金融海嘯至少證明了兩件事：1.企業沒有不倒神話、2.看不見的風險才是風險。前者尚未結束，後者還在發生。 美國在1934年賣出第一張「董監事與重要職員責任險」保單（Directors and Officers’ Liability Insurance，簡稱D&O Insurance），到我國1996年10月9日財政部核准由外商(美國環球產物保險公司)推出第一張D&O，中間相距了近62年，而我國推出上開保單的前三年間僅不過十七家公司投保，其漠視之程度與曲高和寡之現象可見一般。 根據投資人保護中心的統計，到2008年6月底為止，投保中心替投資人提出集體訴訟向問題公司求償金額已達240億元，而參加集體訴訟求償的投資人也高達六萬四千人。然而按保險公會統計資料顯示，國內的董監責任險投保規模尚不大，在2003年總投保的保費規模只有2.49億元，到了2007年總投保的保費規模也才6.23億元，但是國內的董監責任險賠款率的比重卻直線上升，2003年這項賠款率才只有0.59％，但近年則已跳升直逼12％，等於保險業每承做十件董監責任險，就有一件多會面臨求償。 2001年美國安隆案（Enron）爆發金融危機（西北大學教授說：『這是有史以來美國人對資本主義比對政治信心還低落的時刻』），此為「公司治理」這門近年顯學正式拉開序幕，之後接二連三金融醜聞、財務弊案不斷，迫使政府、大眾投資人與企業高度警覺的至少對三個議題感到興趣：一是「企業內部資訊必須透明化」；二是「代理問題下經理人應該受到監督」；三是「盡責的董監事與重要職員應該受到保護」。 2003年敝人因工作關係向企業界登門推廣D&O Insurance，儘管從簡報的過程與互動中清晰可見D&O Insurance被需求的殷切，但往往在論及保單條款複雜的設計與風氣未開的雙重前題下，2002年我國通過「證券投資人暨期貨交易人保護法」、2003年成立投資人保護中心(僅需20位投資人授權即可由投資人保護中心提出團體訴訟)、投資人保護中心所提之訴訟，訴訟標的一億元以上免裁判費（2009年4月29日下修為一千萬，以一審裁判費需繳1％計算，即繳交裁判費由一百萬元大幅降至十萬元）、及免擔保假扣押等有利武器下，無異對投資人興訟撞開方便之門，同時為董監事及重要職員投下一顆不定時的深水炸彈、2006年證券交易法修正（要求公開發行公司應設立獨立董事、主張舉證責任之倒置---舉證責任由投資人轉移至經營管理階層。使經營管理層陷入「舉證之所在，敗訴之所在」的下風。）、令人聞之色變的「內線交易」定義模糊不明及罰則的大大加重（證交法第157條）--如果因為內線交易而「損及證券市場穩定者，加重其刑二分之一」，最高可以判20年有期徒刑，外加7.5億元罰金。這個刑度是我國除了死刑、無期徒刑以外最重的罪，和美國內線交易罪的25年有期徒刑也很接近（賴英照說法—從內線交易到企業社會責任第14頁），在如此種種足以為「董監事暨重要職員責任保險」推波助瀾的具體氛圍下，2009年止本國上市櫃公司投保者仍只有區區六百多家之譜，相較於英美國家90%的投保率相去甚遠。顯見D&O Insurance在我國未來的發展空間仍大，也可說，待努力及探討的地方甚為遼闊。 董事、監察人與重要職員肩負了許多證券交易法、公司法及民刑法上的責任與義務，而敵意併購中目標公司為了捍衛經營權，在策略應用上為了出奇不意的效果，往往需要機密性地進行，以免增加更多風險，而就在董監事與重要職員最需要D&O Insurance給予適時的倚靠與保障時，這張保單是否不負所託的展現它存在的價值？本文以實務個案探究之。 從敵意併購中目標公司的角度檢視D&O Insurance，本文提及諸多觀點，提綱挈領地針對公司治理、保單條款、及企業責任等部分提出建議，期能使保險公司從「保費低廉、理賠迅速」轉為「積極輔導、降低風險」的經營模式，提高相關人員對本保單接受度，進而由被動的接受到主動的保單設計，共創更完善的金融保險體制。 / The financial tsunami had proved that there is no corporation can exist forever and the invisible risk is the most important kind of risk. Until now, they are still occurring. The first Directors and Officers’ Liability Insurance policy (D&O Insurance) was sold in U.S.A. 1934. In Taiwan, the first D&O Insurance was sold in October 9, 1996. We can find out that D&O Insurance is ignored in Taiwan. Based on the data of Investor Protection Center in June 2008, the amount of the claims which were aroused by it can reach NT 240 billion. And the number of the investors can reach 64,000 people. Besides, based on the data of Insurance Association, the insurance premium in 2003 reached 249 million, in 2007 reached 623 million. Thus we can find out that D&O Insurance is not popular in Taiwan. But the loss run is getting more and more. For example, in ten policies, there is a one case will make a claim. In other words, the compensation rate can reach 12%. Since 2001, the Enron case aroused attention of the government, the investment and operators in U.S. Furthermore, the government had promoted related rules to increase the directors’ and officers’ liability. In 2003, I had visited corporations and promoted D&O Insurance. Although the process of briefing and interaction can find out the strong demand of policy, but they had lower will to buy it. It might content several reasons, for examples, clauses are too complex and difficult to understand. Rising claims activity, including lawsuits by investors, tougher policy standards and coverage disputes, is the latest developments in the D&O insurance arena. As a result, some carriers have added limits to policies. The directors and officers bear liability of Securities and Exchange Act, Company Act, Civil Code. When the target company tries to protect the right of management against the hostile takeover action, they sometimes have to take any tactic in private and might also be faced more risk. Could D&O Insurance distribute the risks which are aroused from the defense in the hostile takeover action? This article will study on the case and try to find the answers. We use the angle of the target company to inspect the function of D&O Insurance and hopefully try to amend it with the suggestion in the context. The function of D&O Insurance could be the key of corporate governance or distribution risks. For example, when the carriers provide the policy, we truly hope they could also provide positive solution to help the target company. Furthermore, the target company could participate in the design of policy.

本文主要分為四大部分，主要針對保險事故與危險發生通知義務在責任保險中的特殊性做出討論。首先對於保險事故的認定，由於翻譯名詞上的差異，具備不同的解釋空間，而本文認為保險事故的廣義定義應該係一抽象的損失發生原因，而非僅單純以保單的客觀角度認定，更產生了危險發生通知義務的解釋空間。 而現行保險法第五十八條的危險發生通知義務的立法目的不明確，本文詴從國外立法例的角度整理出相關立法目的，並確認其屬法定義務之一環，且在責任保險中具備一定的特殊性。至於本義務的定性上，本文採取一個較為特殊的見解，認為在保險契約當事人間應屬附隨義務的性質，而在非契約當事人間則應屬不真正義務的型態。另針對通知義務人、通知期限、通知期限起算點、通知方式、通知內容以及義務之免除等部分，在比較外國立法例後，本文認為我國現行法皆有再議之空間，並提出相關修正草案。 對於責任保險的保險事故而言，不只在我國學說上存有爭議，在外國立法例上也都有不同的認定與標準，本文在此要特別強調的是保險法第九十條不應作為限制我國責任保險判定保險事故的強制規定，否則索賠制以外的保單將無法運作。 正因為責任保險的保險事故性質特殊，因此在危險發生通知義務上應該要有所加強，而我國現行法第五十八條在適用上便會有所疏漏，因此本文認為應該要參酌外國的保險單條款在保單條款上加以修正，要求在有足以導致被保險人對第三人負賠償責任之事實發生或第三人確向被保險人行使請求權之時，通知義務人皆應對保險人加以通知，縱使未在保單條款中約定，本文認為亦應從目的性擴張解釋的法學方法加以處理，不過最適的解決方案還是建議修法新增責任保險特殊的通知義務。 最後在違反危險發生通知義務的效果上，本文發現我國現行法規範具有嚴重缺失。在無可歸責事由的前提下要求損害賠償的效果，相較於外國立法例明顯過重，建議可以依照不同的通知義務定性來分別作處理，對於契約當事人的通知義務違反，應該與民法的債務不履行架構統一，加入可歸責事由後搭配損害賠償效果；至於非契約當事人的通知義務違反，應該至多僅能搭配減免其保險金給付的效果而分別作處理。 本文於文末對於我國現行危險發生通知義務規範提出相關修正草案，對於危險發生通知義務的要件、違反效果以及責任保險的特殊通知義務一併提出修正建議與理由，希冀本文的提出能對於未來我國危險發生通知義務之發展能有所助益。

本研究探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱：董監責任險)與資訊不對稱之間的關係。過去文獻關於購買董監責任險所獲得的利益以及所需付出的代價有許多的辯論。其中一種觀點認為購買董監責任險可以提供公司治理的監督機制以降低資訊不對稱程度，因此對股東有利。但是另一種觀點認為購買董監責任險會以減少董監事面臨訴訟時自己必須負擔的損失，因而可能會出現管理者機會主義行為而導致更多的道德風險問題。本研究採用股票市場中的優勢資訊交易機率(probability of information-based trading，簡稱PIN)當成企業資訊不對稱程度的直接衡量，以了解購買監責任險與資訊不對稱之間的關係。以2008年至2013年台灣上市公司為樣本之實證結果發現，整體而言，有購買董監責任險的公司，有較低的PIN值(也就是資訊不對稱程度較低)，基本上支持購買董監責任險確實可以提供公司治理的監督機制。然而在進一步比較有購買董監責任險公司以及沒有購買董監責任險的公司之後，結果顯示可能不太需要購買董監責任險的公司(以迴歸模型估計購買機率較低者)但實際上卻有購買時，相較於需要購買且實際上也有購買董監責任險的公司，會有相對比較高的PIN值(較高的資訊不對稱)。此結果顯示股票市場的PIN值確實會反應企業的投機行為，因此支持購買董監責任險依然會有出現道德風險問題的可能。本研究提供的證據顯示整體而言購買董監責任險具有公司治理的監督機制功能，但是道德風險問題還是可能會出現在某些購買董監責任險的企業。

目前國際推廣之公司治理制度，非常重視董事會的專業能力，由於董事會是企業的幕後推手，舉凡公司長期策略、經營方向、任免高階主管等重大政策，莫不是董事會的權責，也攸關企業經營成效的良窳，因此如何提升董事會的效能，實為公司治理的共同課題。我國政府於1998年起開始，陸續宣導公司治理之重要性，並推動獨立董事、獨立監察人制度，以及制定符合國情之「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」，引導國內企業強化公司治理，進而提升國際競爭力。依我國現行相關法令，董事除對公司負有忠實與注意義務外，對於第三人就公司業務之執行，如有違反法令致其受有損害時，對該第三人亦應與公司負連帶賠償之責。由於董事、監察人在人力、時間及所處環境等因素，難免會出現判斷失誤等情況，從而承擔重大的責任與風險，進而影響到部分專業人士擔任獨立董事之意願，董、監事暨重要職員責任保險制度可適時轉移董、監事之風險。故本研究以董、監事暨重要職員責任保險制度的規範為主軸，首先論述我國金融機構-金融控股公司、銀行業、證券商及保險業董、監事主要責任，其次探討對董事會職能的影響，最後對健全公司治理結構與落實公司管控的有效性，提出董、監事暨重要職員責任保險制度予以法制化之建議，以落實公司治理並提升董事會之效能。 / The current proposed company governance structure emphasizes the professional abilities of the board; as the board works behind the scenes of a corporation and is responsible for major policy and strategies such as a company’s long-term strategy, operational direction, hiring and firing high-level managers. These are all decisions that affect an organization’s performance, so improving the capability of the board is a joint issue with corporate governance. Since 1998, the nation’s government has continued to address the importance of corporate governance and promoted structures such as independent boards, independent supervisors, and “publicly traded company corporate governance guidelines” that fit national culture to guide the nation’s corporations in strengthening corporate governance and increasing global competitiveness. According to the nation’s current related legal regulations, the board is responsible for the loyalty and care of the company but also must pay damages to third parties and companies if the company causes damages due to illegal activity. As the board and supervisors may err due to elements such as labor, time, and environmental constraints in shouldering major responsibilities and risks, this has affected the desire for certain professionals to hold board and supervisory positions so critical employee responsibility insurance mechanisms can suitably transfer the risk of board or supervisory members. This study explores critical employee responsibility insurance standards as the main topic by first discussing the main responsibilities of board and supervisory members in the nation’s financial institutions such as financial holding companies, banks, security firms ,and insurance companies. We will then explore the board’s effect towards functions and finally propose suggestions to legalize critical employee responsibility insurance standards that promote healthy corporate governance structures to realize effective management of companies in order to appropriate corporate governance and increase the performance of boards.

論文摘要： 汽車為現代人不可或缺之交通工具，汽車責任保險關乎社會大眾權益甚巨，不僅僅是保險人與被保險人兩者之間保險契約之關係，尚且關乎汽車意外事故受害第三人之權利，而每個人都有可能成為汽車意外事故之受害第三人。故保障受害第三人之權益即是保障多數人之權益。為使受害第三人之權益能獲得充分周全之保障，於汽車責任保險之中，創立受害第三人直接請求權制度，實不失為一良法。然而於我國無論是強制汽車責任保險受害第三人直接請求權制度抑或是任意汽車責任保險受害第三人直接請求權制度，均存有若干疑義及缺失，因而引發筆者研究動機。本文之研究方法為(1)、比較法研究及(2)、邏輯架構分析法。將全文分成七章予以論述，主要之研究內容為，以責任保險之意義、思潮及功能為開端，進而論述責任被保險人之保險給付請求權及受害第三人之直接請求權並闡述責任被保險人、責任保險人與受害第三人三者彼此之關係及保險給付請求權與直接請求權競合之處理，並進一步檢視我國現行關於受害第三人直接請求權法令規範之缺失，參酌外國立法例及學說，提出改進建議，期能使我國之受害第三人直接請求權制度，邏輯趨於圓滿一致，以杜絕適用疑義，廣增大眾福祉。 / Abstract： An automobile has become a necessary transportation vehicle for modern people. The automobile liability insurance plays an important role on everyone’s rights in our society. The insurance contract doesn’t only signify the relationship between an insurer and the insured , but also refers to the injured third party’s rights during the automobile accident. Because everyone may become a possible automobile accident injured third party, to protect the injured third party’s right means to protect everybody’s citizenship. In order to preserve the injured third party’s right exactly and sufficiently, it is a good method to establish the legislation system empowering the injured third party possessing the authority to exert the automobile liability. However, as far as the injured third party’s action is concerned, there are flaws and imperfection in the system of compulsory automobile liability insurance and optional automobile liability insurance in our country. That is the motivation of this study and the reason why the author draws this paper. The research methods of this paper are the comparative method and the logic framework analysis method. This paper is consisted of seven chapters. The major content of this paper begins with the significance, development and function of the liability insurance. Then, this paper will discuss the right of the liability insured’s payment claim and the injured third party’s direct action, analyze the relationship among the liability insurer, the liability insured and the injured third party, and exposit how to handle the conflict between the right of the liability insured’s payment claim and the injured third party’s direct action. Furthermore, it is important to inspect the imperfection of the current laws and regulations of the injured third party’s direct action in Taiwan. After considering the spirits of the foreign country’s laws, the researcher will pose and recommend the improving methods for the law system of the injured third party’ direct action in our country. The suggestions try to make the law system more coherent and more logical, to eradicate the mess situation in practice, and to fortify the public welfare.

專利保險可分為「專利侵權責任保險」及「專利訴訟費用保險」。狹義之專利訴訟費用保險係指為專利權人、專屬被授權人、或經明確受託訴權之非專屬被授權人等規劃之保險。該些被保險人欲請求專利侵權損害賠償時，得向保險人請求給付律師費、訴訟費用或仲裁費用；惟有實務保單條款約定保險人得請求分配被保險人受領之損害賠償金，此約定是否能通過我國公序良俗條款之檢驗，不無疑義。至於專利侵權責任保險，係為潛在侵權人所規劃之保險。此類保險之承保範圍雖及於侵權損害賠償，但就我國保險法制而言，其實務保單條款仍有許多調整空間。其中最主要者，係被保險人所為確認專利無效等請求所生費用，於實務保單中受保險金額之限制；然其既具有損害避免或減輕之性質，於我國保險法，不僅保險人有償還責任，其償還數額與賠償金額合計即使超過保險金額，仍應償還。

強制汽車責任保險自1998年1月1日實施至今，立法精神及施行成效深受社會大眾肯定。隨著社會安全制度的持續發展，持續進行全盤檢討，並於2005年2月5日公布新修正強制汽車責任保險法，3月1日正式實施。 由於強制汽車責任保險風險分類直接反應於費率計算，資訊不對稱容易形成道德風險，被保險人與保險人產生顯著資訊落差，保險人無法合理歸類被保險人風險特性，保費計算上易受外界雜訊所影響，產生嚴重道德風險。為降低資訊不對稱的成本增加，保險輔助人成為被保險人與保險人間資訊傳遞的重要中介機構。如何健全保險輔助機構的執業規範及分工定位，以降低資訊不對稱所造成之負面影響，成為強制汽車責任保險的重要監理議題。 本研究主要檢視現行強制汽車責任保險制度，如何有效規範保險輔助人，強化保險作業與交通監理作業降低資訊不對稱成本，討論具體措施諸如設立保費查詢中心、確保理賠損失資料之正確性、各項財務資訊揭露透明度與落實保險人之差異化管理政策，並歸納具體建議如下： 一、 建立強制汽車責任保險專屬網站，強化資訊揭露； 二、 交通監理作業投保查詢應整合保險查詢，減少代理成本； 三、 落實保險人內部稽核，建立承保及理賠標準流程； 四、 建立保險輔助人評等制度，維護市場公平競爭； 五、 車種分類及費率精算宜朝簡化為原則，避免道德風險。 / The Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance Law has been enforced since January 1, 1998, the spirit of the law and the goodwill lay behind it were highly praised by the general public. However, as the social security system continuously has developed and evolved, the law was deemed insufficient and inadequate. Therefore, experts and scholars proceeded to review the law and finally in February 5, 2005, a revision of the law was announced to the public and officially enforced in 1st March the same year. Since the risk classification of Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance directly reflects on rate calculation, information asymmetries can easily cause moral hazard. As the insured and insurers have significant information gap, insurers cannot categorize reasonably the characteristics of insured's risks, the premium calculation therefore can be affected by external noises that leads to serious moral hazard. To reduce the cost of information asymmetry, insurance brokers or agents becomes the insured and insurers' important intermediary for transmitting information. How to build sound operating norms, share the work, position insurance brokers or agents and reduce the negative impact on information asymmetry have turned out to be very important supervisory topics of Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance. This study is mainly examining the existing Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance system; regulating insurance brokers or agents effectively; strengthening insurance and traffic supervision operations to decrease the cost for information asymmetry; discussing specific measures such as the establishment of premium check center so as to ensure the accuracy of claim information, the transparency of financial information; in addition, implementing the differentiation management strategies of the insurers. The specific recommendations are summarized as following five points: 1. Establish official website for Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance and strengthen the disclosed information; 2. The insurance check in traffic supervisory operations shall be integrated with premium check center so that agency costs can be lowered; 3. Put into effect the insurers' internal audit to build up the standard of processes of underwriting and claims; 4. Establish the rating system for insurance brokers or agents so as to maintain fair market competitions; 5. Simplify the classification of type of vehicles and rate calculation to avoid moral hazard.

依照「強制汽車責任保險法」之規定，費率的釐定應兼採從人及從車因素，旨在使保險費率能更臻公平完整。本研究利用卡方獨立性檢定，以國內某大型產物保險公司之承保與理賠資料為依據，分析可能影響強制汽車責任保險損失之是否發生、損失次數與損失幅度的分類因素。除了法定的從人及從車因素之外，本研究亦試圖由取得之保單資料上找出其他可能影響損失的因子，並比較新制實施前後，其影響損失之分類因素的改變，做為是否應採用此分類因素為核保篩選及費率釐定之參考。 研究結果發現： （一）年餘並非為其有顯著影響力之分類因素； （二）性別、婚姻狀況與車種宜列為影響損失的重要分類因素； （三）肇事記錄與廠型對損失之影響不顧著，並非為重要分類因素； （四）車齡與排氣量並非為重要分類因素； （五）是否投保任意責任險與損失有顯著相關； （六）新制實施後，影響損失的顯著因素中，從人因素多於從車因素。 關鍵字：強制汽車責任保險、從人從車因素、損失頻率、損失幅度 / According to the“The Law of Compulsory Auto Liability Insurance”, the ratemaking should take both human factors and vehicle factors into account. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the factors which affect the loss occurrence, loss frequency and loss severity of compulsory auto liability insurance. Besides these legal factors, this paper also tries to find out other influential factors and compare the outcomes before 1998 with that after 1998. The analysis of the changes on the relevant factors helps the government and insurers to make rating and underwriting decisions. The methodology of this study is chi-square test and the empirical findings are as follows: 1.Age is not a significant risk factor. 2.Gender, marriage status and vehicle category should be considered as significant risk factors. 3. Both driving record and category has less effect on loss and thus should not be treated as important risk factors. 4.Neither vehicle-age nor exhaust volume should be considered as significant risk factors. 5.The factor of purchasing voluntary auto third party liability insurance has an important impact on loss. 6.After the new law of compulsory auto liability insurance has been practiced, it shows that human factors are more significant than vehicle factors in affecting insurance claims. Keywords: compulsory auto liability insurance, human factors and vehicle factors, loss frequency, loss severity

本研究主要探討我國企業對產品責任保險需求之原因，分別以四個構面來分析企業對產品責任保險的需求。包括企業經營動機、公司背景資料、產品安全風險管理與上市公司財務特性等四方面來探討企業的投保動機。本研究以我國上市公司為樣本，共計發放440份問卷，並以回收的90份問卷進行Logistic迴歸及複迴歸之實證分析。 研究結果發現，企業交易對象(買方)的要求、產品風險理財因素和產品市場行銷因素為影響上市公司投保產品責任保險之決定因素，呈顯著正向關係。另外，當上市公司過去曾發生過產品損害事件時，對產品責任保險之需求愈高；而且當公司的產品銷售本國地區、美加地區或同時銷售國內外地區時，對產品責任保險需求愈高。至於產品安全風險管理與產品責任保險需求之間的關係，實證結果顯示二者為互補關係，此與Ehrilich and Becker(1972)的理論假設一致。除此之外，本研究發現當公司規模愈大、產品銷售量愈大、負債對業主權益比率愈高以及公司無長期負債時，其對於產品責任保險的需求愈高。此外，當上市公司的財務危機成本愈高以及所面臨的損失頻率與幅度愈大時，其對於產品責任保險需求愈高。 / This paper investigates the corporate demand for product liability insurance in Taiwan. The motivations to purchase product liability insurance can be categorized into four groups, business operation incentive, features of the firm, product safety management, and financial management. The decision of insurance is analyzed based on the logistic model and multivariate regression models with a sample of 90 publicly traded companies in Taiwan. The empirical results of this study indicate that customers’ requests, product risk financing, and product marketing are the determinants for companies to buy product liability insurance. Further, the companies with previous experience of product liability losses have higher product liability insurance demand. Those companies selling their products to North America and Taiwan will purchase more product liability insurance. Moreover, the empirical evidences suggest significantly positive correlation between product safety management and product liability insurance demand, which is consistent with Ehrilich and Becker (1972) that market insurance and self-protection are complements. The results also show that the firm will purchase more product liability insurance when it has larger firm size, greater product sales, higher debt to equity ratio, and no long term debt.

在多元的現代社會中，人們的活動日趨複雜，但意外事故也隨之增加。各國政府為了解決意外傷害造成的社會問題，莫不致力於發展各種意外傷害補償制度，期望能為遭受意外傷害之受害人提供及時有效的補償。我國勞工職業災害補償制度、強制汽車責任保險制度，與紐西蘭意外補償制度的制定即是此脈絡下的產物。 紐西蘭意外補償制度自1974年開始實行，是世界上第一個針對人身傷害採行全面無過失補償制度的國家。全體國民強制加入意外傷害的社會保險體系，由官方的意外補償公司(Accident Compensation Corporation，通稱ACC)負責制度之運作，全民不論在任何場合發生之意外傷害，亦不論意外事故之發生有無過失，均可獲得補償。我國則於民國68年修正勞工保險條例，明訂職業災害保險，並於民國73年制訂勞動基準法第59條，規定雇主之無過失補償責任，建立職業災害補償制度；民國85年亦針對汽車交通事故造成之人身傷亡，制訂強制汽車責任保險法，建立強制汽車責任保險制度。 本文係以紐西蘭意外補償制度及我國勞工職業災害補償制度、強制汽車責任保險制度為研究中心。除介紹兩國意外傷害補償制度的發展過程、法律依據、重要內涵及組織架構外，並針對兩國制度在運作過程中產生的問題進行檢討與制度優缺點之比較分析。最後提出本文對於制度改革的建議，期能解決制度本身存在的問題。