Thesis advisor: Robert Ross / Military balance of power and geographical proximity are two key factors that shape thelikelihood of war and peace in the realist paradigm. However, the empirical cases associated with the leading sea power and a naval challenger sometimes are not congruent to systemic anticipations of both the balance of power theory and hegemonic shift theories. Why do the leading sea power and a challenger fight a war despite naval power disparity and geographical distance? Conversely, how do these powers arrive at a strategic settlement even with naval power parity and geographical proximity? More practically, under what conditions are the U.S. and China more likely to avoid or end up in a war as China’s naval overtake looms large in the Asia-Pacific? To address these questions, I construct a mid-range theory, An Interactive Theory of Power Projection, that incorporates the geographical dimension of power projection in determining the outcome of naval power shifts. Specifically, I conduct comparative historical case studies of the two Anglo-French dyads (1856-1870/1882-1904) and the U.S.-Japan dyad (1921-1941) with a goal of developing a theory to apply to U.S.-China relations. At root, I argue that the outcome of a naval power transition is contingent upon two conditions: (1) the interactive dynamics of a challenger’s expansion and the leading sea power’s expectation about its contagion effect on the first line of maritime defense; and (2) whether alignment opportunity, shaped by third common threats and available allies in the theaters of the power transition, is open or closed. The contagion effect refers to three kinds of possibilities in the event of a challenger’s occupation: (1) an occupation will become a stepping stone on which a challenger further expands into the adjacent first line of maritime defense; (2) an occupation will produce a negative second-order effect on the other, possibly distant, first line of maritime defense; (3) an occupation will undermine or remove local allies on the first line of maritime defense. I argue that while bilateral resource-extraction capacities initiate or end a naval arms race, it is the interactive dynamics of geographical power projection as well as alignment opportunity in the theater of the naval challenge that bring a conflict to the fore and determine its outcome. These findings carry policy implications for U.S.-China relations and U.S. foreign policy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2024. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

No / The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Current concerns largely relate to the threat of weapons acquisition and use by rogue states or by terrorists. But the threat has deeper roots--it has been evident for fifty years that biological agents could be used to cause mass casualties and large-scale economic damage. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century. Deadly Cultures sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: Why have states continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons? Why have states terminated biological weapons programs? How have states demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs? We now live in a world in which the basic knowledge needed to develop biological weapons is more widely available than ever before. Deadly Cultures provides the lessons from history that we urgently need in order to strengthen the long-standing prohibition of biological weapons.

A holistic arms control (HAC) analytical framework was employed to explore the full range of mechanisms that could potentially be utilised to effectively regulate the development, stockpiling, transfer or use of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitants and related means of delivery. From this analysis it is clear that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its attendant regime are the most appropriate and probably the most receptive mechanisms, at least in the short term, for the discussion of these concerns and the development of appropriate policy responses. However, the response of CWC States Parties to these issues is by no means certain and parallel processes should be established to explore alternative regulatory mechanisms with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, UN drugs conventions, international and regional human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, and transfer controls potentially yielding positive results in the next five to ten year period. Other regimes that may well prove important in the longer term include: the international criminal court and other international criminal law entities; the UN Secretary General¿s investigation mechanism and other ad hoc UN investigatory mechanisms. A comprehensive HAC strategy for the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery will also require active involvement of informed and activist civil society in societal verification; development and promotion of norms prohibiting the involvement of scientific and medical communities in weaponisation programmes intended for malign application; and far greater active engagement of such expert communities in relevant State and international policy development processes.

The international arms trade is of strategic and economic importance for the sending and receiving state. Due to the violent nature of arms however, the rhetoric of ethical considerations has become more profound in Western democracies following the end of the cold war. Despite this, previous research has shown that there is a discrepancy between words and actions. This phenomenon is captured in the term organized hypocrisy. No similar study on the case of Sweden has been done however, which I deem best suited for a least likely case study. Using quantitative methods to estimate the effect of variables on the probability of Sweden exporting arms, I find a positive correlation between the potential recipient’s democratic situation and the probability of exporting arms. These results contradict the theory of organized hypocrisy, hopefully contributing to the field and the debate on contemporary arms trade.

This thesis presents the development of a collision avoidance system for human robot collaboration applications where a human shares its workspace with a robotic arm. A vision system is used to capture colour point clouds of the shared workspace in real-time. An easy-to-use calibration method is then developed to transform the point clouds to the robot’s coordinate frame. Algorithms for processing the transformed points to obtain models of the human and static obstacle(s), and a method used to model the robot, were developed next. The human is modelled by a plane in front of their torso, and any body parts or objects in the front of this plane are modelled by spheres. This model is more computationally efficient compared to the spheres-only modelling method. Methods for predicting the motions of the human’s arms, head and torso were also developed. Next, two predictive collision avoidance algorithms that account for the system dead time were developed. Five metrics were proposed for evaluating the collision avoidance and trajectory tracking performances of the algorithms. The 1st collision avoidance algorithm is an optimal algorithm, and the 2nd collision avoidance is a non-optimal algorithm. The robotic arm used in this research is an Elfin 5 industrial robot. Simulations of the robot avoiding a static obstacle using the 2nd algorithm demonstrated the necessity of using prediction whenever system dead time is present. Both algorithms were then simulated with a human model moving with a constant speed blocking the robot’s path. Based on the superior performance of the 1st algorithm in collision avoidance and trajectory tracking, it was selected for the rest of the collision avoidance experiments. Three real-time human robot collaboration scenarios requiring collision avoidance were studied experimentally. The experimental results demonstrate the consistent excellent collision avoidance and trajectory tracking performance of the 1st algorithm in all scenarios. The algorithm accelerates the robot to compensate for the time spent performing collision avoidance so that no productivity is lost, unlike many prior approaches. Its computational speed is also faster than other optimal collision avoidance algorithms for human-robot collaboration. / Thesis / Master of Applied Science (MASc) / People are having more and more interaction and collaboration with robots both in industry and at home. Sharing a workspace with a robot requires the robot to know where the person is, and to avoid contacting them while performing their tasks. In this research, a collision avoidance system for human-robot collaboration was developed to solve this problem. The vision system is developed to capture real-time colour and depth data of the robot and its surroundings. A software algorithm is proposed to model the person by geometric shapes using these data. Two more software algorithms are proposed to control the robotic arm. Both of them worked well when tested using a simulated industrial robotic arm with a significant time delay. The algorithm with the better performance was selected to be tested using the industrial robotic arm in real-time. The results show that the algorithm can consistently move the gripper of the robotic arm to its target location while simultaneously avoiding collisions with the person’s moving body in different human-robot collaboration scenarios.

Burundi became a German protectorate in August 1884. Prior to the establishment of a protectorate, the territory was ruled by Mwamis (kings) who exercised a kind of quasi-divine system of administration. Conflictual relations were quickly dealt with within this complex structure. During the German and later Belgian colonial administrations, these political structures were redefined and a social class structure based on wealth was created. Forced class division became entrenched in the social fabric of Burundian society and the hierarchical system became even more prominent at independence in July 1962. Successive post-colonial regimes have failed to bridge the social gap. The International Community, through initiatives by the United Nations, the Africa Union, Jimmy Carter, Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela have attempted to resolve the political impasse. The dissertation is an attempt to reconstruct the causes of the various crises since 1962 and to reassess whether the various facilitators has succeeded in their tasks. / History / M.A.

Thesis (MA (Political Science))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis aims to ascertain the level of success which civil society and state actors have had in dealing with issues of arms control and disarmament in the SADC region during the post- Cold War era. The main research question shall be divided into two key questions, the first being: How successful have states been in managing arms control and disarmament in the SADC region? The second question being: How successful has civil society been in managing arms control and disarmament in the SADC region? The study is therefore an evaluative study and shall be focused on the case study of Mozambique. Two arms control processes shall be evaluated in this regard. First is the “Transforming weapons into Ploughshares” or TAE project which is a civil society campaign aimed at minimizing the harsh impacts that Small Arms and Light Weapons have on Mozambican society. The demarcated time period for this project shall be 1995-2003. Second is state driven operation between South African and Mozambican police aimed at locating and destroying arms caches responsible for fuelling the illicit trade in light arms between the two countries. This project was known as Operation Rachel and shall be evaluated from the period of 1995-2001. Through evaluating these two projects, the study shall seek to make the point that in terms of arms control in post-conflict developing states, there is a role for both state and civil societies. The role of civil society organizations can be seen as one of identifying security threats, raising public awareness and democratizing security issues such as arms control so that society at large becomes active in negating the problem. The role of the state on the other hand is to live up to its duties as the chief provider of security for the designated population within the state’s territorial boundary. Arms control in Mozambique and in the SADC region in general has been mediocre at best since as shall be demonstrated, states are far too weak to offer any meaningful protection to citizens and secondly civil society organizations which have taken it upon themselves to offer this kind of protection are just not well resourced enough to undertake state responsibilities. Thus the key recommendation of this study is that Southern African states invariably need to build up their capacities. Light weapons have spread uncontrollably throughout the region because weak and fractured states could not contain the problem and continue struggling to manage a multitude of security threats. It is therefore up to civil society organizations to build strong societies which can demand stronger state action. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis se doel is om vas te stel tot watter mate die burgerlike samelewing en Staat akteurs sukses behaal het in terme van wapenbeheer en ontwapening in die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelings Gemeenskap (SAOG) streek na die koue oorlog. Die hoof navorsings vraag sal in twee kern vrae verdeel word, Die eerste vraag is: Hoeveel sukses het die burgerlike samelewing in die SAOG streek gehad met die bestuur van wapenbeheer en ontwapening? Die tweede vraag is: hoeveel sukses het Staat akteurs in die SAOG streek gehad met die bestuur van wapenbeheer en ontwapening? Hierdie studie is dus ʼn evaluerende studie en sal op Mosambiek fokus as gevalle-studie. Twee wapenbeheer prosesse sal in hierdie tesis evalueer word. Eerste, is die “Transforming Weapons into Ploughshares” of “TAE” projek wat ʼn burgerlike samelewings veldtog is, wat hom ten doel gestel het om die negatiewe impak van ligte-wapens op Mosambiekse samelewing te verminder. Die afgebakende tydperk vir hierdie studie sal 1995-2003 wees. Die tweede proses is die staat-gedrewe operasie tussen die Suid-Afrikaanse en Mosambiekse polisie. Die doel van hierdie projek was om die wapen-opslagplekke wat verantwoordelik is vir die onwettige handel in wapens tussen die twee lande te identifiseer en dienooreenkomstig te verwoes. Hierdie was bekend as “Operation Rachel” en sal tussen 1995-2001 evalueer word. Duur die evaluering van hierdie twee projekte sal die studie probeer om die punt te maak dat daar ʼn rol is vir beide die burgerlike samelewing en die staat in terme van wapenbeheer in post-konflik, ontwikkelende lande. Die rol van burgerlike samelewing organisasies kan beskou word as die identifisering van bedreigings wat veiligheid en sekuriteit kan raak, om bewustheid te kweek en die demokratisering van veiligheid en sekuriteit kwessies soos wapenbeheer. Die rol van die staat is om hulle plig te vervul as die ‘hoof verskaffer’ van sekuriteit vir die bevolking binne die staat se territoriale grense. Wapenbeheer in Mosambiek en in die SAOG streek in die algemeen was totdusver minder suksesvol gewees, aangesien state heeltemal te swak is om enige betekenisvolle beskerming aan hulle burgers te verleen. Tweedens, het burgerlike samelewings organisasies wat die verantwoordelikheid aangeneem het om beskerming te verleen net nie genoeg hulpbronne om die staat se verantwoordelikhede te vervul nie. Dus, is die kern aanbeveling van hierdie tesis dat Suider-Afrikaanse state hulle bekwaamheid en kapasiteit sal moet versterk. Ligte wapens het onbeheersd dwarsdeur die streek versprei omdat swak state nie oor die kapasiteit beskik om veelvuldige veiligheids en sekuriteits-bedreigings te kan hanteer nie. Dit hang dus van burgerlike samelewingsv organisasies af om sterk samelewings te bou wat op hul beurt kan aandring op sterker staatsoptrede om hierdie kwessies meer daadwerklik aan te spreek.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The fundamental motivation for emerging arms suppliers to produce arms was the desire to overcome their position of dependence in the system of arms production and transfers. However, their predicament as late entrants into the system castigated them to fail in this endeavour. This failure is based on three criteria, which also assist in the identification of emerging suppliers. Firstly, the weaponry they produce is far below the sophistication characterised by higher levels of technological advancement. Secondly, they can only produce one or two advanced weapon systems. Finally, they rely on the leading suppliers for certain sophisticated components of weapon systems which they cannot produce themselves and as a result, become so dependent that they, with an exception of a few, are unable to go beyond the simple reproduction or retrofitting of existing weapon systems. The capability to produce arms was restrictedly extended to certain states in the post-war era, and even those states that obtained such a capability were confmed to producing small arms and platforms for naval vessels. Those states that went beyond these capabilities did so with the assistance of other states or specialists, the initial intention being to meet domestic requirements, and ultimately to dispose surplus Second World War equipment in the re-transfer market. The emerging supplier states' intention to develop indigenous arms industries was driven by the political urge to reduce their reliance on the leading suppliers and to nationalise the arms production process for import substitution in order to meet domestic security needs. Since the emerging suppliers began the process of defence industrialisation from the importation of complete weapon systems to import substitution, and ultimately to the promotion of exports, they mainly relied on technology imported from the leading suppliers. On the one hand, the leading suppliers attempted to hinder the efforts of emerging suppliers to promote arms exports so as to protect their oligopolistic share of the arms market through tightening the controls and regulations on technological supplies. On the other, the emerging suppliers were impelled to promote their arms exports in order to overcome the saturation of their domestic markets, to utilise effectively their arms production capacities, and to positively affect their balance of payments through the procreation of foreign exchange returns. This study reached the following conclusions and inferences: 1. The arms trade has evolved to be characterised by the transfer of military technology, which did not feature in the arms transactions of the previous periods. 2. The gap between the leading and emerging suppliers is widening with regard to the sophistication of technological capabilities, and accordingly the stratification within the arms production and transfer system is sustainable and reinforced, thus making it hard for the lower tiers to progress beyond their current status. 3. The emerging suppliers' share of and contribution into the arms market is constricted, and as such they specialise in specific (often uncomplicated) weapon systems that constitute niches in the global market. 4. The unfolding arms production and transfer system is characterised by a fiercely competitive atmosphere, and consequently, only those states that can subsidise or integrate their efforts are enabled to sustain an advanced arms production faculty. 5. As the emerging suppliers begin to introduce more and more of their wares into the market, the costs of research and development begin to soar in the same manner as those of the leading suppliers, thus urging them to become more export-oriented. 6. Participants in the system will be compelled to relinquish their comparative technological superiority in order to survive, thus narrowing the gap between the capabilities possessed by both the leading and the emerging suppliers. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die onderliggende motivering van opkomende wapenverskaffers om wapens te produseer word toegeskryf aan 'n behoefte om hulle relatiewe afhanklikheid in die stelsel van wapenproduksie en - handel te oorkom. Boonop het die laat toetrede tot die stelsel hierdie opkomende verskaffers se kanse tot sukses verder belemmer. Die rede vir die onsuksesvolle toetrede word gebasseer op drie kriteria (wat ook dien as identifiserende eienskappe van opkomende wapenverskaffers). Eerstens, die wapens wat opkomende verskaffers lewer skiet tekort aan die vereiste gesofistikeerde standaarde van die gevestigde wapenprodusente. Tweedens, hulle kan slegs een of twee gevorderde wapenstelsels produseer. Derdens, sekere komponente van wapenstelsels word verkry by die gevestigde verskaffers, wat lei tot afhanklikheid tot so 'n mate dat die opkomende verskaffer se vermoëns beperk word tot eenvoudige reprodusering of herinstallasies van bestaande stelsels. Trouens, in die post-oorlog tydperk is die vermoë om wapens te produseer doelbewus beperk tot sekere state wat 'n afgebakende reeks van handwapens en uitrusting vir vloot vaartuie kon vervaardig. State wat verby hierdie vermoë beweeg het, het dit gedoen met behulp van ander state of spesaliste, oorspronklik met die oog op die huishoudelike behoefte maar ook om ontslae te raak van surplusse uit die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. 'n Politieke begeerte om in hulle eie sekuriteitsbehoeftes te voorsien deur middel van invoersubstitusie, het die opkomende verskaffers genoop om ontslae te raak van die afhanklikheid op gevestigde verskaffers en om die wapenproduseringsproses te nasionaliseer. Hulle het hoofsaaklik gesteun op ingevoerde tegnologie om die verdedigingsbedryf te industrialiseer. Die proses het so verloop: volledige wapenstelsels is ingevoer, daarna het invoersubstitusie plaasgevind, en daarna 'n bevordering van uitvoere. Gevestigde verskaffers het endersyds probeer om (deur middel van strenger kontrole en regulasies of tegnologiese ware) die opkomende verskaffers te verhoed om hulle oligopolistiese houvas op die mark te belemmer en andersyds moes opkomende verskaffers noodgedwonge hulle uitvoere bevorder om te voorkom dat die plaaslike mark versadig word. Die laasgenoemde aspek het ook die betalingsbalans van opkomende verskaffers positief beinvloed as gevolg van die inkomste uit buitelandse valuta. Hierdie studie kom tot die volgende aanames en gevolgtrekkings: 1. Wapenhandel het só ontwikkel dat die oordrag van militêre tegnologie die hoofkenmerk geword het in die stelsel - 'n ongekende kenmerk tot dusver in die ontwikkelingsgang van internasionale wapenhandel. 2. Die gaping van tegnologiese vermoëns tussen opkomende en gevestigde wapenverskaffers word groter en daarmee saam word die stratifikasie in wapenproduksie en -lewering volhoubaar en versterk, wat lei tot 'n beperking op die vermoë van opkomende verskaffers om vooruitgang te maak. 3. Opkomende verskaffers se aandeel in en bydrae tot wapenmarkte bly beperk en spesialiseer daarom op spesifieke (meestalongekompliseerde) wapenstelsels wat gemik is op sekere nisse in die wêreldmark. 4. Die ontluikende wapenproduksie en -handelsisteem is uiters kompeterend, met die gevolg dat slegs state wat hulle pogings kan subsidieer of integreer in staat is om gevorderde fasiliteite te onderhou. 5. Met die toenemende aanbod vanaf opkomende verskaffers, styg die kostes van navorsing en ontwikkeling vir beide die opkomende en die gevestigde verskaffer wat weer beide dwing om hulle uitvoere te beklemtoon. 6. Deelnemers in die stelsel sal gedwing word om hulle vergelykende tegnologiese voorsprong prys te gee om te oorleef in die stelsel, waarna die gaping tussen die vermoëns van opkomende en gevestigde verskaffers verminder sal word.

Most scholarly research and international policy initiatives on small arms control (SALW) tend to focus exclusively on the supply side of arms control, while the demand side for small arms remains relatively unexplored. The general assumption is that by regulating the international and regional supply of SALW, and by preventing and tracking the illicit flow that drift into the open markets, armed violence can be reduced. However, empirical evidence suggests that attempts to control and reduce the supply of weapons through sanctions, embargoes, and regional commitments alone have hardly stopped or mitigated armed conflict. In looking at the global arms trade, one sees that often countries subjected to supply side restrictions have managed to acquire arms through finding willing sellers, black market acquisitions, and/or domestic production. This dissertation examines the factors that drive the demand for SALW in weak states by identifying the important gaps in literature on demand, providing a consistent and systematic framework to address these gaps, and applying the framework to a single country case study. The main argument in this study is that in order to understand group arming behaviour, its relationship to the dynamics of armed conflict, and the kind of incentives integral to the design of interventions that seek to influence behaviours associated with arms acquisitions during post-conflict arms management, there needs to be a better understanding of the independent variables shaping the demand for SALW. Too often, analysts conflate the reasons why groups acquire SALW with the reasons why groups go to war. However, if the act of acquiring SALW occurs at a different point in time from the process of organising and planning armed conflict, the two events need to be analysed separately. This study uses a human security analytical approach to understand sources of threats to security at the household level. It employs a nationally representative rapid household survey (n=1200) on SALW ownership, acquisition and attitudes, and focus group discussions (n=77) implemented in select locations to unpack responses which have not been thoroughly addressed during the survey. In-depth interviews with key informants, civilian firearm permit records, and public health data were also collected to supplement primary data. The design is applied to a single case study, the Casamance in Senegal. This study illustrates that an increased level of weapons accumulation does not always necessitate an automatic rise in SALW related violence or local level arms races at the outset of armed conflict. This works contributes to the growing body of literature on SALW by advancing an analytically applicable concept of demand to increase our understanding of what motivates the choices groups make in acquiring and using small arms. Lastly, this study develops a replicable template that can be applied to further research on SALW demand in conflict-ridden regions.

Chacun de leur côté, les phénomènes de la guerre et des tournois au Moyen Âge ont déjà bénéficié d’études nombreuses et approfondies. En revanche, on a négligé d’analyser en profondeur le lien entre ces deux mondes, accusé pourtant de s’étioler au XVe siècle au profit de spectacles grandioses n’ayant plus rien à voir avec la réalité d’un champ de bataille. Par ailleurs, dans le domaine militaire, les gentilshommes imprégnés d’un idéal chevaleresque obsolète se débattraient pour essayer de faire encore croire au maintien de leur suprématie guerrière.La réalité est bien plus complexe et les interactions entre le domaine de la guerre et celui des lices sont multiples. Ce sont d’abord les mêmes personnes qu’on peut retrouver à combattre dans tous les contextes, des hommes censés être nobles, adoubés ou non, qui possèdent un équipement caractéristique, armes et armures, ainsi qu’un cheval entraîné au combat. Les adaptations de leur matériel aux rencontres normées, prévues pour augmenter leur sécurité, ne changent fondamentalement rien à leur façon de combattre. Leurs techniques martiales se révèlent riches et variées, tout comme leurs tactiques collectives, qui savent s’adapter aux différentes configurations rencontrées à la guerre grâce à une surprenante polyvalence. Enfin, la mentalité avec laquelle les hommes d’armes abordent les rencontres armées montrent d’importantes similitudes dans tous les contextes : on attend d’eux qu’ils donnent le meilleur d’eux-mêmes, en démontrant leur prouesse, sans renoncer face à l’adversité. Ainsi, à tous les niveaux, la frontière entre les lices et le champ de bataille s’avère finalement assez floue. / The phenomena of war and tournaments in the Middle Ages have already benefitted from several individual in-depth studies. However, a detailed analysis of the link between the two themes has always been lacking, even though we often accusingly claim that this link declined during the 15th century to be replaced by spectacular shows which had nothing to do with the reality of battlefields anymore. Moreover, some people would argue that, in the military field, noblemen – immersed in an obsolete chivalrous model – would have desperately tried to maintain a semblance of belligerent dominion.But the truth is far more complex and the interactions between the world of war and the world of lists are numerous. First, the same persons could be found in each context: men supposed to be noble – knighted or not – with characteristic pieces of equipment – arms and armours – and horses trained for combat. Adjusting their equipment for formal combats to improve their safety did not fundamentally change the way they fought. Their martial techniques were, in fact, rich and diverse – and so was their group tactic, which could adapt to different configurations encountered at war thanks to their surprising versatility. Lastly, the ways of men-at-arms in martial encounters reveals important similarities in every context: we expected them to give their best and achieve feats with no sign of renouncement while facing the enemy. Thus, the boundary between lists and battlefields actually turns out to be quite vague at every level.