Thesis (M.A.)--Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 1993. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2778. Abstract precedes thesis as [1] preliminary leaf. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 34-39).

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-28T13:43:43Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-jefferson-dos-santos-marcondes-leite.pdf: 492521 bytes, checksum: 278028abd222a64bfe011856ac5e9343 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-28T13:44:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-jefferson-dos-santos-marcondes-leite.pdf: 492521 bytes, checksum: 278028abd222a64bfe011856ac5e9343 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-28T13:44:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-jefferson-dos-santos-marcondes-leite.pdf: 492521 bytes, checksum: 278028abd222a64bfe011856ac5e9343 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-11-29 / O presente trabalho pretende explorar o universo ético do ceticismo pirrônico antigo de Sexto Empírico. Para tanto, investigamos o tema nos livros em que Sexto trabalha a questão da ética, a saber, Hipotiposes Pirrônicas, livros I e III, e Contra os Éticos. Sexto apresenta, no livro I das Hipotiposes, a concepção geral do ceticismo. Essa apresentação permite entender como o cético se relaciona com a ética, tanto do ponto de vista da sua reflexão sobre a ética dogmática, como da sua ação ética. Sobre este último ponto, Sexto rejeita as críticas feitas pelos filósofos dogmáticos com relação a impossibilidade da vida prática do cético, indicando qual seria o critério cético de ação. As outras duas obras desenvolvem a reflexão cética sobre a ética. Examinaremos se as duas obras estão de acordo com a apresentação feita no livro I das Hipotiposes, ressaltando a unidade e a autenticidade que o pensamento pirrônico de fato tem. Inicialmente, nos livros sobre ética, Sexto investiga, a respeito das filosofias dogmáticas de sua época, principalmente a dos estoicos, a natureza do bem, do mal e do indiferente, visto que os modelos éticos de sua época consistem numa reflexão sobre esses conceitos. Ao aplicar o seu método filosófico, a argumentação dos dois lados de uma questão, gerando a equipolência, Sexto conclui que a única solução possível para os temas éticos, tal como os dogmáticos a entendem, é suspender o juízo sobre se existe algo que seja o bem, o mal ou o indiferente por natureza. Em segundo lugar, Sexto mostra que toda arte de viver está fadada ao fracasso, visto que estão também vinculadas aos conceitos morais por natureza. Finalmente, voltaremos à questão prática, quando Sexto apresenta o modelo cético de guiar uma vida eticamente, tendo os fenômenos como o critério cético de ação. Desta forma, apresentaremos o pensamento ético pirrônico de Sexto Empírico, com seu estilo próprio e suas características inovadoras e sofisticadas. / This study aims to explore the ethical universe of ancient pyrrhonian scepticism of Sextus Empiricus. We therefore investigated the subject in books where Sextus works the question of ethics, namely Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes, books I and III, and Against the Ethical. Sextus presents, in Book I of Hypotyposes, the general conception of scepticism. This presentation allows to understand how the skeptic it relates to ethics, both from the point of view of its reflection on the ethics dogmatic as their ethical action. On this last point, Sextus rejects the criticisms made by dogmatic philosophers regarding the impossibility of practical life of the skeptic, indicating what would be the criterion for action skeptical. The other two works develop skeptical reflection on ethics. Examine whether the two works are consistent with the presentation of the book I Hypotyposes, emphasizing unity and authenticity that thought has indeed Pyrrhonian. Initially, the books on ethics, Sextus investigates about the dogmatic philosophies of his day, especially the Stoics, the nature of good, bad and indifferent, since the ethical models of his day consists of a reflection on these concepts. By applying his philosophical method, the arguments on both sides of an issue, generating equipollence, Sextus concludes that the only possible solution to the ethical issues, such as the dogmatic understand it, is to suspend judgment about whether there is something that the good, bad or indifferent in nature. Second, Sextus shows that all art of living is doomed to failure, as they are also linked to moral concepts in nature. Finally, back to the practical question, when Sextus presents the model skeptical of guide a life ethically, with phenomena such as skeptical criterion of action. Thus, we present the ethical thinking Pyrrhonian of Sextus Empiricus, with its own style and its innovative features and sophisticated / TEDE

Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-22T20:50:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2012-01-01. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2015-08-11T03:26:34Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 Publico-JefersondosSantosMarcondesLeite.pdf: 504359 bytes, checksum: 1505996de8d212ead99468e02db2c72e (MD5) / O presente trabalho pretende explorar o universo ético do ceticismo pirrônico antigo de Sexto Empírico. Para tanto, investigamos o tema nos livros em que Sexto trabalha a questão da ética, a saber, Hipotiposes Pirrônicas, livros I e III, e Contra os Éticos. Sexto apresenta, no livro I das Hipotiposes, a concepção geral do ceticismo. Essa apresentação permite entender como o cético se relaciona com a ética, tanto do ponto de vista da sua reflexão sobre a ética dogmática, como da sua ação ética. Sobre este último ponto, Sexto rejeita as críticas feitas pelos filósofos dogmáticos com relação a impossibilidade da vida prática do cético, indicando qual seria o critério cético de ação. As outras duas obras desenvolvem a reflexão cética sobre a ética. Examinaremos se as duas obras estão de acordo com a apresentação feita no livro I das Hipotiposes, ressaltando a unidade e a autenticidade que o pensamento pirrônico de fato tem. Inicialmente, nos livros sobre ética, Sexto investiga, a respeito das filosofias dogmáticas de sua época, principalmente a dos estoicos, a natureza do bem, do mal e do indiferente, visto que os modelos éticos de sua época consistem numa reflexão sobre esses conceitos. Ao aplicar o seu método filosófico, a argumentação dos dois lados de uma questão, gerando a equipolência, Sexto conclui que a única solução possível para os temas éticos, tal como os dogmáticos a entendem, é suspender o juízo sobre se existe algo que seja o bem, o mal ou o indiferente por natureza. Em segundo lugar, Sexto mostra que toda arte de viver está fadada ao fracasso, visto que estão também vinculadas aos conceitos morais por natureza. Finalmente, voltaremos à questão prática, quando Sexto apresenta o modelo cético de guiar uma vida eticamente, tendo os fenômenos como o critério cético de ação. Desta forma, apresentaremos o pensamento ético pirrônico de Sexto Empírico, com seu estilo próprio e suas características inovadoras e sofisticadas. / This study aims to explore the ethical universe of ancient pyrrhonian scepticism of Sextus Empiricus. We therefore investigated the subject in books where Sextus works the question of ethics, namely Pyrrhonian Hypotyposes, books I and III, and Against the Ethical. Sextus presents, in Book I of Hypotyposes, the general conception of scepticism. This presentation allows to understand how the skeptic it relates to ethics, both from the point of view of its reflection on the ethics dogmatic as their ethical action. On this last point, Sextus rejects the criticisms made by dogmatic philosophers regarding the impossibility of practical life of the skeptic, indicating what would be the criterion for action skeptical. The other two works develop skeptical reflection on ethics. Examine whether the two works are consistent with the presentation of the book I Hypotyposes, emphasizing unity and authenticity that thought has indeed Pyrrhonian. Initially, the books on ethics, Sextus investigates about the dogmatic philosophies of his day, especially the Stoics, the nature of good, bad and indifferent, since the ethical models of his day consists of a reflection on these concepts. By applying his philosophical method, the arguments on both sides of an issue, generating equipollence, Sextus concludes that the only possible solution to the ethical issues, such as the dogmatic understand it, is to suspend judgment about whether there is something that the good, bad or indifferent in nature. Second, Sextus shows that all art of living is doomed to failure, as they are also linked to moral concepts in nature. Finally, back to the practical question, when Sextus presents the model skeptical of guide a life ethically, with phenomena such as skeptical criterion of action. Thus, we present the ethical thinking Pyrrhonian of Sextus Empiricus, with its own style and its innovative features and sophisticated. / TEDE

Cette thèse ne propose pas une variation sur la thématique de la mort de Dieu et ses retombées, mais une enquête sur un mode de penser disqualifié, le nihilisme, susceptible de renouveler un diagnostic sur la crise de la modernité. La menace du nihilisme prend consistance dès l'émergence du scepticisme en Grèce ancienne. Passée au crible de l'histoire de la métaphysique et de la prise de pouvoir des mouvements totalitaires, la mise en équivalence nihilisme-scepticisme mérite d'être interrogée. Elle n'est recevable que si les formes anciennes et modernes prises par le scepticisme sont autant de précédents nihilistes et si, inversement, la crise qui scelle la fin de la modernité est interprétable en termes sceptiques. Une approche dynamique de la métaphysique (comme tension et apparentement entre dogmatisme et scepticisme), rend une reconstruction nihiliste du scepticisme sujette à caution. Penser suspensif dans ses formes anciennes, porteur de vacillement à l'époque moderne, le scepticisme se démarque du nihilisme. Ce dernier évide et néantise toutes les différences et consiste, lui, en une négation du fonds commun entre dogmatisme et scepticisme. Quelle que soit la portée créatrice du nihilisme d'un point de vue spéculatif, c'est sa seule dimension destructrice qui s'impose avec l'instauration d'une politique totalitaire. La modernité s'ouvre bien sur un défi de type sceptique : où asseoir sa créance ? Cependant, avec la mort de Dieu, cette question ne se pose plus en termes de vacillement mais de perte définitive de toute assise. S'il en ressort une crise du but dans le cadre métaphysique,l'institutionnalisation du nihilisme donne lieu, quant à elle, à une crise du sens. Le scepticisme contemporain, emporté dans la tourmente, semble disqualifié par sa compromission supposée avec des politiques nihilistes. Forcé d'engager un auto-examen inédit, ne peut-il pas encore être une ressource pour notre temps ? / This thesis does not present a supplementary approach about the death of God and its effects but a study of nihilism, a disqualified way of thought, which could renew a diagnosis on the crisis of modernity. Nihilsm becomes really a threat as soon as scepticism takes shape in Ancient Greece. It is worth questioning stetting nihilism and scepticism as equivalent when considered through the history of metaphysics and rising of totalitarian regimes. This could be accepted only if one considers the ancient and modern forms of scepticism as proceeding from nihilism, and, on the other hand, if the crisis putting an end to modernity can be interpreted from a sceptical point of view. A dynamic approach to metaphysics (as tension and link between dogmatism and scepticism) casts a doubt upon a nihilist interpretation of scepticism. Suspensive thought in its ancient ways, carrying indecision in modern times, scepticism separates from nihilism. The latest eliminates all differences ; by itself, it is the abolition of the common ground between dogmatism and scepticism. Whatever the creative potential of nihilism from a speculative point of view, in the foundation of totalitarian politics, only its destructive aspect stands out. Indeed, modernity opens on a challenge of a sceptic type : which basis for one's belief ? Yet, after the death of God, this question witnesses no longer a state of indecision but truly as the permanent loss of foundation. While it leads to a crisis of the goal from a metaphysical scope, the institutionalization of nihilism provides a crisis of meaning. Contemporary scepticism, caught in the turmoil, appears as discredited because of its presumed involvement with nihilist politics. Could it still be a resource in our time when forced to pratice an original self-examination ?

Esta dissertação procura destacar e compreender a função da noção de corpo na filosofia de Arthur Schopenhauer, especialmente em suas reflexões consagradas à metafísica e à teoria do conhecimento. O corpo é melhor compreendido e ao mesmo tempo destacado, no interior do sistema schopenhaueriano, quando se percebe que sua função está vinculada ao posicionamento do filósofo em relação à chamada polêmica da coisa em si do período pós-kantiano. A introdução da noção de corpo permite a Schopenhauer combater os dois desafios legados por essa polêmica: por um lado, o corpo ajuda a erigir uma teoria do conhecimento que não pretende recair num dogmatismo consistente na afetação da sensibilidade pela coisa em si; por outro lado, o corpo aparece ao mesmo tempo como via de acesso ao em si e como operador central de um argumento de analogia que, ao possibilitar o reconhecimento da coisa em si em todos os fenômenos, combate diretamente o solipsismo. / The present thesis propounds the spotting and comprehension of the function of the notion of body in Arthur Schopenhauers philosophy, particularly in regard to his reflections upon metaphysics and epistemology. The body is better understood through the awareness of the fact that in Schopenhauers set of ideas the function of the body is entwined with the philosophers view on the so-called controversy about things in themselves from the post-kantian period. The introduction of the concept of body provides Schopenhauer with authority to negate two obstacles thrived on that controversy. On the one hand, the body fosters a knowledge which does not intend to be led to a dogmatism of the affection of sensibility by things in themselves, but on the other, the body is here reckoned as a means to access the thing in itself and as the core of an analogy argument which nullifies solipsism whilst favours the recognition of things in themselves in every phenomenon.

Esta dissertação procura destacar e compreender a função da noção de corpo na filosofia de Arthur Schopenhauer, especialmente em suas reflexões consagradas à metafísica e à teoria do conhecimento. O corpo é melhor compreendido e ao mesmo tempo destacado, no interior do sistema schopenhaueriano, quando se percebe que sua função está vinculada ao posicionamento do filósofo em relação à chamada polêmica da coisa em si do período pós-kantiano. A introdução da noção de corpo permite a Schopenhauer combater os dois desafios legados por essa polêmica: por um lado, o corpo ajuda a erigir uma teoria do conhecimento que não pretende recair num dogmatismo consistente na afetação da sensibilidade pela coisa em si; por outro lado, o corpo aparece ao mesmo tempo como via de acesso ao em si e como operador central de um argumento de analogia que, ao possibilitar o reconhecimento da coisa em si em todos os fenômenos, combate diretamente o solipsismo. / The present thesis propounds the spotting and comprehension of the function of the notion of body in Arthur Schopenhauers philosophy, particularly in regard to his reflections upon metaphysics and epistemology. The body is better understood through the awareness of the fact that in Schopenhauers set of ideas the function of the body is entwined with the philosophers view on the so-called controversy about things in themselves from the post-kantian period. The introduction of the concept of body provides Schopenhauer with authority to negate two obstacles thrived on that controversy. On the one hand, the body fosters a knowledge which does not intend to be led to a dogmatism of the affection of sensibility by things in themselves, but on the other, the body is here reckoned as a means to access the thing in itself and as the core of an analogy argument which nullifies solipsism whilst favours the recognition of things in themselves in every phenomenon.

The questions posed by this study were: (1) To determine the relationship between authoritarianism and ressentience among high school coaches employed within San Joaquin County, California.; and (2) To compare authoritarianism and ressentience among high school coaches within San Joaquin County, California, a sample of college students majoring in physical education, and a sample of college students majoring in a subject area other than physical education attending the University of the Pacific, Stockton, California.

abstract: Individuals in a romantic relationship may avoid discussing certain topics with their partner, often to avoid relational and emotional risk. This strategy is known as topic avoidance and may be an important factor for individuals in turbulent romantic relationship to consider due to the importance of communicating with a partner. The associations between characteristics such as openness, relationship satisfaction, and perceived partner unresponsiveness, and topic avoidance have not been directly studied within dogmatism literature. However, dogmatism, defined as a person’s relative openness (or closedness) to new information, may be an important construct associated with topic avoidance that strengthens the associations between perceived partner unresponsiveness, and topic avoidance, and weakens the association between openness, relationship satisfaction, and topic avoidance. Using data from 334 individuals in romantic relationships, results revealed that perceived partner unresponsiveness was positively associated with State of the Relationship, relationship satisfaction was positively associated with Conflict-Inducing and Negative Life Experiences, such that as scores on relationship satisfaction and perceived partner unresponsiveness increased, topic avoidance scores also increased. Openness was not associated with Topic Avoidance. Additionally, as predicted, dogmatism moderated the association between relationship satisfaction and State of the Relationship Topic Avoidance, the associations between perceived partner unresponsiveness and State of the Relationship Topic Avoidance and Negative Life Experiences Topic Avoidance. This research has important implications for clinicians working with individuals who present with relational concerns and exhibit dogmatic behavior. Limitations and future directions are discussed. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Counseling 2019

Suite aux grands changements politiques, économiques et sociaux que l’Occident a connus depuis plus d’un siècle, de nombreux problèmes ont émergé, de nouveaux défis ont été lancés et plusieurs approches et solutions ont été avancées. L’avènement de la démocratie, un exploit humain inestimable, a plus ou moins règlementé la pluralité idéologique, pour permettre un exercice politique organisé. Aujourd’hui, dans le nouvel ordre mondial, c’est la pluralité morale et religieuse qui a besoin d’être gérée; un défi pour les institutions démocratiques et pour la société civile, afin de réaliser un mieux vivre-ensemble dans le dialogue, la compréhension et le compromis. Or, beaucoup de travail est encore à faire : dans un premier temps, à l’intérieur de chaque tradition religieuse; dans un deuxième temps, entre les différentes traditions; et dans un troisième temps, entre ces traditions et la modernité. Le ‘dogmatisme’ est au cœur de ces débats, qu’il soit d’ordre traditionnel ou moderne, il entrave la raison dans son processus de libération et d’émancipation. La problématique de ce mémoire concerne la gestion de la pluralité morale et religieuse en Occident. Dans ce travail, nous allons essayer de démontrer comment la libération du dogmatisme en général et la libération du ‘dogmatisme’ musulman, en particulier, peuvent contribuer à la réalisation d’un mieux vivre-ensemble en Occident. Pour ce faire, nous analyserons les projets de deux penseurs musulmans contemporains : Muhammad Arkoun et Tariq Ramadan. Notre recherche va essentiellement se pencher sur leurs attitudes vis-à-vis de la tradition et de la modernité, car, nous pensons que l’enjeu du ‘dogmatisme’ est lié aux rapports des musulmans à leur tradition et à la modernité. Selon nos deux penseurs, la libération du ‘dogmatisme’ musulman n’est possible qu’à condition de pouvoir changer à la fois notre rapport à la tradition et à la modernité. Arkoun pense que ce changement doit suivre le modèle de la libération occidentale, au moyen d’une critique subversive de la tradition islamique. Cependant, Ramadan opte pour une réforme radicale de la pensée islamique qui vise une critique globale de la tradition, mais, qui épargne les fondements de la foi : le ‘sacré’. / Following the major political, economic and social changes that occurred in the West for over a century, many problems have emerged, new challenges have surfaced, and several approaches and solutions have been proposed. The advent of democracy, an invaluable human achievement, more or less regulated ideological plurality, and allowed the evolution of an organized political exercise. Today, in the new world order, it is the moral and religious diversity that need to be managed. The challenge remains for democratic institutions and civil society to create a better harmonious community through dialogue, understanding and compromise. However, much work is still to be done : first, within each religious tradition, second, between different traditions and third, between tradition and modernity. Dogmatism is at the heart of these debates. An order, whether traditional or modern hampers objectives reasoning in the process of liberation and emancipation. The issue of this paper concerns the management of the moral and religious plurality in the West. In this work, we will try to demonstrate how the relinquishing of ‘dogmatism’ in general and the relinquishing of Muslim ‘dogmatism’ in particular, can contribute to the achievement of a harmonious in a pluralistic West. This will be achieved by shedding light on the projects of two contemporary Muslim thinkers : Muhammad Arkoun and Tariq Ramadan. Our research is mainly to reflect on their attitudes towards tradition versus modernity, as we believe that the issue of dogmatism is linked to Muslims’ attitude towards tradition and modernity. According to these two thinkers, the release of muslims’ ‘dogmatism’ is only possible by changing both our relationship to tradition and modernity. Arkoun thinks this change should follow the model of Western release through a subversive critique of the Islamic tradition. However, Ramadan opts for a radical reform of Islamic thought through a comprehensive critique of the tradition, in order to save the foundation of faith : The ‘sacred’.

Esta tese de doutorado estuda o perspectivismo na obra de Nietzsche, bem como o confronto com a verdade que ele representa. Para tanto, procuramos mostrar que esse confronto atravessa toda a obra de Nietzsche, pois já os seus escritos iniciais investigam as condições para o surgimento da crença na verdade, além dos interesses a que ela atendia. Expondo que Nietzsche, apropriando-se do legado crítico de Kant em suas primeiras obras, ensaia uma destruição completa da verdade, pretendemos demonstrar que ele falha em seus objetivos porque a radicalidade de seus argumentos destruiria os próprios pressupostos em que estão baseados, ou seja, os do idealismo transcendental kantiano. Nesse momento em que circunscrevemos nossa análise aos escritos inicias, tentamos demonstrar que Nietzsche limita-se a refutar a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas falha ao querer ampliar esse refutação além desses limites. Por isso, analisando a maneira pela qual o combate à verdade se posiciona a partir dos escritos da década de 80, defendemos que neles o perspectivismo se torna decisivo para os problemas enfrentados inicialmente por Nietzsche. Interpretando o perspectivismo como um fenomenalismo da consciência e um interpretacionismo, investigamos, no decorrer deste trabalho, a forma pela qual Nietzsche re-elabora a crítica à verdade em seus escritos tardios. Considerando essa crítica ainda a partir da apropriação de Kant, buscamos demonstrar que ela atinge os fins perseguidos por Nietzsche sem, contudo, ficar preso aos impasses das primeiras 5 obras. Isso implica mostrar que Nietzsche vai recusar não apenas a noção de verdade como adequação com a coisa-em-si, mas também a concepção moderna de verdade como certeza e fundamento para o conhecimento. Eis por que Nietzsche alveja a noção cartesiana do eu penso como a primeira verdade, assim como a concepção kantiana de verdade expressa nos juízos lógicos. Sustentamos, assim, que o fenomenalismo da consciência refuta a noção de unidade, pressuposto fundamental às filosofias cartesiana e kantiana. Em seguida, analisamos como Nietzsche, apropriando-se da ideia kantiana de princípios regulativos, afirma que todas as visões com que avaliamos o mundo são ficções, erros, ótica-de-perspectivas da vida com valor regulativo para a existência. Defendemos, por fim, que embora se posicione radicalmente contra a verdade a partir da luta de interpretações, o perspectivismo não se torna um relativismo, na medida em que se liga à teoria da vontade de potência, a qual é o critério para avaliar as perspectivas e ela mesma apresentada como interpretação. / This Doctoral Thesis studies perspectivism on the work of Nietzsche, as well as the confrontation with the truth it represents. In order to do so, we try to show that this confrontation pervades Nietzsche\'s work, as his former writings investigate the conditions for the emergence of the belief in the truth, beyond the interests to which it served. By expounding that Nietzsche, borrowing Kant\'s critical legacy in his early works, starts out a complete destruction of truth, we intend to demonstrate that he fails in his objectives. This occurs because the radicalism of his arguments would destroy the very foundations which they are based upon, that is, Kantian transcendental idealism. At the moment we circumscribe our analysis to the early writings, we intend to demonstrate that Nietzsche limits himself to refuting the notion of truth as an adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but fails to widen this refutation beyond these limits. Therefore, we analyze the means of the fight against the truth, as presented in his writings from the 80`s. We defend that, in these writings, perspectivism becomes decisive in relation to the problems formerly faced by Nietzsche. By interpreting perspectivism as a phenomenalism of the conscience and interpretationism, we investigate the means by which Nietzsche re-elaborates the critique of truth in his late writings. Through the understanding of this critique as an appropriation of Kant\'s ideas, we try to demonstrate that it reaches the goals set by Nietzsche. Therefore it bypasses the impasses of his early work. This is to show that Nietzsche declines not only the notion of truth as adequacy to the thing-in-itself, but also the modern concept of truth as certainty and foundation of knowledge. That is 7 why Nietzsche aims at the Cartesian notion of \"I think\" as the first truth, as well as the Kantian conception of truth as expressed in logical judgments. Therefore, we sustain that phenomenalism of the conscience refutes the notion of unity, fundamental presupposition to Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. Additionally, we analyze the way Nietzsche, appropriating the Kantian idea of regulative principles, asserts that every vision we take to evaluate the world is fiction, a mistake, a perspectives-optic of life with a regulative value to existence. We defend, finally, that, even perspectivism radically stands against the truth - understood as strife of interpretations. It does not become relativism, since it is connected to the Theory of the Will to Power, which is the criterion to evaluate perspectives and which is itself presented as interpretation.