Titel: A Game of Nods and Winks - En studie om faktorer som påverkar svenska börsbolagsanvändning av resultatmanipulering Bakgrund: Resultatmanipulering är att omdiskuterat ämne i Europa såväl som i USA.Resultatmanipulering har konstaterats frekvent användas i svenska bolag. Vi frågar oss vilkabakomliggande faktorer kan påverka mängden av resultatmanipulation. Syfte: Studiens syfte avser att förklara hur analytikers prognoser och andelen kvinnligastyrelseledamöter påverkar resultatmanipuleringen i svenska noterade bolag. Metod: En tvärsnittsstudie med en deduktiv ansats genomförs där teorier testats viahypotesprövning. Teorierna Positiv redovisningsteori, Agentteori, Prospect theory och Critical Mass theory avser att behandla de incitament som ligger till grund förresultatmanipulering. Urvalet består av Stockholmsbörsens Large, Mid, Small Cap bolagunder åren 2012 till 2016. Slutsatser: Resultatet påvisar att företag har en stark vilja nå analytikers prognoser samt atten hög andel kvinnliga styrelseledamöter har en negativ påverkan på företagets vilja atttillämpa resultatmanipulering. Vi kan i studien även visa en interaktionseffekt mellan de tvåfaktorerna. / Title: A Game of Nods and Winks - A study on underlying factors that affect the use of Earnings management in Swedish public companies Background: Earnings management is a subject of discussion in Europe as well in the United States. Earnings management has been found to be frequently used in Swedish companies. We ask ourselves what the underlying factors are and how can they affect the amount of Earnings management. Purpose: The main purpose of this study is to investigate how analysts’ forecasts and a high proportion of female board members affects how public Swedish companies manage their earnings through Earnings management. Method: A quantitative cross-sectional study with a deductive approach are performed and theories constitutes the basis for our hypothesis. The theories; Positive accounting theory, Agency theory, Prospect theory and Critical Mass theory intends to deal with the incentives behind Earnings management. The observation period is 2012 to 2016 and consists of companies from the Stockholm stock exchange market. Conclusions: The result concludes that companies have strong incentives to reach analysts’ forecasts and that a high percentage of female representation on the board have a negatively impact on company’s willingness to manage their earnings. In the study, we can also detect an interaction effect between the two variables.

La promulgation de la loi de la sécurité financière (LSF) en 2003 a modifié l’architecture institutionnelle et la pratique d’audit en France. Au travers l’adjonction de nouvelles règles imposées par cette loi aux spécificités persistantes depuis 1966 comme le co-commissariat aux comptes et la durée du mandat de six ans, le marché d’audit se montre unique. Cette recherche examine l’impact de cette fusion réglementaire sur la qualité et le coût de l’audit en France. En se basant sur un échantillon composé par 888 observations du SBF 250 sur la période 2005-2010, nous avons révélé l’apport de la rotation des équipes signataires dans la restriction de la discrétion managériale. Outre son avantage dans la promotion de la qualité de l’audit, ce dispositif favorise la négociation à la baisse des honoraires d’audit. Nous avons aussi souligné l’évolution sous forme parabolique de la composante discrétionnaire sur la durée de mandat. En effet, la qualité de l’audit est inférieure pendant la première et la dernière phase de l’engagement. Ce postulat renvoie au renforcement de la compétence dans le temps et l’érosion de l’esprit critique à la fin du mandat. Le décalage, issu de la fusion réglementaire, favorise le maintien du niveau de la qualité élevé sur le marché français. L’association des deux équipes avec des durées auditeur-audité différentes est une contrainte à la discrétion managériale. Toutefois, ce décalage ne doit pas être excessif pour limiter la domination du plus ancien. Cet inconvénient du régime du co-commissariat aux comptes s’est trouvé limité sur le marché français. Nos résultats confirment son efficacité, essentiellement dans le cas d’un collège composé par deux Big 4. / In 2003, the promulgation of the financial security act (LSF) has changed the institutional architecture and audit practice in France. Through the addition of new rules imposed by this act to the persistent specificities since 1966 as the joint audit and tenure of six years, the audit market shows unique. This research examines the impact of this regulatory merger on the quality and the cost of the audit in France. Based on a sample composed by 888 observations of the SBF 250 over the 2005-2010, we found the contribution of rotation audit partners in restricting managerial discretion. Besides its advantage in promoting audit quality, this device supports the negotiation of lower audit fees. We also emphasized the evolution in the parabolic form of the discretionary accruals over tenure. Indeed, the audit quality is lower during the first and last phase of the engagement. This assumption refers to strengthening the skills over time and erosion of critical appraisal at the end of audit tenure. The shift from regulatory fusion helps to maintain the level of high quality on the French market. The combination of the two teams with different listener-audited tenures is a constraint to managerial discretion. However, this shift should not be excessive to limit the oldest’ domination. This drawback of the system of joint audits is limited in the French market. Our results confirm its effectiveness, mainly in the case of two Big 4.

摘要 本文主要檢視中國大陸連續虧損公司面臨下市緩衝機制壓力時之盈餘管理行為。本文所謂的下市緩衝機制係指特別處理(簡稱ST)與特別轉讓(簡稱PT)的管制。具體而言，ST管制要求連續兩年虧損的公司，必須冠上ST標記，漲跌幅限制為5%(一般股票為10%)，中報需審計；PT管制要求連續三年虧損的公司，必須冠上PT標記，同樣有停板限制，僅允許週五交易。ST與PT管制設計原意係希望提高整體市場新陳代謝與營造理性投資的環境，但盈餘基礎的本質與保守的配套措施反而衍生盈餘管理與投機炒股。此下市緩衝機制實質之經濟後果為管制機關與投資大眾高度關注，但過去相關研究相當有限，本文希望藉由下列研究問題的探索以補充文獻缺口。 第一，中國大陸上市公司面臨下市緩衝機制漸進懲處時，管理當局如何進行盈餘管理以因應連續虧損門檻？第二，各群虧損公司次年扭虧次數與盈餘管理行為差異為何？第三，零損失的法規門檻如何引發盈餘分配的特殊型態；操控前盈餘與盈餘管理關係為何？ 依據1998年至2000年267家虧損公司樣本，實證結果簡要彙總如下：第一，虧損公司裁決性應計數字(營業外所得)顯著降低盈餘，特別在虧損第一個年度，此結果顯示管理當局意圖儲存盈餘以因應未來更嚴格制裁之緩衝。第二，ST股與PT股盈餘劇烈震盪，其盈餘型態分別呈現V字型與W字型。第三，1998與1999年連續三年虧損的公司次年扭虧百分比小於其他虧損公司；但2000年結果相反。主要理由乃中國證監會於2001年2月22日要求PT股在未來一年扭虧(過去為三年)，否則必須下市。第四，虧損公司次年盈餘分配集中於略高於零損失門檻的區間，隱含實質小虧的公司預支未來盈餘，實質大盈的公司儲存本期盈餘的可能性。第五，虧損公司次年扭虧時，操控前盈餘與盈餘管理呈現負向關係，且操控前盈餘越小的組別其盈餘管理越大。但持續虧損公司操控前盈餘與盈餘管理的關係並沒有系統性的結論。 本文實證結果顯示，中國大陸下市緩衝機制由於仰賴會計基礎管制，衍生相當普遍的盈餘管理行為。建議中國證監會應在下市決策中考量非盈餘資訊，投資大眾亦應關注盈餘以外的訊息以避免功能固著的迷失。 / Abstract This study investigates earnings management of Chinese listed companies subject to delisting buffer mechanism for reporting losses for consecutive years. The delisting buffer mechanism in China means Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) regulations. Specifically, it requires that companies with two and three consecutive losses be labeled as ST shares and PT shares respectively. ST shares are subject to 5% price limits (one half of common shares) and their interim reports should be audited. PT shares are also subject to price limits and they are allowed be traded only on Friday. Although these regulations originally aim to maintain market’s metabolism and foster rational investment environment, their earnings-based nature and conservative schemes are likely to induce pervasive earnings management and speculation. Their economic consequences are a source of concern by regulators and investors, but previous study is relatively limited. Thus, this paper explores the following research questions to fill this void. First, how do Chinese listed firms manage earnings in response to consecutive loss thresholds, while facing the progressive sanctions of the delisting buffer mechanism? Second, what differences in positive earnings frequencies and earnings management exist among different group of loss firms in the following year? Third, how does the zero-loss regulatory threshold induce specific types of earnings distribution, and what relationship can be found between pre-managed earnings and earnings management? Based on a sample of 267 loss firms from 1998 to 2000, the empirical results are briefly summarized as follows. First, discretionary accruals (nonoperating income) of loss firms show significant earnings decreases, especially in the initial loss year, which is consistent with managerial incentives to save earnings for future more severe regulations’ cushion. Second, ST shares and PT shares experience large earnings volatility, and the patterns of ST shares and PT shares’ earnings generally look like V and W respectively. Third, percentage of positive earnings of firms with 3-year losses in the following year is less than that of other loss firms in 1998 and 1999, but more than in 2000. The underlying reason is the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee requires PT shares have positive earnings within the next year rather than next three years after Feb 22, 2001, otherwise they are delisted. Fourth, earnings distribution of loss firms heavily clusters slightly above zero-loss threshold in the following year, which implies firms with small latent losses likely to borrow future earnings and firms with large latent earnings likely to save current earnings. Fifth, the pre-managed earnings and earnings management for loss firms reporting profits in the following year are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the smaller the pre-managed earnings are, the larger the earnings management is. However, the data reveal no systematic relationship between pre-managed earnings and earnings management for firms with persistent losses. Overall, the empirical results indicate that China’s delisting buffer mechanism, relying mainly on accounting-based regulation, induces pervasive earnings management. The findings therefore suggest that the Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee should consider non-earnings information into delisting decisions and investors look beyond bottom-line to avoid functional fixation.

近幾年來，財務弊案層出不窮，管理當局參與創造性會計的情事日益嚴重，資本市場陷入紀律危機，徒增成本。為喚醒投資者對於盈餘品質的關注，以及對盈餘管理有更客觀的瞭解，本研究提出兩種不同基礎之盈餘品質分類法，並探討台灣上市公司在盈餘品質分類法下，財務特性與盈餘管理成分的差異。 以往國內文獻多個別探討盈餘品質的內涵，或盈餘管理的現象；將盈餘品質與盈餘管理兩大主題做結合，乃新嘗試。研究主要分為兩大部分，第一部份定義盈餘品質，而第二部分深入盈餘管理的課題。 研究以2002年第3季到2004年第3季，381家台灣上市公司，共3429個樣本點，進行迴歸模型分析。 首先將樣本以：一、盈餘對營運現金流量的關係，及二、應收帳款成長率對營收成長率的比較，共兩種基礎，區分盈餘品質。在區分盈餘品質後，以盈餘品質測試盈餘評價能力與持續性。發現以盈餘對營運現金流量關係作為基礎之盈餘品質，具有增額評價能力，而以應收帳款成長率對營收成長率的比較做為基礎者，無增額評價能力。而兩種盈餘品質對盈餘持續性有顯著貢獻。 第二部分將樣本分為盈餘平滑企業與非盈餘平滑企業，探討盈餘評價功能之強弱，發現在盈餘平滑與盈餘非平滑兩組別中，盈餘平滑化並不影響盈餘評價能力。接著導入盈餘品質，觀察在交叉分組下盈餘評價功能的差異，發現高盈餘品質結合盈餘非平滑化（Quality Non-Smoother）的組別中，有最高盈餘評價係數。盈餘進一步拆解成三個組成份子：營運現金流量，裁量性應計數，與非裁量性應計數。其中，觀察重點在於裁量性應計數，研究同樣加入盈餘品質，測試其評價能力與持續性。發現裁量性應計數具有評價功能，而在兩種盈餘品質指標分類下，高盈餘品質之裁量性應計數，並無增量評價貢獻；在持續性方面，兩種盈餘品質指標同樣對裁量性應計數有正向貢獻。 為測試盈餘品質在盈餘管理誘因下的反應，最後將盈餘管理誘因區分為達成損益兩平與超越前期盈餘兩項目標，並加入盈餘品質，觀察其交互作用。發現在「達成損益兩平」與「超越前期盈餘」兩種盈餘目標下，盈餘管理現象的確存在。加入盈餘品質變數後，在兩種盈餘品質變數之作用下，對「達成損益兩平」與「超越前期盈餘」兩項管理誘因均有抑制作用。 / During the last few years, there have been numerous cases of financial ma-nipulation and scandals of firms and the situation of the managing authority par-ticipating in creative accounting has become worsen which has posed enormous disciplinary risks and unnecessary costs on the entire capital market. In order to invoke the concern of investors towards earning quality and to objectively under-stand more broadly about earning management, this study focused on two dif-ferent earning quality categorization based on different basis. The other aim of this study was to discuss the differences of financial characteristics and earning management that arise under two different earning quality categorizations. Most of the local existing literature discussed separately on the essence of earning management or the phenomenon of earning management; this study would be a completely new attempt, which combined the above-mentioned two topics into one study. The first part of this study focused on the definition of earn-ing quality and the second part discussed in detail on issues concerning earning management. A regression analysis was conducted on 381 publicly listed firms in Taiwan during the period from the third quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2004 and the total sample points were 3429. Firstly, the samples were processed and the samples’ earning qualities were categorized based on: 1. the comparison between earning and operating cash flow; 2. the comparison between the growth rate of account receivables and the growth rate of revenue. After the categorization of earning qualities, earning qual-ity was used to test the ability of earning valuation and the persistence of the earning. It was revealed in this study that the earning quality based on the com-parison between earning and operating cash flow could greatly enhance the abil-ity of earning valuation. On other hand, the earning quality based on the compari-son between the growth rate of account receivables and the growth rate of reve-nue failed to enhance the earning valuation. However, both categories of earning qualities had significant contribution to the persistence of earning. The second part of the study separated the samples into earning smoothing firms and non-earning smoothing firms in order to discuss the power of the ability of earning valuation. The results showed that earning smoothing did not have any impact on ability of earning valuation. The next step was to introduce earning quality into this part of the study and to observe the differences in the ability of earning valuation that arise from cross grouping. It was revealed that the group of high earning quality combining non-smoother had the highest earning valuation coefficient. Earning was further decomposed into three components: operating cash flow, discretional accruals and non-discretional accruals. The focus was on the observation of discretional accruals, and in this part of the study, the earning quality was also introduced in order to test the ability to valuate and the persis-tence of earning. It was discovered that discretional accruals possessed the func-tion of valuation. Furthermore, under the categorization of earning quality indexes with two different bases, discretional accruals with high earning quality had no contribution toward the ability to enhance valuation; however, about the persis-tence, both earning quality indexes had positive contribution toward discretional accruals. Finally, in order to test the reactions of earning quality under the influence of the incentives of earning management, the incentives of earning management were categorized into two groups with two different goals: 1. to reach breakeven; 2. to exceed prior period earning. The earning quality was also introduced to ob-serve the interactions. It was observed that under the two different goals in earn-ing, the phenomenon of earning management did indeed exist. After including the variable of earning quality, under the influences of two different categories of earning quality variables, there was some kind of suppressive effects on the management incentives of “reaching breakeven” and “earning that surpasses the prior period earning”.

本研究以實徵性會計理論為基礎，測試在現金增資此一會計數字被使用來評估公司績效的事件中，上市公司是否有動機美化申請增資所使用的會計報表，亦即採用增加盈餘的裁量性應計項目，或是控制營業外交易以增加盈餘的方式進行盈餘的操縱以順利通過證管會的審查。同時，本研究亦檢定上市公司是否在增資結束後，由於應計項目的自動迴轉，而使其裁量性應計項目的變動為負。同時本研究亦透過三個假說來檢定現金增資前的操縱行為受某些公司特徵或增資時的經濟狀況等因素之影響是否顯著。 　　本研究的分析過程分成三大部份：第一部分的檢驗在了解現金增資公司的營業收入變動狀況，以Wilcoxon signed rank統計檢定法確定樣本公司的營業收入是否有顯著的變動；第二部分為整體性的探討上市公司增資之前，是否採用增加盈餘之裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額，同時探討增資後上述會計項目變數變化的情形，本研究採用Wilcoxon signed rank檢定法，檢定增資前後裁量性應計項目和營業外收益變動的差異；第三部分乃將樣本分為二組，以Wilcoxon rank sum檢定法，分別檢定高、低內部人持股比率，股市景氣榮枯期增資，以及大、小規模等二組樣本公司在增資前，其盈餘操縱行為是否有顯著差異？ 　　本研究所得到的結論如下： 　　1.樣本公司在增資前後期間營業收入淨額均顯著地持續增加。 　　2.樣本公司在增資前一年的確採取增加盈餘的裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額，且增資後一年，裁量性應計項目因迴轉而有負向的變動，但此盈餘操縱行為未達統計顯著性。 　　3.樣本公司在增資當年裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額均呈顯著的正向變動，可能的解釋是：(1)來自樣本公司在年初或年中季報的操縱行為；(2)公司在增資後有較高的「政治敏感性」。進一步測試發現：公司的確在增資前一季、增資完成當季和後一季，均有盈餘操縱的行為。 　　4.在股市景氣繁榮期增資的樣本公司，的確較顯著地採用了提高盈餘的裁量性應計項目和營業外收益淨額。而代理成本較高和規模較小的公司，分別較代理成本低和規模大的公司，傾向在增資前進行盈餘管理行為，但此行為並未達統計顯著性。

財務會計準則公報第39 號「股份基礎給付之會計處理準則」於2008 年起正 式實施，強制規定公司所發放之員工分紅必須認列為費用而非視為盈餘之分配，如此一來，公司管理階層是否會因此考量其盈餘報導之美觀性，導致減少發放員工分紅，以及員工分紅費用化後，是否仍會造成公司管理階層採行盈餘管理。此外，本研究以員工分紅費用化作為一重大事件，深入研究經理人對其分紅之行為模式是否會因而受到改變並趨向利益掠奪假說，並探討經理人持股與獎酬分紅兩者間之關係是否因公司治理程度不同以及發放對象為經理人與一般員工時是否有所不同。 實證結果發現，不論有無排除費用化前一年之影響，員工分紅費用化後公司 確實會考量其盈餘之美觀性而傾向減少發放員工紅利，另雖然過去研究指出，於費用化前，資本市場早已認知員工紅利為公司費用，但公司管理階層仍會考慮投資者間仍存在的功能固著現象，針對員工分紅費用化此一事件進行盈餘管理；然而，若以未預期盈餘將樣本公司加以劃分，則在未預期負盈餘之樣本公司中，無法證實其會利用負向之裁決性應計項目進行洗大澡；最後，在分紅費用化之後，經理人持股比例與分紅金額呈正比，顯示經理人在代理問題上從利益收斂趨向利益掠奪公司，並且在公司治理較差的公司中尤為明顯；此外，經理人會同時增加對於經理人與一般員工之分紅金額。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No.39 has beening implemented since year 2008, and it is a mandatory requirement for the company to recognized employee bonus as an expense rather than as a surplus of assignment. Therefore, the management might consider company’s earnings performance and result in paying less employee bonus, as well as adopt the earnings management. In addition, this paper apply the employee bonus expense as a major event to study whether the patterns of managers’ behavior on their dividends will be affected and correspond to entrenchment hypothesis. Also, this paper investigates the relationship between manerger’s ownership and bouns under the different levels of corporate governance as well as different payment objectives (e.g. managers and staff). The empirical results indicate that whether excluding the effect of the previous non-expnsing year or not, the company did consider its earnings performance and tend to pay less employee bonus after expensing employee bonus. Although other studies point out the capital market has already seen employee bonus as an expense, the company will manage earnings due to functional fixation hypothesis. However, it can’t be verified that taking big bath would exist by using negative discretionary accruals. Finally, after expensing employee bonus, managers’ ownership is directly proportional to the amount of bonus and the companies with poor corporate governance is particularly significant. In addition, managers will also increase their own and staff’s dividend amount as well and it implies the angency problem towards entrenchment hypothesis from convergence of interest hypothesis.

本研究係以裁量性應計數字及其組成成分衡量盈餘管理，以審計人員產業別市場佔有率與產業別客戶集中度之綜合衡量捕捉審計品質，探討不同樣本公司之盈餘管理特性，以及審計品質對不同盈餘管理特性之影響。管理者對應計項目的認列通常有某種裁量權，此裁量權可用以顯露私有資訊而增進盈餘的價值攸關性，或可投機性地管理盈餘而減低盈餘為公司績效衡量的可靠性。所以探究盈餘管理行為是增加財務報告資訊性(information)或雜訊(noise)即非常重要。研究內容依盈餘管理特性區分為投機性盈餘管理與訊息發放性盈餘管理二大部分。每一研究內容則是先辨認盈餘管理本質，其次探討審計品質對盈餘管理之影響。在研究設計上，為避免實證代理變數之衡量誤差重大影響結果，乃採用實驗組公司與控制組配對公司相比較，以凸顯出前者之盈餘管理型態。 　　研究結果顯示，門檻公司從事盈餘管理以達前期盈餘門檻，且此盈餘管理不具未來現金流量持續性之涵義，係符合「隱藏當期不利績效、遞延本期不尋常盈餘至未來年度」以減低會計盈餘數字波動性之特性。就自願性盈餘預測此一資訊揭露工具而言，在盈餘預測偏屬樂觀之傾向下，仍有管理者自願揭露壞消息預期，即可知管理者之誠意，不失為一可資信賴之訊號。但自願預測盈餘增加，則不必然具有高公信力。甚至在管理者降低盈餘差距之動機下，易引起管理者操縱盈餘。此為財務報表使用者所需注意。就持股變動此一資訊揭露工具而言，在我國家族企業居多之情形下，增加持股並未代表任何特定之涵義。反而是減少持股所透露之訊息，值得投資人注意，尤須慎防其盈餘操縱行為。 　　面對增加所得之裁量性應計數字，審計品質有效阻止投機性盈餘管理。面對顯露私有資訊之盈餘管理，審計品質能夠協助管理者選擇最能彰顯未來現金流量預期之會計方法，以增強裁量性應計數字與未來現金流量變動之關聯性。在高審計品質所賦予之資訊公信力下，盈餘資訊在投資人之決策過程中有一定之重要性，故投資人發現裁量性應計數字增加（減低）盈餘價值攸關性，因而增加（減低）盈餘評價係數。然而對低審計品質所查核的財務報表，較低的資訊公信力，使盈餘未在投資人評價過程中扮演重要角色，因而盈餘管理特性亦不受投資人重視。 / This research examined characteristics of earnings management and effects of audit quality therein. Specifically, the magnitude of earnings management was proxied by the discretionary accruals, which are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. Different from prior research, the audit quality was captured by a combined measure of the auditor's market share and client concentration. The market share measured the auditor's competence (industry specialty) and the client concentration measured the auditor's independence. Managers usually exercised discretion to recognize accruals. They could either signal private information to enhance earnings' value relevance, or opportunistically manage earnings to reduce the reliability of earnings as the performance measure of the firm. As a result, it was important to examine earnings management and to identify whether it would increase the informativeness or noise of financial reports. This study was organized according to the characteristics of earnings management: opportunistic earnings management and signaling earnings management. For both parts, the nature of earnings management was identified first, and then the effects of audit quality therein examined. To reduce the impact of measurement errors of proxy variables, the treatment group and controlled group were compared and contrasted to make earnings management pattern of the treatment group more evident. 　　The results showed that threshold firms managed earnings to sustain last year's earnings level. Discretionary accruals of the threshold firms were not significantly associated with future cash flow changes. Those discretionary accruals were used to hide the current unfavorable performance, or to defer current unusual earnings to the future, so that managers could reduce the volatility of accounting earnings. As a means of information disclosure, voluntary earnings forecasts tended to be optimistic, but we still could observe some voluntary forecasts which decreased earnings. In those situations, we might conclude that managers tried to convey credible signals. However, it was not necessarily credible in the case of voluntary forecasting which increased earnings. Managers would manipulate earnings to reduce the difference between forecasted earnings and reported earnings. In respect of the information signal of changes in directors' share holding percentages, it signaled nothing when directors increased holding percentages because most companies were family businesses in Taiwan. Nonetheless, investors should look out the possibility of earnings manipulation when directors decreased their holding percentages. 　　Audit quality could effectively deter opportunistic earnings management but not the income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Based on information signaling perspective of earnings management, auditors with higher audit quality tended to assist managers to choose accounting methods that might signal cash flow expectations. Stronger associations between discretionary accruals and future cash flows were observed for firms audited by higher quality auditors. Because higher audit quality might increase information credibility, earnings would play a more important role in the decision process of investors. When discretionary accruals increased (decreased) earnings' value relevance, earnings association coefficients would be increased (decreased). However, for the financial reports audited by lower quality auditors, earnings did not play an important role in the valuation process because of lower information credibility. Therefore, empirical results showed that investors of firms audited by lower quality auditors did not make decisions according to different characteristics of earnings management.

本文以美國公司為樣本，探討高階主管獎酬結構與後續經營績效之關係以及高階主管獎酬結構與盈餘結構之關係。在高階主管獎酬結構與後續經營績效之關係方面，本文以營業活動之現金流量(CFO)、經濟附加價值(EVA^R)與股票報酬率(RET)作為衡量公司經營績效之指標，並以會計績效指標之總資產報酬率(ROA）與普通股權益報酬率(ROE)作為敏感性分析。實證結果均支持預期之推論，即高階主管獎酬結構著重長期激勵之公司，其後續績效明顯優於獎酬結構著重短期激勵之公司。 　　在高階主管獎酬結構與盈餘結構之關係方面，本研究發現：(1) 盈餘結構之應計項目中，應收帳款變動數、應付帳款變動數、存貨變動數與高階主管短期激勵性獎酬呈正相關，而折舊費用則與高階主管之短期激勵性獎酬呈負相關；反之，應收帳款變動數、應付帳款變動數、存貨變動數則與高階主管之長期激勵性獎酬呈負相關，而折舊費用則與高階主管之長期激勵性獎酬呈正相關。如預期地，這說明較高的短期性盈餘應計項目會導致較高的短期激勵性獎酬，及較低的長期激勵性獎酬；而與長期性投資有關的折舊費用則與長期激勵性獎酬呈正相關。因此偏向短期激勵性獎酬之結構，易誘使高階主管利用該四項應計項目，以獲取短期激勵性獎酬；反之，若高階主管獎酬結構以長期激勵性獎酬為主，則高階主管會較重視長期獲利能力與績效，無形中減少操縱短期盈餘之誘因。(2)高階主管現金獎酬比例越高之公司，其盈餘結構中之流動裁決性應計項目比例亦越高，說明現金獎酬比例較高之獎酬結構會誘導高階主管調節流動裁決性應計項目，以達到預定之盈餘目標。 　　綜合以上研究發現，高階主管獎酬結構對於經理人之經營誘因，扮演極重要之角色。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEO compensation structure and components of earnings and that between CEO compensation structure and firm's long-term performance. The larger the proportion of long-term incentive compensation in CEO's total compensation, the better the firm's long-term performance which is measured either as CFO, EVA^R, stock return, or accounting performance measures. On the contrary, higher proportion of short-term incentive compensation in total compensation can be obtained by manipulating accrual components. Firms with larger proportion of cash compensation have higher current discretionary accruals so that managers could be motivated toward managing discretionary current accruals to achieve target earnings. Such evidence suggests that compensation structure can be an important mechanism that induces manager's efforts towards shareholders' interest.

本研究分成兩部分，研究對象為中國大陸之上市公司，第一部分以2004至2009年之財務資料，探討2008年中國大陸企業所得稅法之實施對中國大陸上市公司平均有效稅率之影響；第二部分以1998至2009年之財務資料，探討中國大陸上市公司是否為了因應企業所得稅法實施對有效稅率的影響，而從事租稅誘因盈餘管理之行為。 第一部分之實證結果發現，中國大陸上市公司之平均有效稅率在2008年企業所得稅法實施後有顯著的下降，表示中國大陸上市公司之有效稅率隨著名目稅率降低而下降。外資持股比例超過20%之上市公司（定義為外資企業），其2008年後之有效稅率上升，且內外資企業之其平均有效稅率之差異有縮小之趨勢。屬於高科技產業之上市公司在2008年企業所得稅法實施後，其有效稅率並未下降；但與除了農林牧漁業外之其他產業相比，高科技產業之上市公司其有效稅率較低。第二部分之實證結果發現，在2008年有效稅率下降之上市公司，其於2008年後的裁決性應計項目較大，有將盈餘遞延認列之傾向。 / This study consists of two research issues. The first part uses the financial statement and capital structure data of China listed companies from 2004 to 2009, to investigate the effects of the implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax in 2008(hereafter 2008 Income Tax Law). And the second part which uses the financial and capital structure data of China listed companies from 1998 to 2009 investigates if China listed companies take the action of earnings management in response to the implementation of the 2008 Income Tax Law. The empirical findings of the first part show that the average ETRs of China listed companies declined after the implementation of the 2008 Income Tax Law. The listed companies whose proportion of foreign ownership is above 20% (defined as foreign enterprises) increased ETRs after 2008 and the differences in ETRs between domestic enterprises and foreign enterprises are reduced gradually. Further, the average ETRs of China listed companies of information technology industry do not appear to be decreased after the implementation of the 2008 Income Tax Law. However, besides the agriculture, forestry, herding, fishery industries, listed companies of information technology industries remain to have lower average ETRs after implementation of the 2008 Income Tax Law. The empirical findings of the second part show that China listed companies whose average ETRs decreased in 2008 appeared to have greater discretionary accruals after 2008, suggesting those companies shifting earnings to 2008.

非審計服務究竟是否會影響會計師獨立性，長久以來即為各界關注焦點。本研究第一部分將驗證非審計服務對會計師獨立性的影響。此外，有別於美國要求全面揭露審計、非審計公費資訊，我國規定公開發行公司若符合一定門檻應揭露支付給會計師的各項公費資訊，本研究第二部份將探討我國採門檻制的公費揭露政策下，刻意隱藏公費資訊的公司，其會計師的獨立性是否會不同於無需揭露公司。最後一部份則為市場反應測試，探討市場是否能對公費資訊進行判斷，判斷公司刻意隱藏的情形並給予負面的評價。 實證果發現非審計服務的提供對會計師獨立性產生負面影響，而在我國採門檻制公費揭露政策下，刻意隱藏公費資訊公司進行盈餘管理的可能性越大，若我國之公費揭露政策若能改為全面性揭露將對會計師獨立產生正面影響。此外，市場反應部份結果顯示投資人並未考慮公費資訊的內涵。 關鍵詞：非審計服務、門檻制公費揭露、會計師獨立性、裁量性應計 / Whether or not the purchase of non audit services (NAS) impairs audit independence is the focus of a growing body of accounting research in the U.S. Using the data of Taiwanese list firms, this paper examines whether the association holds in environment other than that of the United States. In addition, compared to that in the U.S., Taiwanese Securities and Futures Bureau requires firm to disclose information on the audit and nonaudit fees under some circumstances. The second objective of this paper, therefore, is to explore whether some firms meeting the disclosure threshold have an incentive to avoid the disclosure requirement by concealing audit fee from external investors and regulators, and whether there is difference in the independence between firms which should have met the disclosure threshold otherwise and firms disclosing nonaudit fees. Finally, I investigate whether premium given by market participants varies among these two groups. We find that the purchase of NAS impairs audit independence, consistent with prior studies. We also document that firms which should have met the disclosure threshold otherwise are more likely to conduct earnings management relative to other firms, as predicted. Finally, our empirical results show that market participants are not able to distinguish these two groups. Key words: non-audit services, disclosure threshold, audit independence, discretionary accruals