本研究採用Dhaliwal, Krull, Li, and Moser (2005)之實證模型研究投資相關稅負對企業權益資金成本的影響。Dhaliwal et al. (2005)利用股利所得與資本利得最高級距稅率計算股利稅租稅罰，然而，使用最高級距稅率計算而得知代理變數恐無法完全捕捉稅負對資金成本的影響，因此本研究參考許崇源、俞洪昭、洪盈斌與戚務君 （2000），假設在個人董監事等大股東之所得稅率較一般散戶為高的前提下，以個人董監事持股比例做為個人股東邊際稅率之替代變數，再計算股利稅租稅罰之代理變數。 本研究利用台灣經濟新報資料庫（簡稱TEJ資料庫）取得台灣上市櫃公司2000年至2009年之財務資料，進行迴歸分析。實證結果顯示，因股利所得稅率與證券交易所得稅率差異造成的股利稅租稅罰，會使得權益資金成本上升；而且因為機構投資人較一般投資人享有較多租稅優惠，造成其適用稅率較低；而公司的邊際投資人又多為機構投資人，因此機構投資人持股可減輕股利稅租稅罰造成權益資金成本上升的情形。 / This study uses the empirical model proposed by Dhaliwal, Krull, Li, and Moser (2005) to examine the effect of investment tax on the cost of equity capital. Dhaliwal et al. (2005) used the top statutory tax rates on dividends and capital gains to get the variable “penalty”; however, it may not perfectly capture the dividend tax penalty. We follow the assumption that individual directors and supervisors may adopt higher tax rate than other individual stockholders (Hsu, Yu, Hung, and ,Chi 2000), then derive the variable “penalty” by using the rate of shares owned by individual directors and supervisors as the proxy variable of individual stockholder‟s marginal tax rate. This study uses the financial data of listed companies in Taiwan via Taiwan Economic Journal database (TEJ database) from 2000 to 2009 for regression analysis. The empirical results show that the dividend tax penalty resulting from the difference between the tax rate on dividend and capital gain increase the cost of equity capital. Furthermore, institutional investors always receive more favorable tax treatment than individual investors, making them adopt lower tax rate, and a firm‟s marginal investor is more likely to be an institutional investor, therefore the aggregate institutional ownership mitigates the increase of cost of equity capital.

本研究利用2000年至2004年的資料，分析獨立董事與監察人的設置 (以下簡稱為獨立董監) 與公司債務資金成本的關聯性。在以利息費用除以付息負債做為代理變數的前提之下，本研究的實證結果顯示，無論以當期利率水準、次期利率水準或者利率水準的變化做為被解釋變數，均顯示聘任獨立董監的企業會享有較低的債務資金成本。此外，進一步的分析也發現，無論以簡單的單變量模型、普通最小平方法或者利用縱橫面資料 (panel data) 模型，都得一致性地得到獨立董監得以有助於減緩公司與債權人間代理成本的實證結果。就控制變數而言，與預期相同，較完備的公司治理、較高的企業規模以及較佳的營運績效均與債務資金成本具有負向的關聯性。 / Corporate governance has become an imperative issue recently, especially the focus on the independent director system. Securities and Futures Commission has requested that those applying to be listed companies should set up the independent director systems for the purpose of building better corporate governance systems. In the framework of corporate governance formulated by the World Bank, as an essential capital provider or financial statement user, creditor plays an indispensable role. But few literatures has conducted to evaluate the relationship between the cost of debt financing and corporate governance, much less with the independent directors. Therefore, this study based on a sample of listed companies data in Taiwan Economic Journal over the period of 2000 to 2004 is to explore the relationship between independent directors and cost of debt and expected to provide the financial institutions determining the borrowing rate with some empirical results. The results indicate the cost of debt, whether based on the level analysis or change analysis of ordinary least square model or panel data analysis, is inversely related to the independent directors with significance at 1% level, suggesting that the enterprise with independent directors having the lower cost of debt in favor of the hypothesis. The analysis also indicates the relationship of the control variables of board characteristics, such as the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors is inversely with cost of debt、the higher ratio of the pledged shares held by the board and supervisors with the higher cost of debt and the enterprise with the combined titles of the chairman and CEO has higher cost of debt, follow our expectation again.

本研究基於資本效益之概念，探討金融控股公司合理之資本配置，並以2002年第4季至2005年第2季間富邦金融控股公司之財務資訊進行實證分析。首先，本研究應用Margrabe (1978)互換選擇權評價模式，計算金融控股公司經營所隱含違約風險之賣權價值。其次，利用Myers and Read (2001)邊際違約價值相等之原則，將資本分配至旗下各子公司。實證結果歸納如下： 1.各子公司所需配置之邊際資本大小依序為台北富邦銀行、富邦人壽、富邦證券、富邦產險。即邊際資本越大，子公司每承擔1單位負債需要配置更多之資本。 2.富邦產險、富邦人壽與富邦證券實際資本均遠高於理論配置之資本，台北富邦銀行實際資本則低於理論資本。在給定固定門檻利率下，各子公司資金成本大小依序為台北富邦銀行、富邦人壽、富邦證券、富邦產險。 本研究結果顯示，富邦產物保險公司以減資方式，將過剩之資本退還富邦金融控股母公司，與Myers and Read (2001)邊際違約價值相等之資本配置原則相符。

研究以2000至2004年之國內上市(櫃)公司為樣本，探討董事會結構、股權結構、資訊透明度與公司債發行行為(融資決策、公司債資金成本與債務違約)之關聯性。 融資決策之實證結果顯示，當企業有長期資金需求且向外部融資時，公司治理特性之控制權與所有權偏離程度及資訊透明度顯著影響企業之外部融資決策(發行公司債或股票)。股份盈餘偏離倍數愈低、資訊透明度愈高，則公司愈傾向以公司債向外融資，而非發行股票。獨立董監席次比例、機構投資人席次比例及董監事質押比則對融資決策無顯著影響。 公司債資金成本之實證結果顯示，企業之公司治理特性亦影響公司債資金成本之高低。控制權與所有權之偏離程度及資訊透明度與資金成本具有顯著關係，股份盈餘偏離倍數愈低、資訊透明度愈高之公司，在債券市場可以較低之資金成本籌資。獨立董監席次比例、機構投資人席次比例及資訊透明度則對資金成本無顯著影響。 債務違約之分析結果顯示，相較於未違約之企業，債務違約公司之機構投資人席次比例較低、偏離程度較高、營運能力較低，但兩樣本在公司債資金成本上則無明顯差異。

本研究旨在探討不同的市場參與者是否會視公司自願性採用Clawback條款與否，而給予不同的回應。以2007至2011年間納入Russel 3000指數之公司(排除金融服務與保險業)為樣本，本研究發現，與未採用Clawback條款之公司相比，自願性採用Clawback條款之公司，其權益資金成本較低，且信用評等較佳，顯示投資人及信用評等機構皆認為Clawback條款有助於提升公司之財務報導品質，進而降低其所承受之資訊風險。本研究進一步以F-score (Dechow et al. 2011)來衡量公司的事前舞弊風險，並將樣本區分為高舞弊風險組與低舞弊風險組。本研究發現，Clawback條款僅在低舞弊風險組與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，顯示財務品質較佳之公司確實會透過自願性採用Clawback條款來向資本市場彰顯其信心，而投資人亦會以較低之要求報酬做出回應。然而，本研究亦發現，Clawback條款僅在高舞弊風險組與信用評等呈顯著正相關，這意味著信用評等機構能夠區別Clawback條款對於高舞弊風險公司及低舞弊風險公司的效益，並針對尋求實質改善的公司做出正面回應。最後，本研究使用機構投資人持股比例，將樣本區分為高外部監督與低外部監督(亦即低代理問題與高代理問題)兩組。迴歸結果顯示，僅有在公司所受到的外部監督程度較低時，Clawback條款方會與權益資金成本及信用評等呈顯著相關。 / This study examines whether different market participants react differently to voluntary adopters and non-adopters of clawback provisions. Based on the sample of non-financial firms included in the Russel 3000 index from year 2007 to 2011, the empirical results show that, comparing to non-adopters, firms who voluntarily adopt the clawback provisons have lower cost of equity capital and higher credit rating, suggesting that both investors and credit rating agency regard clawback provisions as a means to reduce information risk and, therefore, enhance firms’ financial reporting quality. This study further uses the F-score (Dechow et al. 2011) to separate the sample into high versus low risk of occuring fraudulent financial reporting groups. The regression results from both groups indicate that the adoption of clawback provisions is negatively related to cost of equity capital only when firms have lower fraud risk. This finding implies that firms with good financial reporting quality tend to adopt clawback provisions to signal their confidence on financial reporting, and investors respond by requiring lower returns. In contrast, the results report that the adoption of clawback provisions is positively related to credit rating only when firms are more likely to incur fraudulent financial reporting, implying that credit rating agency appears to consider the effect of clawback provisions and responds to firms who seek real improvement in their financial reporting quality. Finally, this study adopts institutional investors’ ownership to seperate the sample into high versus low external monitoring (i.e., low versus high agency problem) groups. The regression results from both groups show that the effects of clawback provisions on cost of equity capital and credit rating remain only for firms that are subjected to low external monitoring.

本論文之研究目的係驗證公允價值資訊是否會影響聯合貸款的借款條件。實證結果顯示公司採用更多公允價值，尤其是第1等級輸入值，可在聯合貸款市場中可取得較有利的聯合貸款條件，例如可取得更低的利率及更高額的貸款金額。然而實證結果也顯示，若公司採用更多公允價值，尤其是第1等級輸入值，會有更高的機會被債權人要求提供債務擔保。由此可知，公司採用更多公允價值可有助於取得更有利的聯合貸款借款條件，同時第1等級輸入值可獲得更顯著的結果。

董監事會為公司治理之核心，本研究以民國87年至民國91年為研究期間，針對我國上市公司探討董監事會特性與權益資金成本之關聯性，而不同於以往國內有關估計權益資金成本的方法，本研究以Ohlson模型來設算權益資金成本。實證結果顯示： 1.董監事會成員持股比率與企業權益資金成本率之關係並不顯著，若觀測兩者間是否存有非線性關係，本研究亦未發現兩者間的不顯著關係是由非線性因素所造成。 2.複迴歸分析顯示，董監事會持股質押比與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，若進一步區分全體樣本為正、負盈餘樣本，則發現在負盈餘樣本中，董監事會持股質押比與企業權益資金成本呈現顯著正向關係；另外，若以Panel Data分析，本研究則發現在電子業中董監事持股質押比與權益資金成本始呈現正相關。 3.公司是否聘任獨立董監與權益資金成本之關係並不顯著，且不論是在有聘任或無聘任獨立董監之樣本間，或是在自願性聘任與強制性聘任獨立董監之樣本間，其權益資金成本並無明顯的差異。 / This study examines the relations between characteristic of board of directors and supervisors and cost of equity capital. It is unlike previous research to use capital assets pricing model（CAPM）, this research adopts an alternative technique for estimating the cost of equity capital. Specifically, we use Ohlson (1995) model to generate a market implied cost of capital. Our samples consist of all public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporate over 5 years period 1998-2002. The empirical results are as follows: 1.There is no significant negative relation between the ratio of the stock held by the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. Moreover, we don’t find this relation caused by nonlinear specification. 2.There is no significant positive relation between the pledged share ratio of the board and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. When the entire samples are divided into the sub-samples of firms experiencing losses and others, the existence of the positive relationship is found only in the firms experiencing losses. In addition, the relation is further proved in the electronic industry when adopting panel data analysis. 3.There is no significant reverse relation between the independent directors and supervisors and the cost of equity capital. And there is also no significant difference in the cost of equity capital between companies with implementing the independent directors and supervisors and those without implementing the regulation.

近年來，我國上市上櫃公司發行公司債籌措資金的情形蔚為風潮。依據我國目前規定，公司擬發行的公司債須由證期會認可之信用評等機構進行評等，並出具報告。既無信用評等向來重視會計資訊的品質，因此引起了本研究探討資訊揭露是否會降低公司債資金成本的動機。關於資訊揭露與負債資金成本的關係，僅見於Sengupta(1998)的研究，而本研究則試圖以資訊揭露能降低代理成本的角度，探討在國內資本市場中，資訊揭露是否與負債資金成本存在一反向關係。 本研究評估揭露指數方法與之前文獻所採用的的內容分析法不同。本研究是以公司發行公司債前一年度盈餘概估情形評估揭露指數口本研究採用最小平方法迴歸分析(OLS)對測試假說，其結果如下： 1.公司發行公司債之增額負債資金成本與資訊揭露程度存在反向關係。 本研究之實證結果顯示，我國資本市場中，公司資訊揭露程度與公司債之殖利率存有顯著的反向關係。顯示在債券的初級市場中，除了債券的條件與公司體質的好壞以外，資訊揭露也可能成為公司債殖利率的決定因素。 2.若公司債的代理成本較高，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本之反向變動關係會較強。 本研究以公司債轉換條款與擔保條款的有無，區分公司債代理成本的高低。實證結果發現，發行具轉換條款公司債之公司與發行不具轉換條款公司債之公司，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本影響顯著較低。驗證了設有轉換條款或擔保條款之公司債將因為債券本身的代理成本下降，而削弱資訊揭露對公司債殖利率的影響。也就是說若公司債屬於普通公司債或無擔保公司債時，資訊揭露對公司債之殖利率影響更大。因此對於有意發行無擔保公司債或普通公司債的公司而言，資訊揭露將更能降低其負債資金成本。 關鍵字：代理成本，負債資金成本，揭露程度，資訊不對稱 / In recent years, it has become a common phenomenon for listed corporations to issue bonds in Taiwan. Currently in Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Committee (SFC) forbids a corporation to issue bonds unless it has been properly rated by a credit rating agency certified by the SFC. Since the credit rating agency all along have generally placed a great deal of emphasis on the quality of accounting information, this research purports to investigate whether fuller disclosure of accounting information can indeed reduce the cost of debt capital. Only one study by Sengupta (1998) focused on the cost of debt capital, and addressed the issue about the relation between the disclosure level the cost of debt capital, and this study attempts to investigate whether a reverse relationship exists between disclosure and cost of debt capital in Taiwan form the angle of the agency cost. The method to determine the score of the disclosure level applied by this research is different from the content analysis method applied by prior studies. This research uses the earning estimation disclosure made in the year prior to the bond issuance, for measuring the disclosure level. This research applies the QLS model to test the hypotheses. After controlling for other variables, this research concludes that: 1.There may exist a reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level. The result shows that there exists a significant reverse relation between the yield to maturity of bond and the corporate disclosure level. This finding leads us to conclude that because of the ability to lower the agency costs and control the information asymmetry, corporate disclosure level, couple with the terms of the bond and the issuing corporation's financial conditions, could be one determinant of the yield to maturity of the bond. 2.If the agency cost of the bond is higher, the reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be stronger. In this research, agency costs are considered low when the bond is convertible or secured, or vice versa. The result shows that for the corporation issuing convertible or secured bonds, the impact of the disclosure is less significant. This finding verifies that when the bond is convertible or secured, the reverse relation between the cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be weakened since the agency costs are lower. Therefore, this research draws a conclusion that for corporations that attempt to issue straight bonds or unsecured bonds, the disclosure level plays a more important rule to reduce the cost of debt capital. Key word: Agency Cost, Cost of Debt Capital, Disclosure Level, Information Asymmetry.

本文從債務契約的角度，調查穩健會計對財務報表使用者的經濟效益，以及編製者提供穩健會計的經濟誘因。穩健會計的最主要受益者為債權人，選擇債務契約係基於，首先，本研究利用當期公司穩健特性預期次期該公司契約是否違約，研究結果發現穩健會計得以使債權人及時偵知債務人倒帳風險，其次，本研究調查編製者的經濟誘因，實證結果未能發現，其中經濟誘因的變數包括銀行貸款利率、異常應計與盈餘反應係數，本文建議未來研究可繼續探求財報提供者報導穩健之誘因，並進行跨國分析比較。 / Perceived from the perspective of debt contract, this paper investigates the benefit of accounting conservatism for users of financial statements and the motivation of financial preparers to provide conservative reporting. I choose this topic because main beneficiaries of accounting conservatism are the lenders. First, I use the measure of conservatism in current period to predict the default risk of borrowers in next period. The evidences show that conservatism benefits lenders through the timely signaling of default risk. Second, I try to discover the motivation of borrowers to provide conservatism accounting through the proxies of cost of capital, abnormal accruals and earning response coefficient but fail. One potential avenue for future research is to find the economic motivation of financial reporting preparers to report conservative accountings and do the cross-country comparisons.

本研究旨在探討我國實施兩稅合一制度後，稅額扣抵比率及未分配保留盈餘加徵10%營利事業所得稅在上市公司不同產業間的實行狀況，以及新稅制對上市公司資本結構及資金成本的影響，並評估這些結果是否有達成政府實施兩稅合一政策的主要目的，改善企業的資本結構及創造有利於企業的投資環境。本研究的研究範圍以兩稅合一實施前後，自民國85年至88年共四年度在台灣證券交易所之股票上市公司為研究樣本。 本研究結果顯示，在稅額扣抵比率方面，由於電子業上市公司相對於非電子業上市公司享有較多的租稅優惠，故其稅額扣抵比率顯著地低於非電子業上市公司。此外，在未分配盈餘加徵10%營利事業所得稅方面，民國88年度，我國被加徵未分配盈餘稅的上市公司中，大約有15%的公司民國87年度並無財務所得，但依所得稅法第六十六條之九計算的未分配盈餘卻為正值，顯見現行以課稅所得為基礎計算的未分配盈餘與財務會計的處理結果有很大的差異。至於未分配盈餘加徵的稅額，我國電子業上市公司即約佔38%，且其加徵稅的平均值也遠高於全部樣本之平均值。 在兩稅合一實施前，舉債較高且租稅負擔較低的公司，兩稅合一實施後，因新稅制減少了企業對於融資決策的扭曲，故有助於財務風險較高的公司改善資本結構。此外，公司的稅額扣抵比率愈高，則其舉債比率愈低。再者，在兩稅合一實施前，舉債較少且租稅負擔較高的公司，兩稅合一實施後，資金成本的變動呈現上升趨勢，與本研究預期相反，但本文實證結果仍發現公司的稅額扣抵比率愈高，則其資金成本愈低。因此，兩稅合一對於企業資金成本的降低仍具有效益。