本文考慮當資訊不對稱下的逆向選擇問題存在時,如何遵循Myerson(1979)提出的揭露原則 (the revelation principle)來設計一套具備誘因相容性 (incentive compatibility)的存款保險契約,契約中的自有資本比率為要保機構的自我選擇變數 (self-selection variable),而保險費則為存保公司用來控制要保機構決策行為的控制變數(control var iable),依此可以建立一套自我選擇機能(self-selection mechanism),來促使要保機構誠實揭其風險類型的私有訊息(private information),進而將要保機構依風險高低正確分類,徹底解決訊息不對稱下的逆向選擇問題。

Market Liquidity, Active Investment, and Markets for Information. This paper studies a financial market in which investors choose among investment strategies that exploit information about different fundamentals. On the one hand, the presence of other informed investors generates illiquidity. On the other hand, investors who use different strategies can serve as quasi-noise traders for each other, thereby also supplying each other with liquidity. Thus, investment strategies can be substitutes or complements. Such externalities in information acquisition have effects on investor herding, comovement in prices and liquidity across assets, trade volume, and the informational role of prices. They further affect the relationship between financial markets and information markets. Information market competition fosters investor diversity, whereas monopoly power promotes investor herding. Also, in order to benefit from quasi-noise trading, a financial institution may engage in both proprietary trading and information sales. Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening. This paper shows that non-voting shares can promote takeovers. When the bidder has private information, shareholders may refuse to tender because they suspect to sell at an ex-post unfavourable price. The ensuing friction in the sale of cash flow rights can prevent an efficient sale of control. Separating cash flow and voting rights mitigates this externality, thereby facilitating takeovers. In fact, the fraction of non-voting shares can be used to discriminate between efficient and inefficient bidders. The optimal fraction decreases with managerial ability, implying an inverse relationship between firm value and non-voting shares. As non-voting shares increase control contestability, share reunification programs entrench managers of widely held firms, whereas dual-class recapitalizations can increase shareholder wealth. Signaling in Tender Offer Games. This paper examines whether a bidder can use the terms of the tender offer to signal the post-takeover security benefits to the shareholders of a widely held target firm. As atomistic shareholders extract all the gains in security benefits, signaling equilibria are subject to a constraint that is absent from bilateral trade models. The buyer (bidder) must enjoy gains from trade that are excluded from bargaining (private benefits), but can nonetheless be relinquished and enable shareholders to draw inference about the security benefits. Restricted bids and cash-equity offers do not satisfy these requirements. Dilution, debt financing, probabilistic takeover outcomes and toeholds are all viable signals because they make bidder gains depend on the security benefits in a predictable manner. In all the signaling equilibria, lower-valued types must forgo a larger fraction of their private benefits and these signaling costs prevent some takeovers. When the bidder has additional private information about the private benefits as in the case of two-dimensional bidder types, fully revealing equilibria cease to exist. This does not hold once bidders can offer not only cash or equity but also (more) elaborate contingent claims. Offers which include options avoid inefficiencies and implement the symmetric information outcome. Goldrush Dynamics of Private Equity. This paper presents a simple dynamic model of entry and exit in a private equity market with heterogeneous private equity firms, a depletable stock of target companies, and rational learning about investment profitability. The predictions of the model match a number of stylized facts: Aggregate fund activity follows waves with endogenous transitions from boom to bust. Supply and demand in the private equity market are inelastic, and the supply comoves with investment valuations. High industry performance precedes high entry, which in turn precedes low industry performance. There are persistent differences in fund performance across private equity firms, first-time funds underperform the industry, and first-time funds raised in booms are unlikely to be succeeded by a follow-on fund. Fund performance and fund size are positively correlated across firms, but negatively correlated across consecutive funds of a private equity firm. Finally, booms can make ”too much capital chase too few deals.” Reputable Friends as Watchdogs: Social Ties and Governance. To examine how governance is affected when a designated supervisor befriends the person to be supervised, this paper embeds a delegated monitoring problem in a social structure: the supervisor and the agent are friends, and the supervisor desires to be socially recognized for having integrity. Strengthening the friendship weakens the supervisor’s monitoring incentives, forging an alliance against the principal (bonding). But the agent also grows more reluctant to put the supervisor’s perceived integrity at risk, thus becoming more aligned with the principal (bridging). If the supervisor’s desire for social recognition is strong, the principal’s preferences regarding the supervisor-agent friendship are bipolar. Weak friendship makes the supervisor monitor intensively to save face. Strong friendship leads the supervisor to abandon monitoring but the agent to behave well in order to protect the supervisor from losing face. The strength of friendship necessary for the latter outcome decreases in the supervisor’s desire for esteem; that is, image concerns leverage the bridging effect of friendship. This suggests that overlapping personal and professional ties can enhance delegated governance in cultures or contexts where social recognition is important, and provides a novel perspective on issues related to crony capitalism, corporate governance, and organizational culture. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2009 Sammanfattning jämte 5 uppsatser

本論文為關於營利與非營利機構之營運管理策略之兩篇理論性質的文章。 第一篇文章旨在探討營利機構之實質盈餘管理策略。本研究檢驗在產品市場競爭下，公司如何透過實質盈餘管理策略來滿足盈餘目標之要求以及公司之實質盈餘管理動機會如何影響市場競爭對手之行為。本文考慮一個兩期非合作之R&D競爭寡占模型。本文假設存在資訊不對稱；具有私人資訊的廠商為追求獲利最大亦或追求盈餘目標達成兩種類型。本文透過完美貝氏均衡 (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) 解出分離均衡 (separating equilibrium) 與混和均衡 (hybrid equilibrium)。 本研究指出追求獲利最大類型之廠商可以藉由影響競爭對手之猜測來進一步左右追求盈餘目標達成類型之目標達成之可能性。在分離均衡中，當外在成本衝擊未超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商無誘因藉由R&D 投資水準之提升來規避負向成本衝擊以影響市場對手猜測並且進一步提升其產品市場競爭力。因此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標無法達成。 在混和均衡中，當外在成本衝擊超過預期時，追求獲利最大類型之廠商有誘因採取混合策略以誤導市場對手之猜測;該類型之廠商可以藉由部分模仿盈餘目標達成類型之R&D 投資策略以混淆競爭對手之信念並且提升其產品產出、獲利水準。在此，追求盈餘目標達成類型之盈餘目標能夠達成。本研究之結果有別於傳統R&D盈餘管理實證文獻中，公司內部當局有誘因透過R&D支出的減少用以滿足公司短期之盈餘目標 (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005) 。本研究指出公司可以藉由R&D 投資水準之提升，以創造“cookie jar” 並且有助於公司獲利提升與盈餘目標之達成。此外，本研究與盈餘奇異現象之實證研究 (earnings kinky) 結論一致: 公司可以藉由盈餘管理策略來達成盈餘目標，但是盈餘目標之達成不盡然是透過盈餘管理策略 (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003)。 第二篇文章旨在探討非營利機構提供非獲利性質服務之策略性之影響。本研究指出非獲利性質服務之提供不僅有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升，相對於營利機構。當所有權與經營權分離時，若市場需求彈性為不具彈性時，非獲利性質服務之提供對非營利機構之經理人而言，可以做為一個策略工具藉以促使該機構之所有人提供一個於獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。此外，隨著非獲利性質服務之外生價格的提升，當非營利性質服務之外生價格的提升對於非營利機構之所有人與經理人利益衝突影響之間接效果大於對獲利性質服務價格影響之直接效果時，非營利機構之所有人仍然會提供一個獲利部分過分補償之薪酬水準。這會有助於非營利機構於獲利性質服務之競爭優勢的提升。 / This dissertation consists of two theoretical studies on the operation strategies of for-profit and non-profit firms. Chapter 1 addresses how firms use real earnings management to meet or beat their earnings targets, and how this influences sequential product market competition. We study this issue in a two-period non-cooperative R&D competition with one-sided asymmetric information in which the informed firm could be either the maximizing type or the target-meeting type (or target-beating). We show that the maximizing type of the informed firm’s R&D investment level could influence rival firm’s conjecture about the informed firm’s type which in term affects the success of meeting or beating the target for the target-meeting type of the informed firm. We find that the privately informed firm can increase its R&D investment in the first period to meet or beat the earnings target. This can help the firm increase profits in a sequential product market competition. More precisely, once the cost uncertainty realized is realized to exceed expectations, the maximizing type of the informed firm could hide its identity by adopting a mixed strategy and setting its R&D investment and output level higher than in the separating equilibrium. Contrary to popular claims that meeting or beating short earnings targets induces an R&D investment reduction (Barber et. al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Graham, 2005), we show that R&D overinvestment can give an opportunity to create some reserves, i.e., a cookie jar, to be used later to earn a higher profit and reach later targets. Our result is also supporting the observation of firms meeting or beating the earnings target, but not necessarily using earnings management (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003). Chapter 2 shows that the provision of not-for profit service would not only give not-for-profit organizations a competitive advantage over for-profit organizations. Under the separation of control and ownership, we illustrate that once market demand is inelastic, the provision of not-for-profit service serves as a strategic device for the manager of a not-for-profit organization and thus induces the owner of a not-for-profit organization to overcompensate his manager regarding the margin of profit. Moreover, as the regulated price of not-for-profit service increases, a not-for-profit organization could still over-compensate his manager in regard to profit, when the indirect effect on increasing preference difference between the owner and manager of the not-for-profit organization dominates the direct effect on market price. Thus, a not-for-profit organization could charge more in for-profit service.

在保險市場中，保險商品主要透過保險經紀人、保險代理人以及保險人所掌握的直接通路予以販售，特別是在大型商業財產及責任保險的行銷通路上，保險經紀人扮演了舉足輕重的角色。本論文主要是以商業財產及責任保險市場為研究重心，並由經濟觀點探討保險經紀人的仲介角色、市場競爭態勢、報酬結構以及業務安排方式等，同時以保險監理的角度檢討保險經紀行業存在的誠信自律、利益衝突以及客戶公平對待等問題。 不同於保險代理人，保險經紀人係基於保單持有人之利益為其安排保險。因此，保險經紀人必須透過多家保險人提供報價的方式，從中選擇價格及條件最佳者做為保險業務安排之對象；換言之，誠實的報價程序，方足以保障客戶之利益並維繫保險市場的健全。然而國外近年發生的大型保險經紀人與部分保險人共謀提供不實之報價事件，不僅嚴重影響到保單持有人的權益，更引發了對於保險經紀人不當市場力量運用以及或有佣金（contingent commissions）制度存廢的廣泛討論。2004年10月14日紐約州總檢察官Eliot Spitzer向紐約州最高法院針對全球最大保險經紀商Marsh & McLennan及部分保險人所涉及的投標詐欺、操縱價格、收受保險公司或有佣金等三大罪狀提出了民事訴訟。此案例不僅使得涉案公司付出鉅額賠償，更暴露出大型保險經紀人公司存在已久的市場壟斷、價格操控、利益衝突等問題。 對照於英、美等國在保險經紀人制度方面的成熟與發達，我國在此方面尚屬新興發展階段，所謂他山之石可以攻錯，借重先行者的經驗，不僅可以避免重蹈覆轍，更可加快成長的腳步；在全球化的浪潮衝擊之下，保險經紀市場唯有與國際充分接軌，並健全相關制度，才能為國內保險市場的業務成長，帶來蓬勃生機，並立下永續發展的堅固磐石。 / In the insurance market, policies are sold through direct channels controlled by insurance companies or intermediaries, such as brokers and agents. Brokers play a vital role in the property & casualty insurance market and serving commercial clients with complex and large exposures. This report focusing on the commercial property & casualty insurance market, we look at the economic performance by brokers, the competitive structure of the marketplace, the compensation arrangements for brokers, and the placement with insurers. Furthermore, we also from regulators’ point of view to study and review a variety of issues, such as the ethics and conduct , conflict of interest, treating customers fairly, which are raised from insurance brokers industry. In contrast to captive agents, brokers act on behalf of the insured, for this circumstance, the role of the brokers is to increase price and coverage competitiveness, by providing the customers access to a wider range of possible insurers. Clearly the integrity of the bidding process is very important to protect the interest of customers and to the health of the insurance brokers market. Unfortunately, the integrity of the placement process by brokers has been questioned due to the allegations of bid rigging in which one or more global brokers and a few insurers appear to have conspired to submit non-competitive bids. This anti-competitive practice is not only detrimental to the customers but also cause public concerned that too much market power lead to abuses by brokers and that contingent commissions should be abolished. On October 14, 2004, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer filed suit against Marsh & McLennan alleging that the insurance brokers engaged in bid rigging and received widespread kickbacks from insurance companies. On January 31, 2005, Marsh agreed to pay $850 million in restitution to buyers as part of an agreement to settle the suit, but lawsuits still in progress. The above-mentioned case has revealed conflict of interest, anti-competitive and market manipulation for meg-brokers, in fact, these problems existed for a long time. Comparing with US and UK insurance brokers market, Taiwan is belong to emerging market, to gain knowledge of pioneer’s developing experience, we could shorten the time to get more progress. When we deal with the globalization challenge, local insurance broker market should be complied with international practices, improve relative rules and regulations is also necessary, once above situations are available, it could help domestic insurance market rapid and healthy growth.

The dissertation employs laboratory experimental methodology to study decision-making when people face trade-offs between ethical and economic values. More explicitly, the three chapters investigate 1) consumer behaviour when a substantially equivalent version of a product is more expensive because it was produced without child labour, 2) the interaction between an expert advisor and an ignorant decision-maker, when the former may gain from lying and the latter has to decide whether or not to trust in the advice, and 3) fairness in divisions of an economic gain between two people who were both involved in creating the gain, but only one of them provided real effort. Here, a focus is on the impact of power structure, i.e. who decides, on divisions and fairness judgments. All studies discuss implications of experimental behaviour for market and business domains. In addition, the thesis emphasizes ethical theories as complementary to normative benchmark from economic and psychological theory. / La tesis utiliza una metodología experimental para investigar las decisiones de los individuos cuando hay un conflicto entre valores éticos y económicos. Mas específicamente, los tres capítulos investigan sobre 1) el comportamiento del consumidor cuando se enfrenta a dos versiones de un mismo producto, siendo una de ellas más cara por ser producida sin trabajo infantil, 2) la interacción entre un agente experto y un agente desinformado que debe tomar una decisión confiando o no en el consejo del experto, el cuál puede mentir para ganar más dinero, y 3) el reparto justo de una ganancia económica entre dos personas de las cuales sólo una ha contribuido trabajando en un ejercicio. Este último estudio se centra en el impacto de la estructura de poder, es decir quién decide, en el reparto y en los juicios de que es lo justo. Los estudios analizan las implicaciones del comportamiento experimental sobre los mercados y las empresas. Además, la tesis propone teorías éticas para complementar las teorías económicas y psicológicas.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:30:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Matias Filho.pdf: 2247216 bytes, checksum: 9f58a8acab229af1da81ea011f6e8bd0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-14 / The economic growth is close linked with the growth of the companies. There is a great expectation that the countries of the supposed block BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India and China presented a vigorous growth in the coming decades. The capital structure of these companies will have a key role in providing more financial resources for the increased activity, necessary for this expected growth. The present study investigated the capital structure of the companies in this supposed economic block, in order to identify its determinants, the influence of governmental policies in their training and the alignment with the main theories of capital structure currently discussed in the literature: agency costs, trade-off, asymmetric information and pecking order. Made a comparison with U.S. companies, the leading country in the world economy, and calculate the level of debt off of the sample. The results identified several variables as determinants of capital structure of companies of the sample, with predominance for the variables at the firm level, and to a lesser degree in the macro-economic level. Strongly corroborated the assumptions of the theories discussed, and provided robust evidence of being aligned with U.S. companies. They also showed a reasonable debt off for countries in the sample, which can be applied to increase de activity of enterprises, except Russia. / O crescimento econômico está intimamente ligado com o crescimento das empresas. Existe uma grande expectativa que os países do BRIC: Brasil, Rússia, Índia e China apresentem um crescimento vigoroso nas próximas décadas. A estrutura de capital dessas empresas terá um papel fundamental na oferta de mais recursos financeiros para o aumento da atividade, necessário a esse crescimento esperado. O presente estudo investigou a estrutura de capital das empresas desse suposto bloco econômico, buscando identificar suas determinantes, a influência das políticas governamentais na sua formação e o alinhamento com as principais teorias de estrutura de capital discutidas atualmente na literatura: custos de agência, trade-off, assimetria de informação e pecking order. Efetuou uma comparação com empresas dos EUA, país líder da economia mundial, além de calcular o nível de folga de endividamento das empresas da amostra. Os resultados identificaram diversas variáveis como determinantes da estrutura de capital das empresas da amostra, com predominância para as variáveis no nível da empresa, e em menor grau no nível macro-econômico. Corroboraram fortemente as premissas das teorias discutidas, e forneceram indícios robustos de estarem alinhadas com as empresas dos EUA. Mostraram também uma folga de endividamento razoável para os países da amostra, que pode ser aplicada no aumento da atividade das empresas, com exceção da Rússia.

Pourquoi les négociations de paix échouent-elles? Pour répondre à cette question, ce mémoire synthétise la littérature sur les théories de la négociation et l’intervention de tierces parties dans les conflits intra-étatiques. À l’aide de la méthode de l’étude de cas, j’applique ce cadre théorique au troisième cycle de négociations de paix entre la Turquie et le Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan, qui s’est tenu de la fin décembre 2012 à Juillet 2015. Le modèle de négociation de guerre met l’accent sur les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible qui mènent à l’échec de négociations. Les problèmes d’information asymétrique et engagement crédible sont habituellement plus aigus dans les conflits intra-étatiques. Car il est plus difficile d’obtenir les informations sur les capacités militaires des groupes armés non-étatiques (GANE) et il y a généralement de grandes asymétries de pouvoir entre les États et les GANE. Cette étude de cas apporte ainsi quatre contributions à la compréhension du sujet. Premièrement, lors d’un processus de paix, les deux parties impliquées peuvent consciemment faire des choix qui ne leur permettront pas d’atteindre leurs objectifs. Deuxièmement, ces choix résultent des mesures mal-conçues dans les pratiques de négociation et/ou l’absence de tierce partie qui rétablirait l’équilibre relatif de pouvoir et qui le maintiendrait pendant les négociations de paix. En fin de compte, cela accentue les problèmes d’engagement crédible. Troisièmement, les changements exogènes perturbateurs en matière des capacités relatives, en particulier en faveur des GANE, peuvent produire les problèmes d’information asymétrique. Quatrièmement, certains conflits ne se prêtent pas à l’intervention de tierce partie. Il peut être très difficile ou lourd de conséquence pour les tierces parties de rétablir l’équilibre relatif des pouvoirs. / Why do peace negotiations fail? Answering this question, this dissertation synthesizes the literature on bargaining theory and third party involvement in intrastate conflicts. Using qualitative case study methods, I employ this theoretical framework to the third round of the peace talks between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which was held between December 2012 and July 2015. Bargaining model of war highlights the problems of information asymmetries and credible commitment that lead to bargaining failures. Information asymmetries and commitment problems are usually more severe in intrastate conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the military capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and there tends to be larger power asymmetries between states and NSAGs. The case highlights four sets of implications. First, both sides in a peace process can willingly make choices that fail to achieve the ends to which they aspired. Second, these choices result from ill-designed measures in bargaining practices and/or the lack of a third party that would redress the relative balance of power and maintain it during the peace talks. This ultimately intensifies the problems of credible commitment. Third, disruptive exogenous shifts in relative capabilities, especially in favor of the NSAG, may produce asymmetric information problems. Fourth, some conflicts do not lend themselves to third-party involvement, as it may be too difficult or costly for third parties to redress the relative balance of power.

Cette thèse se compose de trois essais autonomes sur le marché boursier chinois. Le premier essai examine le processus de la découverte du prix des actions A et H pour des sociétés chinoises double cotées à la fois sur les bourses de Shanghai/Shenzhen et de Hong Kong durant les sessions d'échange communes. Nous mettons en évidence une relation de long terme entre les prix des actions A et H. En appliquant la méthode de l'information partagée de Hasbrouck (1995), il apparaît, quand la Chine adoptait un régime de change fixe, le marché domestique contribuait plus d'information à la découverte du prix que le marché étranger; tandis que sous un régime de change flexible, c'est le marché étranger qui dominait dans la découverte du prix.Le deuxième essai prenant les réformes chinoises du régime de Juillet 2005 et de Juillet 2008 comme des événements spéciaux, il étudie si ces changements de régime de change affectent l'arbitrage entre les marchés des actions A et H. En comparant les niveaux des impacts des facteurs idiosyncratiques sur la décote de prix des actions A et H avant et après les changements de régime, les résultats montrent que la relaxation des contrôles des changes ne favorise pas l'arbitrage entre les deux marchés. Par ailleurs, ce changement de régime de change introduit un risque de change important dans la stratégie des arbitragistes.Le troisième essai aborde la transmission d'information en séance et hors séance de cotation en termes de rendements et de volatilités entre la Chine, l'Amérique et l'Europe. Le problème du synchronisme est considéré avec soin dans la modélisation bivariée avec la Chine comme référence avec des données journalières. / This thesis consists of three self-contained essays on the Chinese stock market. The first essay examines the price discovery process of Chinese dual-listed firms on the A-share and H-share markets during overlapping trading hours. We provide evidence that there exists a long-term relationship between the A- and H-share markets. By applying the information share model of Hasbrouck (1995), we find that: under a fixed exchange rate, the A-share market contributes more innovations in price discovery than the H-share market; while under a managed floating exchange rate, it is the H-share market that plays a dominant role in the price discovery process.In the second essay, by using the exchange rate regime changes of July 21, 2005 and July 01, 2008 of as special events, we examine whether changes in exchange-rate regime affect the intensity of inter-market arbitrage between A- and H-share markets. By comparing the significance of the impact of idiosyncratic factors on the H-share discount before and after the changes of exchange rate regime, the results show that the relaxation of exchange controls does not encourage inter-market arbitrage between the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong markets. Further, the switch from a fixed to a floating exchange-rate regime introduces an important exchange rate risk to arbitrageurs.The last essay studies daytime and overnight information transmission in terms of returns and volatility between China, America and Europe. The asynchronicity issue is carefully considered in the bivariate modelling with China as benchmark with daily data.

Cette thèse apporte une lumière sur divers aspects du financement par émission d’obligations convertibles sur le marché ouest européen entre 1994 et 2016. La première étude analyse la réaction du marché à l’annonce d’obligations convertibles en période de crise. Nos résultats montrent une réaction significativement plus négative en période de crise qu’en période normale. L’étude des déterminants de cette réaction indique que les investisseurs intègrent le potentiel des obligations convertibles à réduire les coûts de financement externes. Cependant, la réaction négative du marché est au moins partiellement due à la suspicion d’une possible surévaluation de l’émetteur et cette suspicion est exacerbée en périodes de crise financière. Par ailleurs, nous montrons qu’une part de la réaction négative enregistrée à l’annonce des convertibles est probablement due aux ventes à découvert opérées par les arbitragistes. La deuxième étude de cette thèse teste la théorie du financement séquentiel de Mayers (1998) qui prédit que le recours aux obligations convertibles permet de financer de façon optimale des investissements séquentiels. Nous évaluons l’importance du call émetteur dans la mise en œuvre optimale du financement séquentiel en comparant les activités de financement et d’investissement des firmes ayant rappelées par anticipation leurs obligations convertibles à celles d'entreprises du même secteur les ayant remboursées normalement à leur échéance. Nos résultats indiquent que la clause de rachat anticipé permet aux émetteurs de minimiser les coûts d’émissions et signale une stratégie de financement séquentiel sous sa forme « forte ». De plus, le modèle des doubles différences indique que les firmes ayant rappelées leurs convertibles par anticipation investissent plus que les entreprises les ayant remboursées normalement aux dates de rappel et ce en considérant les effets temporels et autres variables de contrôle. Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse traite de la politique de remboursement anticipé des obligations convertibles. Nous montrons à l’instar des études précédentes que les firmes retardent le rappel de leurs convertibles par rapport au point optimal de rappel préconisé par Ingersoll (1977). L’analyse des différentes théories justifiant le rappel tardif des obligations convertibles débouche sur des résultats cohérents avec l’hypothèse de détresse financière mais rejette celles liées à l’existence de la période de notification. / This thesis focuses on three aspects of convertible bonds financing using a Western European sample between 1994 and 2016. The first study of this thesis is related to the shareholder wealth effects at the announcement of the convertible bonds issuance during financial crises. We find that the market reaction is more negative during crises’ periods compared to that in normal periods. Analysis of the determinant of this reaction indicates that the market recognizes the potential of convertible bonds to reduce agency and adverse selection costs. However, we also find that the signal of overvaluation sent by the issuance mitigates the investors’ optimism about the ability of the convertible bonds to alleviate external financing costs and this bad signal is exacerbated during the financial crises. Furthermore, we find that firms that are short-sale constrained incur less negative market reaction. The second study tests the sequential financing theory of Mayers (1998) which supports that firms issue callable convertible bonds in order to implement optimal sequential financing strategy. We point out in this study the importance of the call provision by comparing the investment and financing activities of Western European firms that early called their convertible bonds to those in the same industry that redeemed their bonds at maturity. We find that the inclusion of such provision allows firms (callable convertible bonds issuers) to better control issuance costs and signals a “strong” sequential financing strategy. We also find that the calling firms invest more than the non-calling firms at the call date and the difference-in-differences model shows that this difference is due to the call decision, after controlling for time fixed effects and other control variables. The last chapter of this thesis addresses the issue of convertible bonds call delay. As previous studies, we find that the companies do not call their bond at the optimum point identified by Ingersoll (1977). Unlike previous researches in the same area, our study considers the main theoretical rationales for convertible bonds call delay. We find strong evidence for the financial distress hypothesis, little evidence for cash flow advantage and signaling theories but no evidence for the notice period justification.

Diese Dissertation befasst sich in drei voneinander unabhängigen Kapiteln mit dem Forschungsfeld des ökonomischen Designs. Das "Design" von Situationen wirtschaftlicher Interaktion hat zum Ziel, den Verlauf und das Ergebnis der jeweiligen Interaktion zu steuern. In dieser Arbeit werden mathematisch-theoretische "Designs" zum einen formal entwickelt und diese zum anderen durch politische oder soziale Institutionen realisiert. Das erste Kapitel thematisiert die Implementierung von Sozialwahlfunktionen in einem kollusiven Umfeld. Es wird gezeigt, wie die gezielte Schaffung von asymmetrischer Information zwischen den kolludierenden Parteien deren Koordination erschweren und die Implementierung erleichtern kann. Im zweiten Kapitel wird dieser Ansatz im Kontext der Bestechlichkeit bei Finanzaudits angewendet. Korruption kann verhindert werden, wenn der bestechliche Akteure eine Warnung über anstehende Kontrollen erhält, nicht jedoch der bestechende Akteur. Das dritte Kapitel wiederum untersucht "Design" in Form von Markt- und Wettbewerbsregulierung. Eine Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs - durch eine Begrenzung der Zahl miteinander konkurrierender Firmen - kann entgegen der ökonomischen Intuition wohlfahrtsoptimierend sein. / This thesis contributes to the field of economic design in three independent chapters. Taking the perspective of a "designer", it derives formal solutions in the framework of economic theory and suggests political as well as social institutions to put these solutions to practice. The first chapter employs mechanism design to mitigate the problem of collusion. It shows how the implementation of social choice functions can be achieved by introducing asymmetric information into a system prone to collusion. In the second chapter, this methodology is applied to the context of corruption in auditing. Bribery is impeded by selectively warning one - and only one - of the corruptive parties about upcoming inspections. Finally, the third chapter studies market regulation as a means of "design". Contrary to economic intuition, it may be beneficial in terms of welfare to limit competition by restricting the number of firms allowed to enter a market.