Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime. Toutefois, d’autres philosophes soutiennent que malgré son omniprésence dans la vie de tous les jours, le blâme doxastique n’est jamais approprié. En effet, selon l’argument à partir de l’involontarisme doxastique, nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances puisque (1) nous pouvons être blâmés pour une croyance seulement si elle est sous notre contrôle volontaire et (2) nos croyances ne sont jamais sous notre contrôle volontaire. Le but de ce mémoire est de déterminer si les déontologistes peuvent répondre de manière convaincante à cet argument. Autrement dit, pouvons-nous parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances malgré ce qu’en disent les anti-déontologistes, ou faut-il leur donner raison et rejeter la pratique du blâme doxastique ? Pour répondre à cette question, je commence par clarifier l’argument anti-déontologiste en précisant la teneur de sa thèse centrale : l’involontarisme doxastique. Par la suite, je passe en revue différentes stratégies qui ont été proposées par des représentants du déontologisme pour défendre le blâme doxastique contre cet argument. Devant l’échec de ces réponses, je suggère une défense alternative du déontologisme selon laquelle l’involontarisme doxastique n’est pas incompatible avec le blâme doxastique. Si cette réponse est concluante, alors nous n’avons pas à donner raison aux anti-déontologistes : nous pouvons parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances. / Can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs ? According to epistemic deontologism, the ordinary practice of blaming and criticizing people for their beliefs is a legitimate one. However, some philosophers argue that despite its pervasiveness in everyday life, doxastic blame is never appropriate. According to the argument from doxastic involuntarism, we can never be blamed for our beliefs since (1) we can be blamed for a belief only if it is under our voluntary control, and (2) our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether deontologists can reply convincingly to this argument. In other words, can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs despite what anti-deontologists claim, or do we have to accept the argument from doxastic involuntarism and reject the practice of doxastic blame ? In order to answer that question, I first clarify the anti-deontologist argument by making more precise the nature of its central thesis: doxastic involuntarism. I then review different strategies proposed by deontologists to defend doxastic blame against this argument. Given the failure of these replies, I propose an alternative defense of deontologism according to which doxastic involuntarism is not incompatible with doxastic blame. If this reply is sound, then we do not have to accept the anti-deontologist argument: we can sometimes be blamed for our beliefs.

No description available.

The centrepoint of this thesis is an action research project, the Maternal Alienation Project (MAP), implemented during 2002 and 2003 in Adelaide, South Australia. Resourced by two government-funded community health services, it was established to improve organisations’ (health, welfare and legal) and systems’ responses to the newly termed ‘maternal alienation’. MAP was situated within a tradition of feminist participatory and action research. It was designed to work on three levels: practice, systems and policy-making, and research. The outcomes, processes and events of MAP at the different levels of its operation are examined in the thesis through the employment of a gendered analysis drawn mainly from materialist feminism and standpoint theories. Post-project interviews and focus groups provided further data to the fieldnotes written throughout MAP, and the project’s formal and informal documents. A recent example of a contested gendered concept, “maternal alienation” was first identified and named in 1999 as a component of gender violence (Morris 1999). It forms part of a spectrum of violence perpetrated in households, and had been identified within domestic violence and child sexual abuse. It is a term for the range of tactics used by mainly male perpetrators, predominantly the mothers’ intimate partners and the children’s fathers or step-fathers, to deliberately undermine the relationship between mothers and their children. The mother-blaming discourses and degrading constructions of mothers conveyed to children and those in the family’s orbit are strongly related to wider socio-cultural constructions of women and mothers. The thesis examines theories of gender, gendered organisations and gender violence. It develops the concept of an abusive household gender regime, characterised by perpetrators’ imposition of a coercive and abusive regime on household members, and particular patternings of gendered relations. Comparisons are made between household and organisational gender regimes, which are also viewed in relation to the local gender order at the time of MAP. It was found that services that lack an analysis of gender are likely to re-inscribe the dynamics of maternal alienation in their responses to families. Language was found to play a significant part in addressing maternal alienation, particularly in developing congruence between language and women’s and children’s “lived” experiences. The principles that were developed were founded on supporting mothers and rebuilding their relationships with children, and making visible the tactics employed by perpetrators, thereby reducing their power to coerce and increasing their accountability. The concept of maternal alienation and MAP itself were attacked by a coalition of men’s rights and Christian Right lobbyists. This compromised the operations of MAP, and of its key supporters, managers of feminist and gender-aware organisations. In many ways these attacks, played out at a macro level, reflected the techniques and dynamics of maternal alienation at a micro level. This thesis raises questions about the strategies that feminist organisations need to develop to more effectively pursue feminist agendas, and to re-invigorate a women’s movement. / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Social Sciences, 2008

Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime. Toutefois, d’autres philosophes soutiennent que malgré son omniprésence dans la vie de tous les jours, le blâme doxastique n’est jamais approprié. En effet, selon l’argument à partir de l’involontarisme doxastique, nous ne pouvons jamais être blâmés pour nos croyances puisque (1) nous pouvons être blâmés pour une croyance seulement si elle est sous notre contrôle volontaire et (2) nos croyances ne sont jamais sous notre contrôle volontaire. Le but de ce mémoire est de déterminer si les déontologistes peuvent répondre de manière convaincante à cet argument. Autrement dit, pouvons-nous parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances malgré ce qu’en disent les anti-déontologistes, ou faut-il leur donner raison et rejeter la pratique du blâme doxastique ? Pour répondre à cette question, je commence par clarifier l’argument anti-déontologiste en précisant la teneur de sa thèse centrale : l’involontarisme doxastique. Par la suite, je passe en revue différentes stratégies qui ont été proposées par des représentants du déontologisme pour défendre le blâme doxastique contre cet argument. Devant l’échec de ces réponses, je suggère une défense alternative du déontologisme selon laquelle l’involontarisme doxastique n’est pas incompatible avec le blâme doxastique. Si cette réponse est concluante, alors nous n’avons pas à donner raison aux anti-déontologistes : nous pouvons parfois être blâmés pour nos croyances. / Can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs ? According to epistemic deontologism, the ordinary practice of blaming and criticizing people for their beliefs is a legitimate one. However, some philosophers argue that despite its pervasiveness in everyday life, doxastic blame is never appropriate. According to the argument from doxastic involuntarism, we can never be blamed for our beliefs since (1) we can be blamed for a belief only if it is under our voluntary control, and (2) our beliefs are never under our voluntary control. The goal of this thesis is to determine whether deontologists can reply convincingly to this argument. In other words, can we sometimes be blamed for our beliefs despite what anti-deontologists claim, or do we have to accept the argument from doxastic involuntarism and reject the practice of doxastic blame ? In order to answer that question, I first clarify the anti-deontologist argument by making more precise the nature of its central thesis: doxastic involuntarism. I then review different strategies proposed by deontologists to defend doxastic blame against this argument. Given the failure of these replies, I propose an alternative defense of deontologism according to which doxastic involuntarism is not incompatible with doxastic blame. If this reply is sound, then we do not have to accept the anti-deontologist argument: we can sometimes be blamed for our beliefs.

Submitted by Mirian Albert Pires (mirianalbert@yahoo.com.br) on 2018-07-26T17:23:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Irresponsabilidade Social Empresarial - O caso Mariana - Tese - Mirian - Final.pdf: 2700004 bytes, checksum: 478a9b4de7ac44c898648f186318d969 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2018-07-30T18:56:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Irresponsabilidade Social Empresarial - O caso Mariana - Tese - Mirian - Final.pdf: 2700004 bytes, checksum: 478a9b4de7ac44c898648f186318d969 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-07T14:36:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Irresponsabilidade Social Empresarial - O caso Mariana - Tese - Mirian - Final.pdf: 2700004 bytes, checksum: 478a9b4de7ac44c898648f186318d969 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-27 / Esse trabalho investigou o tema Irresponsabilidade Social Empresarial, a partir de um estudo de caso relativo ao desastre ambiental causado pela Samarco Mineração S.A. ao município de Mariana-MG, que impactou todas as cidades localizadas na região dos rios Gualaxo do Norte, do Carmo e Doce. Diante dessas considerações, apresentou como objetivo geral o propósito de constatar se a identificação social com a Samarco Mineração S.A., que surge em função dos benefícios econômicos proporcionados por ela a alguns municípios, reduz a atribuição de culpa dessa empresa e a intenção punitiva de um evento de irresponsabilidade social, além de gerar impacto para demais atribuições e sentimentos que possam surgir nos indivíduos-alvo da investigação. Alguns modelos teóricos forneceram subsídios para a testagem de dois modelos empíricos que foram testados e possibilitaram alcançar esse objetivo. Em termos metodológicos, trata-se de um estudo quantitativo, adotando a técnica do estudo de caso, aplicando um questionário com 1616 moradores de cinco cidades afetadas pelo desastre, coletado presencialmente na sua maior parte. Os dados de cada cidade foram analisados com o uso da modelagem de equações estruturais, com auxílio do software Stata versão 14, e posteriormente os resultados de cada cidade foram comparados entre si. Com relação a esses resultados, o modelo relacionando os benefícios econômicos e a Irresponsabilidade Social Empresarial, ajustado com base nas sugestões do modification indices, gerou resultados estatísticos com um bom ajuste considerando os indicadores apresentados. Como conclusão desse modelo, foi possível constatar que os benefícios para a economia local afetaram negativamente a intenção punitiva dos moradores das cidades de Anchieta-ES, Guarapari-ES e Mariana-MG, cidades essas que eram beneficiadas economicamente pela Samarco Mineração S.A. Além disso, foi identificado por intermédio desse modelo que, para as cidades de Anchieta-ES, Colatina-ES, Guarapari-ES, Linhares-ES e Mariana-MG, a severidade/gravidade do evento afetou positivamente a atribuição de culpa à empresa; e a intenção punitiva afetou positivamente a intenção de fazer comentários negativos à mineradora. Quanto ao modelo dos sentimentos negativos relacionados à Irresponsabilidade Social Empresarial, que também foi ajustado com base nas sugestões do modification indices, os resultados estatísticos evidenciaram um bom ajuste de acordo com os indicadores apurados. Como conclusão desse segundo modelo, foi verificado que a ganância afetou positivamente a percepção de falta de integridade da empresa, que, por sua vez afetou de forma positiva a sensação de ultraje moral, que, na sequência, gerou efeito positivo sobre os comentários negativos dos indivíduos pesquisados. Houve uma contribuição no sentido de evidenciar os processos da sociedade que contribuem para a existência e manutenção da Irresponsabilidade Social Empresarial. Foram apresentadas as discussões para esses resultados, bem como as contribuições teóricas, metodológicas e práticas do estudo, além da proposição de uma agenda futura de pesquisas relacionadas ao tema irresponsabilidade social empresarial. / This study explores the issue of Corporate Social Irresponsibility, using a case study on the environmental disaster caused by Samarco Mineração SA in the municipality of Mariana-MG, which impacted all cities located in the region of the rivers Gualaxo do Norte, Carmo and Doce. The main objective was to determine whether the social identification of the affected population with Samarco Mineração SA – built based on the economic benefits of the company for the municipalities in the region – reduces the blame attribution and the punitive intention towards the company because of the event of social irresponsibility. And to see whether this social identification impacts on other attributions and feelings that may be observed in the population targeted in the study. Some theoretical models supported the testing of two empirical models that were applied and contributed to achieve the study’s objective. As for the methodology, it is a quantitative study using a case study and applying a questionnaire with 1,616 inhabitants of five cities affected by the disaster, collected mostly in person. The data in each city were analyzed using structured equation modeling processed through the software Stata 14. The results for each of the cities were then compared. Regarding the results, the model relating the economic benefits and the Corporate Social Irresponsibility (adjusted based on the suggestions of the modification indices), generated statistical results with a good adjustment considering the indicators presented. The conclusion, considering this first model, is that the benefits to the local economy negatively affected the punitive intention of the residents of the municipalities of Anchieta-ES, Guarapari-ES and Mariana-MG, benefited economically by Samarco Mineração SA. In addition, it was possible to observe that, for the cities Anchieta-ES, Colatina-ES, Guarapari-ES, Linhares-ES and Mariana-MG, the severity of the event positively affected the blame attribution towards the company; and the punitive intention positively affected the intention of making negative comments to the mining company. As for the model of negative feelings related to Corporate Social Irresponsibility, which was also adjusted based on the suggestions of the modification indices, the statistical results showed a good adjustment according to the indicators presented. The conclusion, considering this second model, is that the perception of greed on the part of the company positively affected the perception around its lack of integrity, which in turn positively affected the feeling of moral outrage, and had a positive effect on the negative comments of the participants. It was possible to highlight the processes of society that contribute to the existence and maintenance of Corporate Social Irresponsibility. The results are discussed considering theoretical, methodological and practical contributions of the study and an agenda for future research is proposed in order to explore the issue of corporate social irresponsibility.

The research dealt with three girls in middle childhood years, in a children’s home, who were experiencing difficulties with self-blame. These difficulties were addressed through play therapy sessions using the ‘gestalt’ approach with the life story book as an aid. The motivation for the study originated during discussions with the social workers at the Abraham Kriel/Maria Kloppers Children’s Home. During these discussions the researcher became aware of the vast number of children in the caseloads of the social workers at Abraham Kriel/Maria Kloppers Children’s Home, who blame themselves for being removed from their parents’ custody. The purpose of the study was to determine whether the life story book could be used as an aid in play therapy sessions focussing on the self-blame of girls in middle childhood years, living in a children’s home. To achieve the goal of this study, a literature study was done regarding the middle childhood years, self-blame, the child in a children’s home and the use of the life story book in play therapy. An empirical study was conducted on the use of the life story book regarding the self-blame of three girls in the middle childhood years, living in a children’s home. Finally the researcher made conclusions and recommendations regarding the use of the life story book, after taking into consideration both the literature study and the empirical study. The investigation was based on applied research. For the purpose of this study, three girls in middle childhood years living in a children’s home were identified by means of purposive sampling. The girls participated in six play therapy sessions each. From this empirical research, it was clear that the life story book could be successfully used in play therapy, focussing on self-blame, with the three girls in middle childhood years living in a children’s home. As an outcome of this study, conclusions and recommendations were formulated. / Dissertation (MSD (Play Therapy))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Social Work / unrestricted

En partant de l’une des périodes les plus riches dans l’histoire de l’Islam en termes de créativité et de production poétiques, notre projet vise à mettre au jour les formes qu’a revêtues le rapport entre le poète et le Prince. Pour élucider ce rapport aussi complexe que protéiforme, nous ferons appel à un corpus riche et varié, et on tentera alors d’examiner la question de l’éloge et du blâme à travers trois prismes : la rhétorique, l’éthique et la politique. Le discours encomiastique mobilise la rhétorique afin d’emporter l’adhésion d’un auditoire sur une matière qui n’est pas encore établie. Mais l’effort déployé par l’orateur afin de convaincre l’auditoire ne peut se passer de la toile de fond éthique et du système commun de valeurs dont il procède pour arriver à la persuasion. Quant à la dimension politique, elle se reflète dans la fonction du poète comme « arme verbale » au service du Prince et instrument de légitimation de sa position politique contre ses adversaires réels ou potentiels. Par-delà la fonction de panégyriste officiel, la performativité du discours politique s’étend également à la parole, d’éducation, de réforme voire de critique ouverte qui pourrait évoquer la parrêsia antique. Grâce à un fonds sapiential, la poésie apporte sa contribution au processus de formation de l’homme politique et lui offre un excellent manuel de gouvernement. Quant à la veine contestataire, l’invective, la caricature et la mobilisation de la parole polémique constituent ses principaux ressorts. La veine contestataire traverse le regard que le poète jette sur l’univers de la cour, la politique du Prince ou le rapport entre gouvernants/gouvernés. Qu’il s’agisse de nominations, de projets politiques ou de l’ethos même de l’homme du pouvoir, le poète est toujours présent pour donner son avis. L’injustice d’une décision prise par un juge, le népotisme d’un gouverneur ou la dureté d’un général sont autant d’aspects qui témoignent de la vivacité de la critique du pouvoir par le poète, et du rôle que ce dernier endosse en tant que moralisateur de cette sphère. Le conseil se présente alors comme le moyen de rectifier les décisions ou les orientations générales du Prince et témoigne de l’existence d’une véritable rationalité poétique. Aussi, la rhétorique de l’éloge et du blâme témoigne-elle de l’existence d’une rationalité poétique qui arrive à maturité à l’époque abbasside et parvient à un degré d’efficience oratoire sans précédent en raison d’une conscience accrue du poète de la nécessité de s’impliquer dans la vie politique et de peser sur le cours de l’Histoire. / Based on one of the richest periods in the history of Islam in terms of poetic creativity and production, our project seeks to revise the forms that characterized the relationship between the poet and the prince. To elucidate this relationship as complex as it is protean, we will call on a rich and varied corpus, and then examine the question of praise and blame through three prisms: rhetoric, ethics and politics. The encomiastic discourse uses rhetoric to gain an audience’s support for a matter that is not yet established. But the effort required by the orator to convince the audience necessitates the ethical backdrop and common system of values, from which he proceeds to persuade. As for the political dimension, it is reflected in the poet’s function as the “verbal arm” serving the prince and as an instrument legitimizing his political position against real or potential opponents. Beyond the function of official panegyrist, the performativity of political discourse also extends to speech, education, reform, even open criticism that could evoke the antique parrêsia. By virtue of its sapiential substance, poetry contributes to the process forming the politician and offers him an excellent manual to government. As for the dissenting vein, invective, caricature and the mobilization of polemical speech constitute his main resources. The dissenting vein passes through the poet’s gaze on the universe of the court, the prince’s politics and the relationship between governor/governed. Whether it involves nominations, political projects or the very ethos of the man of power, the poet is always present to give his opinion. The injustice of a decision made by a judge, the nepotism of a governor or the harshness of a general are all aspects that demonstrate the poet’s vivacious criticism of power, and the role that the latter assumes as the moralizer of this sphere. The counsel is then presented as a means to rectify the prince’s general decisions or orientations and attests to the existence of a veritable poetic rationality. Furthermore, the rhetoric of praise and blame indicates the existence of a poetic rationality that reached maturity in the Abbasid period and attained an unprecedented degree of oratory efficiency, due to the poet’s growing consciousness of the necessity to be involved in political life and to influence the course of history.

This thesis, bearing the name "The crime of drunkenness according to § 360 of Act No. 40/2009Coll., Criminal Code" aims to analyse and understand deeper the crime of drunkenness in all its aspects. Initially, it deals with the historical kontext of this crime and the development of its conception through history to this day. The thesis also describes terms of diminished sanity and insanity as well as other terms related to the crime including the institute actio libera in causa in both of its forms. This crime is indeed an atypical one, whilst being one of the methods of dealing with illegal deeds committed by inflicted insanity. Such crime lies in the fact that the offender of an act otherwise criminal (one lacking an important sign of a crime) had, prior to such act, induced himself to a state of insanity by culpable consuming or applicating an addictive substance. Insanity as itself exclude criminal culpability of the offender, however not in cases hen offender self-inducing it by consuming or applicating an addictive substance, which makes the crime of drunkenness unique. No less interesting is that, in a way, the crime of drunkenness overcomes the principle nullum crimen sine culpa, or no crime without culpability, since it is composed of two separate actions, while culpability revers only to...

<p>This dissertation argues for a number of theses related to responsibility, norm psychology, and personhood. Although most of the papers argue for “standalone” theses, in the sense that their truth does not depend the truth of the others, the five papers collectively illustrate a broader view of humans as (a) responsible agents who are (b) self-governing and (c) equipped with a capacity for norms, and whose agency (d) centers on dynamic responsiveness to corrective feedback. Drawing on this broader picture, the dissertation sheds light on ethical questions about our social practices and technologies, as well as descriptive questions about the nature of substance use disorder. </p> <p>Most centrally, the dissertation argues that forward-looking considerations are relevant for responsibility, not merely because the consequences of our responsibility practices are desirable, but primarily because of a connection which I argue exists between relationships, norms, and learning. On the view I defend, an agent is a responsible agent only if she can learn from being held responsible, so as to regulate herself according to norms of which she presently falls short. I argue that, if it were not for the capacity of humans to learn from <i>social corrective feedback</i>, such as normative responses like praise and blame, humans would be unable to participate in norm-governed relationships and communities. It is in virtue of their participation in these relationships and communities that humans are subject to interpersonal norms, such that they can fulfill or violate these norms and be praiseworthy or blameworthy for doing so. So, without the kind of learning that makes participation in these relationships a possibility, humans could never be praiseworthy or blameworthy for anything that they do. </p> <p>The dissertation also argues that human norm psychology has implications for how we should relate to “social robots”—artificial agents designed to participate in relationships with humans. I argue that, like humans, social robots should be equipped with a capacity to recognize and respond to normative feedback. Lastly, the dissertation resists a common narrative about addiction as being a form of akrasia in which agents act against their own better judgment. While this is certainly a central aspect of many cases of addiction, I argue that it fails to appreciate the ways in which addiction sometimes interacts with a person’s identity and goals, especially in cases where the agent believes that the things she values would not be feasible if she did not continue to engage in addictive behavior.</p>

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