Deye mo-n se mo-n is a proverb in Haiti that roughly translates to "Beyond the mountains, more mountains." This saying holds a deep meaning to the Haitian peoples, who have lived through unrelenting violence and poverty. In its 200 years of independence, Haiti's inhabitants have seldom known a decade without political violence. Like the chain of mountains, political violence in Haiti seems to go on forever with no end in sight. Not only are the devastating effects of violence felt within politics, but also in the economic and social sectors of the country. The collapse of these sectors has created a predatory democracy which fails to provide for the population but rather enriches political elites who fight for the control of power and ignore their civic duties. The result of the political infighting, corruption, and weak governance has left Haiti the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. A recent conflict which continues to have negative effects in the country is the 1991 military coup d'etat. The source of the coup was the political classes' constant fight for the control of power. The consequences of the coup are the collapse of the sectors previously mentioned. This has led to a country's struggle to reestablish functioning political, economic, and social institutions. Through secondary literary sources, online journals, and biographies, the causes and negative effects of the coup will be explored in hopes of illustrating the overall proximate and underlying causes of political violence in Haiti. This research will eventually lead to the exploration of different institutional reforms which needs to be enforced to break the cycle of violence.

The 2021 military coup in Myanmar is part of a much bigger trend towards democratic regression in Southeast Asia where military influence has played an important role. Previous research on the SEA region suggests that the citizenry has been overlooked in understanding how civil-military relations have been shaped. Rebecca L. Schiff’s concordance theory presumes that when concordance, i.e., agreement, between the military, political leadership, and the citizenry exists on the four indicators (1) social composition of officer corps, (2) political decision-making procedures, (3) recruitment method and (4) military style, military intervention in domestic politics is less likely to occur. The aim of this thesis is to conduct a comparative case study of Myanmar and Indonesia to understand how the three actors have shaped their respective civil-military relations. By applying concordance theory, a comparison is made to assess the theory’s predictive and explanatory power of the two cases. Results suggest that the two cases' political developments are in line with the theory. Indonesia demonstrates a higher degree of concordance among all indicators and has not experienced a military intervention in the studied time period. Comparatively, Myanmar demonstrates a low degree ofconcordance among all indicators and subsequently, military intervention in domestic politics is common. However, a lack of data on some indicators questions the strength of these claims. Collecting primary material for future research is suggested to analyse the concordance of all four indicators in depth and ensure an accurate representation of the citizenry for both cases.

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Denna studie syftar till att förklara de strukturella faktorerna till kuppförsöket den 15 juli 2016 i Turkiet. Syftet med studien är att få en förståelse samt förklaring till hur kuppförsöket kunde äga rum och som teoretiskt ramverk används Aron Belkin och Evan Schofers metaanalys av militärkupper samt Tore Wig och Espen Geelmuyden Röds teori om politiska val som faktor till militärkupper. Forskningsdesignen för arbetet har varit en förklarande enfallsstudie där delar av Belkins och Schofers teori applicerats på fallet med syfte att påvisa vilka faktorer som bidrag till kuppförsöket i Turkiet. De strukturella faktorer som använts i studiens analys är externa hot och delaktighet i väpnade konflikter, militärens nationella säkerhetsdoktrin, ekonomisk utveckling och välfärd, civilsamhällets styrka, regimens legitimitet, tidigare militärkupper samt politiska val. Slutsatsen som kan dras efter genomförd analys är att de strukturella faktorer som teorin erbjuder kan förklara kuppförsöket genom att det skett en ökning av våldsanvändning i landet, att militären har en stark ideologisk tro som påverkar deras åsikter och handlande, att inkomstklyftorna och korruptionen i landet ökat, att civilsamhället är försvagat, att tidigare elitgrupperingar anser den sittande regeringen som illegitim, förekomsten av tidigare militärkupper i landet samt förändringen av valresultaten i valen 2015 Även om alla presenterade faktorer i någon utsträckning varit närvarande i Turkiet kan det fastställas att militärens nationella säkerhetstradition och dess lojalitet till den kemalistiska traditionen ger den bästa förklaringen till kuppförsöket i Turkiet 2016. / This study explains the structural factors to the military coup July 15th, 2016 in Turkey. The aim is to get an understanding and explanation to how the coup could take place and as theoretical framework is Aron Belkin and Evan Schofer’s meta-analysis of military coups, together with Tore Wig and Espen Geelmuyden Röd’s theory about political elections as a factor for military coups used. The study is an interpretative case study where parts of Belkin’s and Schofer’s theory have been applied on the case in order to present relevant factors in the military coup. The structural factors that has been used in this study’s analysis are external threats and participation in armed conflicts, the military’s national security doctrine, economic development and welfare, the civil society’s strength, the regimes legitimacy, previous military coups and political elections. The result shows that the factors that the theory presents as general factors to military coups also can explain the coup attempt in Turkey because there has been an increase in the use of violence, that the military have a strong ideological belief that affects their opinions and actions, that the inequality and corruption in the country have increased, that the civil society is debilitated, that previous elite groups sees the current government as illegitimate, that Turkey have had military coups in the past and also the change of election results in the 2015 elections. Even if all the factors, that the theory present, to some extent have been present in Turkey it can be concluded that the military’s national security doctrine and its loyalty to the Kemalist tradition give the best explanation to the coup attempt in July 2016.

This study analyzed the causes of military coups and the consequences of military rule in the Third World during the 1960-1985 period. Using a coup d" etat score, including both successful and unsuccessful coups, as a dependent variable and collecting data for 109 developing nations from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, The New York Times Index, and public documents, sixteen hypotheses derived from the literature on the causes of military coups were tested by both simple and multiple regression models for the Third World as a whole, as well as for four regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa) and in two time periods (1960-1970 and 1971-1985). Similarly, three models of military rule (progressive, Huntington's, and revisionist models) were analyzed to assess the consequences of military rule. The results of the study concerning the causes of military coups suggest four conclusions. First, three independent variables (social mobilization, cultural homogeneity, and dominant ethnic groups in the society) have stabilizing consequences. Second, six independent variables (previous coup experience, social mobilization divided by political institutionalization, length of national independence, economic deterioration, internal war, and military dominance) have destabilizing consequences. Third, multiple regression models for each region are very useful; most models explain more than 50% of the variance in military coups. Fourth, the time period covered is an important factor affecting explanations of the causes of military coups. In the analysis of the consequences of military rule, this study found that military governments did not differ significally from civilian governments in terms of economic, education, health, and social performances. However, the study found that military rule decreased political and civil rights. Its findings are thus very consistent with the best of the literature.

République du Congo, l’armée, en tant qu’ensemble de structures et de moyens militaires institutionnellement affectés à la mise en œuvre de la politique décidée par les autorités politiques pour assurer et garantir la défense nationale, est loin d’être l’auteur exclusif des coups d’Etat, même si, systématiquement, elle profite des conséquences politiques attachées à ceux-ci. En réalité, les coups d’Etat y sont la résultante d’une lutte entre plusieurs champs. Dans cette lutte, les acteurs des coups d’Etat, en fonction de leurs corpus idéologiques respectifs, mettent en place des stratégies dont la particularité n’est pas de se limiter au champ bureaucratique mais d’engager également la société appréhendée au regard de leurs groupes ethniques ou régionaux d’appartenance. Ainsi, mobilisent-ils, non seulement leurs propres capitaux (diplômes, profession), mais aussi les ressources de leurs groupes ethniques ou régionaux en vue de réaliser la conquête ou la conservation du pouvoir. Par le jeu complexe des solidarités idéologiques, ethniques ou corporatistes, les acteurs politiques tissent des alliances et, selon le cas, participent ou s’opposent à l’exécution des coups d’Etat. Sous ce rapport, les coups d’Etat, qui supposent une importante mobilisation stratégique, politique et matérielle de la part de ceux qui en forment le projet, se confondent à un mode de conquête du pouvoir assimilable formellement à l’élection, et s’inscrivent dans ce que Marcel Mauss nomme les faits sociaux totaux. Les leaders politiques appartenant aux ethnies minoritaires, ne pouvant accéder au pouvoir par voie démocratique, élaborent une stratégie de conquête de pouvoir prenant appui sur l’armée. Ainsi, détournée de sa mission traditionnelle de protection du territoire national face aux agressions extérieures, l’armée voit sa valeur opérationnelle diminuée. / In Republic of Congo, the army, as a whole of structures and average soldiers institutionally assigned to the implementation of the policy decided by the political authorities to ensure and guarantee national defense, is far from being the exclusive author of the coups d'etat, even if, systematically, it benefits from the political consequences attached to those. Actually, the coups d'etat are there the resultant of a fight between several fields. In this fight, the actors of the coups d'etat, according to their respective ideological corpora, set up strategies whose characteristic is not to limit themselves to the bureaucratic field but to also engage the company apprehended taking into consideration their ethnic or regional group of membership. Thus, they mobilize, not only their own capital (diplomas, profession), but also resources of their ethnic or regional groups in order to carry out the conquest or the conservation of the power. By the complex play of ideological solidarity, ethnic or corporatists, the political actors weave alliances and, according to the case, take part or are opposed to the execution of the coups d'etat. Under this report, the coups d'etat, which suppose an important strategic mobilization, political and material on behalf of those which form the project of it, merge with a mode of conquest of the power comparable formally to the election, and fit in what Marcel Mauss names the total social facts. The political leaders belonging to the minority ethnic groups, not being able to reach the power by democratic way, work out a strategy of conquest of fascinating power support on the army. Thus, diverted its traditional mission of protection of the national territory vis-a-vis the external aggressions, the army sees its decreased operational value.

Si les grandes coalitions gouvernementales sont parvenues à stabiliser la trajectoire politiquemalienne, les interventions militaires au Niger (1996, 1999, 2010) ont en revanche marqué leshésitations politico-prétoriennes à l’oeuvre et leurs conséquences sur le processus transitionnelglobal. Parce qu’elles répondent à plusieurs facteurs, les « formules » politiques et militaires derégulation des champs appellent par conséquent une réflexion plus générale sur : (i) le rôle del’histoire, des ressources et des stratégies dans la fixation des choix (institutionnels) despossibles ; (ii) les contextes globaux qui ordonnent les « logiques et mythologiques »d’interaction et participent à une délimitation, objective (i.e. « spontanée ») et subjective (i.e.stratégique), des solutions adaptées de gestion politique. Ce travail visera plus spécifiquement àcomprendre les « décloisonnements » stratégiques qui, dans des conjonctures non routinières,appellent la mobilisation de ressources objectivées et valorisées d’action, autorisent de largesregroupements (coalitions post-transitionnelles au Mali, collusions « transectorielles » oupolitico-militaires au Niger) et permettent finalement de tranquilliser la trajectoire politique deces Etats. / Whereas oversized coalitions successfully stabilized the Malian political path, the recurrentmilitary Coups in Niger (1996, 1999 and 2010) focused more on the politico-praetorianwonderings and their consequences for the transitional process. Then, the political and militarymodes of administration in Mali and Niger question: (i) the role of history, strategic resources andpolitical strategies in defining the institutional means of regulation; (ii) the general contextsshaping the “logics and mythologies” of interaction and defining the well-suited models ofpolitical control. This work will more specifically aim at understanding the strategic“decompartmentalization” which, first, orders the mobilization of objectivised and valorisedresources, then allows oversized groupings (post-transitional coalitions in Mali, “transectorial” orpolitico-military collusions in Niger) and finally reassure the political trajectories of those Stateswithin uncertain conjunctures.

Fundação de Apoio a Pesquisa e à Inovação Tecnológica do Estado de Sergipe - FAPITEC/SE / The Civil-Military Coup, which deposed the president of the Republic João Goulart in Brazil in 1964, sought the support of institutions such as the Institute for Research and Social Studies / Brazilian Institute of Democratic Action (IPES-IBAD), Brazilian Bar Association (OAB), the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB), evangelical churches, the mass media and broad sectors of the urban middle classes, with the objective of guaranteeing the ascendancy and permanence of the military in power and providing it with the minimum Of legitimacy. The city of Aracaju / SE hosted the Crusade Cristo Esperança Nossa, from September 20 to 27, 1964, an evangelical campaign interdenominacional, that is, promoted and directed by several Protestant churches of the State, but idealized by Presbyterians with the support of missionaries North Americans. This event was based on the preservation of moral and Christian values, in the midst of the establishment of the new political-institutional order in the country marked by authoritarianism. The crux of this crusade, based on the idea of "political field", "symbolic power" and habitus of Pierre Bourdieu (1996), is investigated to prove the hypothesis that this event contributed to the diffusion of the anti-communist ideology in Sergipe, Context of the Cold War. Through the press and oral testimony, some manifestations of popular religious and popular evangelical leaders have been able to find a position, often discreetly stated, in favor of the takeover of power in 1964 and in defense of Christian morality, although Christ Esperança Nossa Has not been, a priori, a political event in its essence. Actions such as these also fit into the political environment conducive to marches, such as the "Family March with God for Freedom", and other evangelization campaigns that represented the defense of conservative postulates typical of the society of that period. / O Golpe Civil-Militar, que depôs o presidente da República João Goulart em 1964, no Brasil, buscou o apoio de instituições como o Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais / Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (IPES-IBAD), Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB), Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (CNBB), igrejas evangélicas, meios de comunicação de massa e de amplos setores das classes médias urbanas, com o objetivo de garantir a ascensão e permanência dos militares no poder e proporcionar-lhe o mínimo de legitimidade. A cidade de Aracaju/SE sediou a cruzada Cristo Esperança Nossa, nos dias 20 a 27 de setembro de 1964, uma campanha evangélica interdenominacional, ou seja, promovida e dirigida por várias igrejas protestantes do Estado, porém idealizada por presbiterianos com o apoio de missionários norte-americanos. Este evento se fundamentou na conservação de valores morais e cristãos, em meio à instauração da nova ordem político-institucional no país marcada pelo autoritarismo. Investiga-se os desdobramentos dessa cruzada, com base na ideia de “campo político”, “poder simbólico” e habitus de Pierre Bourdieu (1996), para comprovar a hipótese de que este evento colaborou para a difusão do ideário anticomunista em Sergipe, no contexto da Guerra Fria. Foi possível constatar em algumas manifestações de líderes religiosos e populares evangélicos, através da imprensa e de depoimentos orais, um posicionamento, muitas vezes explicitado de forma discreta, a favor da tomada do poder em 1964 e em defesa da moralidade cristã, embora Cristo Esperança Nossa não tenha sido, a priori, um evento político em sua essência. Ações como essas se enquadram, também, no ambiente político favorável às marchas, como a “Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade”, e outras campanhas de evangelização que representaram a defesa de postulados conservadores típicos da sociedade daquele período.

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wurden Doppelringinfiltrationsexperimente an teilweise gefro­renen Böden durchgeführt. Diese Experimente wurden anschließend mit den zwei computer­ge­stützten Modellen, Erosion 3D / Winter und COUP, nachgestellt, um die Frage zu beantworten, ob es möglich ist, die Infiltration in teilweise gefrorene Böden vorherzusagen. Die Doppelringinfiltrationsexperimente wurden auf einem ackerbaulich genutzten Lehm­boden mit geringer Lagerungsdichte und Bodenfeuchten im Bereich der Feld­kapa­zität, an der nördlichen Grenze des hydrologischen Untersuchungsgebietes „Schäfertal“ durch­ge­führt. Drei Experimente erfolgten bei teilweise gefrorenen und ein Experiment bei unge­frorenem Boden. Bei diesen Experimenten wurde herausgefunden, dass die Endinfiltrationsrate des gefro­renen Bodens mit 7·10-5 m/s gleich der Endinfiltrationsrate des ungefrorenen Bodens war. Während bei dem Infiltrationsexperiment mit ungefrorenem Boden die Endinfiltrations­rate bereits nach 10 bis 20 min erreicht war, wurden bei den Experimenten mit gefrorenen Böden aufgrund der zusätzlichen Sättigung des kryoturbativen Sekundärporenvolumens mehr Zeit benötigt. Zu den im Boden ablaufenden Prozessen bei Zugabe von Infiltrationswasser (Tem­pe­ratur­veränderung, Gefrier- und Auftauprozesse, Veränderung der Porosität) besteht noch Klärungsbedarf. Der für die Modellierung wichtige Eingabeparameter der Anfangsbodenfeuchte konnte bei winterlichen Bedingungen nicht genau bestimmt werden. Gravimetrische Boden­feuchtebestimmungen liefern aufgrund des Eintrags von zusätzlichen Eis- und Schnee-Wasser zu hohe Werte. TDR- und Watermark-Messungen unterschätzen hingegen die Bodenfeuchten, weil sie nur den Anteil des flüssigen Wassers berücksichtigen. Mit Erosion 3D / Winter konnten die Ergebnisse der Infiltrationsexperimente, unter der Voraussetzung, dass die effektive gesättigte hydraulische Leitfähigkeit des ungefrorenen Bodens exakt bekannt war, sehr gut nachgestellt werden. Eine Modellierung der Infiltration in einen teilweise gefrorenen Boden ist damit, zumindest für den untersuchten Boden und die betrachteten meteorologischen Bedingungen, möglich. Das COUP - Modell lieferte dagegen völlig andere Ergebnisse, weil von einem Ein­frieren des infiltrierten Wassers bei negativen Temperaturen ausgegangen wird. Eine Verbesserung der Infiltrationsbeschreibungen könnte hier wahrscheinlich durch die Vorgabe einer größeren Anzahl von Eingabeparametern, die die natürliche Situation besser repräsentieren als die für die Modellierung verwendeten Daten, erfolgen.

Le silence — ou plutôt la grande variété de ce que l’on appelle “silences” — est un phénomène complexe qui prend une part directe dans la dynamique du langage et la création du sens linguistique, mais aussi dans la production du sens symbolique et des effets poétiques. Le travail est organisé en deux parties: la première traite la question de l'acte de silence dans l'expérience linguistique du monde, tandis que la deuxième analyse l'expérience poétique des silences en appliquant les résultats précédemment obtenus au Coup de dés de Stéphane Mallarmé. Plus précisément, dans la partie linguistique, on passe en revue différentes théories pour dégager la place que le silence s’y voit reconnaître. On l’étudie successivement en tant que signe linguistique, en tant qu’acte linguistique, comme élément pertinent, comme procédé rhétorique, comme phénomène symbolique. La partie poétique se fonde sur la théorie de l'évocation pour aboutir, en passant par un chapitre consacré à la poésie moderne dans son ensemble, à l'œuvre de Stéphane Mallarmé, le premier poète qui ait créé une véritable poétique des silences, tant dans ses ouvrages poétiques (dont le Coup de dés est l'exemple le plus radical) que dans ses écrits théoriques.