This is a dissertation in philosophy of psychiatry and ethics focused on the question of how does one live and react responsibly to the experience of mood disorders such as depression and anxiety. In looking to the current state of psychiatry and cultural understandings of mental disorder, I identify what I call being “epistemically adrift” – the sense that individuals face too many conflicting opinions and a constant debate of how to live with depression that they are unable to process for themselves what their best options for living are. This feeling of being epistemically adrift is all the more complicated by the experience of mood disorder itself, which often makes individuals feel morally inadequate and pressured to do the right thing without clear direction. In the absence of a clear path regarding depression and anxiety, this dissertation proposes an ethics for depression and anxiety disorders – drawing a virtue theory from the existentialist tradition that focuses on the outskirts of mental disorder in order to create an inclusive ethical system for those generally excluded in moral philosophy. The first chapter outlines the general theory of being epistemically adrift in relation to depression and anxiety and how the themes of uncertainty in these conditions inherently lead to different epistemic insights. This chapter establishes the dissertation’s roots in existential phenomenology and epistemic injustice literature in order to sketch out how the combined uncertainty in interdisciplinary understanding of mental illness with the uncertainty experienced within mood disorders lead individuals to feeling adrift and unable to determine what they should do for themselves in living good lives. Meanwhile I argue that the insights of depression and anxiety attune individuals to the world in different ways than their non-depressed peers, which imports interesting questions regarding our responsibility toward one another. The second chapter explores a case study of this sort of insight, arguing that the experience of excessive or “delusional” guilt within depressive disorders can provide a deeper insight into our general moral responsibility towards one another. I compare this feeling of guilt to Karl Jaspers’ conception of “metaphysical” or collective guilt in his analysis of the German people after the Second World War and Holocaust. These sorts of guilt feelings within depression is often incapacitating and hard to make sense of for individuals, but it additionally has a transformative ability to reevaluate moral life. I argue that parallel to the concept of “depressive realism” where individuals with depression have different and sometimes better insights than others, depressive guilt differently attunes individuals to how they relate to others and the world at large. From there, the third chapter engages with how psychiatric diagnosis shapes and limits one’s perceptions of their freedom and agency. More specifically, this chapter employs an existentialist analysis of how one can react to their diagnosis in bad faith – deflecting their own responsibility either by indulging into diagnostic patterns as inherent destiny or denying the condition’s effect on their motivations. I argue that there must be a middle path where one takes responsibility for one’s situation as being depressed or anxious, which both acknowledges the condition but also sees it as a personal challenge to improve on one’s life. The final chapter of the dissertation culminates in the development of an ethical theory that directly centers itself within the experience of mood disorders. This theory stems from both existentialism for its commitment to projecting meaning on uncertainty and absurdity along with virtue theory which allows for a sense of imperfection and improvement over time. I have been developing a set of virtues for how to be responsible for one’s depression or anxiety. “Responsibility” in this sense is the question of how one responds to their moods and other symptoms related to mood disorders, that is, an account of responsibility that resists narratives of fault or blame. These virtues are meant to be a set of therapy-informed guidelines to help those with depression and anxiety counteract the worst feelings of being adrift and foster autonomy and dignity for themselves. / Philosophy

Epistemic injustices are the distinctly epistemic harms and wrongs which undermine or depreciate our capacities knowers. This dissertation develops a theory of epistemic injustice and justice which accounts for excesses in epistemic goods as a source of epistemic injustice. This is a theory of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. The dissertation can be divided into three parts: 1) motivational, 2) theoretical, 3) applications and implications. First, Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the study of epistemic injustice and epistemic overload. Chapter 1 identifies a gap in the literature on epistemic injustice concerning excesses in epistemic goods as sources of epistemic injustice while canvassing the major themes and debates of the field. Chapter 2 levels an objection to ‘proper’ epistemology, thereby providing an indirect defense of the study of epistemic injustice. Second, theoretical development occurs in are Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6. Chapter 3 initiates the argument for epistemic overload, while Chapter 4 extends the case for epistemic overload, identifying several epistemic injustices arising from excesses of understanding, credibility, and truth. Chapter 5 explains the oversights of prior theorists by developing a more descriptively adequate account of social epistemics that explains the many sites of epistemic injustice. Chapter 6 develops a two-stage contractualist theory of epistemic in/justice to explain the bad-making features of epistemic injustices and generates the duty of epistemic charity. The third part of the dissertation applies the findings of earlier chapters to contemporary practical and theoretical problems. Chapter 7 employs the contractualist reasoning of Chapter 6 to address and ameliorate problems from excesses in the uptake and circulation of hermeneutical resources and true-beliefs. Chapter 8 considers the mutual dependence relations between political phenomena and epistemic in/justice, showing that accounts of political justice depend upon or presuppose epistemic justice. Finally, Chapter 9 applies epistemic overload to the use of big data technologies in the context of predive policing algorithms. An abductive argument concludes that the introduction of the “Strategic Subjects List” as part of a Chicago policing initiative in 2013 introduced understandings which likely contributed to gun-violence in Chicago and which constitutes an epistemic overload. In sum, the dissertation shows the theoretical and practical significance of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. / Ph. D. / Epistemic injustice refers to the ways in which people can be wronged in their capacities as knowers and thinkers. What we know and how we think are of central importance to our identity and well-being. Theories of epistemic injustice endeavor to explain the emergence, nature, and effects of these injustices, while developing accounts for promoting the intellectual agency of persons. Epistemic injustices are important to recognize for social justice when they systematically undermine marginalized people, rendering people unable to resist oppression as they become unintelligible, lose credibility, or are overwhelmed by epistemic excesses. The centrality of “Black Lives Matter,” “#MeToo,” and “FakeNews” to contemporary social movements demonstrates how the circulation of phrases accompanying understandings are crucial for effective public deliberation and political progress, particularly in diverse societies. Yet, subtleties of social epistemics often conceal epistemic injustices, as willful misinterpretations of “Black Lives Matter,” for example, are immeasurable and defy conventional distinctions between ethical and epistemic conduct. These considerations motivate studying epistemic injustice. The central thesis of this dissertation is that excesses in epistemic goods such as credibility, understanding, and true-beliefs can constitute epistemic injustices. Hence, epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. Theoretically, this dissertation extends the challenge to the univocal status of traditional epistemic goods. Recurrent and long-held views on the value of truth, credibility, and understanding are upended as I show that these goods can undermine epistemic agency itself. Practically, it shows how epistemic goods and resources can be harmful and counterproductive to persons as epistemic agents and for the achievement of social justice. These results are applied to the identity-types generated by predictive policing big-data algorithms.

This thesis analyzes specific challenges concerning 'truth-telling' war reporters face when reporting on international conflict. For this purpose truth is examined in accordance with journalistic principles outlined in codes of ethics, with a focus on objectivity and fairness. The aim is to discover ways to improve the application of principles, in order to battle epistemic errors and the effects they entail: polarization, reductionism, and superficiality. The study concludes that providing context and nuance is crucial, but that codes - although essential - are insufficient in helping journalists decide what is relevant and what is not. An approach in virtue ethics is recommended where phronesis (or practical wisdom) can inspire responsible journalists to comply with the spirit, rather than the letter of the principles.

[pt] Esta tese é o resultado de uma pesquisa de inspiração etnográfica sobre o refúgio como prática de injustiça epistêmica, analisado por meio do universo brasileiro da elegibilidade e dos processos de produção de significados sociais. A concepção de injustiça epistêmica está relacionada a duas importantes práticas epistêmicas: produzir e compartilhar o conhecimento com outros por meio do testemunho e fazer sentido das próprias experiências sociais. A tese busca, assim, examinar a produção e a transmissão do conhecimento nos processos burocráticos da elegibilidade, isto é, na determinação do status de refugiado, e as formas de representação midiática em torno da figura do refúgio e seus sujeitos. Para tanto, a análise contou com uma pluralidade metodológica composta por trabalho de campo por meio da realização de entrevistas e abordagem com corpus através do uso de softwares específicos. A partir disso, a tese analisa o espaço das práticas epistêmicas que atravessam a categoria do refugiado e podem contribuir para a produção de injustiças, afetando a vida de solicitantes de refúgio e refugiados no Brasil. / [en] This thesis is the result of a research on asylum as epistemic injustice, analyzed through the Brazilian eligibility process and the practices of media representation in the country. The concept of epistemic injustice is intimately related to two crucial epistemic practices: conveying knowledge to others and making sense of our own social experiences. Hence, the two main aims of the research are the analysis of knowledge production in the bureaucratic process of eligibility (or refugee status determination process, RSD) and the investigation on how the Brazilian mainstream media represents refugees. To this end, the pluralistic research methods used consist of interview-based fieldwork and corpus linguistics with the help of specific software. The thesis therefore analyzes the space of epistemic practices that have an impact on the refugee category and may contribute to the production of injustices, affecting the lives of asylum seekers and refugees in Brazil.

This thesis is concerned with philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness, with each chapter exploring different philosophical issues. Chapter one delineates the central concept around which the rest of the work revolves: the stigma of mental illness. It provides an outline of the stigma mechanism, how it applies to mental illness, why it is such a large public health concern and what has been done so far to combat it. Chapter two is concerned with the application of recent literature in the philosophy of implicit bias to the topic of mental illness. It suggests that we have hitherto been preoccupied with explicit formulations of the stigma mechanism, but argues that there are distinctive issues involved in combatting forms of discrimination in which the participants are not cognisant of their attitudes or actions, and that anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness should take note. Chapter three applies the philosophical literature concerning the ethics of our epistemic practices to the stigma of mental illness. It contains an analysis of how epistemic injustice- primarily in the forms of testimonial injustice and stereotype threat- affects those with mental illnesses. The fourth chapter brings in issues in the philosophy of science (particularly the philosophy of psychiatry) to explore the possibility of intervening on the stigma process to halt the stigma of mental illness. The first candidate (preventing labelling) is discounted, and the second (combatting stereotype) is tentatively endorsed. The fifth chapter is concerned with how language facilitates the stigma of mental illness. It suggests that using generics to talk about mental illness (whether the knowledge structure conveyed is inaccurate or accurate) is deeply problematic. In the former, it conveys insidious forms of social stereotyping. In the latter, it propagates misinformation by presenting the category as a quintessential one.

Cette thèse explore le phénomène de whistleblowing et comment il a été encadré, principalement du point de vue anglo-saxon, à travers des lectures proches de récits culturels et une vue critique sur l'érudition existante sur whistleblowing. À travers des lectures rapprochées d'une sélection de cas, la poursuite, l'importance et l'impact de la vérité apparaîtront comme le thème central dans les récits culturelles explorées, mais aussi les moments où la vérité est rendu impuissante, en raison de sa nature coercitive comme factualité. L'impuissance de la vérité vécue par les lanceurs d'alerte ("les whistleblowers") est ce qui relie d'autre part les récits culturels à l'art tragique. Les diseurs de vérité ne sont pas reconnus, et ils entrent dans un conflit tragique parce qu'elles révèlent des vérités qui ne sont pas pratiques pour les gens au pouvoir. En d'autres termes, les whistleblowers, en disant la vérité, cherchent à élargir l'espace épistémique dans la sphère publique et à tenir les gens et le pouvoir responsables. Cependant, ils sont continuellement négativement encadrés avec des métaphores conceptuelles qui obstruent la perception d'eux en tant que conteurs de la vérité. / This dissertation posits that whistleblowing is factual truth-telling, or truthful public denunciation. In scholarship, media, and in the popular perception of whistleblowing, the truth-claim is often overlooked, and in many occasions hampered by the dominant ways it is framed (e.g. as leak, which is explored among other frames as a problematic conceptual metaphor). Interestingly, the representation of the whistleblower is different in cultural narratives. Through close readings of a selection of cases, the pursuit, importance, and impact of truth will appear as the central theme in the explored plots, but also the moments where truth becomes impotent, due to its coercive nature as factuality - a process that furthermore connects whistleblowing with the idea of the tragic. Put differently, the special literary interest of narratives of whistleblowing is to turn ignorance into knowledge, knowledge into telling, and how the unraveling of truth becomes a reversal of fortune for the truth-teller who enters a particular tragic conflict. As frame, as narrative, and as a modern phenomenon of truthful public denunciation, whistleblowing offers particular moments of truth, often about moments of falsehood, and ultimately seeks to be a moment of impetus: for the public to restore justice, and for readerships and audience of narrative and dramatic configurations to choose or to distance themselves from multiple proposals of justice emplotted - not only ethical justice, but also epistemic, hermeneutical, and testimonial justice. In other words, whistleblowers, by telling the truth, seek to expand the epistemic space in the public sphere and hold people and power accountable.

Syftet med arbetet är att undersöka eventuella vinster med att använda anonyma digitala enkäter i filosofiundervisningen i gymnasieskolan. Utgångspunkten är vissa elever kan vara mindre benägna att delta muntligt under filosofilektioner jämfört med lektioner i andra ämnen, vilket delvis kan kopplas till att eleverna upplever att de riskerar att utsättas för epistemisk orättvisa i form av vittnesorättvisa. Undersökningen har genomförts i samband med en lektionsserie i epistemologi som genomfördes på en VFU-skola. Tre olika datainsamlingsmetoder har använts: semistrukturerade gruppintervjuer med syfte att undersöka vilka hinder elever upplever i filosofiundervisningen och huruvida anonyma digitala enkäter kan hjälpa dem att övervinna dessa, två kvantitativa flervalstest med syfte att testa elevernas epistemologikunskaper före och efter lektionsseriens genomförande samt en deltagande klassrumsobservation med fokus på metodens hjälp i den formativa bedömningen. Resultatet visar att anonyma digitala enkäter har god potential att fungera som ett stöd i filosofiundervisningen i förhållande till de olika utmaningar som diskuteras i arbetet. / The purpose of this study is to investigate potential benefits of using anonymous digital surveys in Swedish upper secondary school philosophy education. The study assumes that some students may be less inclined to participate orally during philosophy lessons compared to lessons in other subjects, which can partially be linked to students perceiving a risk of being subjected to epistemic injustice in the form of testimonial injustice. The study was conducted in conjunction with a series of lessons on epistemology, which were taught at a placement school. Three different data collection methods were used: semi-structured group interviews aimed at exploring the obstacles students experience in philosophy education and whether anonymous digital surveys can help them overcome these obstacles, two quantitative multiple-choice tests aimed at assessing students' knowledge of epistemology before and after the lesson series, and a participatory classroom observation focusing on the method's benefits for formative assessment. The results indicate that anonymous digital surveys have good potential as a benefit within philosophy education in relation to the various challenges discussed in the study.

Drawing on the theoretical influences of Mad and Disability Studies; philosophical conceptualizations of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007), ethical loneliness (Stauffer, 2015), and psycho-emotional disablism (Reeve, 2012; Thomas, 1999; 2007); disability/service user/feminist ethics; a decade of Mad Movement community organizing; as well as autobiographical illustrations and empirical data from two collaborative research projects, this thesis describes my efforts to live a Mad politics in the community, academy, and social work education. Central to this politics, and to the overall contribution of the thesis, is its focus on (1) the recognition and redress of affective-epistemic harms that are often ignored by legislative/social welfare approaches to in/justice; and (2) the generation and refinement of Mad knowledge/ways of knowing that respond to our own priorities as Mad people, rather than those of mental health systems. It contributes to these areas of Mad Studies theory in several ways: First, by recognizing and politicizing the often ignored affective-epistemic effects of abandonment and neglect Mad people experience from society, including loneliness, anger, resentment, distrust, low expectations of others and lack of confidence. Second, by seeking new conceptualizations (such as epistemic loneliness) and contributing to existing ones (like expectations of just treatment, psycho-emotional disablism) in order to more adequately interpret and attest to these harms and call for their redress. Third, by affirming emergent Mad moral and epistemological frameworks, especially those that manifest in the aftermath of harm and account for ontologies of knowing. Fourth, by developing Survivor/Service User Research approaches to analysis (listening for resonance, everyday forms of service user resistance, and ‘quiet’ data) that value affective engagements with data and perceive and respond to Mad onto-ethico-epistemologies in and on their own terms. Ultimately, this work calls for greater relational justice, and an expansion of what we owe each other. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis contributes to Mad theory by recording some of the things I learned while trying to survive in the world, community organizing, the academy, and social work education as a Mad person. To do so, I reflect on the existential and ethical questions I brought to my doctoral studies, the people, texts, and concepts that I found particularly good company during this time, and my Mad methods of living/doing/knowing. Three separate but interconnected articles then follow. These are about (1) moving with loneliness as a Mad student; (2) resisting unmet expectations as service user ethics, and (3) how pedagogical partnerships between students and faculty/staff can cultivate marginalized students’ confidence in their knowledge. The thesis ends with a discussion of its overall contributions to how we conceptualize the psycho-emotional harms produced through sanism/disablism and the ways we understand what Mad knowledge is and how it is generated.

L’invalidation de leur expérience par les professionnel·le·s de la santé est partagée par un grand nombre de personnes vivant avec de la douleur chronique. Elle correspond au fait de ne pas prendre au sérieux ce que l’autre personne communique ou de discréditer ses émotions. Le témoignage des personnes qui vivent de la douleur n’est donc pas perçu comme égal et compétent. Les injustices épistémiques, soit la disqualification d’une personne comme agente de savoir, sont une forme d’invalidation. Ce cadre théorique a été mobilisé dans la littérature dans le contexte de la relation médicale afin de comprendre l’invalidation de la douleur chronique. Cependant, ces études, très théoriques, tendent elles-mêmes à reproduire des injustices épistémiques en ne donnant pas la voix aux personnes directement concernées par ces injustices. Les mécanismes ciblés comme favorisant les injustices épistémiques et les conséquences découlant de celles-ci sont donc identifiés de façon théorique, sans égard au vécu réel des patient·e·s. Similairement, les avenues proposées pour favoriser la justice épistémique ne tiennent pas compte des besoins et préférences de réel·le·s patient·e·s. Ce projet de recherche vise à mieux comprendre les injustices épistémiques de façon globale et intégrative dans la relation médicale au moyen d’entretiens qualitatifs narratifs conduits auprès de dix-sept personnes vivant avec de la douleur chronique. Il vise à identifier les mécanismes sous-jacents aux injustices épistémiques et leurs conséquences individuelles, politiques et structurelles. Les avenues pour favoriser la justice épistémique sont également recensées dans la littérature, comparées et analysées à la lumière du témoignage de réel·le·s patient·e·s. Une avenue intégrative, le partenariat patient, est identifiée. / Experiences of chronic pain invalidation by healthcare practitioners are shared by many people living with chronic pain. Invalidation can include not taking seriously someone’s testimony, imposing one's thoughts, or discrediting someone’s emotions. In those cases, the testimony is not perceived as equal and competent. Epistemic injustices, that is, the disqualification of a person as a knower, are a form of invalidation. This theoretical framework has been used in the context of the medical relationship, and to understand the invalidation of chronic pain. However, these studies are theoretical, and tend to reproduce epistemic injustices by not giving a voice to the people directly impacted by these injustices. The mechanisms underlying epistemic injustices and the consequences resulting from them are therefore identified theoretically, without regard to the actual experience of patients. Similarly, the avenues proposed to promote epistemic justice do not consider the needs and preferences of real patients. This research project aims at better understanding epistemic injustices in a global and integrative way in the medical relationship by means of qualitative narrative interviews conducted with seventeen people living with chronic pain. It aims at identifying the mechanisms underlying the epistemic injustices and their individual, political and structural consequences. Avenues for promoting epistemic justice are also identified in the literature, compared, and analyzed though patients’ testimonies. An integrative avenue, patient partnership, is identified.

The quest for epistemic liberation remains an important project in the post-colonial era of Zambia, and entails challenging the existing inequalities in knowledge representation at the epistemic front in the country. At the core of this quest is the position that the continued dominance of Western knowledge and the corresponding marginalisation of indigenous knowledges amount to an epistemic injustice that affects the contemporary existence of the peoples in the country. This study critically examines the problem of epistemic injustice in Zambia while reflecting on the country’s uncompleted project of decolonisation. It traces the problem from the theoretical assumption of modernity that Western knowledge is universal and that it should, therefore, be applied to all societies in the world. It is submitted that the current education system in Zambia is based on this assumption, and, consequently, favours Western knowledge to the exclusion of indigenous knowledges. This practice is identified as a conduit for accelerating epistemic injustice and its intensity in the country. The study approaches this problem from an African philosophical standpoint, and draws its current from the history of the political struggle against domination on the continent. To adequately confront the problem of epistemic injustice in Zambia, the study suggests parity and equilibrium in representation between indigenous knowledges and Western knowledge in the country. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)