Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats. / The three essays in this thesis study the implications of financial frictions, such as collateral and credit constraints, for economic decisions of agents and their impact on aggregate macroeconomic variables. In the first chapter "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection", we propose a theory of the level of investor protection. Lower investor protection implies higher cost of external financing due to more severe agency problems between outside investors and entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, this excludes more financially dependent agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. When the level of investor protection is chosen by majority voting, the theory generates (i) lower investor protection in economies with higher inequality in financial dependence across entrepreneurs, (ii) non-monotone output dynamics, (iii) improvements (worsening) of investor protection following output slowdowns (accelerations). The empirical evidence provides some support to these predictions. In the second chapter "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", we investigate how the presence of financial frictions may lead to formation of diversified conglomerates or business groups. Specifically, we build a general equilibrium model of entrepreneurship in which business groups arise endogenously and partially substitute for imperfect credit market. We show that the model is able to quantitatively explain several key stylized facts on the way production is organized, on cross-firm productivity differences, and on cross-country differences in the degree of conglomeration. The third chapter "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" studies empirically the relation between size, productivity, and the organizational structure of a firm. Using micro-data on Canadian manufacturing plants, we document several stylized facts about size and total factor productivity of establishments in conglomerates and single-segment firms. We find that establishments in conglomerates are on average larger than their counterparts in single-segment firms, small plants in conglomerates are less productive than plants of similar size in single-segment firms, but large plants in conglomerates are more productive than those of similar size in single-segment firms. This evidence is consistent with efficient internal reallocation of resources in conglomerates.

Cette thèse examine les effets des imperfections des marchés financiers sur la macroéconomie. Plus particulièrement, elle se penche sur les conséquences de la faillite dans les contrats financiers dans une perspective d'équilibre général dynamique. Le premier papier construit un modèle qui utilise l'avantage comparatif des banques dans la gestion des situations de détresse financière pour expliquer le choix des firmes entre les prêts bancaires et les prêts du marché financier. Le modèle réussit à expliquer pourquoi les firmes plus petites préfèrent le financement bancaire et pourquoi les prêts bancaires sont plus répandus en Europe. Le premier fait est expliqué par le lien négatif entre la valeur nette de l'entreprise et la probabilité de faire faillite. Le deuxième fait s'explique par le coût fixe d'émission de bons plus élevé en Europe. Le deuxième papier examine l'interaction entre les contraintes de financement affectant les ménages et les firmes. Une interaction positive pourrait amplifier et augmenter la persistance de l'effet d'un choc agrégé sur l'économie. Je construis un nouveau modèle qui contient des primes de financement externes pour les firmes et les ménages. Dans le modèle de base avec prix et salaires flexibles, j'obtiens une faible interaction négative entre les coûts de financement des firmes et des ménages. Le facteur clé qui explique ce résultat est l'effet du changement contre cyclique du coût de financement des ménages sur leur offre de travail et leur demande de prêts. Dans une période d'expansion, cet effet augmente les taux d'intérêt, réduit l'investissement et augmente le coût de financement des entreprises. Le troisième papier ajoute les contraintes de financement des banques dans un modèle macroéconomiques avec des prêts hypothécaires et des fluctuations dans les prix de l'immobilier. Les banques dans le modèle ne peuvent pas complètement diversifier leurs prêts, ce qui génère un lien entre les risques de faillite des ménages et des banques. Il y a deux effets contraires des cycles économiques qui affectent la prime de financement externe de la banque. Premièrement, il y a un lien positif entre le risque de faillite des banques et des emprunteurs qui contribue à rendre le coût de financement externe des banques contre cyclique. Deuxiément, le lissage de la consommation par les ménages rend la proportion de financement externe des banques pro cyclique, ce qui tend à rendre le coût de financement bancaire pro cyclique. En combinant ces deux effets, le modèle peut reproduire des profits bancaires et des ratios d'endettement bancaires pro cycliques comme dans les données, mais pour des chocs non-financiers les frictions de financement bancaire dans le modèle n'ont pas un effet quantitativement significatif sur les principales variables agrégées comme la consommation ou l'investissement. / This Dissertation examines the effect of financial market imperfections on the Macroeconomy. More particularly, it focuses on the consequences of equilibrium default using a Dynamic General Equilibrium approach. The first paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes banks' comparative advantage in monitoring financial distress in order to explain firms' choice between bank loans and market debt. Banks can deal with financial distress more cheaply than bond holders, but this requires a higher initial expenditure proportional to the loan size. In contrast, bond issues may involve a small fixed cost. Entrepreneurs' choice of bank or bond financing depends on their net worth. The model can explain why smaller firms tend to use more bank financing and why bank financing is more prevalent in Europe than in the US. The first fact can be explained by the negative link between the net worth of a business and its default probability. Explaining the second fact requires taking into account the higehr fixed cost of issuing market debt in Europe. The second paper examines the possibility of feedback effects between between the financing constraints of households and of firms. A positive interaction between the financial strength of household and firm balance sheets may amplify aggregate shocks and increase the persistence of aggregate fluctuations. I develop a new model that incorporates both firm and household external finance spreads and time varying leverage. Contrary to a common intuition, the baseline Real Business Cycle model with credit constraints produces a small negative interaction between the costs of external financing for firms and households. The key factor in this result is the effect of changes in the external finance premium on borrowers' labour supply and the demand for loans. The reduction in households' cost of borrowing in a boom decreases labour supply and raises houshold loan demand. This increases interest rates, crowds out investment, and raises borrowing costs for financially constrained firms. The third paper integrates household financing frictions with bank financing frictions and house price fluctuations in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The key assumption in the model is that a bank cannot fully diversify shocks, leading to a link between household and bank sectors' default risks. The cyclical behaviour of banks' external funding cost is determined by two main factors. On one hand, booms improve the financial health of the banks' borrowers which tends to reduce the cost of bank funding. On the other hand, consumption smoothing by savers and borrowers during booms increases the proportion of external financing in the banks' balance sheet which tends to increase the cost of bank funding. As a result of these opposing effects, the model matches procyclical profits and leverage in the financial sector, as observed in the data, but for non financial shocks the banking frictions in the model have an insignificant impact on the main macroeconomic aggregates such as output, consumption and investment.

Les trois essais dans cette thèse étudient les implications des frictions financières, telles que les contraintes de collatérale ou de crédit, pour les décisions économiques des agents et leur impact sur les variables macro-économiques agrégées. Dans le premier chapitre "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection" nous proposons une théorie du niveau de protection des investisseurs. Une faible protection des investisseurs implique un coût de financement externe plus élevé à cause des problèmes d'agence plus aigus entre les investisseurs et les entrepreneurs. À l'équilibre, ceci exclut les agents plus dépendants sur le financement externe de l'entrepreneuriat, ce qui augmente les profits des entrepreneurs qui restent actifs. Quand le niveau de la protection des investisseurs est choisi par un vote majoritaire, la théorie génère (i) une protection des investisseurs plus faible dans les économies avec plus grande inégalité dans les besoins de financement externe parmi les entrepreneurs, (ii) une dynamique non-monotone de l'output, (iii) améliorations (détériorations) de la protection des investisseurs suite à des ralentissements (accélérations) de l'output agrégé. L'évidence empirique donne un support à ces prédictions de la théorie. Dans le deuxième chapitre "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", nous examinons comment la présence des frictions financières peut mener à la formation des conglomérats et des "business groups" diversifiées. Particulièrement, nous construisons un modèle d'équilibre général d'entrepreneuriat dans lequel les conglomérats émergent de façon endogène et substituent partiellement le marché du crédit imparfait. Nous montrons que ce modèle est capable d'expliquer quantitativement plusieurs faits stylisés concernant l'organisation de la production, les différences de productivité entre les firmes et les différences en présence des conglomérats entre les pays. Le troisième chapitre "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" étudie empiriquement la relation entre la taille, la productivité, et la structure organisationnelle d'une firme. Utilisant les micro-données sur les établissements manufacturiers canadiens, nous documentons plusieurs faits stylisés concernant la taille et la productivité totale des facteurs des établissements dans les conglomérats et dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Nous trouvons que les établissements dans les conglomérats sont en moyenne plus larges que leurs contreparties dans les firmes non-diversifiées, les petits établissements dans les conglomérats sont moins productifs que les établissements de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées, mais les larges établissements dans les conglomérats sont plus productifs que ceux de taille similaire dans les firmes non-diversifiées. Cette évidence est consistante avec réallocation interne efficiente des ressources au sein des conglomérats. / The three essays in this thesis study the implications of financial frictions, such as collateral and credit constraints, for economic decisions of agents and their impact on aggregate macroeconomic variables. In the first chapter "Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor Protection", we propose a theory of the level of investor protection. Lower investor protection implies higher cost of external financing due to more severe agency problems between outside investors and entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, this excludes more financially dependent agents from entrepreneurship, increasing the profits of the remaining entrepreneurs. When the level of investor protection is chosen by majority voting, the theory generates (i) lower investor protection in economies with higher inequality in financial dependence across entrepreneurs, (ii) non-monotone output dynamics, (iii) improvements (worsening) of investor protection following output slowdowns (accelerations). The empirical evidence provides some support to these predictions. In the second chapter "Financial Frictions, Internal Capital Markets, and the Organization of Production", we investigate how the presence of financial frictions may lead to formation of diversified conglomerates or business groups. Specifically, we build a general equilibrium model of entrepreneurship in which business groups arise endogenously and partially substitute for imperfect credit market. We show that the model is able to quantitatively explain several key stylized facts on the way production is organized, on cross-firm productivity differences, and on cross-country differences in the degree of conglomeration. The third chapter "Size and Productivity of Single-segment and Diversified Firms: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing" studies empirically the relation between size, productivity, and the organizational structure of a firm. Using micro-data on Canadian manufacturing plants, we document several stylized facts about size and total factor productivity of establishments in conglomerates and single-segment firms. We find that establishments in conglomerates are on average larger than their counterparts in single-segment firms, small plants in conglomerates are less productive than plants of similar size in single-segment firms, but large plants in conglomerates are more productive than those of similar size in single-segment firms. This evidence is consistent with efficient internal reallocation of resources in conglomerates.

Cette thèse examine les effets des imperfections des marchés financiers sur la macroéconomie. Plus particulièrement, elle se penche sur les conséquences de la faillite dans les contrats financiers dans une perspective d'équilibre général dynamique. Le premier papier construit un modèle qui utilise l'avantage comparatif des banques dans la gestion des situations de détresse financière pour expliquer le choix des firmes entre les prêts bancaires et les prêts du marché financier. Le modèle réussit à expliquer pourquoi les firmes plus petites préfèrent le financement bancaire et pourquoi les prêts bancaires sont plus répandus en Europe. Le premier fait est expliqué par le lien négatif entre la valeur nette de l'entreprise et la probabilité de faire faillite. Le deuxième fait s'explique par le coût fixe d'émission de bons plus élevé en Europe. Le deuxième papier examine l'interaction entre les contraintes de financement affectant les ménages et les firmes. Une interaction positive pourrait amplifier et augmenter la persistance de l'effet d'un choc agrégé sur l'économie. Je construis un nouveau modèle qui contient des primes de financement externes pour les firmes et les ménages. Dans le modèle de base avec prix et salaires flexibles, j'obtiens une faible interaction négative entre les coûts de financement des firmes et des ménages. Le facteur clé qui explique ce résultat est l'effet du changement contre cyclique du coût de financement des ménages sur leur offre de travail et leur demande de prêts. Dans une période d'expansion, cet effet augmente les taux d'intérêt, réduit l'investissement et augmente le coût de financement des entreprises. Le troisième papier ajoute les contraintes de financement des banques dans un modèle macroéconomiques avec des prêts hypothécaires et des fluctuations dans les prix de l'immobilier. Les banques dans le modèle ne peuvent pas complètement diversifier leurs prêts, ce qui génère un lien entre les risques de faillite des ménages et des banques. Il y a deux effets contraires des cycles économiques qui affectent la prime de financement externe de la banque. Premièrement, il y a un lien positif entre le risque de faillite des banques et des emprunteurs qui contribue à rendre le coût de financement externe des banques contre cyclique. Deuxiément, le lissage de la consommation par les ménages rend la proportion de financement externe des banques pro cyclique, ce qui tend à rendre le coût de financement bancaire pro cyclique. En combinant ces deux effets, le modèle peut reproduire des profits bancaires et des ratios d'endettement bancaires pro cycliques comme dans les données, mais pour des chocs non-financiers les frictions de financement bancaire dans le modèle n'ont pas un effet quantitativement significatif sur les principales variables agrégées comme la consommation ou l'investissement. / This Dissertation examines the effect of financial market imperfections on the Macroeconomy. More particularly, it focuses on the consequences of equilibrium default using a Dynamic General Equilibrium approach. The first paper builds a dynamic general equilibrium model that emphasizes banks' comparative advantage in monitoring financial distress in order to explain firms' choice between bank loans and market debt. Banks can deal with financial distress more cheaply than bond holders, but this requires a higher initial expenditure proportional to the loan size. In contrast, bond issues may involve a small fixed cost. Entrepreneurs' choice of bank or bond financing depends on their net worth. The model can explain why smaller firms tend to use more bank financing and why bank financing is more prevalent in Europe than in the US. The first fact can be explained by the negative link between the net worth of a business and its default probability. Explaining the second fact requires taking into account the higehr fixed cost of issuing market debt in Europe. The second paper examines the possibility of feedback effects between between the financing constraints of households and of firms. A positive interaction between the financial strength of household and firm balance sheets may amplify aggregate shocks and increase the persistence of aggregate fluctuations. I develop a new model that incorporates both firm and household external finance spreads and time varying leverage. Contrary to a common intuition, the baseline Real Business Cycle model with credit constraints produces a small negative interaction between the costs of external financing for firms and households. The key factor in this result is the effect of changes in the external finance premium on borrowers' labour supply and the demand for loans. The reduction in households' cost of borrowing in a boom decreases labour supply and raises houshold loan demand. This increases interest rates, crowds out investment, and raises borrowing costs for financially constrained firms. The third paper integrates household financing frictions with bank financing frictions and house price fluctuations in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The key assumption in the model is that a bank cannot fully diversify shocks, leading to a link between household and bank sectors' default risks. The cyclical behaviour of banks' external funding cost is determined by two main factors. On one hand, booms improve the financial health of the banks' borrowers which tends to reduce the cost of bank funding. On the other hand, consumption smoothing by savers and borrowers during booms increases the proportion of external financing in the banks' balance sheet which tends to increase the cost of bank funding. As a result of these opposing effects, the model matches procyclical profits and leverage in the financial sector, as observed in the data, but for non financial shocks the banking frictions in the model have an insignificant impact on the main macroeconomic aggregates such as output, consumption and investment.

[pt] Expansões fiscais têm sido propostas como soluçao para economias passando por fortes recesseções e episódios de deflação. Mostramos em uma arcabouço fiscalista que um aumento dos deficits pode iniciar uma estagflação por afetar negativamente a intermediação de recursos para investimentos. Intermediários financeiros coletam depósitos para comprar títulos do governo e realizar empréstimos através de contratos nominais de longo-prazo. Quando intermediários enfrentam fricções financeiras e um descasamentos entre seus ativos e passivos, uma inflação surpresa e/ou uma reavaliação dos preços dos títulos prejudica seus balanços, reduzindo os empréstimos, investimentos e produção. Em uma expansao fiscal, a recessção vem com inflação porque a queda na oferta de capital iniciada no setor financeiro aumenta os custos marginais das firmas produtoras de bens. A probabilidade de uma recessão é maior quanto maior for o descasamento de maturidade, a sensibilidade dos preços dos titulos às taxas de juros e quanto maior a participação dos titulos no balanço dos bancos. Esses resultados: (1) dão suporte teórico para a relação negativa entre a performance do setor financeiro e alta inflação; (2) ajudam a explicar episodios de alto endividamento publico, alta inflação e crises bancarias e, mais importante, (3) expõem desvantagens de politicas fiscais inflacionarias propostas para inflacionar e estimular economias com baixa inflação, onde o arcabouço proposto neste artigo é mais provavel de estar presente. / [en] Expansionary fiscal policies have been advocated to induce output expansions and inflation in deep recession or deflationary episodes. We show that, in a fiscalist setup, an increase in deficits can trigger a stagflation by negatively affecting financial intermediation of resources to investments. Financial intermediaries collect deposits to buy government bonds and lend through nominal long-term loans. When intermediaries face financial frictions and a maturity mismatch on their assets and liabilities, a surprise inflation and/or a revaluation of bonds prices impair their net-worth reducing lending, investments, and output. Recession comes with inflation in a fiscal expansion because the fall on capital triggered on the financial sector rises production firms marginal costs. The probability of a recession is higher the greater is the maturity mismatch, the sensitivity of bonds prices to the policy rate, and the share of bonds on banks balances. These results: (1) give theoretical support for the negative relation documented between financial sector performance and inflation (2) help explaining high debt, high inflation environments coinciding with banking crisis and, more importantly, (3) expose drawbacks of fiscal inflation policies proposed to inflate and stimulate low inflation economies, where the fiscalist setup stressed in this paper is more probable to be present.

Submitted by Caio Machado (caiohm@gmail.com) on 2017-05-18T18:01:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2017-05-18T19:16:58Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-18T20:24:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_Machado2017.pdf: 1442885 bytes, checksum: 6de78cd6ea7228909465f19bc20ae0ce (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-05-11 / Coordination failures are often said to play an important role in business cycles. If agents’ incentives of taking a given action depend on the amount of other agents expected to take the same action, coordination failures can often arise. Firms may not invest because they do not expect others to invest, confirming their initial expectations. Similarly, banks may not lend because they do not expect others to lend. This dissertation analyzes different environments in which crises arise as a result of coordination failures. The first chapter analyzes an economy that is subject to a dynamic coordination problem. Because of aggregate demand externalities, firms’ incentives to increase their production depend on expected demand, which in turn depends on the amount produced by other firms. The problem is dynamic since firms do not take investment decisions at the same time, implying that a firm deciding today is trying to forecast what other firms will decide in the future. This opens the possibility of dynamic coordination traps: firms do not invest today because they do not believe others will invest tomorrow, generating lower incentives for firms to invest at future dates. This chapter focuses on the following questions: In economies subject to dynamic coordination traps, what is the optimal stimulus policies? Should policy makers provide higher incentives to production in times of low economic activity? The answer is that a constant subsidy implements the first-best in an economy where beliefs are endogenously determined. The reason is that, although it is harder to coordinate in times of low economic activity, agents are naturally more optimistic about the future in times of poor economic activity and reasonably good fundamentals. This optimism arise from the fact that in bad times negative shocks do not change the level of economic activity, while positive shocks may end a recession. The second chapter proposes a model to study unusually deep financial crises. Previous empirical work has found that financial crises are very deep and persistent on average, but there is a lot of heterogeneity across different episodes. Some financial crises feature a very distressed financial sector, but little distress on the real sector, while others are real macroeconomic disasters. In light of this evidence, I propose a model in which there is a highly non-linear feedback between the real and the financial sector. Disaster episodes arise from the dynamic interaction of two frictions: coordination frictions and financial frictions. When banks have weak balance sheets they do not intermediate much capital. This causes firms to get trapped in a self-reinforcing regime with low aggregate demand, which ends up provoking further damage to banks’ balance sheets. I use the model as a laboratory to study unusually deep financial crises and the effects of some policies. It is shown that the effects of disasters go far beyond what we observe during those episodes: they imply very low asset prices, economic growth and welfare, even in good times and when their probability is very small. Policies that protect the financial sector from those episodes can be very beneficial. Moreover, higher risk-taking in bad times may improve economic growth, welfare and financial stability. The third chapter studies the policy trade-off of a regulator that wants to avoid coordination failures, but at the same time does not want to generate distortions arising from moral hazard. Banks have investment opportunities with an expected return that depends positively on the amount of other banks undertaking similar investments, opening room for coordination failures. At the same time, banks may risk-shift to projects with smaller expected return but higher volatility. By providing guarantees in case of failures, a regulator can enhance coordination, but that leads banks to switch to worse projects. It is shown that in some states a regulator will provide no guarantees, even if it that means allowing a coordination failure to happen. Moreover, the possibility of risk-shifting reduces the amount of guarantees needed to avoid a coordination failure. / Com frequência argumenta-se que falhas de coordenação têm um papel importante no ciclo de negócios. Se os incentivos dos agentes a realizar determinada ação depende da quantidade esperada de outros agentes que tomarão a mesma ação, falhas de coordenação podem acontecer. Empresas podem não investir porque não esperam que outras empresas irão investir, confirmando suas expectativas iniciais. De maneira similar, bancos podem não conceder empréstimos porque eles não esperam que outros bancos irão fazer o mesmo. Esta tese analisa diferentes ambientes onde crises surgem como o resultado de falhas de coordenação. O primeiro capítulo analisa uma economia que está sujeita a falhas de coordenação dinâmicas. Por causa de externalidades de demanda agregada, os incentivos para uma dada firma aumentar sua produção dependem da demanda esperada, que por sua vez depende da quantidade produzida por outras firmas. O problema é dinâmico porque as firmas não tomam decisões de investimento ao mesmo tempo, implicando que uma firma tomando decisões hoje está tentando prever o que outras firmas decidirão no futuro. Isso abre a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação dinâmicas: firmas não investem hoje porque elas não acreditam que outras firmas investirão amanhã, gerando incentivos menores para outras firmas investirem no futuro. Este capítulo foca nas seguintes questões: Em economias sujeitas a este problema de coordenação dinâmico, qual a política de estímulo ótima? O governo deveria prover mais estímulos em épocas de baixa atividade econômica? A resposta é que um subsídio constante implementa o ótimo nesta economia. O motivo é que, embora seja mais difícil coordenar em tempos de baixa atividade, os agentes estão naturalmente mais otimistas sobre o futuro em tempos de baixa atividade e fundamentos razoavelmente bons. Este otimismo surge do fato que em tempos ruins choques negativos não alteram o nível de atividade econômica, mas choques positivos podem acabar com uma recessão. O segundo capítulo desta tese propõe um modelo para estudar crises financeiras mais severas que o usual. Trabalhos empíricos prévios mostram que, em geral, crises financeiras são muito profundas e persistentes, mas também que há muita heterogeneidade entre diferentes episódios. Algumas crises financeiras causam enormes danos no sistema financeiro, mas pouco dano no setor real, enquanto outras são verdadeiros desastres macroeconômicos. À luz desta evidência, esta tese propõe um modelo onde há um feedback extremamente não linear entre o setor financeiro e o setor real. Desastres surgem através da interação dinâmica de duas fricções: fricções de coordenação e fricções financeiras. Quando os bancos estão com problemas em seus balanços, eles optam por intermediar menos capital. Isso leva as firmas a entrar em um regime com baixa demanda agregada, que causa ainda mais dano ao capital dos bancos. Este modelo é utilizado como um laboratório para estudar crises financeiras muito severas e o efeito de algumas políticas. É mostrado que os efeitos de desastres econômicos vão muito além do que observamos durante estes episódios. Eles levam à queda dos preços de ativos, baixo crescimento e perdas de bem-estar, mesmo que a probabilidade destes eventos seja muito pequena. Finalmente, quando os bancos tomam mais risco em tempos ruins, podemos ter um aumento de crescimento, bem-estar e estabilidade financeira. O terceiro capítulo estuda o trade-off enfrentado por um regulador que quer evitar falhas de coordenação, mas ao mesmo tempo não quer gerar distorções que surgem por conta de risco moral. Os bancos possuem oportunidades de investimento cujo retorno esperado depende positivamente da quantidade de outros bancos investindo em projetos similares, abrindo espaço para a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação. Ao mesmo tempo, bancos podem escolher investir em projetos com menor retorno esperado e maior volatilidade. Ao prover garantias em caso de falha de um banco, um regulador pode melhorar a habilidade que estes têm de coordenar, mas ao mesmo isto pode levar os bancos a tomarem risco excessivo. É mostrado que em alguns estados o regulador não proverá garantias, mesmo que isso implique permitir que uma falha de coordenação aconteça. Ainda, a possibilidade dos bancos tomarem risco excessivo reduz a quantidade de garantias necessárias para evitar uma falha de coordenação.

La mondialisation financière des dernières décennies témoigne du phénomène du déséquilibre mondial dans lequel les comptes déficitaires actuels de certaines grandes économies avancées sont continuellement financés par certains pays en développement avec des taux de croissance élevés et des stocks de capitaux rares. Sur le plan théorique, le modèle de croissance néoclassique implique qu’une économie avec une pénurie de capitaux aurait un produit marginal élevé de capital et un taux d’intérêt élevé d’autarcie. Par conséquent, lors de l’intégration avec la capitale mobile gratuite, ce pays éprouverait les entrées nettes de capitaux nets afin que le taux d’intérêt domestique soit égal au reste du taux mondial (Lucas 1990). De plus, une économie qui se développe plus rapidement que le reste du monde aurait également une demande d’investissement plus élevée et devrait connaître les entrées de capitaux totaux nets (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2013). Les déséquilibres mondiaux sont le résultat de l’hétérogénéité des tendances de l’épargne et des investissements dans tous les pays. En effet, un pays connaît un apport de capitaux si son économie est inférieure à son investissement : ce pays emprunte au reste du monde si sa sauvegarde est supérieure à son investissement. La thèse emploierait la croissance de la productivité pour afficher les sources de lumière sur cette hétérogénéité entre les pays. [...] / The financial globalization for the past decades witnesses the global imbalance phenomenon on which the deficit current accounts by some large advanced economics are continuously financed by some developing economies with the high output growth rates and the scarce capital stocks. On the theoretical ground, the Neo-Classical growth model implies that one economy with scarcity of capital would have a high marginal product of capital and a high autarky interest rate therefore, at the integration with the free mobile capital, that country would experience the net total capital inflows so that the domestic interest rate equals that to the rest of world’s rate (Lucas 1990). Furthermore, one economy growing faster than the rest of the world would also have a higher investment demand and should experience the inflows of net total capitals (Gourinchas and Jeanne 2015). The global imbalances are the result of the heterogeneity in the patterns of savings and investments across countries. Indeed, one country experiences an inflow of capital if its saving is less that its investment: that country borrows from the rest of the world to finance the excess investment demand. Similarly, one country would lend to the rest of the world if its saving is higher than its investment. The thesis would employ the productivity growth to shed the refresh lights on this heterogeneity across countries. [...]

La contrazione della formazione di imprese dopo la crisi finanziaria del 2008 è stata in parte determinata dall'inasprimento degli standard creditizi. Incorporare l'imperfezione del mercato del credito nei modelli DSGE è diventato un passo essenziale verso una migliore spiegazione di tali risultati. Nel primo capitolo, indago sul ruolo del finanziamento esterno nella creazione d'impresa. Sottolineo l'impatto del potere di mercato delle banche e la presenza di dispersione tra i tassi di interesse dei grandi e dei piccoli prestiti all'ingresso. Pertanto, sviluppo un modello DSGE che collega l'ingresso dell'impresa al sistema bancario imperfetto e introduco costi di prestito eterogenei per operatori storici e nuovi. Il modello prevede un impatto amplificato degli shock reali e finanziari e mostra una maggiore volatilità man mano che lo spread dei tassi di interesse si allarga. In linea con l'evidenza, la versione sticky-price produce un'entrata prociclica in risposta allo shock monetario espansivo. Nel secondo capitolo, mi concentro sull'interazione tra i prezzi delle case, le insolvenze sui prestiti e l'ingresso di imprese. Presento prove SVAR che rivelano una risposta prociclica positiva della nascita allo shock dei prezzi delle case e una reazione negativa alle inadempienze sui prestiti. Quindi sviluppo un modello DSGE in grado di prevedere e spiegare queste risposte. L'endogeneità del vincolo collaterale e della creazione d'impresa è al centro del meccanismo del modello. Il modello genera dei secondi momenti ragionevolmente vicini alle controparti dei dati. / The contraction of business formation after 2008 financial crisis was driven partly by the tightened credit standards. Incorporating credit market imperfection to DSGE models became an essential step towards better explaining such outcomes. In the first chapter, I investigate the role of external financing in firm creation. I highlight the impact of bank market power, and the presence of dispersion between interest rates of large and small loans on entry. Therefore, I develop a DSGE model linking firm entry to imperfect banking system, and introduce heterogeneous borrowing costs for incumbents and entrants. The model predicts amplified impact of real and financial shocks, and exhibits higher volatility as the spread in interest rates gets wider. In line with evidence, the sticky-price version produces pro-cyclical entry in response to expansionary monetary shock. In the second chapter, I focus on the interaction between house prices, loan defaults, and firm entry. I present SVAR evidence that reveals positive pro-cyclical response of birth to house price shock, and negative reaction to loan defaults. Then I develop a DSGE model that is able to predict and explain these responses. The endogeneity of collateral constraint and firm creation is in the core of the model’s mechanism. The model generates some second moments that are reasonably close to their data counterparts.

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Diese Dissertation umfasst drei Aufsätze, die untersuchen, wie sich Veränderungen im Kreditangebot auf Investitionen auswirken. Ein besonderes Augenmerk liegt hierbei auf der Relevanz von Firmenheterogenität und Finanzfriktionen. Der erste Aufsatz untersucht die Rolle von Heterogenität im Kreditausfallrisiko verschiedener Unternehmen für die Transmissionsmechanismen unkonventioneller Geldpolitik. Hierbei geht es insbesondere um Politikmaßnahmen, welche das Kreditangebot erhöhen (sogenannte Credit Policy). Die Analyse basiert auf einem Neukeynesianischen Modell mit zwei Agenten. Im Vergleich zu einem Modell mit einem einzigen repräsentativen Unternehmen, ist die Effektivität von Credit Policy in diesem Modell geringer. Darüber hinaus ist Credit Policy am effektivsten, wenn sie auf jene Unternehmen abzielt, die vergleichsweise schwach von Kreditbeschränkungen betroffen sind. Der zweite Aufsatz beinhaltet eine detaillierte empirische Analyse der Auswirkungen von Kreditangebotsschocks auf der Unternehmensebene. Im Rahmen sogenannter Panel-Local-Projections wird gezeigt, dass Unternehmen unterschiedlich und asymmetrisch auf solche Schocks reagieren. Die Asymmetrie in den Reaktionen der Unternehmen lässt sich nicht auf Zweitrundeneffekte über Kreditbeschränkungen zurückführen. Im dritten Aufsatz wird ein partielles Gleichgewichtsmodell entworfen, um diese empirischen Resultate zu erklären. In diesem Modell führen zeitweise bindende Beschränkungen von Finanzintermediären zu Asymmetrie in den Auswirkungen von Kreditangebotsschocks. Die Interpretation der empirischen Resultate im Rahmen dieses theoretischen Modells deutet darauf hin, dass Beschränkungen von Finanzintermediären entscheidend für die Effekte von Kreditangebotsschocks sind. Dies ist relevant für die gesamtwirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen und die Verteilungswirkung von Credit Policy. / This thesis contains three essays, which study the transmission of changes in credit supply to investment, focusing on the role of firm heterogeneity and financial frictions. The first essay theoretically investigates the role of default risk heterogeneity for the transmission of unconventional monetary policy. Specifically, I consider the effects of policies expanding the supply of credit (credit policy) in the context of a Two-Agent New-Keynesian model with financial frictions. In this model with firm heterogeneity, the effectiveness of credit policy is reduced compared to a representative firm model. Moreover, credit policy is most effective when targeted at firms that are relatively less affected by financial constraints. The second essay features a detailed empirical analysis of the firm-level effects of credit supply shocks. Using a panel local-projections analysis, I show that there is pronounced heterogeneity and asymmetry in the investment effects of these shocks. I also document that asymmetry in investment responses is not driven by differences in the strength of second round amplification effects via firm-level borrowing constraints. In the third essay, I construct a partial equilibrium model to rationalize these empirical findings. In this model, occasionally binding constraints of financial intermediaries give rise to asymmetry in the effects of credit supply shocks. Interpreted in the context of the partial equilibrium model, my empirical findings indicate that constraints of financial intermediaries are crucial for the transmission of credit supply shocks. This may have implications for the aggregate and distributional consequences of credit policy.