It has become something of a truism to contend that David Foster Wallace was concerned with irony; both its challenge to ethical conviction and the ability of the author to enact sincere communication in the millennial United States. However, this privileging of sincerity within Wallace Studies has resulted in neglect being shown to the first half of Polonius’ famous dialectic – ‘to thine own self be true’ – precluding analysis of Wallace that focuses on his relationship with authenticity. Similarly, critics have often sought to argue for Wallace’s panhuman universalism, to the detriment of the overtly nationalistic strain in his writing. This thesis aims to address these underrepresented areas within Wallace scholarship, arguing that his writing is fundamentally engaged with a debate over what it means to be ‘real American’. The phrase is taken from a 1996 interview with Salon.com’s Laura Miller, during which Wallace averred that his intention when writing Infinite Jest was to capture ‘something real American, about what it’s like to live in America around the millenium’ (Conversations with David Foster Wallace 59). This comment is central to an understanding of Wallace’s oeuvre, as it introduces his historical specificity and his pragmatic desire to explore ‘what it’s like to live’, whilst also alluding to his constant negotiation with epistemological and ontological questions over the ‘real’, all framed within an expressly nationalistic paradigm. The word ‘real’ is used in this sense both as an adverb to connote something that is authentically or intrinsically ‘American’, whilst it also serves as an intensifier – to denote something that is very American – implying a hierarchy of things that can be more ‘American’ than others. With regards to his immediate historical context, this entrenches Wallace firmly within the Culture Wars of the 1990s, and yet it also gestures further back in history, situating him within a fundamentally American literary tradition: the American Jeremiad. Wallace’s challenge was to attempt to engage with ideas of the real and the really American, despite the challenges to authenticity (and indeed the idea of a nation) that resulted from the permeation of myriad contemporary discourses into the national psyche, including advertising jargon, postmodern/poststructural ‘theory’, the language of psychotherapy, the discourse of political correctness, and the partisan rhetoric of politicians. The first two chapters will focus on Wallace's engagement with ostensible challenges to the 'authentic' subject, and the difficulty of authentically representing the self. Chapter one will focus on 'Octet' and Wallace's uneasy place within the so-called 'New Sincerity' paradigm, highlighting Wallace’s attempt to counter the discourse of ‘postmodern irony’ with an ‘other-directed’ sincerity, and yet exposing his conservative project of self-preservation. Chapter two will examine Wallace's often fraught relationship with psychotherapy; in particular the way that psychotherapeutic discourse has infiltrated American culture, precluding the singularity and authentic representation of individual experience. Chapter three will continue this exploration of the widespread adoption of specialist discourses, although this time focusing on the abstractions of postmodern/poststructural theory, and Wallace’s attempt to find ‘real American’ replacement cultural symbols that could be applied to both individuals and the nation as a collective. Chapter four will be concerned with Wallace's search for an efficacious philosophical model that is suitably 'American'; whilst also capable of incorporating the singularity of individual experience within a national collectivity. Finally, chapter five will focus on Wallace's more explicit engagement with politics, tracing the development of his political ideas. In doing so a picture of Wallace will emerge that highlights some of his contradictions; contradictions that he himself was aware of and drew attention to, as well as contradictions that run to the very heart of 'the idea of America'.

Quelle obligation morale peut être désormais pensée et pratiquée, à l’heure du déclin des absolus religieux et des sciences évolutionnistes ? Tel est le problème auquel Jean-Marie Guyau, philosophe français de la fin du XIXème siècle, entend apporter une contribution décisive. Dans ce travail, nous proposons de redécouvrir l’itinéraire logique et chronologique suivi par Guyau pour élaborer sa propre pensée. Celle-ci doit se comprendre comme le dénouement logique d’une problématisation qui passe par l’étude de l’histoire de la philosophie morale. Après avoir élaboré une méthode de commentaire pour l’étude des doctrines passées, Guyau pense pouvoir interpréter l’histoire de la morale comme un antagonisme entre le naturalisme (d’Épicure à Mill et Spencer) et l’idéalisme (d’Épictète à Kant et Fouillée). Une exposition critique détaillée permet à Guyau de montrer les lacunes de chacune de ces traditions : l’idéalisme absolutise ce qui n’est qu’hypothétique ; l’obligation théorisée par le sensualisme est dissoute par cette théorie même ; et l’évolutionnisme, forme ultime que prend la science des mœurs, pense indûment l’avenir sur le modèle du passé. Dès lors, l’obligation ne peut plus être conçue ni comme catégorique ni comme instinctive : elle doit être pensée à partir du principe qui engage le moins de présupposés (la vie), et ne doit plus être considérée comme uniforme mais comme anomique. Partant des prémisses naturalistes, la philosophie de Guyau tente alors d’idéaliser l’existence morale de l’homme ; le principal relais de cet accroissement de la vitalité est l’éducation, dont Guyau reconsidère non seulement le but (la moralisation) mais encore les moyens (la suggestion). / At the time of evolutionist science and the decline of the religious absolute, what moral obligation can be thought and practised nowadays ? Such is the problem Jean-Marie Guyau, a French philosopher of the late 19th century, intends to make a decisive contribution to.In this research work, we suggest rediscovering the logical and chronological route followed by Guyau to elaborate his own thought. This thought has to be understood as the logical outcome of a raised issue which starts by studying the history of moral philosophy.After elaborating a method of comment upon past doctrines, Guyau thinks he can interpret the history of morality as an antagonism between naturalism (from Epicurus to Mill and Spencer) and idealism (from Epictetus to Kant and Fouillée). A thorough scrutiny allows Guyau to show the gaps of each of these traditions : idealism absolutises what is only hypothetical ; the obligation theorized by sensualism is dissolved by this same theory ; as for evolutionism, the ultimate shape taken by the science of customs, its view of the future is wrongfully based on the model of the past. From then on, obligation cannot be conceived either as categorical or as instinctive any more : it must be thought from the principle which involves as few presuppositions (life) as possible, and must not be considered as uniform but anomic any more. Relying on naturalist beginnings, Guyau’s philosophy then tries to idealize the moral existence of Man ; this increase in vitality is mainly handed over through education. Actually, not only does Guyau reconsider its purpose, i-e raising moral standards, but also its means, namely suggestion.

The general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind. We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing. In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism. In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke's causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke's position suffers from the omission of concepts.

Made available in DSpace on 2009-11-18T19:00:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 cjarck.pdf: 2377384 bytes, checksum: 68f6a0118f6f2af1e4c034162fb78123 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Over the past few years, innovation has increasingly garnered the headlines as one of the core competencies every sustainable organisation must have. Yet, it is the idea which is the foundation of any innovation. This paper draws together knowledge about idea generation, and its management, and how the process of encouraging ideas, creativity and then managing them effectively will enhance the opportunities of successfully finding and implementing innovations which will add value to the organisation and its stakeholders. Extensive review of literature in the field of idea and innovation management, as well as a study of Souza Cruz¿s recently conceptualised and implemented Idea Management programme has brought together the many facets involved in successfully harnessing and implementing ideas.

This master thesis focuses on founding and forming of czech scouting. The main source are printed documents because of lack preserved archive documents. The main method is textological and comparative analysis. At first the history of world and czech scouting is presentend. To find out the essential differences between english and czech scouting I compared two basic manuals: Scouting for Boys and Základy junáctví. In the following part of the thesis I determine three areas in which the reception of scouting in czech environment is investigated. These areas are scout value system, attitude to nation and state and relation to the Sokol organisation. In thesis are also analyzed the results of international research concerning the origin of scouting in other european countries. The results are then copared with the situation in czech lands. The thesis also includes three following attachments: set of short biographies of mentioned personalities, edition of scout laws and filled research questionnaires.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O principal objetivo do presente trabalho consiste em demonstrar que, segundo a Lógica, a Filosofia do Espírito e a Estética de Hegel, os âmbitos da natureza e do espírito, tal como descritos pelo autor, não podem ser concebidos como âmbitos isolados entre si, mas devem ser tidos antes como domínios interligados por dois importantes fundamentos conceituais, a saber: em primeiro lugar, Hegel concebe tanto o espírito quanto a natureza como modos de manifestação da Ideia Absoluta; em segundo lugar, Hegel define a natureza como o espírito alienado de si. Sendo assim, investigaremos em que consiste tal estado de alienação e o modo como o mesmo se torna evidente em meio às considerações do autor sobre a natureza, bem como o modo pelo qual tal alienação é, por assim dizer, superada pelo próprio espírito imanente à natureza, superação esta que o conduz ao reino da consciência. Entretanto, é importante ter em mente desde já que a suspensão deste estado de alienação não ocorre de forma repentina: ao contrário, a assim chamada des-alienação do espírito se dá por meio de um processo gradual, onde a essência espiritual da natureza se torna mais manifesta à medida que o auto-movimento torna-se perceptível como algo imanente aos seres naturais, tendo como ápice de sua manifestação a natureza orgânica. Nesta forma de existência natural, a alma ― termo cunhado a partir do termo latino anima, a fonte de animação dos organismos em geral ― lhes empresta a vitalidade que lhes é própria, vitalidade esta que, como veremos, consiste na forma de expressão mais elevada da presença do espírito na natureza. / This dissertation aims at demonstrating that, according to Hegels Logic, Philosophy of Spirit and Aesthetics, the domains of nature and spirit cannot be conceived as two completely isolated domains, but rather as domains which are intimately connected by two important conceptual grounds, namely, the fact that Hegel conceives both nature and spirit as two modes of manifestation of the Absolute Idea and the fact that Hegel defines nature as the spirit existing as alienated from itself. In this way, we shall analyze such state of alienation, in order to clarify exactly what it is and how it expresses itself among the authors descriptions of the natural realm; besides, we shall also investigate how such alienation is, so to speak, overcome by the spirit lying within the essence of nature, which leads to the rise of consciousness. However, according to Hegel, the overcoming of such state of alienation is not something that happens instantly: on the contrary, it consists in a gradual process, in which the immanent spiritual essence of nature unfolds itself and becomes more clearly manifested as the property of self-movement begins to be acknowledged as something inherent to the natural beings, organic nature being the apex of spirits manifestation within nature. In the realm of organic nature, the soul a term that is related to the Latin word anima, the source of animation of organisms in general grants them the vitality which characterizes them as living beings; as we shall see, this vitality is the most elevated way of the spirits manifestation within nature.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo desta tese é analisar a confrontação de Heidegger com Platão, no que concerne às duas palavras fundamentais da metafísica platônica, idea e aletheia. O primeiro capítulo estuda o horizonte hermenêutico em que ocorre essa confrontação, no contexto da segunda fase da obra de Heidegger, após a viragem (Kehre) do seu pensamento: uma meditação histórico-ontológica capaz de saltar para o impensado do outro início, ao destruir a história da ontologia baseada na metafísica da idea, que constitui o primeiro início. O segundo capítulo concentra-se no conceito de idea, nos seus múltiplos aspectos: metafísico, ontológico, teoló-gico, eidético, ótico, apriorístico e dualista. A noção de ideia implica uma transição epocal no sentido filosófico da verdade, considerada não mais como aletheia, mas como correspondên-cia do pensamento à ideia, à entidade dos entes. Esse é o objeto do terceiro capítulo, que rela-ciona o acontecimento apropriativo do ser (Ereignis) à verdade histórico-ontológica da physis e à verdade metafísica da ideia. / The goal of this thesis is to analyze Heideggers confrontation with Plato, regarding the two fundamental words of platonic metaphysics, idea and aletheia. The first chapter studies the hermeneutical horizon in which occurs this confrontation, in the context of the second phase of Heideggers work, after the turn (Kehre) of his thought: a historical-ontological meditation able to leap to the unthought of the other beginning, by destroying the history of ontology based on the metaphysics of the idea, that constitutes the first beginning. The second chapter deals with the concept of idea, in its multiples aspects: metaphysical, ontological, theological, eidetic, optic and dualistic. The notion of idea imply a historical transition in the philosophical meaning of truth, considered no more as aletheia, but as correspondence of thought with the idea, the entity of beings. This is the object of the third chapter, which relates the event of appropriation of being (Ereignis) with the historical-ontological truth of physis and with the metaphysical truth of idea.

Denna uppsats är en studie med ett fenomenologiskt och hermeneutiskt perspektiv. Genom kvalitativa forskningsintervjuer har estetlärares sätt att se på undervisning om idégenerering undersökts. Baserat på teorier kring hur styrdokumenten påverkar undervisning, vad kreativitet och idégenerering är i en skolkontext samt estetiska lärprocesser har följande frågor ställts: Vad har estetlärare för erfarenheter av undervisning om idégenerering? Vad beskriver estetlärare som framgångsrika metoder i undervisning kring elevernas idéer? Hur beskriver estetlärare sin roll i styrningen av elevernas arbete med idéer? Intervjuerna genomfördes med hjälp av en frågeguide för att skapa en riktning. Varje intervju är 30-40 minuter och spelades in. Efteråt transkriberades och analyserades intervjuerna och beskrivningarna respondenterna gav delades in i teman. Dessa teman fick rubriker utifrån vad respondenterna berättar i intervjuerna. Lärarnas erfarenheter kring undervisning av idégenerering handlar om att skapa förutsättningar genom att ge eleverna rätt förkunskaper, tillhandahålla relevant material och att skapa en trygg miljö. Under det arbetet intar lärarna olika roller, men den roll de refererar till mest är handledarrollen. Konstnärligt skapande tar tid vilket lärarna förhåller sig till både via att följa styrdokumenten men också genom att begränsa tiden för eleverna för att sätta en form av press på att det ska bli ett skapande. En balansgång är att förhålla sig till elevernas motivation, vilket gör att feedbacken och samtalen ser väldigt olika ut beroende på vad lärarna upplever att eleverna klarar av. Att jobba med samtal och feedback ses som en viktig metod i arbetet, likaså att skapa ingångar till projekt som begränsar men samtidigt öppnar upp för kreativitet. För att eleverna ska växa i sitt eget skapande undervisar lärarna om processen på olika sätt samt skapar ett klassrum där det är tillåtet att göra fel och att experimentera. Styrningen av elevernas arbete sker genom annan undervisning som skapar en väg för eleverna kring hur de ska jobba med egna idéer, exempelvis genom att jobba med en viss teknik. Beroende på undervisningssituation och elevernas individuella förmåga styr lärarna ibland väldigt tydligt medan eleverna ibland får stort utrymme då lärarna intar en mer bakåtlutad roll. Slutligen skapar bedömningen i form av betygsättning en viss styrning, dels eftersom eleverna vet om att de kommer bli bedömda men också eftersom det skapar ett visst sätt att jobba som pedagog. / This paper is a study with a phenomenological and hermeneutic perspective. Through qualitative research interviews, the experience of idea generation among teachers in aesthetics has been examined. Based on theories about how governing documents in school affect teaching, what creativity and idea generation means in a school context and aesthetic learning processes, the following questions were asked: What experience do teachers in aesthetics have of teaching about idea generation? Which methods do teachers in aesthetics describe as successful in teaching about students' ideas? How do teachers in aesthetics describe their role in the management of students' work with ideas? The interviews were conducted using a interview guide to create a direction. Each interview was 30-40 minutes long, and was recorded. The interviews were subsequently transcribed and analyzed, and the descriptions given by the respondents were divided into themes. These themes were given headings based on the respondents’ answers. The teachers' experiences of teaching idea generation is about creating good conditions, this by giving students the correct knowledge, providing relevant material and creating a secure and positive environment. During their work, teachers take on different roles, and the role most commonly referred to by the teachers is representing the mentor. Artistic creation takes time, which the teachers relate to, both by following the governing documents, but also by making time limits for the students’ work. This to pressure the students to be more creative. The teachers balance when relating to the students’ motivation, meaning that feedback and conversation differ considerably depending on the teacher’s perception of what the students are able to cope with. Working with conversation and feedback is seen as an important working method, as well as creating entrance for projects that limit but at the same time opens up for creativity. In order for the students to grow along with their own creation, teachers teach about the process in different ways trying to create a culture in the classroom where it is allowed to make mistakes and to experiment. The students' work is guided through other teaching that creates a way for students to work with their own ideas, for example by working with a certain technique. When taking on the mentor role, the teachers sometimes guide the work in a very distinct way, and other times take a less prominent approach allowing the student to work more freely. Finally, the assessment in the form of grading creates a certain degree of control, partly because the students are aware that they will be evaluated but also because it creates a certain way of working for the teacher.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O principal objetivo do presente trabalho consiste em demonstrar que, segundo a Lógica, a Filosofia do Espírito e a Estética de Hegel, os âmbitos da natureza e do espírito, tal como descritos pelo autor, não podem ser concebidos como âmbitos isolados entre si, mas devem ser tidos antes como domínios interligados por dois importantes fundamentos conceituais, a saber: em primeiro lugar, Hegel concebe tanto o espírito quanto a natureza como modos de manifestação da Ideia Absoluta; em segundo lugar, Hegel define a natureza como o espírito alienado de si. Sendo assim, investigaremos em que consiste tal estado de alienação e o modo como o mesmo se torna evidente em meio às considerações do autor sobre a natureza, bem como o modo pelo qual tal alienação é, por assim dizer, superada pelo próprio espírito imanente à natureza, superação esta que o conduz ao reino da consciência. Entretanto, é importante ter em mente desde já que a suspensão deste estado de alienação não ocorre de forma repentina: ao contrário, a assim chamada des-alienação do espírito se dá por meio de um processo gradual, onde a essência espiritual da natureza se torna mais manifesta à medida que o auto-movimento torna-se perceptível como algo imanente aos seres naturais, tendo como ápice de sua manifestação a natureza orgânica. Nesta forma de existência natural, a alma ― termo cunhado a partir do termo latino anima, a fonte de animação dos organismos em geral ― lhes empresta a vitalidade que lhes é própria, vitalidade esta que, como veremos, consiste na forma de expressão mais elevada da presença do espírito na natureza. / This dissertation aims at demonstrating that, according to Hegels Logic, Philosophy of Spirit and Aesthetics, the domains of nature and spirit cannot be conceived as two completely isolated domains, but rather as domains which are intimately connected by two important conceptual grounds, namely, the fact that Hegel conceives both nature and spirit as two modes of manifestation of the Absolute Idea and the fact that Hegel defines nature as the spirit existing as alienated from itself. In this way, we shall analyze such state of alienation, in order to clarify exactly what it is and how it expresses itself among the authors descriptions of the natural realm; besides, we shall also investigate how such alienation is, so to speak, overcome by the spirit lying within the essence of nature, which leads to the rise of consciousness. However, according to Hegel, the overcoming of such state of alienation is not something that happens instantly: on the contrary, it consists in a gradual process, in which the immanent spiritual essence of nature unfolds itself and becomes more clearly manifested as the property of self-movement begins to be acknowledged as something inherent to the natural beings, organic nature being the apex of spirits manifestation within nature. In the realm of organic nature, the soul a term that is related to the Latin word anima, the source of animation of organisms in general grants them the vitality which characterizes them as living beings; as we shall see, this vitality is the most elevated way of the spirits manifestation within nature.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo desta tese é analisar a confrontação de Heidegger com Platão, no que concerne às duas palavras fundamentais da metafísica platônica, idea e aletheia. O primeiro capítulo estuda o horizonte hermenêutico em que ocorre essa confrontação, no contexto da segunda fase da obra de Heidegger, após a viragem (Kehre) do seu pensamento: uma meditação histórico-ontológica capaz de saltar para o impensado do outro início, ao destruir a história da ontologia baseada na metafísica da idea, que constitui o primeiro início. O segundo capítulo concentra-se no conceito de idea, nos seus múltiplos aspectos: metafísico, ontológico, teoló-gico, eidético, ótico, apriorístico e dualista. A noção de ideia implica uma transição epocal no sentido filosófico da verdade, considerada não mais como aletheia, mas como correspondên-cia do pensamento à ideia, à entidade dos entes. Esse é o objeto do terceiro capítulo, que rela-ciona o acontecimento apropriativo do ser (Ereignis) à verdade histórico-ontológica da physis e à verdade metafísica da ideia. / The goal of this thesis is to analyze Heideggers confrontation with Plato, regarding the two fundamental words of platonic metaphysics, idea and aletheia. The first chapter studies the hermeneutical horizon in which occurs this confrontation, in the context of the second phase of Heideggers work, after the turn (Kehre) of his thought: a historical-ontological meditation able to leap to the unthought of the other beginning, by destroying the history of ontology based on the metaphysics of the idea, that constitutes the first beginning. The second chapter deals with the concept of idea, in its multiples aspects: metaphysical, ontological, theological, eidetic, optic and dualistic. The notion of idea imply a historical transition in the philosophical meaning of truth, considered no more as aletheia, but as correspondence of thought with the idea, the entity of beings. This is the object of the third chapter, which relates the event of appropriation of being (Ereignis) with the historical-ontological truth of physis and with the metaphysical truth of idea.