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Le plaisir dans la pensée d’Aristote : physiologie, essence, valeur et usage / Aristotle on pleasure : physiology, essence, valuation and practiceCampbell, Matthieu 12 November 2011 (has links)
Cette étude réexamine la théorie aristotélicienne du plaisir en analysant les textes qui s’approchent au plus près d’une définition du concept, et en mesurant les présupposés et les enjeux de leur contenu doctrinal dans l’ensemble de la philosophie d’Aristote. Elle est organisée autour d’un commentaire suivi de Ethique à Nicomaque X 3-4, où le statut du plaisir se trouve précisément déterminé : au sein d’un unique acte cognitif pensé comme une activité continuellement parfaite, le plaisir est à la fois la satisfaction avérée de notre bon exercice, et l’incitation à le continuer tel quel. Cette étude exige une élucidation de l’opposition entre « activité » (energeia) et mouvement, mais aussi un examen préalable de certains présupposés : nous reconsidérons, notamment à partir des traités de psychologie, les caractéristiques formelles de la sensation, paradigme de l’activité plaisante, et montrons que les plaisirs n’obéissant pas au même paradigme, et d’abord les satisfactions des appétits corporels, ne sont pas pour Aristote des plaisirs effectifs. Le dernier moment de notre étude est consacré à évaluer la théorie par rapport à sa destination, le savoir dont doit disposer l’éducateur pour produire les vertus et le bonheur : à partir des éléments fournis par Aristote, il s’avère difficile, bien que nécessaire, de distinguer le plaisir du bien auquel on doit tendre ; il est également malaisé de penser et d’évaluer les plaisirs que l’éducation doit réguler, mais aussi ceux qu’elle doit atteindre (celui de la meilleure pratique et celui de la meilleure contemplation). / I scrutinize Aristotle’s theory of pleasure by analysing the texts that define the concept as closely as can be, and by assessing the presuppositions and the stakes of this definition within Aristotle’s philosophy as a whole. My study is centred upon a commentary of Nicomachean Ethics X, 3-4 where the status of pleasure is enlightened with precision: located within a unique act of cognition (which is essentially a perfect and perpetual activity), pleasure is both an aspect that reveals our good functioning, and an incentive for us to keep it working in the exact same way. I explore the elements presupposed by this account, elucidating the opposition between “activity” (energeia) and process, and before, giving a new light to the formal features of the paradigm of a pleasant activity, i. e. perception, as it is conceived in the psychological treatises. I also explain how pleasures that do not follow this paradigm, i. e. bodily pleasures, are not seen by Aristotle as some effective pleasures at all. The last phase in this work is devoted to an assessment of the discourse on pleasure according to its aim: delivering to a teacher the knowledge he needs in order to produce virtues and happiness. I underline that, from the elements given by Aristotle, it is difficult, but necessary, to make a distinction between the pleasure one can feel at goodness and this very same goodness towards which one must strive. It is quite as difficult to conceive and evaluate all the forms of pleasure education has to regulate, as well as those that it must lead one to feel (pleasure deriving from the best practice, or from the best contemplation).
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Towards Scalable Real-time Analytics:: An Architecture for Scale-out of OLxP WorkloadsGoel, Anil K., Pound, Jeffrey, Auch, Nathan, Bumbulis, Peter, MacLean, Scott, Färber, Franz, Gropengiesser, Francis, Mathis, Christian, Bodner, Thomas, Lehner, Wolfgang 10 January 2023 (has links)
We present an overview of our work on the SAP HANA Scale-out Extension, a novel distributed database architecture designed to support large scale analytics over real-time data. This platform permits high performance OLAP with massive scale-out capabilities, while concurrently allowing OLTP workloads. This dual capability enables analytics over real-time changing data and allows fine grained user-specified service level agreements (SLAs) on data freshness. We advocate the decoupling of core database components such as query processing, concurrency control, and persistence, a design choice made possible by advances in high-throughput low-latency networks and storage devices. We provide full ACID guarantees and build on a logical timestamp mechanism to provide MVCC-based snapshot isolation, while not requiring synchronous updates of replicas. Instead, we use asynchronous update propagation guaranteeing consistency with timestamp validation. We provide a view into the design and development of a large scale data management platform for real-time analytics, driven by the needs of modern enterprise customers.
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Hegel sobre o aparecer : os conceitos de aparência (schein) e fenômeno (erscheinung) na Ciência da LógicaMiranda, Marloren Lopes January 2014 (has links)
A partir da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant, na tentativa de colocar a metafísica no caminho da ciência e determinar o que podemos conhecer, recoloca o problema do conhecimento sob uma distinção fundamental: como as coisas são em si mesmas e como essas coisas aparecem para nós. Kant defende, no idealismo transcendental, que nós só podemos conhecer as coisas como elas aparecem, e não podemos conhecê-las como são. Segundo ele, temos uma estrutura a priori determinada, que possibilita o conhecimento das coisas de certa maneira, a saber, sob essas nossas condições de experimentá-las e que, ao mesmo tempo, impossibilita-nos sairmos do nosso ponto de vista e conhecer as coisas como são nelas mesmas, isto é, abstraindo essas condições – e, porque o modo que as coisas aparecem para nós depende dessas condições, se abstrairmos tais condições, as coisas apareceriam de outra maneira; maneira a qual, portanto, não podemos conhecer. Assim, só podemos fazer ciência das coisas como aparecem, e não como são nelas mesmas. Para Hegel, se partimos desse pressuposto, tudo o que podemos conseguir produzir são meras opiniões, e não ciência: é preciso que possamos saber como as coisas são nelas mesmas para que haja conhecimento. Segundo Hegel, podemos conhecer as coisas como elas são, não apenas porque temos condições subjetivas de conhecê-las como elas aparecem, mas porque elas aparecem como são para nós. Sendo assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa é reconstruir a ressignificação hegeliana do aparecer e suas variações conceituais, mais precisamente os conceitos de aparência (Schein) e de fenômeno (Erscheinung) sob a óptica da Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. Para tanto, a presente pesquisa divide-se em três capítulos centrais. No primeiro capítulo, investigaremos o que Kant, na Crítica da Razão Pura, e Hegel, principalmente na Fenomenologia do Espírito, compreendem por ciência e sua relação com a Filosofia. No segundo capítulo, investigaremos o que ambos compreendem por lógica e seu papel para o conhecimento, buscando métodos diferentes para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas, a partir da Crítica e da Ciência da Lógica. No terceiro capítulo, estabelecemos como Hegel ressignifica o aparecer e o apresenta como um processo lógico de aparecimento dos objetos no mundo, a partir de um aprofundamento da Doutrina da Essência da Ciência da Lógica, buscando, por fim, esclarecer precisamente porque, para Hegel, as distinções kantianas de fenômeno e coisa em si não cumprem o papel de colaborar para a Filosofia seguir o caminho de uma Ciência. / Since the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, in an attempt to place metaphysics in the way to science and determine what we can know, replace the problem of knowledge in a fundamental distinction: how things are in themselves and how those things appear to us. In transcendental idealism, Kant advocates that we only can know the things as they look like and cannot know them as they are. According to him, we have a determined a priori structure that enables us to know things in certain way, namely, into our conditions to experience them, and that, at the same time, preclude us from leave our point of view and know things as they are, that is, abstracting these conditions – and, for the reason the way things appear to us depends on these conditions, if we abstract them, things would appear in another way: a way that we cannot know. Therefore, we can only make science of things as they appear, and cannot make science of things as they are in themselves. To Hegel, if we start from this presupposition, we can only produce mere opinions, and not science; we need to know how things are in themselves if we want to have knowledge. According to Hegel, we can know things as they are, not only because we have subjective conditions to know them how they appear, but because they appear as they are to us. Thus, the objective of this work is to rebuild the Hegelian reframing of the appear (Scheinen), and its conceptual variations, precisely the concepts of appearance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung) in the point of view of the Science of Logic. For this purpose, this work is divided in three central chapters. In the first chapter, we will inquire Kant’s and Hegel’s understanding of science and its relation to Philosophy, mainly in Critic of Pure Reason and Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second chapter, we will inquire their comprehension of logic and its role to knowledge, pursuing different methods to the development of their systems, according to the Critic and Science of Logic. In the third chapter, from a deep reading of the Doctrine of Essence, in the Science of Logic, we will set up how Hegel reframes the appear (Scheinen), and presents it as a logical process of appearance of objects in the world. By the end, we will try to clarify precisely why, to Hegel, the Kantian distinctions of appearance (Erscheinung) and thing in themselves do not play the role of helping Philosophy to follow the way to Science.
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Hegel sobre o aparecer : os conceitos de aparência (schein) e fenômeno (erscheinung) na Ciência da LógicaMiranda, Marloren Lopes January 2014 (has links)
A partir da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant, na tentativa de colocar a metafísica no caminho da ciência e determinar o que podemos conhecer, recoloca o problema do conhecimento sob uma distinção fundamental: como as coisas são em si mesmas e como essas coisas aparecem para nós. Kant defende, no idealismo transcendental, que nós só podemos conhecer as coisas como elas aparecem, e não podemos conhecê-las como são. Segundo ele, temos uma estrutura a priori determinada, que possibilita o conhecimento das coisas de certa maneira, a saber, sob essas nossas condições de experimentá-las e que, ao mesmo tempo, impossibilita-nos sairmos do nosso ponto de vista e conhecer as coisas como são nelas mesmas, isto é, abstraindo essas condições – e, porque o modo que as coisas aparecem para nós depende dessas condições, se abstrairmos tais condições, as coisas apareceriam de outra maneira; maneira a qual, portanto, não podemos conhecer. Assim, só podemos fazer ciência das coisas como aparecem, e não como são nelas mesmas. Para Hegel, se partimos desse pressuposto, tudo o que podemos conseguir produzir são meras opiniões, e não ciência: é preciso que possamos saber como as coisas são nelas mesmas para que haja conhecimento. Segundo Hegel, podemos conhecer as coisas como elas são, não apenas porque temos condições subjetivas de conhecê-las como elas aparecem, mas porque elas aparecem como são para nós. Sendo assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa é reconstruir a ressignificação hegeliana do aparecer e suas variações conceituais, mais precisamente os conceitos de aparência (Schein) e de fenômeno (Erscheinung) sob a óptica da Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. Para tanto, a presente pesquisa divide-se em três capítulos centrais. No primeiro capítulo, investigaremos o que Kant, na Crítica da Razão Pura, e Hegel, principalmente na Fenomenologia do Espírito, compreendem por ciência e sua relação com a Filosofia. No segundo capítulo, investigaremos o que ambos compreendem por lógica e seu papel para o conhecimento, buscando métodos diferentes para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas, a partir da Crítica e da Ciência da Lógica. No terceiro capítulo, estabelecemos como Hegel ressignifica o aparecer e o apresenta como um processo lógico de aparecimento dos objetos no mundo, a partir de um aprofundamento da Doutrina da Essência da Ciência da Lógica, buscando, por fim, esclarecer precisamente porque, para Hegel, as distinções kantianas de fenômeno e coisa em si não cumprem o papel de colaborar para a Filosofia seguir o caminho de uma Ciência. / Since the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, in an attempt to place metaphysics in the way to science and determine what we can know, replace the problem of knowledge in a fundamental distinction: how things are in themselves and how those things appear to us. In transcendental idealism, Kant advocates that we only can know the things as they look like and cannot know them as they are. According to him, we have a determined a priori structure that enables us to know things in certain way, namely, into our conditions to experience them, and that, at the same time, preclude us from leave our point of view and know things as they are, that is, abstracting these conditions – and, for the reason the way things appear to us depends on these conditions, if we abstract them, things would appear in another way: a way that we cannot know. Therefore, we can only make science of things as they appear, and cannot make science of things as they are in themselves. To Hegel, if we start from this presupposition, we can only produce mere opinions, and not science; we need to know how things are in themselves if we want to have knowledge. According to Hegel, we can know things as they are, not only because we have subjective conditions to know them how they appear, but because they appear as they are to us. Thus, the objective of this work is to rebuild the Hegelian reframing of the appear (Scheinen), and its conceptual variations, precisely the concepts of appearance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung) in the point of view of the Science of Logic. For this purpose, this work is divided in three central chapters. In the first chapter, we will inquire Kant’s and Hegel’s understanding of science and its relation to Philosophy, mainly in Critic of Pure Reason and Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second chapter, we will inquire their comprehension of logic and its role to knowledge, pursuing different methods to the development of their systems, according to the Critic and Science of Logic. In the third chapter, from a deep reading of the Doctrine of Essence, in the Science of Logic, we will set up how Hegel reframes the appear (Scheinen), and presents it as a logical process of appearance of objects in the world. By the end, we will try to clarify precisely why, to Hegel, the Kantian distinctions of appearance (Erscheinung) and thing in themselves do not play the role of helping Philosophy to follow the way to Science.
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Hegel sobre o aparecer : os conceitos de aparência (schein) e fenômeno (erscheinung) na Ciência da LógicaMiranda, Marloren Lopes January 2014 (has links)
A partir da publicação da Crítica da Razão Pura, Kant, na tentativa de colocar a metafísica no caminho da ciência e determinar o que podemos conhecer, recoloca o problema do conhecimento sob uma distinção fundamental: como as coisas são em si mesmas e como essas coisas aparecem para nós. Kant defende, no idealismo transcendental, que nós só podemos conhecer as coisas como elas aparecem, e não podemos conhecê-las como são. Segundo ele, temos uma estrutura a priori determinada, que possibilita o conhecimento das coisas de certa maneira, a saber, sob essas nossas condições de experimentá-las e que, ao mesmo tempo, impossibilita-nos sairmos do nosso ponto de vista e conhecer as coisas como são nelas mesmas, isto é, abstraindo essas condições – e, porque o modo que as coisas aparecem para nós depende dessas condições, se abstrairmos tais condições, as coisas apareceriam de outra maneira; maneira a qual, portanto, não podemos conhecer. Assim, só podemos fazer ciência das coisas como aparecem, e não como são nelas mesmas. Para Hegel, se partimos desse pressuposto, tudo o que podemos conseguir produzir são meras opiniões, e não ciência: é preciso que possamos saber como as coisas são nelas mesmas para que haja conhecimento. Segundo Hegel, podemos conhecer as coisas como elas são, não apenas porque temos condições subjetivas de conhecê-las como elas aparecem, mas porque elas aparecem como são para nós. Sendo assim, o objetivo desta pesquisa é reconstruir a ressignificação hegeliana do aparecer e suas variações conceituais, mais precisamente os conceitos de aparência (Schein) e de fenômeno (Erscheinung) sob a óptica da Ciência da Lógica hegeliana. Para tanto, a presente pesquisa divide-se em três capítulos centrais. No primeiro capítulo, investigaremos o que Kant, na Crítica da Razão Pura, e Hegel, principalmente na Fenomenologia do Espírito, compreendem por ciência e sua relação com a Filosofia. No segundo capítulo, investigaremos o que ambos compreendem por lógica e seu papel para o conhecimento, buscando métodos diferentes para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas, a partir da Crítica e da Ciência da Lógica. No terceiro capítulo, estabelecemos como Hegel ressignifica o aparecer e o apresenta como um processo lógico de aparecimento dos objetos no mundo, a partir de um aprofundamento da Doutrina da Essência da Ciência da Lógica, buscando, por fim, esclarecer precisamente porque, para Hegel, as distinções kantianas de fenômeno e coisa em si não cumprem o papel de colaborar para a Filosofia seguir o caminho de uma Ciência. / Since the publication of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant, in an attempt to place metaphysics in the way to science and determine what we can know, replace the problem of knowledge in a fundamental distinction: how things are in themselves and how those things appear to us. In transcendental idealism, Kant advocates that we only can know the things as they look like and cannot know them as they are. According to him, we have a determined a priori structure that enables us to know things in certain way, namely, into our conditions to experience them, and that, at the same time, preclude us from leave our point of view and know things as they are, that is, abstracting these conditions – and, for the reason the way things appear to us depends on these conditions, if we abstract them, things would appear in another way: a way that we cannot know. Therefore, we can only make science of things as they appear, and cannot make science of things as they are in themselves. To Hegel, if we start from this presupposition, we can only produce mere opinions, and not science; we need to know how things are in themselves if we want to have knowledge. According to Hegel, we can know things as they are, not only because we have subjective conditions to know them how they appear, but because they appear as they are to us. Thus, the objective of this work is to rebuild the Hegelian reframing of the appear (Scheinen), and its conceptual variations, precisely the concepts of appearance (Schein) and appearance (Erscheinung) in the point of view of the Science of Logic. For this purpose, this work is divided in three central chapters. In the first chapter, we will inquire Kant’s and Hegel’s understanding of science and its relation to Philosophy, mainly in Critic of Pure Reason and Phenomenology of Spirit. In the second chapter, we will inquire their comprehension of logic and its role to knowledge, pursuing different methods to the development of their systems, according to the Critic and Science of Logic. In the third chapter, from a deep reading of the Doctrine of Essence, in the Science of Logic, we will set up how Hegel reframes the appear (Scheinen), and presents it as a logical process of appearance of objects in the world. By the end, we will try to clarify precisely why, to Hegel, the Kantian distinctions of appearance (Erscheinung) and thing in themselves do not play the role of helping Philosophy to follow the way to Science.
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Le problème du mal dans la Summa de bono de Philippe le ChancelierBarichard, Louis-Hervé 08 1900 (has links)
Ce mémoire entend mettre en lumière la solution au problème du mal développée par Philippe le Chancelier dans la Summa de bono (1225-1228). À cet effet, notre analyse se polarise sur la notion du mal qui occupe à la fois le système des transcendantaux et la division du bien créé découlant du principe du souverain bien. La somme est bâtie d’après la primauté de la notion du bien transcendantal, et fut rédigée par opposition avec la doctrine manichéenne des Cathares, en vogue au XIIIe siècle, qui s’appuyait sur la prééminence de deux principes métaphysiques causant le bien et le mal, d’où devaient procéder toutes les choses de la Création. Ceci explique que nous ayons privilégié de seulement examiner les notions du bien et du mal en un sens général, car c’est au stade universel de l’ontologie du bien que l’auteur défait la possibilité du mal de nature, en amont des ramifications du bien créé, déployées, à l’envi, dans les questions de la somme où les réponses sont assignées à des problèmes spécifiques. Nous offrons ici, pour la première fois, une traduction en français d’une série de questions ayant permis de mener à bien ce projet. / This master’s thesis intends to clarify Philip the Chancellor’s answer to the problem of evil in the Summa de bono (1225-1228). To this end, we focus on the concept of evil as located within the transcendental system and the division of created good resulting from the supreme good. This sum, which is conceived from the primacy of the transcendental notion of good, was drafted in opposition to the Manichean doctrine of Cathars, a belief popular in the thirteenth century, which states that two metaphysical principles cause good and evil and it is from these principles that all things are created by nature. For this reason, we decided to study the concepts of good and evil only in a general sense, because the author dismantles the possibility of natural evil at the universal level of the ontology of the good and, prior to the deployment of the created good, it is through the sum’s questions that specific problems can be resolved. Here, we offer for the first time a French translation of several questions useful to this project.
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Témoins de l'horreur, images de terreur : pour un portrait du sujet actuelBergeron, Catherine 11 1900 (has links)
No description available.
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Le problème du mal dans la Summa de bono de Philippe le ChancelierBarichard, Louis-Hervé 08 1900 (has links)
Ce mémoire entend mettre en lumière la solution au problème du mal développée par Philippe le Chancelier dans la Summa de bono (1225-1228). À cet effet, notre analyse se polarise sur la notion du mal qui occupe à la fois le système des transcendantaux et la division du bien créé découlant du principe du souverain bien. La somme est bâtie d’après la primauté de la notion du bien transcendantal, et fut rédigée par opposition avec la doctrine manichéenne des Cathares, en vogue au XIIIe siècle, qui s’appuyait sur la prééminence de deux principes métaphysiques causant le bien et le mal, d’où devaient procéder toutes les choses de la Création. Ceci explique que nous ayons privilégié de seulement examiner les notions du bien et du mal en un sens général, car c’est au stade universel de l’ontologie du bien que l’auteur défait la possibilité du mal de nature, en amont des ramifications du bien créé, déployées, à l’envi, dans les questions de la somme où les réponses sont assignées à des problèmes spécifiques. Nous offrons ici, pour la première fois, une traduction en français d’une série de questions ayant permis de mener à bien ce projet. / This master’s thesis intends to clarify Philip the Chancellor’s answer to the problem of evil in the Summa de bono (1225-1228). To this end, we focus on the concept of evil as located within the transcendental system and the division of created good resulting from the supreme good. This sum, which is conceived from the primacy of the transcendental notion of good, was drafted in opposition to the Manichean doctrine of Cathars, a belief popular in the thirteenth century, which states that two metaphysical principles cause good and evil and it is from these principles that all things are created by nature. For this reason, we decided to study the concepts of good and evil only in a general sense, because the author dismantles the possibility of natural evil at the universal level of the ontology of the good and, prior to the deployment of the created good, it is through the sum’s questions that specific problems can be resolved. Here, we offer for the first time a French translation of several questions useful to this project.
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The intention for a preference : Aimless ventureLazaridis, Georgios January 2021 (has links)
In search of, the current and urgent, accompanied with our guiltless but potentially not agencies, we fight for the intelligence of reality. A zeitgeist that we try to ghostbust, that we hope to understand. A pandemonium circulated around the event, the now, the branches of time that flicker the possibilities and variations of expressions, that we as trajectories might solidify into a reality. "So, one can start from a simple question, at which one does not care to conclude with an answer: "why do we mark/trace a surface? Or for that matter, sculpt, think, animate etc." What is the inclination behind it? And more importantly, why do we cling to a specific preference?" In this essay I attempt a brief brush through from a number of familiar questions about art. And attempt to provide my own understanding, of art, creativity, society, and the ever newer intentions of the human expressive trajectories, that provide variations of possibilities and potentialities.
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