Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:39:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gilberto Cabeleira Alves.pdf: 909648 bytes, checksum: ae5ef27c0ea7db4792c6c17142f495e3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-20 / This dissertation, a case study, has the purpose of examining the control functions in a large financial institution in Brazil and answer the central question: how and why to integrate the control functions in financial institutions? The study comprised the analysis of concepts, mission and approaches in use by Internal Control, Operational Risk Management and SOX Compliance functions. The internal control concept was identified as being the foundation of the three control functions under analysis. The framework of best practices in internal controls, COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework, is used to compare the way in which those functions operate. Interviews and questionnaires are used to collect primary data and documental analysis and observation for secondary data. Answers from the participating areas indicate that the departments reviewed by the control functions consider integration as necessary. By analyzing the purpose of those functions it is identified that Operational Risk Management and SOX Compliance functions have different purposes and focuses, the first aims at reducing the historic of losses and the later focuses on the quality of financial reporting, both functions report to different directors, have different performance measures and require different skill from their professionals. Comparison of the practices in use indicates that those functions adopt similar approaches; however, not integrated. It is identified a number of examples of opportunities for integration, such as: implementing a shared process for identifying and ranking risks, monitoring controls and reporting. The full integration within a single department revealed to be not adequate, but it is accepted that those functions need to be reviewed to take advantage of the integration opportunities / Esta dissertação, um estudo de caso, tem por objetivo examinar funções de controle em instituição financeira de grande porte no Brasil e responder a questão central: como e por que integrar as funções de controle em instituições financeiras? O estudo compreende análise dos conceitos, objetivos e abordagens adotadas pelas funções: Controles Internos, Gestão de Riscos Operacionais e SOX Compliance. Identifica-se o conceito de controles internos como sendo o fundamento das três funções de controle em análise. A estrutura de melhores práticas do COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework é utilizada para comparar a atuação das três funções. Entrevistas e questionários são utilizados para coleta de dados primários, e análise documental e observação, para dados secundários. Respostas das áreas participantes indicam que departamentos sujeitos a revisões pelas funções de controle consideram a integração destas funções necessária. Análise dos objetivos destas funções identifica que Gestão de Riscos Operacionais e SOX Compliance possuem objetivos e enfoques diferentes, a primeira objetiva reduzir histórico de perdas, a segunda, qualidade dos reportes financeiros, ambas reportam para diretorias diferentes, possuem métricas de performance distintas e requerem diferentes habilidades de seus profissionais. Comparação das práticas em uso demonstra que estas funções adotam abordagens semelhantes, entretanto, não integradas. São identificados inúmeros exemplos de oportunidades de integração, tais como: implante de processos compartilhados para identificação e categorização de riscos, monitoramento de controles e reporte. A completa integração em área única mostrou-se não adequada, mas é aceito que a forma de atuação destas funções precisa ser revista para que aproveitem oportunidades de integração

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raphael Moggioni de Lima.pdf: 444702 bytes, checksum: 56f47c113f2541bfd33f3159e4e6c428 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-17 / Bankruptcy cases as the ones occured in U.S. economy after 2001 involving big corporations, as Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing have exposed the fragilities of the companies internal control over financial reporting. Trying to reestablish the confidence in financial information provided to the investors and the market balance, the U.S. Congress enacted the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), on 30 July 2002, introducing numerous changes to corporate governance and with respect to the controls over the results achieved. The rigorous changes introduced by SOX have been raised lots of discussions about the costs and benefits for the companies and the investors. This work aims to analyze the existing relations between the internal control over financial reporting disclosure (one requirement according to SOX) and the market performance of the companies shares. The analyses perform were based on regressions with brazilian companies informations issued in U.S. market share. The data used in the study are secondary, from the data base economática and the forms 20-F. The results show that the returns are badly affected in short term, however in longer periods there is no evidence between the internal control deficiencies disclosure and the increase in risk perceptions for the investors / Processos de falência como os ocorridos na economia norte-americana a partir do ano de 2001, afetando grandes organizações, tais como: Enron, WorldCom e Global Crossing expuseram a fragilidade do sistema de controles internos das empresas sobre as divulgações financeiras. Buscando restaurar a confiança nas informações fornecidas aos investidores e o equilíbrio dos mercados, o Congresso dos Estados Unidos promulgou a Lei Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), de 30 de julho de 2002, repleta de reformas no ambiente da governança corporativa e nos controles sobre a contabilização dos resultados alcançados. As rígidas alterações trazidas pela SOX têm suscitado diversas discussões sobre os custos e benefícios para as companhias e os investidores. O presente estudo tem como objetivo analisar a relação existente entre a divulgação de deficiências no sistema de controles internos das empresas, uma das exigências da Lei Sarbanes-Oxley, e o desempenho das ações das companhias. A análise foi realizada por meio de regressões estatísticas com informações das empresas brasileiras que emitem títulos no mercado norte-americano. Os dados foram coletados do banco de dados Economática e dos formulários 20-F. Os resultados indicam que os retornos são afetados negativamente no curto prazo, contudo em períodos mais longos não há relação direta entre a divulgação de deficiências nos controles internos e aumento na percepção de risco pelos investidores

Using 1,473 going private transactions completed between 1985 and 2007, I assess whether the increase in going private transactions that occurred after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was driven by SOX, or whether this phenomenon continues an ongoing historical trend. To examine this issue, I initially used structural break tests and intervention analysis. From the initial techniques, I find support that the passage of SOX increased going private transactions for these categories. Secondarily, I use Granger causality tests and impulse response functions to examine the link between going private transactions and the public stock market. When I categorize going private transactions according to the type of acquirer, transaction size, and target industry, I find bi-directional Granger causality relationships between smaller-sized going private transactions and the S&P 500 Index (or Tobin's Q). I also find several unidirectional Granger causality relationships for some categories of going private transactions, based on the type of acquirer or the target industry, to the S&P 500 Index (or to Tobin's Q). The impulse response of going private transactions (or the public stock market) to a shock in the public stock market (or going private transactions) is not immediate, but is delayed two to three quarters. The link between going private transactions and the public stock market is an ongoing phenomenon, continuing a historical trend for going private transactions. For going private transactions with structural breaks, SOX affects the linkage but not for going private transactions with no structural break.

In the United States, approximately 7% of nonprofits' annual revenue is lost as a result of a lack of ethical financial operations among nonprofit executive directors (EDs). This represents $85 billion in estimated annual losses in available operating funds. This study addressed the problem of ineffective leadership in nonprofit organizations from the perspective of EDs responsible for ethical financial operations. The purpose of this phenomenological study was to understand the lived experiences of nonprofit EDs who self-reported the use of 1 of Burn's and Bass' 3 leadership styles and whether leadership style influenced the use of the Sarbanes Oxley Act to manage the ethical financial operations of their human service nonprofit organization. Qualitative data were collected from 12 EDs through semi structured interviews and then coded and analyzed using a modified van Kaam procedure. The results of the study indicated that EDs who self-reported using transformational leadership style were more inclined to adhere to the Sarbanes Oxley Act. In addition, participants acknowledged the need for organizational support to improve leadership qualities in EDs, efficiency, and effective ethical financial operations in nonprofit organizations. The study provides a baseline for nonprofit organizations to increase positive social change by adding knowledge on implementing strategies that will result in the enhancement of quality leadership in EDs that may ultimately result in more efficient and effective ethical financial operations in nonprofit organizations.

Submitted by Claudio Manfredi (cafmanfredi@msn.com) on 2013-10-09T18:20:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 EBAPE-MEX2011-Dissertação-Manfredi,CAF.pdf: 2229754 bytes, checksum: 41145bff33a84b8375d5b1386db67bd7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2013-10-09T20:24:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 EBAPE-MEX2011-Dissertação-Manfredi,CAF.pdf: 2229754 bytes, checksum: 41145bff33a84b8375d5b1386db67bd7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-10-11T17:56:12Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 EBAPE-MEX2011-Dissertação-Manfredi,CAF.pdf: 2229754 bytes, checksum: 41145bff33a84b8375d5b1386db67bd7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-10-11T17:57:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 EBAPE-MEX2011-Dissertação-Manfredi,CAF.pdf: 2229754 bytes, checksum: 41145bff33a84b8375d5b1386db67bd7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-04-18 / Companies seek to create an enabling context in which trust is a predominant element . In 2002, after the well - known corporate governance scandals, the Congress of the United States of America (USA) enacted the Sarbanes - Oxley Act (SOx), in order to protect investors and reestablish the shaken confidence. U.S. public companies were forced to adopt corporate codes of ethics, ensuring maximum effectiveness in preventing frauds committed by their employees, subject to heavy civil and criminal penalties for both companies and their executives. This study aims to assess the effectiveness of the Co rporate Codes of Ethics ( CC E) by the perception of Brazilian employee s of Brazilian national companies subject to comply with S o x . Based on the model described by Singh (2011), 18 independent variables of CCE’ effectiveness were analyzed . The results reve aled that 84.4% of the questionnaire respondents positively evaluated the C CE of their respective companies. But the model of Singh (2011) did not fully reflect the factors identified by him , allowing the proposi tion of a new model of effectiveness of the CCE . Further research should include an analysis of the Brazilian cultural aspects that may impact the effectiveness of the EEC. Case studies regarding the universe of employees of one sole public company should be conducted , aiming to provide a n actual diagnosis of the effectiveness of its code of ethics. / As empresas buscam criar um contexto capacitante no qual a confiança é elemento preponderante para tais objetivos. Em 2002, após os conhecidos escândalos de governança corporativa, o Congresso dos Estados Unidos da América (EUA) sancionou a Lei Sarbanes-Oxley (SOx), com o objetivo de proteger os investidores e resgatar a confiança abalada. Empresas norte-americanas de capital aberto foram obrigadas a adotar códigos de ética corporativos, garantindo a máxima efetividade na prevenção de fraudes praticadas por empregados, sob pena de pesadas sanções cíveis e criminais para as empresas e seus executivos. O presente estudo visa verificar a efetividade dos Códigos de Ética Empresarial (CEE) na percepção do empregado brasileiro de empresa nacional subordinada à SOx. Com base no modelo de Singh (2011), foram analisadas 18 variáveis independentes de efetividade dos códigos de ética corporativos. Os resultados revelaram que 84,4% dos respondentes ao questionário avaliaram positivamente os CEE de suas respectivas empresas. Mas o modelo de Singh (2011) não refletiu integralmente os fatores por ele identificados, permitindo a proposição de um novo modelo de efetividade dos CEE. Novas pesquisas deverão contemplar a análise dos aspectos culturais brasileiros que podem impactar na efetividade dos CEE. Estudos de caso, considerando o universo de funcionários de uma única empresa, poderão aprofundar as pesquisas sobre o tema, além de possibilitar à empresa estudada um diagnóstico mais real da efetividade de seu código de ética.

No description available.

This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm’s performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with managerial job security and entrenchment. Furthermore, although director excess compensation is not significantly inversely related to the firm’s future performance, it has an indirect negative effect on future performance through its impact on the entrenchment-performance relationship. Therefore, this essay proposes that the overcompensation of directors is directly associated with a board culture predicated by mutual back-scratching and collusion between the CEO and the board members. The second essay tests the effect of an exogenous shock, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, on the structure of corporate boards and their efficiency as a monitoring mechanism. The results suggest an increase in the participation of independent directors at the expense of insiders. Consequently, we investigate the implications of board composition changes on CEO turnover and firm value. We document a noticeable reduction in CEO turnover in the post-SOX period. We also demonstrate that, after SOX, a board dominated by independent directors is less likely to remove a CEO due to poor performance. Finally, we highlight a negative association between the change in board composition and firm value. We propose that our findings are predicated on an off equilibrium result whereby firms were forced to modify iv their endogenously chosen board composition. Therefore, contrary to the legislators’ objectives, we suggest that the change in board structure brought about inefficient monitoring and promoted an unfavorable tradeoff between independent directors and insiders. The third essay examines the relationship between the firm’s governance structure and its value during different economic conditions. We show that both relative industry turnover and CEO entrenchment increase during economic downturns. We also find that relative industry turnover and managerial entrenchment have opposite impacts on the value of the firm throughout the recessionary period. While industry turnover leads to an appreciation in firm value, managerial entrenchment reduces shareholders’ wealth. The negative impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value, however, outweighs the positive impact of industry turnover. Accordingly, we propose that a recession provides managers with a good opportunity to camouflage their behavior and extract more private benefits and, thus, blame the poor performance on bad economic conditions.

In the years following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, corporations have heightened their efforts to comprehensively manage all aspect of business risk that could jeopardize their operations or potentially lead to business failure. This increase in efforts have motivated firms to adopt additional preventative measures to internally manage their unique portfolios of impeding enterprise risk. Due to legislative efforts by the U.S. Congress, both the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) were broadly developed to improve corporate governance while increasing transparency within financial reporting. Specifically, Dodd-Frank mandates that large financial firms with $50 billion in assets establish special committees dedicated to assessing their financial risks. Meanwhile, SOX requires all public firms to establish rigorous internal control systems to ensure the adequacy of financial reporting. However, these laws mainly target financial firms and fall short of requiring nonfinancial firms to establish a separate committee to manage corporate risk even though it would be in these companies own interest to enhance their safeguarding efforts against ambiguous financial uncertainties, reputation downshifts, and other inherent risk. This dissertation seeks to understand whether a separate voluntary risk management committee at the board level is related to the financial stability and creditworthiness of nonfinancial firms. Firstly, we investigated whether the existence of a separate risk management committee is associated with the firm’s leverage, solvency, financial health, and organizational soundness. Secondly, we examined whether the existence of a separate risk management committee is associated with the firm’s short- and long-term credit ratings. Using secondary data from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), we analyzed data from a wide range of financial ratios and credit ratings from companies listed on the S&P 1500 index to evaluate if these committees have an association with the firm’s ability to manage its risk effectively. Regression analysis was utilized to explore this relationship. Although the direction of the relationship cannot be determined, the results suggest that the establishment of a separate voluntary risk management committee was minimally related to the financial soundness of the firm and was not related to the firm's leverage, solvency, or overall organizational soundness. Inferences or causality cannot be made. Additionally, we found that firms with better short-term credit ratings were more likely to establish a voluntary risk management committee, while long-term credit ratings did not show a correlation with the presence of a voluntary risk management committee. Interestingly, the study also found that the presence of more men on the board and a larger board size increased the likelihood of firms adopting a risk management committee, but over time, the interest in forming these committees has declined within the timeframe reviewed, particularly in the healthcare, communication, and utilities sectors. The results of this study suggest that relying on traditional financial/accounting ratios might not be the most effective method for assessing a firm's risk. Further, these results underscore the need for a more comprehensive approach that includes both quantitative and qualitative risk assessments and approaches. This dissertation contributes to the benefits of establishing a voluntary risk management committee in nonfinancial firms, which is a topic that has not been extensively researched. The aim is to offer a deeper insight into the benefits of such committees and encourage more firms to improve their risk management practices where positive correlations were identified. / Business Administration/Interdisciplinary

Visselblåsarbegreppet har blivit ett allt mer frekvent förekommande inslag inom den unionsrättsliga lagstiftningen, och vikten av att beskydda arbetstagare som bistår myndigheter med information som kan stoppa överträdelser har på senare år uppmärksammats och betonats världen över. I samband med en modernisering och uppdatering av den finansmarknadsrättsliga lagstiftningen, inte minst till följd av den tekniska utvecklingen inom området, valde EU:s lagstiftande organ att göra en markering mot fysiska och juridiska personer som ägnar sig åt överträdelser som kan vilseleda aktörerna på de finansiella marknaderna. Bland annat infördes, genom ett antal nya rättsakter, enhetliga sanktioner samt minimibestämmelser för kriminalisering av vissa ageranden. Vid framtagandet av lagstiftningen diskuterades även på EU-nivå huruvida ett potentiellt införande av ekonomiska incitament för visselblåsare som bidrar med värdefull information i fråga om marknadsmissbruk borde utgöra en del av det sociala skyddet för nämnda individer. Medlemsstaterna hade redan i samband med tidigare unionsöverskridande lagstiftning ålagts att vidta särskilda åtgärder för att säkerställa att visselblåsare erhåller skydd gentemot arbetsgivare avseende hämndaktioner, men här, tydligt inspirerade av den amerikanska lagstiftningen i motsvarande område, öppnade EU för första gången för att låta unionsmedlemmarna erbjuda monetära utbetalningar till visselblåsare. I förevarande uppsats presenteras den aktuella EU-lagstiftningen samt den inhemska lagstiftning som bestämmelserna genererat i Sverige. Nämnda inslag sätts i relation till den amerikanska visselblåsarlagstiftningen. En redogörelse för lagstiftningens mottagande och effekt – kombinerat med teoretiska såväl som statistiska studier avseende ekonomiska incitament kopplat till visselblåsning – används för att besvara frågan huruvida ett införande av nämnda incitament skulle kunna utgöra ett ändamålsenligt inslag inom den svenska lagstiftningen. Min argumentation, vilken presenteras i analysdelen, utmynnar i ståndpunkten att ekonomiska incitament mycket väl skulle kunna utgöra en funktionell beståndsdel av visselblåsarskyddet, men att lagstiftningens utformning och det praktiska utförandet skulle kunna optimeras jämfört med dess amerikanska motsvarighet. Vidare vill jag i analysavsnittet betona vikten av ett skifte i inställning och attityd inom europeisk rättskultur gentemot visselblåsare.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Magali Aparecida Camazano.pdf: 740899 bytes, checksum: a0beef09f1c292595d15bc89e031aaca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-14 / Deregulation and globalization of financial services allied with the sophisticated technology used to perform financial operations have increased the complexity of banking activities resulting in the subsequent exposure of financial corporations to operational risk. Several cases of huge losses related to operational risk have been reported in the last 10 years as the bankruptcy of the traditional Barings Bank in England. Therefore, the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), published by the Basel Committee in 2004, established that internationally active banks are required to allocate capital to cope with operational risk (just as required for credit and market risks). The Brazilian Central Bank, following the demands as established by the Basel II Accord has also determined that Brazilian financial corporations are required to allocate regulatory capital to face operational risk as well as implement an operational risk management framework. At the same time, losses related to operational risk occurred in different segments of the economy where American corporations as Enron and WorldCom perpetrated huge accounting frauds resulting in their subsequent bankruptcy in 2001 and 2002 respectively. These events led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. On account of the importance of operational risk management for the soundness of the financial market and the close relation existing between such risk and the requirements mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, such as the enhancement of accounting internal controls and corporate governance attributes, this paper intends to study the influence as set forth by the American Act over the operational risk management within the Brazilian financial corporations that are required to comply with this Act such as Bradesco, Itaú and Unibanco. Thus, a comparison was made between the framework established by the Basel Committee for the banking operational risk management and the mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This study disclosed that both, either the Basel Committee framework as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act focus on the same purposes, that is, control and mitigate the events likely to result in operational risk. Sarbanes-Oxley enables the enhancement of both, accounting internal controls and corporate governance practices, as it will serve as an additional tool for the management of operational risk, cooperating with and supplementing the Basel Committee framework. Therefore, Sarbanes-Oxley allows the Brazilian financial corporations to lower the capital allocation for operational risk due to their decreasing exposure to related risk / A desregulamentação e a globalização dos serviços financeiros associadas à sofisticação das tecnologias financeiras têm aumentado a complexidade das atividades bancárias e a conseqüente exposição dos bancos ao risco operacional. Casos diversos de perdas catastróficas relacionadas ao risco operacional se fizeram presentes nos últimos 10 anos, a exemplo da quebra do tradicional Barings Bank, na Inglaterra. Por decorrência, o Novo Acordo de Capital da Basiléia (Basiléia II), divulgado pelo Comitê da Basiléia em 2004, introduziu a necessidade de alocação de capital para risco operacional (tal qual para os riscos de crédito e de mercado) pelos bancos internacionalmente ativos. O Banco Central do Brasil, à luz do Acordo Basiléia II, igualmente instituiu a necessidade de alocação de capital regulatório para o risco operacional por parte das instituições financeiras brasileiras, bem como a implementação de estrutura de gerenciamento do risco operacional. Paralelamente, prejuízos relacionados ao risco operacional ocorreram em outros segmentos da economia, destacando-se os escândalos contábeis e falências das empresas americanas Enron e WorldCom em 2001 e 2002, respectivamente, culminando na promulgação do Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002. Face à importância do gerenciamento do risco operacional para a solvência do mercado financeiro e à estreita relação existente entre tal risco e os requerimentos impostos pelo Sarbanes-Oxley, tais como o aprimoramento de controles internos contábeis e de aspectos de governança corporativa, este trabalho teve por objetivo estudar a influência das exigências da Lei americana sobre o gerenciamento do risco operacional das instituições financeiras brasileiras sujeitas à sua observância, a saber: Bradesco, Itaú e Unibanco. Para tanto foi adotado o método de procedimento comparativo, tendo sido realizado cotejo entre o marco regulatório do Comitê da Basiléia para o gerenciamento do risco operacional bancário e as exigências do Sarbanes-Oxley Act, cujo resultado revelou a existência de convergência entre ambos, pois possuem a mesma base conceitual de propósitos, qual seja, controlar os fatores de consubstanciação do risco operacional. O Sarbanes-Oxley proporciona o aperfeiçoamento dos controles internos contábeis e das práticas de governança corporativa, caracterizando-se como um instrumento adicional ao gerenciamento do risco operacional, contribuindo e complementando o marco regulatório do Comitê da Basiléia. Outrossim, o Sarbanes-Oxley propicia a redução de alocação de capital para risco operacional, pelas instituições financeiras brasileiras, haja vista seu potencial de redução à exposição ao referido risco