This dissertation provides a rebuttal to the claims of Richard Dawkins in explaining the origin of life. The bulk of the ensuing analysis challenges his philosophical assumptions as it notes his vacillation between several models over time. The study further details Dawkins's multifaceted approach to the problem as it points out a number of errors permeating his general methodology and reasoning.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-27T13:48:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ANDERSON CLAYTON SANTANA DO NASCIMENTO.pdf: 1307071 bytes, checksum: 9188332f6cac59d6d5ee6501fa8fd09a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-02 / Deus, um delírio? A doutrina neoateísta de Richard Dawkins enquanto doadora de sentido para a vida é uma pesquisa que tem como objetivo analisar o pensamento de Richard Dawkins, condensado em sua obra principal o livro Deus um delírio para que seja possível verificar como funcionam os argumentos ali contidos e analisar a oferta de sentido que traz para substituir a religião enquanto doadora de sentido para a vida. A pesquisa foi feita através de uma revisão bibliográfica das obras do autor e de seus principais críticos. No primeiro capítulo foram investigados os pressupostos e as origens das ideias do pensamento ateísta de Dawkins. No segundo capítulo se faz uma análise mais pormenorizada das ideias de Dawkins. No terceiro capítulo o pensamento de Dawkins é analisado enquanto doutrina doadora de sentido para a vida humana. Foi constatado que Dawkins usa a o conhecimento científico fora de sua alçada para propagar uma doutrina liberalista.

Esta dissertação de mestrado aborda a controvérsia em torno de qual é o nível biológico no qual a seleção natural atua, com ênfase na proposta de Richard Dawkins do gene egoísta e nas questões que surgem em torno da mesma. Examina-se um panorama de questões de filosofia da biologia abordadas a partir do problema dos níveis nos quais a seleção natural atua. Esperamos que ao avaliar o impacto da teoria do gene egoísta na problemática evolutiva, consigamos compreender sua importância. O objetivo deste trabalho é filosófico, delineando as questões e clarificando alguns termos do debate, sem se propor a tomar partido por uma ou outra posição. O primeiro capítulo apresenta as origens históricas do debate, partindo do ponto de vista original de Charles Darwin no qual o indivíduo era a entidade efetivamente selecionada. Em seguida, buscamos entender como novas questões empíricas, em especial a busca de explicações biológicas para o altruísmo, conduziram a propostas de seleção de grupo. No segundo capítulo delineamos como o desenvolvimento da genética possibilitou que um novo nível de seleção fosse proposto: o gene, e acompanhamos a exposição de Dawkins sobre o ponto de vista do gene egoísta, em especial a partir de seus dois livros mais relevantes sobre o tema: O gene egoísta e O fenótipo estendido. O terceiro capítulo examina diversas aproximações filosóficas no contexto de resposta à pergunta: o que é uma unidade de seleção?. Nosso estudo é consistente com a tese de que as forças seletivas atuam simultaneamente em diversos níveis. / This Masters thesis studies the controversy over what is the biological level in which natural selection takes place. Emphasis is given to Richard Dawkins proposal of the selfish gene and to the issues that arise therefrom, which include many questions in the philosophy of biology. We hope that by assessing the impact that the theory of the selfish gene has had on the problems of evolution, one may understand its importance. The aim of this study is philosophical, raising questions and clarifying the terms of the debate, without taking side on one or another position. The first chapter presents the historical origins of the debate, starting with the original view of Charles Darwin that the individual is the entity that is effectively selected. We then set out to understand how new empirical problems, specifically the search for biological explanations for altruism, led to proposals of group selection. In the second chapter, we depict how the development of genetics allowed that a new level of selection be proposed: the gene. We analyze Dawkins exposition of the point of view of the selfish gene, especially in the two most important books on the subject: The selfish gene and The extended phenotype. The third chapter examines several philosophical approaches to the question what is a unit of selection?. Our study is consistent with the thesis that selective forces act simultaneously in different levels.

Esta dissertação de mestrado aborda a controvérsia em torno de qual é o nível biológico no qual a seleção natural atua, com ênfase na proposta de Richard Dawkins do gene egoísta e nas questões que surgem em torno da mesma. Examina-se um panorama de questões de filosofia da biologia abordadas a partir do problema dos níveis nos quais a seleção natural atua. Esperamos que ao avaliar o impacto da teoria do gene egoísta na problemática evolutiva, consigamos compreender sua importância. O objetivo deste trabalho é filosófico, delineando as questões e clarificando alguns termos do debate, sem se propor a tomar partido por uma ou outra posição. O primeiro capítulo apresenta as origens históricas do debate, partindo do ponto de vista original de Charles Darwin no qual o indivíduo era a entidade efetivamente selecionada. Em seguida, buscamos entender como novas questões empíricas, em especial a busca de explicações biológicas para o altruísmo, conduziram a propostas de seleção de grupo. No segundo capítulo delineamos como o desenvolvimento da genética possibilitou que um novo nível de seleção fosse proposto: o gene, e acompanhamos a exposição de Dawkins sobre o ponto de vista do gene egoísta, em especial a partir de seus dois livros mais relevantes sobre o tema: O gene egoísta e O fenótipo estendido. O terceiro capítulo examina diversas aproximações filosóficas no contexto de resposta à pergunta: o que é uma unidade de seleção?. Nosso estudo é consistente com a tese de que as forças seletivas atuam simultaneamente em diversos níveis. / This Masters thesis studies the controversy over what is the biological level in which natural selection takes place. Emphasis is given to Richard Dawkins proposal of the selfish gene and to the issues that arise therefrom, which include many questions in the philosophy of biology. We hope that by assessing the impact that the theory of the selfish gene has had on the problems of evolution, one may understand its importance. The aim of this study is philosophical, raising questions and clarifying the terms of the debate, without taking side on one or another position. The first chapter presents the historical origins of the debate, starting with the original view of Charles Darwin that the individual is the entity that is effectively selected. We then set out to understand how new empirical problems, specifically the search for biological explanations for altruism, led to proposals of group selection. In the second chapter, we depict how the development of genetics allowed that a new level of selection be proposed: the gene. We analyze Dawkins exposition of the point of view of the selfish gene, especially in the two most important books on the subject: The selfish gene and The extended phenotype. The third chapter examines several philosophical approaches to the question what is a unit of selection?. Our study is consistent with the thesis that selective forces act simultaneously in different levels.

Le concept de gène est central en biologie. Certains ont avancé (Ruse (1971, 1976)) que la génétique classique pouvait être réduite à la génétique moléculaire. Dans le même ordre d'idée, Richard Dawkins, dans The Extended Phenotype, offre une double définition de son concept de gène qui présuppose qu'il soit possible d'opérer cette réduction. Nous comptons montrer que la génétique moléculaire et la génétique des populations ont chacune leurs problématiques propres en reconstituant l'histoire de la génétique depuis Darwin. Ensuite, nous expliciterons la position de Dawkins et soulignerons les contradictions auxquelles il parvient en raison de cette réduction infondée. À la suite de quoi, nous nous attarderons aux nouvelles découvertes moléculaires qui montrent qu'il n'est pas possible d'opérer la réduction d'un des concepts à l'autre. Nous terminerons en soulignant que la thèse génocentriste de Dawkins n'est pas mise en péril par l'abandon de la réduction, mais qu'il est nécessaire de tempérer ces prétentions. La conclusion globale de ce mémoire est qu'il est possible d'admettre le concept de Dawkins, mais pas la manière dont il l'utilise. Le concept est bon, il n'est tout simplement pas dans le bon cadre théorique. / The concept of gene is of great importance in biology. Some philosophers asserted (Ruse (1971, 1976)) that classical genetics can be reduce to molecular genetics. Similarly, in The Extended Phenotype, the definition of the gene Richard Dawkins is giving presupposes such a reduction. By reconstituting the history of genetics since Darwin, we will show that population genetics and molecular genetics are interested in problems of their own. Then, we will explain Dawkins' position and stress contradictions which follow from that illegitimate reduction. Afterward, we'll show that new molecular researches refute the possibility of reducing the concept of population genetics to a concept of molecular genetics. One of our conclusion is that the gene's eye view has not to be dropped out. It is only necessary to temper these claims. The most important conclusion of this memoire is that the concept Dawkins is using is legitimate, but not the way he is using it. The concept does not fit in Dawkins' conceptual framework.

The compatibility between the Christian faith and various scientific advances has been up for discussion time and again to the degree that the debate is hard to miss. According to most, the most daunting subject of the discussion might be the compatibility with Darwin’s theory of evolution. In an attempt to get a perspective on this issue, this paper discusses compatibility by analysing the argumentation on the subject by two evolutionary biologists: Richard Dawkins and Joan Roughgarden. The arguments of the two authors are then tested regarding validity and applicability, leading to the conclusion that although both make valid claims regarding the subject of evolution, Dawkins’ reasoning of incompatibility can only be applied to a strictly limited group of Christians, whereas Roughgarden’s arguments for compatibility between the theory of evolution the Bible appears to be both tenable and applicable to Christianity at large. The conclusion is thus drawn that a certain compatibility appears to exist.

This essay intends to examine the atheists Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens and Michel Onfray's arguments against religion, based on the themes of religion, atheism and the perception.of their present worldview. In addition, the research aims to find out whether it is suitable to talk about a new atheism. And, if so, whether such newatheism correspond with the definition represented by the Christian critics. The essay intends to contribute to a very limited research on the so-called new atheism without applying pro-religious arguments. Previous research and theory highlight the problem of defining the terms atheism, religion and secularism a concern that is reflected by the five critics troughout their arguments. What really united the critics were the idea about religion taking too much place in society, and the opinion that atheistic morality is at least as good as religious morality. In addition, the authors agree that religion is not needed to maintain good morale, on the contrary, religion affect the morale negatively. They also assumed that religion restricts people and and that moderate religion more or less leads to, or is responsible for, fundamentalism. Also, the value of truth and contempt against relativism brought the authors together, although they were sometimes justified by very different arguments. Crucially, however, are the differences in their definitions of religion, both concerning their focus on substantive and functional definitions, the relationship between absolute, relative-, and private religion and their political focus. To regard these authors' arguments as a new atheism is thus hard to justify. The results conclude that both the Christian critics and the five critics of religion generalize their opponents view of atheism or religion, and also fail to define themselves in order to be able to unite as a group against the other.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Clarissa de Franco.pdf: 3281883 bytes, checksum: 9bdef4d359b91f69b35ab1ca66383f0c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-09 / Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo / The object of study is the main Richard Dawkins ideas of atheism and this reception on the brasilian atheists. Dawkins is one of the leading publishers and militant atheist movement today, and despite his public facet - released worldwide on websites and in books of recognized success - there are debates of the author , pertaining to academic spaces and restricted to scientists, who do not always have congruent to its exhibitions and public defenders . Internally the walls of science, Richard Dawkins can not find full verification and corroboration of some central points of his theory that seem to support its public arguments of atheism, such as the theory and the concept of memetic and selection gene, ideas presented to the lay public one of his most famous books, The Selfish Gene (2001a [1976]) and maintained publicly with the status of consolidated science. We assume that the figures of scientist and militant atheist from Dawkins mingle in front of the public imagination, which tends to lead his followers to understand atheism as a more legitimate and true way that religious, being interpreted that as a way to free choice and the latter undergoes a indoctrination. We believe, however, that atheism can be understood as subject to natural cognitive mechanisms, as religion. We take into account the political scene today is favorable to atheists, since we observed a phenomenon we call "moral atheists revenge", a reversal of official protection and legitimacy of the state, which has long been welcoming and protecting the speech religious and today happened to be synchronized with atheistics claims, being religious in an outdated and uncomfortable place in the democratic debate. These hypotheses was investigated by means of confrontation between the scientific and public speeches of Richard Dawkins and through a mixed questionnaire (with open and closed questions ) that investigated 1022 atheists, noting whether and to what extent atheism sample follows trends thinking of Richard Dawkins. We observed patterns of response, three groups: Super Atheists, Moderates Atheists and Discrete Atheists. Approximately 30% of the sample declare themselves as followers of the author, and all, nearly 80% have knowledge about any point of the theory of Dawkins / O objeto de estudo consiste nas principais ideias ateístas de Richard Dawkins e na recepção destas por parte dos ateus inseridos na cultura brasileira. Dawkins é um dos principais divulgadores e militantes do movimento ateísta da atualidade, e a despeito de sua faceta pública divulgada em sites mundiais e em livros de reconhecido sucesso existem debates do autor, concernentes aos espaços acadêmicos e restritos a cientistas, que nem sempre se apresentam congruentes às suas exposições e defesas públicas. Internamente aos muros da ciência, Richard Dawkins não encontra plena verificação e corroboração de alguns pontos centrais de sua teoria que parecem embasar sua argumentação pública do ateísmo, tais como a teoria da memética e o conceito de seleção de gene, ideias apresentadas ao público leigo em um de seus mais célebres livros, O gene egoísta (2001a [1976]) e mantidas publicamente com o status de ciência consolidada. Consideramos que as figuras de cientista e militante ateu em Dawkins fundem-se diante do imaginário público, o que tende a levar seus seguidores a compreenderem o ateísmo como um caminho mais legítimo e verdadeiro que o religioso, sendo aquele interpretado como um caminho de livre escolha e este último submetido a uma doutrinação. Acreditamos, no entanto, que o ateísmo pode ser compreendido como submetido a mecanismos cognitivos naturais, como a religião. Levamos em conta que o cenário político hoje é favorável aos ateus, uma vez que observamos um fenômeno que chamamos de vingança moral dos ateus , uma inversão da proteção oficial e da legitimidade do Estado, que durante muito tempo esteve acolhendo e protegendo o discurso religioso e hoje passou a se afinizar com reivindicações ateístas, ficando o religioso em um lugar ultrapassado e incômodo no debate democrático. Estas hipóteses foram investigadas por meio da confrontação entre os discursos científico e público de Richard Dawkins e através de um questionário misto (com questões fechadas e abertas) que investigou 1022 ateus, observando se, e em que intensidade, o ateísmo da amostra segue as tendências do pensamento de Richard Dawkins. Pudemos observar nos padrões de resposta, três grupos: Super Ateus, Ateus Moderados e Ateus Discretos. Aproximadamente 30% da amostra declara-se fã do autor, e ao todo, perto de 80% tem conhecimento sobre algum ponto da teoria de Dawkins

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne, Faculty of Education, 2004. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis it is argued that the age-old philosophical "Problem of the Self' can benefit by being approached from the perspective of a relatively recent science, namely that of Complexity Theory. With this in mind the conceptual features of this theory is highlighted and summarised. Furthermore, the argument is made that the predominantly dualistic approach to the self that is characteristic of the Western Philosophical tradition serves to hinder, rather than edify, our understanding of the phenomenon. The benefits posed by approaching the self as an emergent property of a complex system is elaborated upon, principally with the help of work done by Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Paul Cilliers. The aim is to develop a materialistic conception of the self that is plausible in terms of current empirical information and resists the temptation see the self as one or other metaphysical entity within the brain, without "reducing" the self to a crude materialism. The final chapter attempts to formulate a possible foil against the accusation of crude materialism by emphasising that the self is part of a greater system that includes the mental apparatus and its environment (conceived as culture). In accordance with Dawkins's theory the medium of interaction in this system is conceived of as memes and the self is then conceived of as a meme-complex, with culture as a medium for memetransference. The conclusion drawn from this is that the self should be studied through narrative, which provides an approach to the self that is material without being crudely physicalistic. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis word daar aangevoer dat die relatiewe jong wetenskap van Kompleksiteitsteorie 'n nuttige bydra kan lewer tot die eeue-oue filosofiese "Probleem van die Self'. Met die oog hierop word die konseptueie kenmerke van hierdie teorie na vore gebring en opgesom. Die argument word gemaak dat die meerendeels dualistiese benadering van die Westerse filosofiese tradisie tot die self ons verstaan van die fenomeen belemmer eerder as om dit te bemiddel. Die voordele van dié nuwe benadering, wat die self sien as 'n ontluikende (emergent) eienskap van In komplekses sisteem, word bespreek met verwysing na veral die werke van Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett en Paul Cilliers. Daar word beoog om In verstaan van die self te ontwikkel wat kontemporêre empiriese insigte in ag neem en wat die versoeking weerstaan om ongeoorloofde metafisiese eienskappe aan die self toe te ken. Terselfdetyd word daar gepoog om geensins die uniekheid van die self te "reduseer" na 'n kru materialisme nie. In die finale hoofstuk word daar gepoog om 'n teenargument vir die voorsiene beswaar van kru materialisme te ontwikkel. Dit word gedoen deur te benadruk dat die self gesien word as deel van 'n groter, komplekse sisteem, wat die masjienerie van denke en die omgewing (wat as kultuur gekonseptualiseer word) insluit. Insgelyks, in die teorie van Dawkins word die medium van interaksie in hierdie sisteem gesien as "memes", waar die self dan n meme-kompleks vorm, en kultuur die medium van meme-oordrag is. Daar word tot die konklusie gekom dat die self op 'n narratiewe manier bestudeer behoort te word, wat dan 'n benadering tot die self voorsien wat materialisties is, sonder om kru fisikalisties te wees.