable thelegal act to sustain the contract, it is yet necessary to reinforce this first concept, going deeper in itsdefinition and giving it its own legal system, separate from the one of the contract. In this work legalwas eventually defined as an act acknowledged in a legal system as creating legal normes. Moreover,several properties have been highlighted, in particular the existence of its own validity conditions, owingfirst to the requirement of the unflawed will of the author of the act and second to the legitimacy of the motives. Although these properties were brought out from contract law, it has been shown that they could apply to all legal acts, from victim consent in criminal law, to marriage, judgment, administrative act or to the law.

L’assistance dans l’élaboration d’un acte juridique est une technique ancienne à laquelle le législateur continue aujourd’hui d’avoir recours. Pourtant, elle semble susciter peu d’intérêt, de sorte que la légimité de son existence peut être mise en doute. L’objet de cette démonstration est donc de comprendre ce phénomène d’assistance afin de savoir s’il renvoie à une institution singulière et autonome. Apparaissant sous une double forme à l’occasion de la formation d’un acte juridique, l’assistance peut être tantôt “habilitante”, tantôt “facilitante”. Si ce dualisme est utile dans la détermination du régime, il est avant tout, sur le plan notionnel, source de confusion. Dans tous les cas, l’assistance affiche toutefois une unité substantielle. Caractérisée comme un “être avec” et un “agir avec”, l’assistance est une technique de protection intermédiaire refusant toute substitution qui consiste pour l’assistant à être aux côtés de l’assisté afin de l’aider à exprimer une volonté en conformité avec ses intérêts. Ce phénomène se doit par conséquent d’obéir à des règles clairement identifiées, ce qui n’est pas toujours le cas à ce jour. Tout en mettant en évidence le droit positif, cette étude se propose donc d’apporter certaines précisions dans le fonctionnement de l’assistance envisagé à la fois dans la seule relation établie entre les deux principaux protagonistes, mais aussi au-delà. Si l’assistance se déploie entre l’assisté et l’assistant, elle rayonne nécessairement sur l’acte juridique ainsi passé et sur des tiers à la relation d’assistance. / Assistance is a method that the legislator has had recourse to for long in the drafting of a legal transaction and it still does nowadays. However, it seems to arouse so few interest that the legitimacy of its existence may be doubted. The purpose of this demonstration therefore is to understand this practice and determine whether it can be considered as a singular and autonomous institution or not. Assistance can play two parts during the drafting of a legal transaction, sometimes as an “enabler”, sometimes as a “facilitator”. While this duality proves to be useful in the determination of the regime, it mostly brings a lexical confusion. In any case though, assistance conveys a substantial unity. Both defined as “being with” and “acting with”, assistance is an intermediary protection technique that excludes any kind of substitution and consists, for the designated assistant, in standing by the assisted to help him to state a will in accordance with his interests. As a consequence, it has to comply with clearly identified rules, which is, to date, not necessarily the case. Whilst presenting the positive law, this study aims at clarifying the functioning of assistance, both taken as the relationship established between the two main protagonists and beyond. Although assistance mainly concerns the assistant and the assisted, it inevitably has an impact on the legal transaction concluded thereby and the related third parties.

El presente artículo científico tiene como objetivo proponer la modificatoria al artículo 345-A del Código Civil teniendo como presupuesto la distinción entre resarcimiento e indemnización, utilizando la metodología cualitativa, sirviéndose de la técnica del fichaje, análisis documental, la observación y los instrumentos utilizados fueron las fichas textuales y de resumen, la guía de análisis documental y la guía de observación. Entre los resultados se obtuvo que existe una diferencia conceptual entre la indemnización y el resarcimiento, que su ámbito de aplicación es distinto, así como el presupuesto para su configuración, y el criterio para su cuantificación. Por otro lado, en la jurisprudencia casatoria sobre el artículo 345-A del Código Civil, existen pronunciamientos en los cuales se otorga un resarcimiento por daño moral. Por último, en legislaciones como España y Chile se regula el remedio compensación económica con su presupuesto desequilibrio económico, que se proponen legislar en el artículo 345-A del Código Civil. Se concluye que si se modifica el artículo 345-A del Código Civil teniendo como presupuesto la distinción entre resarcimiento e indemnización; entonces se tendrá una redacción más precisa sobre el remedio aplicable en el divorcio por causal de separación de hecho. / The purpose of this scientific article is to propose an amendment to article 345-A of the Civil Code, based on the distinction between compensation and indemnity, using qualitative methodology, using the technique of the file, documentary analysis, observation and the instruments used were the textual and summary files, the documentary analysis guide and the observation guide. Among the results, it was found that there is a conceptual difference between compensation and indemnity, that their scope of application is different, as well as the presupposition for their configuration, and the criterion for their quantification. On the other hand, in the cassatorial jurisprudence on article 345-A of the Civil Code, there are pronouncements in which compensation for moral damages is granted. Finally, in legislations such as Spain and Chile, the remedy of economic compensation is regulated with its presupposition of economic imbalance, which is proposed to be legislated in article 345-A of the Civil Code. It is concluded that if Article 345-A of the Civil Code is modified taking as a presupposition the distinction between compensation and indemnity; then we will have a more precise wording on the applicable remedy in divorce on the grounds of de facto separation.

La presente investigación tuvo por finalidad analizar y desarrollar los criterios de incorporación de una nueva causal de indignidad en el Código Civil Peruano, considerando como indignos a aquellas personas que dejan en estado de desamparo a sus familiares adultos mayores Para ello fue relevante en un inicio, interpretar y analizar los criterios de indignidad después de ello analizar la doctrina nacional e internacional que hace referencia la indignidad. Todo este estudio nos permitió brindar el problema de investigación, aplicando un abordaje metodológico enfocado en garantizar el respeto a la dignidad y la defensa de las personas en estado de vulnerabilidad, esto se logrará a través de una propuesta normativa que surge del análisis de la doctrina y jurisprudencia. / The aim of this research was to analyze and develop criteria for the incorporation of a new ground for disinheritance in the Peruvian Civil Code, specifically targeting individuals who abandon or neglect their elderly family members, leaving them in a state of abandonment. To achieve this goal, an initial step involved interpreting and analyzing the existing criteria for disinheritance, followed by an examination of national and international doctrine on the subject of disinheritance. This comprehensive study enabled us to identify the research problem and apply a methodological approach focused on ensuring respect, dignity, and the defense of vulnerable individuals. This will be achieved through a normative proposal that emerges from the analysis of doctrine and case law.

Raymond Saleilles (1855-1912) és considerat pels comparatistes com pare del dret comparat modern. De fet fou el màxim responsable de l'organització del primer congrés internacional de dret comparat a París el 1900. L'època marcada per la internacionalització dels intercanvis, la crisi del mètode jurídic francès i el repte de la codificació alemanya i suïssa motivà alguns juristes a buscar noves formes d'estudiar el dret. Saleilles defensava pel dret comparat un mètode, un objecte i un fi propis i autònoms diferents dels que fins ara tenien la dogmàtica jurídica o l'estudi de la legislació estrangera. El mètode tenia els seus fonaments en la sociologia i la història. L'objectiu del dret comparat havia de ser la construcció d'un ideal "droit commun de l'humanité civilisée". Aquest dret comú havia de ser construït no només per la doctrina sinó també per la jurisprudència i el legislador. / Raymond Saleilles (1855-1912) is considered by many comparatists as the father of modern comparative law. Saleilles had a great responsibility in the organization of the first International Congress on comparative Law in Paris in 1900. This event is still today considered as the foundation moment of modern comparative law.Saleilles' times were those of the internationalization of exchanges, of the crisis of the "Exegèse" Method and of the new challenging German and Swiss civil codification.Saleilles tried to build a new discipline, comparative law, with its own method, object and aim. This method had its basis on sociology and history and tried to break the national and scientifical fences of Jurisprudence.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:28:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raquel do Amaral de Oliveira Sa.pdf: 1175088 bytes, checksum: 7394418494418c700024af782ff88ff9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-26 / The purpose of this essay is to analyze the possibility of introducing the common law legal figure known as trust in the Brazilian legal system. Trusts were created in England during the middle age and nowadays they are one of the most popular legal devices for wealth management, charity, wills and estate planning and project finance, among other purposes. As they were formed within the common law environment, many dogmatic obstacles to the recognition of the trusts have been raised by some civil law jurisdictions. The main difficulties related to trusts acknowledgment found by civil lawyers are related to the Romanist concept of property rights, which are radically different from the one created by the common law. Hence, we will discuss the historical background of the issue, the efforts that some civil law countries provided to overcome it, as well as the challenges that will eventually be faced by the Brazilian legislator in order to recognize trusts into our legal system / O presente trabalho tem o propósito de analisar a possibilidade de introdução no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro da figura jurídica surgida na common law conhecida como trust. Os trusts foram criados na Inglaterra durante a Idade Média e hoje são um dos mais populares instrumentos para gestão patrimonial, caridade, planejamento sucessório, financiamento de projetos, entre outras finalidade. Como foram criados no ambiente da common law, muitos obstáculos de caráter dogmático têm sido colocados ao seu reconhecimento pelos países de direito romanogermâmico. Os maiores empecilhos colocados pelos juristas romano-germânicos relacionam-se ao conceito romanista de direito de propriedade, o qual é radicalmente distinto daquele encontrado na common law. Destarte, discutiremos as raízes históricas desse problema, os esforços que alguns países romanistas têm despendido para superá-lo, bem como os eventuais desafios que serão eventualmente encontrados pelo legislador brasileiro na tarefa de reconhecer os trusts em nosso ordenamento