Le présent mémoire analyse l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité sur le devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, devoir imposer aux administrateurs de compagnies par la législation corporative canadienne. L'objectif du mémoire est de déterminer un standard de conduite à être adopté par l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire. Dans un premier temps, comment peut-on définir ce que constitue le « meilleur intérêt de la compagnie» ? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que l'intérêt de la compagnie est au carrefour d'une communauté d'intérêts lui étant sous-jacents. L'intérêt de la compagnie, bien qu'indépendant de ces intérêts sous-jacents, ne peut s'analyser en faisant abstraction de ces derniers. La jurisprudence et la doctrine récentes laissent entrevoir que l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité se fait sentir sur la détermination de ces intérêts sous-jacents à celui de la compagnie susceptibles d'être affectés par la finalité poursuivie par la compagnie, finalité axée sur la maximisation des profits à partir des opérations de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, le créancier, à l'instar de l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, supporte le risque commercial résiduel et doit recevoir une attention appropriée par les administrateurs. Par conséquent, dans la détermination de ce que constitue le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, l'administrateur ne peut, lorsque la compagnie est insolvable, faire abstraction de l'intérêt des créanciers. Ainsi, dans un deuxième temps, qui sont les véritables bénéficiaires du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie dans un contexte d'insolvabilité? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que le créancier est un bénéficiaire indirect de ce devoir fiduciaire lorsque la compagnie est insolvable. Tout comme l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, le créancier doit être en mesure d'intenter un recours de nature dérivée en vue d'obtenir réparation, pour et au nom de la compagnie. Le contexte d'insolvabilité fait naître, à l'endroit des administrateurs, une obligation de nature fiduciaire de prendre en considération l'intérêt des créanciers tout en permettant à ces derniers d'intenter un tel recours dérivé en vue d'obtenir réparation à la suite d'une violation du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie. En plus d'être soutenue par une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine canadiennes, cette conclusion s'appuie sur une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine de certains pays du Commonwealth (Angleterre, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande) et des États-Unis, juridictions avec lesquelles le Canada entretient des relations privilégiés, historiquement ou économiquement. Finalement, que doit faire l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie? L'auteur arrive à la conclusion que cette obligation de prendre en considération l'intérêt du créancier dans un contexte d'insolvabilité se traduit par un exercice de conciliation entre les intérêts du créancier et ceux des actionnaires. Les paramètres de cet exercice de conciliation sont déterminés en fonction du scénario envisagé par les administrateurs face à la situation d'insolvabilité. Plus le scénario se rapproche d'une liquidation plus ou moins formelle des actifs tangibles et facilement dissociables de la compagnie, moins cet exercice en sera un de conciliation et plus l'intérêt du créancier devra recevoir une attention prépondérante. À l'opposé, plus le scénario en est un de restructuration fondée sur une relance de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie insolvable, plus l'intérêt de l'actionnaire devra recevoir une attention particulière. / The following thesis analyses the impact of a company's insolvency on the fiduciary duties of its directors and officers, as imposed by Canadian corporate law. More specifically it shall examine the repercussions of an insolvency on management's fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the company's best interests. The objective shall therefore be to assess the extent of such fiduciary duty in the context of an insolvency and to establish a guideline to be followed by directors and officers in view of complying with said duty. Firstly, what constitutes the "best interests of the company"? The author concludes that a company's interests are comprised of a community of underlying interests. Although the interests of the company remain independent, it cannot be determined without taking into account said underlying interests. Amongst this community of underlying interests, shareholders and creditors, members of such community that supports the financing of the company's operations, occupy a predominant place. Recent case law and doctrinal authorities have concluded that the impact of a company's insolvency does not affect the ultimate objective pursued by the company, i.e. the maximisation of profit, but rather affects the determination of the members of the community of underlying interests that shall be affected by the pursuit of such finality. As such, in a context of insolvency, creditors, similar to shareholders in a context of solvency, are the residual risk-bearers of the company's commercial expenditure. Consequently, in view of determining what constitutes the best interests of the company, when it is insolvent, directors and officers may not ignore the creditors' interests. Secondly, who are the real beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty to act in a company's best interests when it becomes insolvent? The author concludes that creditors are indirect beneficiaries of such fiduciary duty in a context of insolvency. Similarly to shareholders in a context of solvency, creditors must be entitled to institute a derivative claim against directors and officers in order to obtain, in the name and for the company, compensation for the violation of said fiduciary duty. Insolvency triggers the existence of an obligation, fiduciary in nature, to take into account the creditors' interests. As such, directors and officers are to consider the creditors' interests in exercising their fiduciary duty to act in strict compliance with the best interests of the company. This conclusion is based on a review of the Canadian statutory law, jurisprudence and doctrinal authorities. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by a review of same from certain Commonwealth jurisdictions (England, Australia and New-Zealand) and from the United States of America, jurisdictions with whom Canada has a privileged relationship, historically and/or economically. Finally, how does the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests translate in practice for directors and officers of an insolvent company? The author concludes that the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests is, in reality, an obligation to reconcile the shareholders' and creditors' interests with that of the company's best interests. The parameters of such obligation shall be determined with respect to the scenario conceived by directors and officers in order to effectively manage a situation of insolvency. Should such scenario focus on the liquidation of the core assets of the company, then the interests of the shareholders shall be subjugated to that of the creditors'. Conversely, should such scenario focus on the reorganisation of the company's commercial expenditures, based on the company's existing structures, then the shareholder's interest shall receive a more extensive attention by directors and officers.

IN ENGLISH The purpose of this paper is to analyse all segments of the duty of due managerial care of member of an elective body of a limited company and propose de lege ferenda approach to segments of the duty. Another goal of this master's thesis was to examine new business judgment rule and present an alternative British model of the rule. To provide a comparative approach the paper utilizes the British company law approach. The first chapter introduces the origin of the duty of due managerial care, in particular its roots in Roman law and Austrian civil code. The second chapter is divided into five subchapters. The first subchapter highlights the recent changes to the duty of due managerial care after recodification of private law. The second subchapter examines duty of care as one of two integral parts of the duty of due managerial care. Firstly, it analyzes the quality of care expected of directors. Secondly, it focuses on the test for determination of necessary standard of care. Thirdly, following a critical examination of the test for determination of a standard of care, the paper suggests de lege ferenda test of due care. Finally, the first subchapter considers the British duty of care, skill and diligence. The third subchapter covers the duty of loyalty including duties derived from it...

Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o earn-out nos contratos de compra e venda de participações societárias. Em específico, esse mecanismo é estudado na sua perspectiva prática e teórica a fim de compreender a sua função e causa, tendo em vista a sua execução no Direito brasileiro. O interesse pelo earn-out justifica-se diante o seu crescente uso em operações de fusões e aquisições na prática negocial brasileira. Esse recente movimento, por um lado, demonstra a grande utilidade do earn-out como instrumento para aproximar as expectativas das partes quanto ao valor correspondente ao preço da empresa-alvo; por outro lado, a utilização inadequada e não adaptada ao Ordenamento revela que o earn-out pode ser um mecanismo indesejado, diante do seu grande potencial de litigiosidade. Nesse contexto, duas foram as perspectivas abordadas no trabalho: a uma, analisa-se o ambiente em que inserto o earn-out, sendo que para cumprir com esse objetivo estuda-se, por um lado, a compra e venda de empresas como um processo e, por outro, as peculiaridades do contrato de compra e venda de participações societárias; a duas, analisa-se o earn-out “aplicado”, isto é, as motivações práticas para utilizar o mecanismo, bem como os melhores mercados em que sua utilização é recomendável. Em decorrência dessas perspectivas, a análise do earnout demonstra sua grande utilidade e eficiência para as partes vendedora e compradora de participações societárias que não chegam a um consenso sobre o preço do objeto do contrato de compra e venda. Contudo, verifica-se que a sua aplicação pode causar problemas de ordem contratual e societária, especialmente quando uma das consequências do mecanismo é manter o vendedor na empresa-alvo para o atingimento das metas do earn-out. Diante dos problemas verificados no âmbito da prática estadunidense e no Brasil, a parte final do trabalho enfrenta as questões que envolvem a execução do earn-out e as dificuldades para a verificação das condições ajustadas pelas partes como metas. Nesse sentido, são estudadas a posição das partes antes e depois da operação, assim como a potencial violação a deveres fiduciários pelos administradores da sociedade-alvo. Ao final, apresentam-se possíveis soluções no âmbito da prática contratual para evitar que a utilização do earn-out seja problemática, e, quando os conflitos já foram instaurados, analisa-se a aplicação de regras interpretativas ao earn-out no Direito brasileiro. / This essay deals with the earn-out in stock purchase agreements. Specifically, the objective is to understand the mechanism, its function and causa, regarding its enforcement in the Brazilian Law. The reason to study the earn-out is justified by its increasingly use in the Brazilian market, which brings two consequences: by one side, it is clear that the earn-out is useful as an instrument to match the expectations of the parties concerning the value that represents the price of the target; on the other hand, the improper and inappropriate use of the earn-out in the Brazilian legal system may turn the mechanism into an unwanted clause, due to its great potential of lawsuits and legal conflicts. In this sense, two perspectives were approached in this research: first, it is analyzed the context in which the earn-out is utilized, for that matter it is studied the mergers and acquisitions as a whole, and the particularities of the stock purchase agreement; second, it is analyzed what is the earn-out as a clause, its legal nature and framework, function and causa, and motivations to use the mechanism, as well as the best markets in which its use is recommended. As an outcome, the results founded are that, although the earn-out may be a useful and efficient tool for the parties, its enforcement could cause contractual and corporate legal problems, since one of the main features of the mechanism is to maintain the seller working for the target in order to achieve the goals agreed as precedent conditions of the earn-out. Considering the problems that arise from the American and, in some cases, Brazilian practice the last part of the essay deals with questions that involve the enforcement of the earn-out and the difficulties to verify the precedent conditions agreed by the parties as goals. In order to achieve this objective, it is studied the position of the parties before and after the deal, as well the possibility of breach of the fiduciary duties by the board and directors of the target; consequently, the intention is to solve the conflicts using the contractual interpretation of the contracts concluded between business and corporate affairs and its repercussions to the stock purchase agreements. In the end of this paper, it is presented possible solutions to avoid the problematic use of the earnout; however, when the conflicts are already set by the parties, it is pondered about the interpretation of the earn-out in the Brazilian Law.

Este estudo busca aprofundar a análise dos mecanismos de proteção disponíveis no direito pátrio para a proteção dos interesses de acionistas não controladores e credores, inclusive aqueles titulares de debêntures, bônus de subscrição e partes beneficiárias, das sociedades envolvidas em uma operação de incorporação. Para tanto, são abordados os dispositivos legais, as interpretações jurisprudenciais e as posições doutrinárias no direito pátrio e no direito comparado. A primeira parte do trabalho apresenta o instituto da incorporação envolvendo sociedades anônimas e a sua importância no contexto econômico brasileiro. A segunda parte do trabalho expõe um panorama sobre os mecanismos utilizados para a proteção dos interesses dos acionistas não controladores, com relação a eventuais abusos por parte da administração ou da acionista controladora, nas operações de incorporação envolvendo sociedades anônimas. A terceira parte do trabalho aborda os mecanismos utilizados para a tutela dos credores nas operações de incorporação de sociedades anônimas, com relação aos arbítrios da administração e dos acionistas da companhia. / This paper aims to deepen the analysis of the mechanisms provided by Brazilian Law to protect non-controlling shareholders and creditors, including those who are holders of bonds, warrants and share certificates, of companies involved in a merger transaction. For this purpose, this work examines the legal provisions, case law understandings and doctrinal positions in Brazilian Law and Comparative Law. The first part of this paper presents the merger institute involving corporations and its importance in the current Brazilian economy. The second part of this paper provides an overview of the mechanisms used to protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders, with respect to possible abuses by the management or the controlling shareholder in mergers. The third part of this paper deals with the mechanisms used to protect creditors in the mergers of corporations against the whims of the companys management and shareholders.

Esta dissertação analisa os limites e a conveniência da vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas. Com a promulgação da lei nº 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, foram incluídos os §§ 8º e 9º, ao art. 118 da lei nº 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 (LSA), que indisputavelmente passaram a vincular os administradores de companhias aos termos dos acordos de acionistas arquivados em suas sedes. Desde então, inexiste consenso doutrinário e jurisprudencial acerca dos limites de tal vinculação. A dissertação analisa, pois, as principais posições doutrinárias que variam desde a vinculação genérica, até a vinculação relativa. A primeira é capaz de abranger todos os atos da administração; a segunda, por sua vez, limita a possibilidade de vinculação da administração apenas com relação aos atos que não sejam de sua competência privativa previstos em lei ou pelo estatuto e, ainda, preserva o poder (dever) finalístico do administrador, previsto no art. 154 da LSA, de buscar e privilegiar o interesse da companhia. A dissertação tece, ainda, diversos comentários e posicionamentos sobre a conveniência de se vincular administradores. / This dissertation analyses the limits and the convenience of binding administrators to the shareholders\' agreement. With the promulgation of law nº 10,303, of October 31, 2001, §§ 8º and 9º were included to the article 118 of law nº 6,404, of December 15, 1976 (LSA), which indisputably began to bind companies administrators to the terms of the shareholder agreements filed in their headquarters. Since then, there is no consensus in the doctrine or the precedents about the limits of such binding situation. The dissertation analyses, thus, the main doctrinal positions ranging from the generic binding form until the relative one. The first is able to cover all acts of the administration; the second, on it turn, limits the possibility of binding the administration only with respect to acts that are not part of its competence provided for by law or by companies by-laws, and also preserves the finalistic power (duty) of the administrator provided for in article 154 of the LSA, of pursuing and giving priority to the companies interest. The dissertation also weaves several commentaries and positions on the desirability to bind administrators.

O presente trabalho visa a estudar a regulamentação existente a respeito da relação de substituição de ações em operações de incorporação de sociedades e incorporação de ações. Para tanto, serão abordados os dispositivos legais, as posições doutrinárias e as interpretações da jurisprudência sobre o assunto no Brasil e em Direito Comparado. No primeiro capítulo, são estudados os institutos da incorporação e da incorporação de ações, analisando-se a natureza jurídica dessas operações e os procedimentos para realização de cada uma delas. No segundo capítulo, examina-se propriamente a relação de substituição de ações e sua natureza jurídica para, na sequência, analisarmos o arcabouço legal em que se insere a determinação da relação de troca de ações. Nesse contexto, são abordados os critérios, parâmetros e requisitos que norteiam a sua definição, bem como os mecanismos legais previstos pela legislação societária para compor os diferentes interesses envolvidos, notadamente aqueles dos acionistas minoritários e do controlador. O terceiro capítulo analisa algumas especificidades relativas às operações de incorporação que envolvem companhias abertas, operações de incorporação englobando sociedades sob controle comum, diferentes relações de substituição de ações entre ações de diferentes espécies e classes e, por fim, entre ações da mesma espécie e classe. Finalmente, a conclusão arremata as principais ideias discutidas ao longo deste trabalho. / This paper aims at analyzing the existing regulation regarding the share exchange ratio in mergers and merger of shares (incorporação de ações). For this purpose, this work will examine the legal provisions, the different doctrinal positions and case law understandings relating to this matter under Brazilian Law and Comparative Law. The first chapter of this paper presents the concepts of the merger and merger of shares and analyzes the nature of such transactions and the procedures necessary for their performance. The second chapter examines the share exchange ratio and its nature, followed by an analysis of the legal environment in which such share exchange ratio is determined. In this sense, this paper analyzes the criteria, parameters and requirements that drive the determination of the share exchange ratio, as well as the legal provisions established by Corporate Law to assure that all interests involved in such transactions are addressed, mainly those of minority shareholders as opposed to those of the controlling shareholders. The third chapter analyzes certain special situations concerning mergers and mergers of shares that involve publicly held corporations or corporations under common control. This chapter also analyzes special cases regarding the establishment of different share exchange ratios between different types and classes of shares and between shares of the same type and class. Finally, the conclusion of this work summarizes the main ideas discussed herein.

Le présent mémoire analyse l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité sur le devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, devoir imposer aux administrateurs de compagnies par la législation corporative canadienne. L'objectif du mémoire est de déterminer un standard de conduite à être adopté par l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire. Dans un premier temps, comment peut-on définir ce que constitue le « meilleur intérêt de la compagnie» ? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que l'intérêt de la compagnie est au carrefour d'une communauté d'intérêts lui étant sous-jacents. L'intérêt de la compagnie, bien qu'indépendant de ces intérêts sous-jacents, ne peut s'analyser en faisant abstraction de ces derniers. La jurisprudence et la doctrine récentes laissent entrevoir que l'impact du contexte d'insolvabilité se fait sentir sur la détermination de ces intérêts sous-jacents à celui de la compagnie susceptibles d'être affectés par la finalité poursuivie par la compagnie, finalité axée sur la maximisation des profits à partir des opérations de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie. Dans un contexte d'insolvabilité, le créancier, à l'instar de l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, supporte le risque commercial résiduel et doit recevoir une attention appropriée par les administrateurs. Par conséquent, dans la détermination de ce que constitue le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie, l'administrateur ne peut, lorsque la compagnie est insolvable, faire abstraction de l'intérêt des créanciers. Ainsi, dans un deuxième temps, qui sont les véritables bénéficiaires du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie dans un contexte d'insolvabilité? L'auteur en vient à la conclusion que le créancier est un bénéficiaire indirect de ce devoir fiduciaire lorsque la compagnie est insolvable. Tout comme l'actionnaire dans un contexte de solvabilité, le créancier doit être en mesure d'intenter un recours de nature dérivée en vue d'obtenir réparation, pour et au nom de la compagnie. Le contexte d'insolvabilité fait naître, à l'endroit des administrateurs, une obligation de nature fiduciaire de prendre en considération l'intérêt des créanciers tout en permettant à ces derniers d'intenter un tel recours dérivé en vue d'obtenir réparation à la suite d'une violation du devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie. En plus d'être soutenue par une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine canadiennes, cette conclusion s'appuie sur une revue de la législation, de la jurisprudence et de la doctrine de certains pays du Commonwealth (Angleterre, Australie et Nouvelle-Zélande) et des États-Unis, juridictions avec lesquelles le Canada entretient des relations privilégiés, historiquement ou économiquement. Finalement, que doit faire l'administrateur d'une compagnie insolvable en vue de répondre à ce devoir fiduciaire d'agir dans le meilleur intérêt de la compagnie? L'auteur arrive à la conclusion que cette obligation de prendre en considération l'intérêt du créancier dans un contexte d'insolvabilité se traduit par un exercice de conciliation entre les intérêts du créancier et ceux des actionnaires. Les paramètres de cet exercice de conciliation sont déterminés en fonction du scénario envisagé par les administrateurs face à la situation d'insolvabilité. Plus le scénario se rapproche d'une liquidation plus ou moins formelle des actifs tangibles et facilement dissociables de la compagnie, moins cet exercice en sera un de conciliation et plus l'intérêt du créancier devra recevoir une attention prépondérante. À l'opposé, plus le scénario en est un de restructuration fondée sur une relance de l'entreprise exploitée par la compagnie insolvable, plus l'intérêt de l'actionnaire devra recevoir une attention particulière. / The following thesis analyses the impact of a company's insolvency on the fiduciary duties of its directors and officers, as imposed by Canadian corporate law. More specifically it shall examine the repercussions of an insolvency on management's fiduciary duty to act in accordance with the company's best interests. The objective shall therefore be to assess the extent of such fiduciary duty in the context of an insolvency and to establish a guideline to be followed by directors and officers in view of complying with said duty. Firstly, what constitutes the "best interests of the company"? The author concludes that a company's interests are comprised of a community of underlying interests. Although the interests of the company remain independent, it cannot be determined without taking into account said underlying interests. Amongst this community of underlying interests, shareholders and creditors, members of such community that supports the financing of the company's operations, occupy a predominant place. Recent case law and doctrinal authorities have concluded that the impact of a company's insolvency does not affect the ultimate objective pursued by the company, i.e. the maximisation of profit, but rather affects the determination of the members of the community of underlying interests that shall be affected by the pursuit of such finality. As such, in a context of insolvency, creditors, similar to shareholders in a context of solvency, are the residual risk-bearers of the company's commercial expenditure. Consequently, in view of determining what constitutes the best interests of the company, when it is insolvent, directors and officers may not ignore the creditors' interests. Secondly, who are the real beneficiaries of the fiduciary duty to act in a company's best interests when it becomes insolvent? The author concludes that creditors are indirect beneficiaries of such fiduciary duty in a context of insolvency. Similarly to shareholders in a context of solvency, creditors must be entitled to institute a derivative claim against directors and officers in order to obtain, in the name and for the company, compensation for the violation of said fiduciary duty. Insolvency triggers the existence of an obligation, fiduciary in nature, to take into account the creditors' interests. As such, directors and officers are to consider the creditors' interests in exercising their fiduciary duty to act in strict compliance with the best interests of the company. This conclusion is based on a review of the Canadian statutory law, jurisprudence and doctrinal authorities. Furthermore, this conclusion is supported by a review of same from certain Commonwealth jurisdictions (England, Australia and New-Zealand) and from the United States of America, jurisdictions with whom Canada has a privileged relationship, historically and/or economically. Finally, how does the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests translate in practice for directors and officers of an insolvent company? The author concludes that the obligation to take into account the creditors' interests is, in reality, an obligation to reconcile the shareholders' and creditors' interests with that of the company's best interests. The parameters of such obligation shall be determined with respect to the scenario conceived by directors and officers in order to effectively manage a situation of insolvency. Should such scenario focus on the liquidation of the core assets of the company, then the interests of the shareholders shall be subjugated to that of the creditors'. Conversely, should such scenario focus on the reorganisation of the company's commercial expenditures, based on the company's existing structures, then the shareholder's interest shall receive a more extensive attention by directors and officers.

Darbe analizuojami bendrovės vadovo civilinės atsakomybės teisinio reglamentavimo Lietuvoje trūkumai ir spragos bei, remiantis užsienio valstybių praktika ir tendencijomis, pateikiami pasiūlymai identifikuotų trūkumų šalinimui. Darbe bendrovės vadovų atsakomybė vertinama ne tik iš kreditorių ir bendrovės pozicijų – į vadovo atsakomybės teisinį reguliavimą pažvelgta taip pat ir iš bendrovės vadovo pozicijų. Darbe siūloma bendrovės vadovo, kaip civilinės atsakomybės subjekto, sąvoką, iki šiol neturinčią jokios aiškios koncepcijos ir turinio, deformalizuoti. Išnagrinėjus bendrovės vadovo pareigų bendrovei turinį, prieita išvada, jog šiuo metu galiojantys teisės aktai sudaro prielaidas klaidingai suvokti bendrovės vadovo pareigas bendrovei, kuomet vadovas sudaro sandorį su bendrove, todėl siūloma atitinkamai koreguoti reglamentavimą. Įvertinus vadovo atsakomybę bendrovės kreditorių atžvilgiu, prieita išvada, jog būtina išlaikyti pusiausvyrą, t. y. užtikrinti tik objektyviai pagrįstą kreditorių interesų apsaugą, nepagrįstai neišplečiant jos bendrovės vadovo atsakomybės sąskaita. Kartu atkreipiamas dėmesys, jog dabartinis kreditorių teisių įgyvendinimo mechanizmas dėl specialaus reglamentavimo nebuvimo neužtikrina vadovų teisinės padėties apibrėžtumo ir užtikrintumo. / Weaknesses and lacks of legal regulation of civil liability of a company’s director in Lithuania are analyzed and suggestions, how to eliminate identified weaknesses, are given in this work, referring to the practice and tendencies of foreign countries. The liability of a company’s directors is evaluated not only from the point of view of creditors and a company, but also legal regulation of a leader’s responsibility is reviewed from the point of view of a company’s directors. In this work, the concept of a company’s director, as a subject of civil liability, which has not had a clear concept and content so far, is suggested to be deformalized. After analyzing the content of liability of a company’s director for a company, it was concluded, that recent laws capacitate to wrongly understand, what responsibilities of a company’s leader are to a company, when he transacts with a company; therefore, several suggestions to improve regulation are given. After evaluating the director’s responsibility in respect of a company’s creditors, it was concluded, that it is necessary to maintain the balance – to ensure just such interest security of creditors, which is objectively grounded, and gratuitously not to extend it for account of a liability of company’s leader. What is more, attention is drawn to the recent mechanism of creditors’ rights implementation, which does not ensure the determination and security of director’s legal status due to the absence of special regulation.

O presente estudo versa sobre a conduta de administradores e controladores em contexto oferta hostil, tendo como principal objetivo a análise desta à luz do interesse social e dos deveres fiduciários, buscando, ao fim, comprovar que o Brasil possui um arcabouço legislativo apto a regular tais situações, bem como que a experiência norteamericana pode servir como fator de auxílio na investigação do papel desses sujeitos no referido contexto. / This paper deals with the behavior of managers and controlling shareholders in hostile tender offer context, with the main goal of analyse it in the light of the “proper role of the companies” and the fiduciary duties, aiming, finally, to prove that Brazilian law is able to rule those situations, as well that American experience could serve as a helpful instrument in the search for directors and officers “proper role” in the related situations.

O presente estudo versa sobre a conduta de administradores e controladores em contexto oferta hostil, tendo como principal objetivo a análise desta à luz do interesse social e dos deveres fiduciários, buscando, ao fim, comprovar que o Brasil possui um arcabouço legislativo apto a regular tais situações, bem como que a experiência norteamericana pode servir como fator de auxílio na investigação do papel desses sujeitos no referido contexto. / This paper deals with the behavior of managers and controlling shareholders in hostile tender offer context, with the main goal of analyse it in the light of the “proper role of the companies” and the fiduciary duties, aiming, finally, to prove that Brazilian law is able to rule those situations, as well that American experience could serve as a helpful instrument in the search for directors and officers “proper role” in the related situations.