A sucessão na empresa familiar tem sido considerada por seus estudiosos como o mais importante desafio a ser enfrentado por aquelas companhias na luta por sua perpetuação. Os processos de transição do controle da família enfrentam várias dificuldades típicas de qualquer transição gerencial ou de propriedade na firma, mas são complicados por fatores subjetivos presentes na interação das dinâmicas empresarial e familiar. Nas sucessões familiares os conflitos emergem, frequentemente, da indiscriminação entre os papéis sociais na família e na empresa. Tais conflitos envolvem questões ligadas à propriedade do negócio, à sua administração e aos interesses da família. A Nova Economia das Instituições adicionou ao corpo teórico das finanças corporativas uma série de variáveis comportamentais desconsideradas pela Economia Neoclássica com o objetivo de imprimir maior realismo às análises teóricas. O presente trabalho investiga as proposições da Teoria Econômica de Finanças para o comportamento dos administradores quanto à escolha da Estrutura de Capital na firma e sua utilidade para os Processos Sucessórios como elemento atenuante de conflitos. As conclusões apontam para uma interdependência entre decisões de Estrutura de Capital e Processo Sucessório, e para uma grande importância da forma de financiamento no longo prazo para o sucesso da Sucessão na Empresa Familiar, além de sugerirem pesquisas mais avançadas no sentido de compreender melhor esse contexto. / Experts consider the process of succession in the family business as the most important challenge in their fight for perpetuation. The transition processes encounter various difficulties common to managerial transitions, yet they are made more complicated due to subjective factors present in both the family and management arenas. During succession processes, conflicts often arise out of a difficulty to differentiate between social and business roles in the family. Such conflicts involve issues such as ownership, management styles and family interests. The New Institutional Economics added a series of behavior variables to the theoretical body of corporate finance. Such variables, previously not considered by the Neoclassic Economics, were added so as to bring a higher level of realism to the theoretical analysis. This dissertation investigates the propositions put forward by the Economic Theory of Finance regarding the behavior of managers as far as their choice of Capital Structure for the business and its validity as conflict attenuation in the process of Succession. The conclusions put forward here point toward an interdependency between decisions regarding Capital Structure and Succession in the Family Business. In addition to that, they highlight the importance of long term financing for a successful process, and suggest further investigation that could support and illustrate the conclusions.

就現階段的企業經營型態而言，專業人才的良窳以及培育訓練可能遠勝於公司有形資產的多寡，這種情形在高科技產業尤其明顯。企業為了留住優秀人才，必須提供許多激勵措施。就我國企業而言，最普遍的激勵措施是員工分紅配股制度。然而，在此制度下，容易產生員工短視近利的缺失。歐美等國較常採行所謂的股票選擇權制度，由於此種制度具有激勵未來的特性，屬於「長期的激勵因子」，更能使員工與股東的利益趨於一致。因此，財政部為順應高科技產業的需求，於民國八十九年准許上市公司實施員工股票選擇權制度，此制度開放後，勢必影響到我國企業對於員工長短期激勵誘因的最適決策。 　本文的主要目的在於利用訊息理論中的「代理模型」，探討股東與員工雙方在「訊息不對稱」下，股東如何設計最適的員工激勵契約。站在股東極大化期望財富的立場，建構一套綜合現金、股票以及股票選擇權的理論模型，並經由模型運算推演，試圖達到下列的研究目的：(1) 在長短期激勵誘因契約下，分別推導出最適員工誘因強度、最適基本薪資以及最適員工努力水準；(2) 比較長短期激勵誘因的最適員工努力水準，驗證股票選擇權制度是否具有提高員工努力程度的激勵效果；(3) 站在股東與員工各自追求期望財富極大化的立場，探討雙方對長短期誘因制度的偏好。 　經由模型分析，可得到以下幾點結論：(1) 員工努力程度不受長短期激勵誘因的影響，股票選擇權的作用或許只在於留住人才以及加深員工對公司的忠誠度；(2) 股東在擬定最適長短期激勵誘因強度時，必須考量公司股本大小、員工對風險的趨避態度、努力投入的成本係數以及景氣波動對公司未來收益的影響；(3) 影響員工最適認股權證比率的大小，除了上述提到的因素外，還包括認股權證的避險比率，股東可以藉由觀察公司股價的高低，以協助長短期激勵誘因的決策擬定；(4) 股東與員工基於期望財富極大化的立場，對於長短期誘因契約的偏好會產生利益不一致的現象，雙方面臨的是一場無法達到雙贏局面的零合遊戲。

過去處理勞資雙方工資談判的文獻，多數假設勞資雙方的訊息是對稱的， 或採合作談判解，或採非合作談判解，他們得到結果多為工資協議往往非 常順利，不會有不合議的事件發生。但事實上勞資雙方談判時，公司的經 營能力或策略、工人之生產力往往是談判雙方互不了解的，也就是現實工 資談判中普遍存有訊息不對稱的情況。本文擬在訊息不對稱的情形下，假 設談判的一方訊息不完全--工會不了解公司的經營能力，設定一個兩期工 資談判模型，僅由工會提議工資，公司之反提議僅為接受或拒絕工會之提 議工資。探討模型之承諾均衡與完全貝氏均衡，並對影響完全貝氏均衡之 因素做進一步之探討。

Social dilemmas constitute a broad class of quandaries, including, for example, common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas and public good (PG) dilemmas. CPR's are characterized by non-excludability and rivalry and are often associated with overexploitation. Through similar arguments, the features non-excludability and non-rivalry give rise to under-provision of PG's. The prevalence and inefficiencies often associated with CPR's have given rise to an extensive literature and the role of resource uncertainty has not been ignored. Uncertainty combined with rivalry is often said to augment users' incentive to overexploit. However, underlying most of the theoretical research is an explicit or implicit assumption of symmetric information, or a symmetric lack of information. In reality, people generally have access to different sources of information and they may differ in their abilities to process information. In the first two papers of this thesis, the assumption of symmetry is relaxed and both papers demonstrate that from a welfare perspective, the distribution of uncertainty is also of importance. Many CPR's and PG's are natural, which can complicate the situation. In the traditional resource management literature, the exploited resource is often assumed to be properly characterized by some concave growth function. Today, there is extensive empirical evidence suggesting that many ecosystems have more complex, often non-linear dynamics. Management of such resources can be quite challenging as the non-linear dynamics can make the ecosystem flip between alternate stable states, and even marginal changes can cause radical transformations of such ecosystems. Most of the CPR models assume the shared resource to be of fixed size or to be able to generate a constant flow of services. In the third paper we aim at providing a more complete picture of the overexploitation of a common resource, by combining the institutional structure with complex ecological dynamics. We manage to raise questions and doubts about the standard assumptions. Another feature of convex-concave resources is that a state can become highly robust and sometimes an ecosystem change may even be irreversible. This is problematic if, for example, we wish to restore a degraded ecosystem. The aim of the fourth paper is to empirically analyze this question, by eliciting peoples' preferences through a hypothetical referendum on the issue. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2005

Det här är en kvantitativ studie av hur kreditpreferenser hos mikrobolag med en årsomsättning om mindre än 10 miljoner SEK beror av branschtillhörighet och företagsstorlek. Mikrobolag är små bolag med mindre än 10 personer anställda och en årsomsättning på mindre än 2 miljoner euro. Det teoretiska ramverket utgår från asymmetrisk informationsteori och mer specifikt från pecking order theory, POT samt trade off-teorin. Kreditpreferenserna mäts genom två olika parametrar, dels genom mikrobolagens avsättning till periodiseringsfonder vilket kan ses som ett mellanting mellan extern och intern finansiering, dels genom förekomsten av externa lån från kreditinstitut. Branscherna som undersöks är tillverkning samt tjänster vilka anses skilja sig åt vad gäller kreditpreferenser. Tillverkningsbranschen har större anläggningstillgångar vilket anses göra det lättare för dem att få extern kredit enligt trade off-teorin. Tjänstebranschen däremot, med mer immateriella tillgångar skulle då föredra periodiseringsfonder eftersom enligt POT så föredrar mindre företag internt genererat kapital. Ett antal hypoteser ställs upp som sedan testas med chi-två. Resultatet motsäger delvis teorierna. Från studien framgår dock att de undersökta företagen i tjänstebranschen har större preferenser för användning av periodiseringsfond än tillverkningsbranschen. En slutsats från studien är alltså att branschtillhörighet har betydelse för kreditpreferenserna. För företagsstorlek går inte att dra några säkra slutsatser.

This thesis is about the economic aspects of public procurement of services through auctionsin Sweden. It focuses on two different institutions, auctions used to find foste r-parents forboarded out children in the 19th century, and auctions of cleaning service contracts in the 20 thcentury. I n both cases, the contracting entity is the municipality or its representative, thelowest bidder wins the auction, and is paid in accordance with his/her bid.In the child auctions, c hildren were allotted to foster-parents by means of an open biddingprocess, the descending English auction, where the bids were given continuously to theauctioneer. In modern public procurement sealed bids ar e used in accordance with the firstprice,sealed bid auction. The first part of this thesis is about price formation in the childauctions and a study is made of the children who were auctioned several times, indicatingasymmetric information among bidders or adverse selection in this market. These subjects arestudied using field data on 601 child auctions held in Northern Sweden during the period 1863to 1889. The empirical findings in the first paper suggest that the foster-parents had a cleareconomic motive in these auctions. The child characteristics significantly affect the amount ofcompensation paid to the foster-parent. There is also evidence that farmers preferred older,more productive children. The second paper studies whether a re-auctioned child commandeda higher or lower price than a child that was not re-auctioned. The results indicate some formof asymmetric information because foster-parents demanded a higher level of compensationfor a re-auctioned child. The results also suggest that the probability that a child was reauctionedincreased if he/she was not healthy.The third paper in the thesis discusses a kind of "paradox". Although there is a competitiveeffect on the bids in the auction of cleaning service contracts, the contracting entity has anoption, given by law, to restrict the number of bidders. In th is paper, an implementation costis introduced fo r the contracting entity to justify such a restriction. The results, based onSwedish municipality data, indicate that contract and municipality characteristics, assumed toaffect the implementation cost, affect the volume of the procurement, and the number ofbidders, but not necessarily the choice of allocation mechanism. The final paper studiesregional differences in bids, costs, and competition in municipal procurement using the samedata as in paper [3]. The results show higher estimated costs for completing the contract, butlower estimated mean bids in the major city area of Stockholm compared with the res t of thecountry. This is explained by lower profit margins and higher operational costs in the majorcity area. An analysis is also carried out of why the lowest bidder is not always the contractedbidder. / <p>Härtill 4 delar.</p> / digitalisering@umu

I denna studie testas tio hypoteser som relaterar till finansiell teori för att se hur väl teorin kan förklara skuldsättningsgraden i små börsnoterade bolag. De teorier som testas är avvägningsteorin (trade-off theory), hackordningsteorin (pecking order theory) samt teorier relaterade till asymmetrisk information och agentkostnader. Testen genomförs med multipel linjär regressionsanalys och de undersökta bolagen är samtliga bolag med färre än 200 anställda på tre av de mindre börslistorna i Sverige. Resultatet visar stöd för åtta av de tio undersökta hypoteserna och är i flera avseenden tydligare än i tidigare studier som testar onoterade små bolag eller ett bredare urval av bolag. / This study tests ten hypotheses related to financial theory in order to determine how well the theory can explain capital structure in small public SMEs. The tested theories are trade-off theory, pecking order theory and theories related to asymmetric information and agent-principal costs. Multiple linear regression analysis is used to test the theories on SMEs with fewer than 200 employees listed on three of Sweden’s smaller stock-exchange lists. The results show statistical significant support for eight out of ten hypotheses, and these results are in many aspects clearer than in studies that test unlisted SMEs as well as studies with broader samples of listed firms.

El objetivo de la presente tesis doctoral consiste, en primer lugar, en investigar si la influencia de los accionistas principales sobre el valor de la empresa se encuentra condicionada por la existencia de conflicto de intereses entre accionistas y directivos, de manera que cuanto más alto sea el beneficio público esperado mayor será la disposición del accionista a asumir los costes derivados de la supervisión. Nuestro segundo objetivo consiste en analizar si en el mercado de capitales español la adquisición de bloques accionariales se encuentra condicionada por el beneficio público que puede derivarse de la supervisión o por la ventaja informativa que poseen los adquirentes, que pondría de manifiesto la necesidad de la aplicación estricta de los códigos de conducta y de un seguimiento más exhaustivo de las empresas con mayor asimetría informativa. El análisis empírico realizado, utilizando la metodología de datos de panel y la regresión logística, nos permite establecer las siguientes conclusiones. En primer lugar, el carácter supervisor de la propiedad accionarial es más intenso en aquellas empresas en las que el potencial conflicto de intereses entre accionistas y directivos es mayor. Asimismo, la existencia de mecanismos de gobierno alternativos en la empresa, que garanticen la supervisión de las decisiones directivas, resta significatividad a la función de vigilancia que ejercen determinados inversores. Por último, los inversores principales de la empresa tratan de compensar los costes de supervisión mediante transacciones en el mercado de control parcial, de manera que se observa un comportamiento comprador cuando se anticipa una mejora en la gestión empresarial derivada de un incremento en la supervisión y cuando existe una mayor asimetría informativa de manera que pueden beneficiarse de su posición de inversores mejor informados. / The aim of this thesis is, firstly, to analyse if the influence of majority shareholders over company value depends on the existence of conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Therefore, the higher the expected social benefit is, the higher interest of shareholders to assume the costs derived form monitoring. The second aim of this study is to analyse if the purchase of share blocks in the Spanish capital market is motivated by the value creation derived from monitoring, or by the informative advantage of the acquirers and insider trading, which would highlight the need of an strict application of Governance Codes and vigilance of firms with asymmetric information. The empirical analysis is accomplished using panel data methodology and a logistic regression. Our empirical analysis allow us to conclude that the supervisory role of ownership is more intense in firms where the potential conflict of interest between shareholders and managers is greater, and therefore the value of the firm can be increased through a specific composition of its shareholders. Moreover, the existence of alternative governance mechanisms, that guarantee managerial decisions monitoring, reduce the importance of the investor's supervision role. Lastly, we observe a purchase behaviour when an improvement in managerial running is foreseen as a consequence of the supervision, and when there is more asymmetric information and therefore the acquirers can benefit from their position of better informed investors.

Antalet hemlösa EU-migranter har på senare år ökat kraftigt i Sverige, och närmare hälften av dem saknar inkomstkälla helt medan många andra försörjer sig genom tiggeri. Numera måste individer förutom att ta ställning till huruvida de ska ge pengar till etablerade välgörenhetsorganisationer även besluta om de ska ge pengar till tiggande EU-migranter. Utifrån antagandet att det existerar asymmetrisk information, och institutionella faktorer som kan påverka individers givande till respektive typ av välgörenhet är det intressant att undersöka om det finns skillnader i benägenheten att ge till tiggande EU-migranter jämfört med etablerade välgörenhetsorganisationer.Forskningsstudiens huvudsakliga syfte är att undersöka benägenheten hos individer att ge pengar till tiggande EU-migranter jämfört med etablerade välgörenhetsorganisationer. Vidare är syftet också att identifiera och analysera olika individspecifika egenskaper som tänkbart påverkar individers givande till respektive typ av välgörenhet. För att besvara syftet samlas primärdata in i Linköpings stad genom en enkätundersökning och analyseras sedan med hjälp av ekonometriska verktyg.Forskningsstudiens resultat indikerar att individer generellt är mindre benägna att ge pengar till tiggande EU-migranter jämfört med etablerade välgörenhetsorganisationer. De egenskaper som har betydelse för att förklara individers givande till tiggande EU-migranter är kön, ålder, härkomst, kunskap om tiggande EU-migranters livssituation och inställning till lagförslag att förbjuda tiggeri. I jämförelse till detta har ålder, utbildning, härkomst, äktenskap och sociala faktorer betydelse för att förklara givandet till etablerade välgörenhetsorganisationer. / In recent years, the number of homeless EU migrants has increased substantially in Sweden, and almost half of them lack an income whereas many others live by begging. Nowadays, individuals in addition to decide whether to give money to established charities also have to decide whether to give money to begging EU migrants. Based on the assumption that asymmetric information and institutional factors exists, which can affect each type of willingness to donate to charity, it is interesting to investigate whether there are differences in propensity to give money to begging EU migrants compared to established charities.The purpose of the research study is to examine individual’s propensity to give money to begging EU migrants compared to established charities. Furthermore, the aim is also to identify and analyze various individual characteristics that conceivably affect individuals' donation to each type of charity. To answer the purpose of the research study primary data is collected in Linkoping city by a questionnaire and the material is analyzed with econometric models.The results of the study indicate that individuals generally are less likely to give money to begging EU migrants compared with established charities. Variables that affect individuals' willingness to give money to begging EU migrants are gender, age, descent, knowledge of begging EU migrants living situation and attitude towards banning begging. Compared to this, factors that affect the willingness to donate to established charities are age, education, descent, married and social factors.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2008 Sammanfattning jämte 3 uppsatser