本研究旨在探討管理當局自願性盈餘預測與權益資金成本之關聯性，檢視管理當局發布盈餘預測頻率之影響是否反應於權益資金成本上，並進一步檢視管理當局之聲譽是否為影響權益資金成本的因素之一。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現管理當局發布自願性盈餘預測之頻率與權益資金成本呈顯著負相關，表示管理當局發布盈餘預測的次數越多時，權益資金成本越低。 在管理當局聲譽對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究實證分析結果發現，管理當局之聲譽與權益資金成本亦呈顯著負相關，管理當局聲譽以管理當局預測誤差和分析師預測誤差來衡量，當管理當局的盈餘預測誤差小於分析師盈餘預測誤差時，投資人認為管理當局對盈餘的預測有效且值得信賴，此時管理當局聲譽提高，投資人認為取得有用的資訊，進而降低企業權益資金成本。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to explore whether the frequency of management forecasts is related to the cost of equity capital. In addition, I further examine whether the association is stronger when management has better reputation. Basing on a sample of S&P 500 listed firms during 2000-2009, I find that, consistent with my prediction, cost of firm’s equity capital decreases with the frequency of management earning forecasts after controlling for other determinants well-documented to be related to cost of equity capital. Second, I find that cost of equity capital is negatively related to the reputation of management; however, I do not find that the association between cost of equity capital and the frequency of management systematically vary with the reputation of management.

本研究係探討關係人交易雙方是否委任相同會計師進行查核，對企業負債資金成本之效果。本文以企業利息費用除以平均帶息負債衡量企業之負債資金成本，企業之關係人交易部分則分成關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易、關係人應收款、關係人應付款等四類型交易，來討論關係人交易與企業負債資金成本之關聯，接著將各類型關係人交易再細分成由相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方與由不同會計師查核關係人交易雙方兩類，以檢驗相同會計師查核對於企業負債資金成本之影響。 研究結果發現關係人交易與企業負債資金成本之關聯並無統計上之顯著性。然將關係人交易進一步拆分為是否由相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方後，關係人進貨交易與關係人銷貨交易等兩類型交易若由相同會計師查核交易雙方，其相較於不同會計師查核能夠有效減緩企業負債資金成本增加之情形。 / This study examines the effect of same auditor auditing both sides of related party transactions (RPTs) on cost of debt. In this study, cost of debt is measured using interest expenses divided by average interest bearing debt and we hand collect from annual reports the data of the four common types of RPTs: sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and accounts payable to related parties. For the four types, we further split RPTs into RPTs whose involved sides are audited by the same auditor and RPTs whose involved sides are audited by different auditors. We do not find any evidence that RPTs are associated with cost of debt. However, we find that for sales to related parties and purchases from related parties, RPTs whose involved sides are audited by the same auditor are associated with cost of debt less strongly than RPTs whose involved sides are audited by different auditors. Our results suggest that same auditor auditing can mitigated the detrimental effect of RPTs on cost of debt.

本研究以權益基礎報酬占總報酬的比率來捕捉薪酬結構，並據以探討給予審計委員會的薪酬結構對於公司權益資金成本及信用評等之影響。利用 2006 至 2010 年間納入美國 S&P1500指數之公司 (排除金融服務與保險業) 為樣本，本研究發現，若權益基礎報酬佔審計委員會薪酬比率越高，其公司之權益資金成本越低，但該公司之信用評等卻越差。顯示權益基礎報酬之比重在二種財報使用者眼中具有不同涵義。投資人認為給予審計委員會較高之權益基礎報酬比重，可使監督更有效，投資人承擔之資訊風險降低，進而願意降低其要求報酬；信用評等機構則認為，給予較高的權益基礎報酬比重將傷害審計委員會獨立性，影響公司治理結構，並降低財務報導之品質，因而給予此類公司較差之信用評等。 / This study examines how investors and credit rating agents react to audit committees’ equity-based compensation. Based on a sample of S&P 1500 firms during 2006-2010, the empirical results show that firms who pay audit committees higher portion of equity-based compensation have lower cost of equity capital and lower credit rating. These results suggest different information users perceive and react to equity-based compensation in different ways. Particularly, investors appear to perceive that higher portion of equity-based compensation can align audit committee members’ interest with the shareholders’, leading to more effective monitoring and smaller information risk. Therefore, investors react by reducing their cost of equity capital. In contrast, credit rating agents appear to perceive that higher portion of equity-based compensation may harm audit committees’ independence, resulting in decreased quality of financial reporting. Therefore, credit rating agents react by downgrading firms’ credit ratings.

歐盟保險業者於2005年開始，將強制採用IFRS之相關規定。而過去IFRS對於保險業之影響主要以理論探討為主，因此本研究以歐盟壽險業為主要研究對象，探討IFRS適用對壽險業之影響。研究結果發現歐洲壽險業者於適用IFRS後，整體而言的確對於其盈餘波動程度產生正向影響；在資金成本方面則為負向之影響。有關投資配置之影響部分，IFRS之實施對於壽險業者之投資決策並未產生顯著之影響。另一方面，壽險業者之審計公費有降低之趨勢，但其資訊揭露成本有顯著增加之趨勢存在。 / Beginning in 2005, compliance with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has been required in the European Union insurance industry. In the past, the influences of IFRS on the insurance business primarily take the theory discussion. The study takes the European Union life insurance industry as the main objects of study, trying to discuss what the influences of life insurance industry to adopt IFRSs. The study finds that after European Union life insurance industry adopting IFRS, the earning volatility increase and cost of capital would decrease. But in the investment allocations, the influences of IFRS are not significant. In the other hand, audit cost would decrease and information disclosure cost would increase.

本研究使用資金成本(cost of capital)、信用供給(credit supply)和資源基礎理論（resource-based view）來探討政府政策與公司投資決策的關係。在資金成本(cost of capital）理論的解釋下，政府政策實施後，企業外部融資成本的下降使企業無謂的損失減少，增加企業投資的動機。同時本研究使用信用供給(credit supply)理論來解釋當政府政策增加金融市場的信用供給後，企業外部融資限制的降低促使其進行投資。結果顯示在資源基礎理論（resource-based view）之下，國家政策對公司投資決策產生顯著的影響，並不是透過改變公司的外部融資條件實現。 / Our research used the cost of capital credit supply and resource-based view to explain the changing in investment decisions after implement policy. The government policy effect will increase the willingness of investment. Meanwhile, we used the credit supply theory to explain the changing of external financing constraints in companies increases investment. Our results showed that based on the resource-based view, government policy significantly affects the investment decisions without having impact on external financing.

本研究主要是探討公司治理結構與資訊透明度之間的關聯性，並進一步檢視公司治理結構與資訊透明度對於權益資金成本及分析師盈餘預測之影響。 在本研究的實證分析結果中，發現企業的資訊透明度確實會受到公司治理結構因素的影響。在股權結構方面，當控制股東所持有的現金流量權比率增加時，由於外部股東的持股相對減少，在監督成本大於效益的情況下，對於公司資訊的需求會降低，因此，管理當局會降低資訊的揭露水準，導致資訊透明度下降。在董事會組成方面，本研究的發現支持財富侵佔假說的論點，當控制股東所掌握的董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會提高控制股東剝奪外部股東財富的動機，使得控制股東傾向利用控制力以影響被投資公司的資訊揭露政策，造成被投資公司的資訊透明度下降。除此之外，研究結果也支持監督假說的預期，即獨立董監事的設置，能有效發揮監督管理當局與制衡控制股東的功能，有助於提昇公司的資訊透明度。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於權益資金成本的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳確實會影響外部投資人對於企業風險的評價，進而影響投資人所要求的必要報酬率(即企業的權益資金成本)。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東的持股比率增加時，其與外部股東的目標會趨於一致，發生代理問題的風險會降低，投資人承擔較低的代理風險。因此，控制股東持股比率增加所傳達予投資人是一項有利的訊息，以致於投資人願意降低必要的投資報酬率，使得公司的權益資金成本降低。董監事持股質押的行為對於投資人而言，可能是一項風險的訊號，理性的投資人預期未來可能被董監事剝奪財富的風險，以致於要求的投資報酬率會提高，企業的權益資金成本會增加。 在公司治理(公司治理結構與資訊透明度)對於分析師預測的影響，本研究的實證結果發現企業之公司治理的良窳會影響企業資訊環境的品質，進而影響分析師預測誤差與離散性。在公司治理結構方面，當控制股東所掌握之投票權比率與現金流量權比率之偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題，降低財務報導的可靠性，因而導致分析師對於公司未來績效與前景的瞭解程度相對較低，分析師之間對於公司未來的盈餘並無一致的看法，即預測的離散性會增加，但是並不影響預測的誤差；當控制股東所掌握之董監事席次比率與現金流量權比率的偏離程度愈大時，會加深控制股東與外部股東之間的利益不一致，使得控制股東有誘因剝奪外部股東的權益，操縱公司的會計資訊，使得會計資訊的可靠性降低，以致於分析師預測未來盈餘所面臨的不確定性會愈大，預測誤差與離散性也會愈高。 關鍵詞：公司治理結構；資訊透明度；權益資金成本；分析師預測；控制股東；獨立董監事 / This study investigates the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, which in turn examines the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on the cost of equity capital and the analyst’s earnings forecasts including forecast error and forecast dispersion. On the relationship between corporate governance structure and transparency, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the transparency is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the transparency is lower with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Finally, the transparency is higher with higher percentage of independent directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on cost of equity capital, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the cost of equity capital is lower with higher cash flow rights owned by controlled stockholder. Second, the cost of equity capital is higher with higher percentage of cash flow rights pledged by directors and supervisors. On the effect of corporate governance structure and transparency on analyst’s forecasts, research findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, the forecast dispersion is higher with higher divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Second, the forecast error and dispersion are higher with higher divergence between the control rights, which are numbers of directors and supervisors, and cash flow rights controlled by controlled stockholder. Keywords: Corporate governance structure；Transparency；Cost of equity capital；Analyst’s forecasts；Controlled stockholder；Independent directors and supervisors.

本研究目的欲探討實施費率自由化第一及第二階段後之情形，即在2006年第二階段實施後，台灣產物保險公司及各險種個別之資金成本，以檢視兩階段自由化實施後是否顯著影響國內產險業。而資金成本為公司每段期間內應支付資金提供者之期望報酬，故以此可做為日後公司經營之參考指標。研究期間為2002年至2008年，分別由一因子模型及多因子模型解釋台灣產物保險業之資金成本，及系統風險(β)的變化是否會影響其資金成本之變動。利用資本資產定價模型(Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM)及Fama-French三因子模型(Fama-French Three-Factor Model, FF3F)求得公司資金成本，再透過完備資訊方法(The Full-information Industry Beta Method, FIB)了解不同險種間之系統風險及資金成本。實證結果顯示： 1. 無論在整體產險公司或是不同險種間，由FF3F模型所估計之資金成本均高於由CAPM模型所估計之資金成本。說明CAPM模型無法反映公司規模及財務危機因子(淨值市價比因子)之溢酬，而造成資金成本之低估。 2. 經CAPM模型及FF3F模型之估計，顯示台灣產險業之資金成本均低於國外產險業之資金成本，如美國。說明台灣產險業於資本市場之融資成本較低，造成其資本效率偏低，投資人變相縱容產險公司從事高風險性資產之投資。 本研究由台灣實證資料，顯示現行產險業資金取得成本低，導致其資本效率偏低，且投資人無法由市場資訊檢視其保險本業是否根據成本之考量來定價，故主管機關應於費用完全自由化後，加強產險業經營之監理，導正產險市場經營模式，避免因核保循環(underwriting cycle)而影響公司財務穩健。 關鍵詞：費率自由化、資金成本、資本資產定價模型、Fama-French三因子模型、完備資訊方法。

隨著我國壽險業資產比率快速增加，投資績效不但影響眾多保戶的權益，更影響整體經濟之安定，但面臨現今全球金融和經濟環境劇烈動盪，加上壽險同業間激烈競爭的情況，我國壽險公司如何訂定投資策略做好資產配置，對壽險公司的營運健全而言相當重要。現行保險法第一百四十六條限制壽險公司的投資上限，但法令限制對壽險公司資產配置的影響為何，本研究將透過Markowitz的平均數－變異數投資組合模式對我國整體壽險業及國泰人壽、南山人壽、新光人壽及富邦人壽探討之；並以夏普指數、崔納指數及詹森指數，評估上述四家壽險公司之資金運用績效；另藉由分析壽險業之資金成本是否低於實際投資率，以達成研究壽險業長期資產配置之穩健度。 本研究主要結論如下：1.運用Markowitz 投資組合模型所推導出的效率前緣，以最大Sharpe Measure評估，不受法令限制下所建立之最佳投資組合，較有受法令限制下所建立之最佳投資組合的期望報酬率高，且分散風險的效果較佳。2.整體壽險業及前四大壽險公司之實際投資報酬率皆低於其實際投資組合之期望報酬，顯示壽險業於資金運用的靈活度及績效性有改善的空間。3.以績效評估指標求出前四大壽險公司的資金運用績效，發現新光人壽在此三項評估指標皆位居最後；國泰人壽在評估中皆名列前茅。4.新光人壽的平均實際報酬率低於平均資金成本，應控管好資金成本並加強投資組合之績效；富邦人壽平均實際報酬率高過平均資金成本最多，顯示富邦人壽在資金成本控管及投資績效有良好之表現。整體壽險業的實際報酬率亦高於平均資金成本，顯示我國壽險業於營運狀況正常。 / With the life insurance companies’ assets ratio rapidly increasing, the investment performances affect not only the right of a number of policy holders, but also affect the economic stability. However, facing the dynamic global financial and economic environment and the keen competition in the domestic life insurance industry, the life insurance companies need to adopt the proper investment strategy. Law of Insurance 146th p restricts the investment upper limit of the life insurance company. This research will use Markowitz MV model to discuss the influence of this investment restriction on life insurance companies’ asset allocation by the samples of Life industry, Cathay Life Insurance, Nan Shan Life Insurance, Shin Kong Life Insurance, and Fubon Life Insurance, and evaluate the performances of these four life insurance companies by Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio, and Jensen’s measure. This research also analyze the cost of capital and real rate of return of these companies to examine the stability of life insurance industry’s long term asset allocation. The conclusions of this research are as follows: 1.Evaluated by the Markowitz efficient frontier and the Sharpe measure, there is the higher expected rate of return and better diversification with no investment restriction. 2.The actual rates of return of the life insurance industry and the above four life insurance companies are below the expected rates of returns of their portfolio evaluated be the Sharpe measure, which means the life insurance industry need to prove their capital allocation. 3. Comparing the performance of the life insurance companies by the performance indicator, we find the then Shin Kong Life Insurance is the last, while Cathay Life Insurance has a good score. 4. We also find the real rate of return of Shin Kong Life Insurance is lower than its cost of capital, which means Shin Kong Life Insurance need to adjust its cost of capital and the investment performance. Meanwhile, Fubon Life Insurance is the excellent in controlling the cost of capital and investment. The real rate of return of the Life insurance industry is higher than its cost of capital, and that shows the Life insurance industry has normal operation.

有鑑於全球愈來愈重視企業營運對社區造成的社會、環境和經濟影響，企業的利害關係人除了重視企業的財務績效之外，也愈來愈關心企業是否有善盡其「社會公民」的責任與角色。企業責任報告之目的就是在傳統的財務報表之外，進一步揭露企業的營業活動對於社會及環境所造成的影響。為了使資本市場能更有效地運作，公司管理當局應該要揭露範圍更廣、透明度更高、並有助於投資決策的攸關性資訊，因此，發布社會責任報告的企業有日益增多的趨勢。本研究之目的即在探討三個與企業責任報告有關的議題：(1) 企業的公司治理結構之良窳與管理當局企業責任報告揭露決策的關係；(2) 企業揭露社會責任報告之決策是否會產生股價溢酬；(3)企業社會責任報告揭露決策對企業的事前權益資金成本的影響。在控制樣本的自我選擇偏誤之後，本研究的主要發現有二：第一、公司治理結構愈好的企業愈傾向於揭露企業責任報告，而且也愈可能以專節的形式在該報告中揭露公司治理資訊；第二、從有無揭露企業責任報告的角度來看，本研究發現有揭露的公司均有較高 (低) 的股價 (資金成本)。其次，從揭露的內容做進一步分析之後，本研究發現「環境績效」、「社會績效」與「公司治理」三大類內容的揭露決策均具有價格溢酬。至於「企業承諾」則對公司股價並無顯著影響。最後，企業責任報告揭露程度較高之企業會有較顯著的價格溢酬以及較低的資金成本。 / In light of the increasing emphasis on companies’ social, environmental and economic impacts on the communities, stakeholders are more concerned about whether firms appropriately assume their responsibility as a social citizen. To fulfill stakeholders’ demand of such non-financial information, many companies have recently begun to voluntarily issue the corporate responsibility reports (CRR) as a means to disclose their social, environmental and economic performance and their commitment to do business responsibly. This study intends to answer the following three key questions related to the CRR disclosure: (a) Will companies with stronger corporate governance be more willing to issue CRR? (b) Will the voluntary disclosure of CRR leads to stock price premium? (c) Will companies making voluntary disclosure of CRR have lower ex ante cost of capital? After controlling for the self-selection bias, the empirical results reveal several important findings. First, the stronger the companies’ coporate governance, the more likely the management will issue CRR. Particularly, these companies tend to disclose their comporate governance policy and procedures in a separate section in the CRR. Second, companies disclosing CRR experience significantly higher (lower) stock prices (cost of capital). A further examination shows that three out of four major components reported in the CRR (i.e., environmental performance, social performance, and corporate governance) give rise to significant price premium. The disclosure of business commitment, however, seems to bear little or no information content embedded in the stock price. Finally, companies disclosing more information in their CRR have higher price premium and lower cost of capital than those disclosing less information. The implications of these findings are discussed.