Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luiz Adelino de Almeida Prado.pdf: 454650 bytes, checksum: ce646b7db68e7b1c880ecdcda5bec04d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-06 / The purpose of the present Master s dissertation is to study the path followed by Peirce in the working up of his concept of belief, from the antecedents that determined it, up to the formulation of the pragmatist maxim. Along this study we shall consider, among other issues, the new role established for the doubt, which for Peirce is the opposite of belief, the importance of the scientific method of fixing belief and Peirce s critique of cartesianism. This critique will also be compared to Kant s critique of dogmatism and skepticism / O intuito desta dissertação de mestrado é o de estudar o itinerário seguido por Peirce na elaboração do seu conceito de crença, desde os antecedentes que o determinaram, até a influência deste conceito na formulação da primeira máxima do pragmatismo. Nessa trajetória examinaremos, entre outros pontos, o novo papel estabelecido para a dúvida, que para Peirce é o oposto da crença, a importância do método científico na fixação da crença e a crítica de Peirce ao cartesianismo. Será também traçado um paralelo entre essa crítica e a crítica de Kant ao dogmatismo e ceticismo

Suite aux grands changements politiques, économiques et sociaux que l’Occident a connus depuis plus d’un siècle, de nombreux problèmes ont émergé, de nouveaux défis ont été lancés et plusieurs approches et solutions ont été avancées. L’avènement de la démocratie, un exploit humain inestimable, a plus ou moins règlementé la pluralité idéologique, pour permettre un exercice politique organisé. Aujourd’hui, dans le nouvel ordre mondial, c’est la pluralité morale et religieuse qui a besoin d’être gérée; un défi pour les institutions démocratiques et pour la société civile, afin de réaliser un mieux vivre-ensemble dans le dialogue, la compréhension et le compromis. Or, beaucoup de travail est encore à faire : dans un premier temps, à l’intérieur de chaque tradition religieuse; dans un deuxième temps, entre les différentes traditions; et dans un troisième temps, entre ces traditions et la modernité. Le ‘dogmatisme’ est au cœur de ces débats, qu’il soit d’ordre traditionnel ou moderne, il entrave la raison dans son processus de libération et d’émancipation. La problématique de ce mémoire concerne la gestion de la pluralité morale et religieuse en Occident. Dans ce travail, nous allons essayer de démontrer comment la libération du dogmatisme en général et la libération du ‘dogmatisme’ musulman, en particulier, peuvent contribuer à la réalisation d’un mieux vivre-ensemble en Occident. Pour ce faire, nous analyserons les projets de deux penseurs musulmans contemporains : Muhammad Arkoun et Tariq Ramadan. Notre recherche va essentiellement se pencher sur leurs attitudes vis-à-vis de la tradition et de la modernité, car, nous pensons que l’enjeu du ‘dogmatisme’ est lié aux rapports des musulmans à leur tradition et à la modernité. Selon nos deux penseurs, la libération du ‘dogmatisme’ musulman n’est possible qu’à condition de pouvoir changer à la fois notre rapport à la tradition et à la modernité. Arkoun pense que ce changement doit suivre le modèle de la libération occidentale, au moyen d’une critique subversive de la tradition islamique. Cependant, Ramadan opte pour une réforme radicale de la pensée islamique qui vise une critique globale de la tradition, mais, qui épargne les fondements de la foi : le ‘sacré’. / Following the major political, economic and social changes that occurred in the West for over a century, many problems have emerged, new challenges have surfaced, and several approaches and solutions have been proposed. The advent of democracy, an invaluable human achievement, more or less regulated ideological plurality, and allowed the evolution of an organized political exercise. Today, in the new world order, it is the moral and religious diversity that need to be managed. The challenge remains for democratic institutions and civil society to create a better harmonious community through dialogue, understanding and compromise. However, much work is still to be done : first, within each religious tradition, second, between different traditions and third, between tradition and modernity. Dogmatism is at the heart of these debates. An order, whether traditional or modern hampers objectives reasoning in the process of liberation and emancipation. The issue of this paper concerns the management of the moral and religious plurality in the West. In this work, we will try to demonstrate how the relinquishing of ‘dogmatism’ in general and the relinquishing of Muslim ‘dogmatism’ in particular, can contribute to the achievement of a harmonious in a pluralistic West. This will be achieved by shedding light on the projects of two contemporary Muslim thinkers : Muhammad Arkoun and Tariq Ramadan. Our research is mainly to reflect on their attitudes towards tradition versus modernity, as we believe that the issue of dogmatism is linked to Muslims’ attitude towards tradition and modernity. According to these two thinkers, the release of muslims’ ‘dogmatism’ is only possible by changing both our relationship to tradition and modernity. Arkoun thinks this change should follow the model of Western release through a subversive critique of the Islamic tradition. However, Ramadan opts for a radical reform of Islamic thought through a comprehensive critique of the tradition, in order to save the foundation of faith : The ‘sacred’.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2006-09-27 / Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos / This work intends to offer a different reading of Carl Gustav Jung writings of the ones that conceive the terms archetype and collective unconscious as explicit references to the transcendent domain, "spiritualistic" readings that would do the Analytical Psychology methodology result in a dogmatic proceeding. In order to understand the notion of "individual" that has place in the Jungian meta-psychology , it becomes important to understand Jung's way to mean and to interpret the psychopathological facts and dreams that him observed in his clinical experience. Every moment the analytical psychology threatens to relapse in an irrationalism if we restrict ourselves in the denotative consideration of the language used to represent the psychic reality. We put emphasis, in our reading, on the representative and symbolic use of the language of psychological communication that intends to express the individual being, in order to investigate the question of the dogmatism that permeates countless critical readings concerning Jung's work. After all, in which paradigm the Analytical Psychology intends to sustain itself as a science? We will show that is the material-reductionism paradigm from the sciences of the nature the responsible for guiding the comprehension of a (transcendent) origin of the collective unconscious archetypes, but these are only enunciated by Jung in order to refer to the (figurative) appearance of the dreamlike fantasies for the psychic (immanent) existence. The causal factor stops being predominant in the interpretation of the archetype concept to give up place to the adaptation purpose of the psychic manifestation of the image. The notion of normality is faced, and crosses the domains of the disease in which takes place the eighty century medicine; if this natural paradigm becomes unable to guide the analytical psychology point of view, that intends to be a science of the man, which new paradigm would be more appropriated in a reading of Jung's work that do not intends to aim in a dogmatic interpretation - what would invalidate it's scientific legitimacy? To understand the pretense connection of the Jungian work to the mystic's domain it is necessary to understand the notion that the history of the philosophical thought checked to the term "dogmatism ". At last, could the Analytical Psychology be understood as a Science, or does it approach more to the Art, that intends to turn the part (finite) the representation of the essence of the "whole" (infinite)? / Este trabalho pretende oferecer uma leitura da obra de Carl Gustav Jung diversa das que concebem os termos arquétipo e inconsciente coletivo como referências explícitas ao domínio transcendente, leituras espiritualistas que fariam com que a metodologia da Psicologia Analítica resultasse num proceder dogmático. A fim de compreender a noção de indivíduo que tem lugar na metapsicologia junguiana, torna-se premente entender o modo de Jung significar e interpretar os fatos psicopatológicos e oníricos por ele observados na experiência clínica. A psicologia analítica ameaça recair a cada instante num irracionalismo caso nos restrinjamos à consideração denotativa da linguagem por ela utilizada para representar a realidade psíquica. Colocamos ênfase, em nossa leitura, no uso representativo e simbólico da linguagem da comunicação psicológica que pretende expressar o individual , a fim de perscrutar a questão do dogmatismo que permeia inúmeras leituras críticas realizadas acerca da obra de Jung. Afinal de contas, qual paradigma em que a Psicologia Analítica pretende se sustentar como uma ciência? Mostraremos que é o paradigma material-reducionista das ciências da natureza o responsável por orientar a questão da origem (transcendente) dos arquétipos do inconsciente coletivo, mas estes são unicamente enunciados por Jung com vistas a esclarecer o motivo (figurativo) das fantasias oníricas para a vivência psíquica (imanente). O fator causal deixa de ser predominante na interpretação do conceito arquetípico para ceder lugar à finalidade adaptativa da manifestação psíquica da imagem. Está em jogo, aqui, a própria noção de normalidade, que ultrapassa os domínios da doença onde se insere a medicina oitocentista; se o paradigma naturalista se torna incapaz de orientar a visão de mundo da psicologia analítica, que pretende ser uma ciência do homem, qual seria o paradigma no qual ela pretende se inserir e qual o sentido permitido a uma leitura da obra de Jung que não pretenda recair numa interpretação dogmática - que invalidaria sua legitimidade científica? Para situarmos esta pretensa vinculação da obra junguiana ao domínio do místico, é necessário compreendermos a noção que a história do pensamento filosófico conferiu ao termo dogmatismo . Em último termo, a Psicologia Analítica poderia ser entendida como uma Ciência, ou ela se aproxima mais da Arte, que pretende tornar a parte (finito) o representante da essência do todo (infinito)?

It is argued that Pryor's criticism of scepticism of perceptual justification misses the point: while Pryor's dogmatism can provide a successful explication of the perceptual justification of first order empirical beliefs (i.e., an explication of propositional justification), it is barren vis à vis second order sceptical criticisms about the epistemic status of beliefs justified via perception (that is, criticisms pointing to the lack of doxastic justification). We argue that the two main motivations that Pryor offers for his dogmatism –to avoid scepticism of perceptual justification and to explicate perceptual justification– fail due to his commitment with some externalist theses, which make it impossible to satisfy the metaepistemic requisites imposed by the sceptic. Hence given the lack of satisfaction of Pryor's own goals, we conclude that Pryor's dogmatism is not an adequate explication of perceptual justification. / Se argumenta que la crítica de Pryor al escepticismo sobre la justificación perceptiva está fuera de foco: mientras que el dogmatismo puede ser una explicación exitosa sobre la justificación perceptiva de las creencias empíricas de primer orden (i.e. de la justificación proposicional), es estéril frente a las críticas escépticas (de segundo orden) sobre el estatus epistémico de las creencias justificadas perceptivamente (es decir, frente a críticas que señalan la ausencia de justificación doxástica). Argumentamos que las dos principales motivaciones que Pryor ofrece a favor de su dogmatismo –evitar el escepticismo respecto de la justificación perceptiva y proporcionar una explicación intuitiva de la misma– fallan, debido, principalmente, a su compromiso con ciertas tesis de corte externista que imposibilitan la satisfacción de los requisitos metaepistémicos impuestos por el escéptico. En vista de este déficit explicativo respecto a sus propias motivaciones, concluimos que el dogmatismo no es una explicación adecuada de la justificación perceptiva en general.

Doctrines are by nature dogmatic and academic education is by nature skeptic. As the two perspectivesare opposites to each other it would be plausible to assume that the nature of their contradictionwould exist between doctrines and military academic education. Though no research has been madeon how or to what extent these contradictions exist.This thesis aims therefore to investigate the relation between Swedish doctrines and military academiceducation from dogmatic and skeptical perspectives. Consequently, explaining to what extentthey correspond to one another and how they can be compared. The result reveals that Swedish doctrines generally correspond to military academic education to alow degree, where deviations may range from very low to moderate. The analysis further displaysstrong multifaceted dissonance in their correspondence to one another, but also within Swedish doctrinesand military academic education separately.

Esta tese de doutorado estuda o perspectivismo na obra de Nietzsche, bem como o confronto com a verdade que ele representa. Para tanto, procuramos mostrar que esse confronto atravessa toda a obra de Nietzsche, pois já os seus escritos iniciais investigam as condições para o surgimento da crença na verdade, além dos interesses a que ela atendia. Expondo que Nietzsche, apropriando-se do legado crítico de Kant em suas primeiras obras, ensaia uma destruição completa da verdade, pretendemos demonstrar que ele falha em seus objetivos porque a radicalidade de seus argumentos destruiria os próprios pressupostos em que estão baseados, ou seja, os do idealismo transcendental kantiano. Nesse momento em que circunscrevemos nossa análise aos escritos inicias, tentamos demonstrar que Nietzsche limita-se a refutar a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas falha ao querer ampliar esse refutação além desses limites. Por isso, analisando a maneira pela qual o combate à verdade se posiciona a partir dos escritos da década de 80, defendemos que neles o perspectivismo se torna decisivo para os problemas enfrentados inicialmente por Nietzsche. Interpretando o perspectivismo como um fenomenalismo da consciência e um interpretacionismo, investigamos, no decorrer deste trabalho, a forma pela qual Nietzsche re-elabora a crítica à verdade em seus escritos tardios. Considerando essa crítica ainda a partir da apropriação de Kant, buscamos demonstrar que ela atinge os fins perseguidos por Nietzsche sem, contudo, ficar preso aos impasses das primeiras 5 obras. Isso implica mostrar que Nietzsche vai recusar não apenas a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas também a concepção moderna de verdade como certeza e fundamento para o conhecimento. Eis por que Nietzsche alveja a noção cartesiana do eu penso como a primeira verdade, assim como a concepção kantiana de verdade expressa nos juízos lógicos. Sustentamos, assim, que o fenomenalismo da consciência refuta a noção de unidade, pressuposto fundamental às filosofias cartesiana e kantiana. Em seguida, analisamos como Nietzsche, apropriando-se da ideia kantiana de princípios regulativos, afirma que todas as visões com que avaliamos o mundo são ficções, erros, ótica-de-perspectivas da vida com valor regulativo para a existência. Defendemos, por fim, que embora se posicione radicalmente contra a verdade a partir da luta de interpretações, o perspectivismo não se torna um relativismo, na medida em que se liga à teoria da vontade de potência, a qual é o critério para avaliar as perspectivas e ela mesma apresentada como interpretação. / This Doctoral Thesis studies perspectivism on the work of Nietzsche, as well as the confrontation with the truth it represents. In order to do so, we try to show that this confrontation pervades Nietzsche\'s work, as his former writings investigate the conditions for the emergence of the belief in the truth, beyond the interests to which it served. By expounding that Nietzsche, borrowing Kant\'s critical legacy in his early works, starts out a complete destruction of truth, we intend to demonstrate that he fails in his objectives. This occurs because the radicalism of his arguments would destroy the very foundations which they are based upon, that is, Kantian transcendental idealism. At the moment we circumscribe our analysis to the early writings, we intend to demonstrate that Nietzsche limits himself to refuting the notion of truth as an adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but fails to widen this refutation beyond these limits. Therefore, we analyze the means of the fight against the truth, as presented in his writings from the 80`s. We defend that, in these writings, perspectivism becomes decisive in relation to the problems formerly faced by Nietzsche. By interpreting perspectivism as a phenomenalism of the conscience and interpretationism, we investigate the means by which Nietzsche re-elaborates the critique of truth in his late writings. Through the understanding of this critique as an appropriation of Kant\'s ideas, we try to demonstrate that it reaches the goals set by Nietzsche. Therefore it bypasses the impasses of his early work. This is to show that Nietzsche declines not only the notion of truth as adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but also the modern concept of truth as certainty and foundation of knowledge. That is 7 why Nietzsche aims at the Cartesian notion of \"I think\" as the first truth, as well as the Kantian conception of truth as expressed in logical judgments. Therefore, we sustain that phenomenalism of the conscience refutes the notion of unity, fundamental presupposition to Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. Additionally, we analyze the way Nietzsche, appropriating the Kantian idea of regulative principles, asserts that every vision we take to evaluate the world is fiction, a mistake, a perspectives-optic of life with a regulative value to existence. We defend, finally, that, even perspectivism radically stands against the truth - understood as strife of interpretations. It does not become relativism, since it is connected to the Theory of the Will to Power, which is the criterion to evaluate perspectives and which is itself presented as interpretation.

Le défi de cette thèse a été de présenter la pensée et les actions marquantes de l’histoire du mouvement islamiste tunisien, Ennahdha, depuis sa création à la fin des années 1960, jusqu’en 2018. La première partie de la thèse se concentre sur son engagement politique. Cette approche nous a amenée à distinguer plusieurs phases qui rythment le développement du parti: après être passé par l’action clandestine à l’époque du jama‘a islamiyya et du MTI avec de brefs instants de semi-légalité (dans les années 1980) et une vingtaine d’années de répression, le leadership du parti fait preuve, surtout depuis 2013, de pragmatisme en politique. En effet, l’expérience d’Ennahdha indique que depuis la révolution les victoires électorales sont devenues son intérêt majeur. La deuxième partie de la thèse met en évidence que cette stratégie impose au parti une évolution constante, afin de répondre aux demandes des acteurs politiques, tout en gardant sa base militante fidèle et en aspirant à attirer des nouveaux adhérents en dehors du noyau islamiste. Dès lors, notre recherche étudie les reconfigurations récentes du mouvement et attire l’attention sur les limites de ces mutations. Nous insistons surtout sur la reconstruction du discours d’Ennahdha qui a renouvelé ses références politico-idéologiques lors de son dixième congrès, en mai 2016. De plus, nous avons eu recours à diverses théories sur les élites et les transitions politiques, afin d’analyser la pratique politique d’Ennahdha après la révolution. En outre, dans une perspective comparative, nous avons examiné son histoire et ses reconfigurations idéologiques en contraste avec l’expérience des partis communistes et chrétiens-démocrates occidentaux et du Parti de la justice et du développement au Maroc. Ce cadre théorique nous a permis d’évaluer les stratégies politiques et les mutations idéologiques d’Ennahdha et d’étudier le fonctionnement du parti, sa structure et la sélection de ses dirigeants, afin de déterminer son degré de démocratisation, ainsi que ses perspectives sur la scène politique tunisienne. / The challenge of this thesis was to present the ideology and the turning points in the history of the Tunisian Islamist movement, Ennahdha, starting from its creation in the late 1960s until 2018. The first part of the thesis focuses on its political commitment. This approach enabled us to distinguish several phases that marked the development of the party: after the clandestine activity at the time of the jama‘a islamiyya and the MTI, some brief moments of semi-legality (in the 1980s) and about twenty years of repression, the leadership of the party has been giving evidence of political pragmatism mostly after 2013. In fact, Ennahdha’s experience indicates that since the revolution the electoral victories have become its major interest. The second part of the thesis highlights that this strategy imposes on the party a constant evolution in the attempt to respond to the political actors’ demands, while keeping its militant base faithful and aiming, at the same time, to attract new members outside the Islamist core. Thus, our research studies the recent reconfigurations of the movement and draws the attention to the limits of these mutations. We emphasize especially on the “restyling” of Ennahdha′s discourse which renew its political and ideological references on the occasion of its tenth congress (in May 2016). Moreover, we resorted to various theories of elites and political transitions, in order to analyse Ennahdha′s political practice after the revolution. Additionally, in a comparative perspective, we examined its history and ideological reconfigurations in contrast with the experience of the occidental communist and Christian democratic parties and the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco. This theoretical framework enabled us to evaluate Ennahdha′s political strategies and its ideological mutations and study how the party operates, how it is structured and how its leaders are selected, in order to determine its degree of democratization, as well as its perspectives on the Tunisian political scene.

This study was designed to determine whether participation in an eight hour training program based on Adlerian theoretical principles would influence managerial attitudes. The effects of the training curriculum on three attitudinal dimensions were investigated: leadership style, acceptance of self and others and level of dogmatism. It was hypothesized that Adlerian training would increase the development of managerial human relations competence. Eighty-one managers participated in the study. The experimental group, comprised of 40 line managers, received eight hours of Adlerian training conducted in two one-half day sessions. The training was both didactic and experiential in content and contained modules on lifestyles/management styles, conflict resolution, effective communication strategies and understanding personality dynamics. The control group, comprised of 41 managers, did not receive training but participated in the pre-testing and post-testing process. Managers completed The Leadership Opinion Questionnaire, The Acceptance of Self and Others Questionnaire, and The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, prior to the first training session and again two weeks after the final training session. A one-way analysis of covariance revealed a significant difference between the experimental and control groups on both the Consideration and Structure dimensions of the Leadership Opinion Questionnaire. This suggests that managers in the experimental group demonstrated a more participative and less authoritarian management style two weeks after training was completed. No significant differences were found between the two groups on managers' level of dogmatism or acceptance of self and others.

Ce mémoire consiste en une explication de la critique biblique de Spinoza contenue dans la Traité théologico-politique. Cette critique répond à un problème précis : la subversion de la religion en superstition. Cette critique, nous l’expliquons en quatre parties. La première partie consiste en une mise en situation problématique. Elle montre que le problème biblique, qui appelle une critique, est la subversion de la religion. On y montre aussi l’origine de la superstition et la manière dont elle subvertit la religion. La seconde partie consiste en une mise en contexte historique, où l’on montre la pertinence historique d’une telle critique. Nous voyons en effet que la critique biblique de Spinoza s’inscrit dans une période de controverses théologiques importante. La troisième partie expose la méthode d’interprétation des Écritures de Spinoza (méthode historico-critique) et cherche à éclaircir la notion de lumière naturelle, notion fondamentale de la dite méthode. Enfin, dans la quatrième partie, nous exposons la critique spinoziste des autres méthodes interprétatives, jugées erronées par ce dernier, soient les méthodes surnaturelle, sceptique et dogmatique. Nous le verrons, la critique biblique, qui se rapporte à une question très précise, a une finalité plus générale. En effet, la critique biblique est inséparable du but que se donne Spinoza dans le Traité théologico-politique, soit défendre la liberté de penser et de dire ce que l’on pense. En fait, la critique biblique est un moyen pour réaliser ce but. / This thesis consists in an explanation of the biblical criticism that we find in Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise. This criticism addresses a specific problem: the subversion of religion in superstition. We explain this criticism in four parts. The first part explain the situation in which Spinoza affirms the necessity of a biblical criticism. This section shows that the actual critical problem is the subversion of religion. We will also explain in this part, the origin of superstition and how it may subvert religion. The second part is historical. It shows the historical context which is relevant for the biblical criticism. We see in fact that Spinoza's criticism is developed in a period of significant theological controversies. The third part describes the interpretative method of the Scripture (the historico-critical method). Finally, in the fourth section, we present Spinoza's criticism of other interpretative methods. These methods (supernatural, skeptical and dogmatic) are considered false by Spinoza. We will see that biblical criticism has a more general purpose. Indeed, biblical criticism is inseparable from the main goal of the Theologico-Political Treatise: the freedom of thought. In fact, biblical criticism is a way to achieve this goal.

Leibniz publie à Leipzig en 1684 un court opuscule devenu classique, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis. Cet essai de quelques pages constitue un véritable discours de la méthode pour la philosophie allemande. Ce travail tente de justifier cette assertion en reconstituant les étapes de la réception par Christian Wolff et Emmanuel Kant de ce court texte. Elle est ainsi conduite à étudier le développement en Allemagne d’une Begriffsanalyse. Elle affronte donc ce problème : qu’est-ce qu’analyser pour Wolff puis pour Kant ? L’étude de cette logique des notions, de son lien avec les mathématiques et du concept cartésienne de Mathesis universalis, aboutit à préciser la distinction kantienne entre méthode dogmatique et dogmatisme. Cette enquête remonte aux sources leibniziennes de la division classique des jugements en analytiques et synthétiques. Elle se conclut par l’étude de la critique d’Eberhard. Bref, pour reprendre une formule de Michel Fichant, elle tente d’établir « que derrière l’allemand de Kant se tient le latin de Leibniz ». / Leibniz published in 1684 a short opuscule, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis. This Leibniz’s essay of few pages is a true discours de la méthode for the German philosophy. This research tries to justify this declaration and restores the reception of this short text by Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant. This work studies the development of the Begriffsanalyse in Germany. But, what means analysis for Wolff and for Kant? The study of this logic of notions, its bond to mathematics and with the Cartesian conception of Mathesis universalis, clarifies the Kantian distinction between dogmatic method and dogmatism. This inquiry goes back to the Leibnizian origin of the classical division of analytic and synthetic judgments. This work comes to an end by the study of Eberhard’s critic of the Critic. In short, like Michel Fichant formulated, this study wants to make manifest that « behind German words of Kant lay down Latin words of Leibniz ».