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Contribuições preliminares para uma análise da conduta de administradores e de controladores de S.A. em contexto de oferta hostilScalzilli, João Pedro January 2009 (has links)
O presente estudo versa sobre a conduta de administradores e controladores em contexto oferta hostil, tendo como principal objetivo a análise desta à luz do interesse social e dos deveres fiduciários, buscando, ao fim, comprovar que o Brasil possui um arcabouço legislativo apto a regular tais situações, bem como que a experiência norteamericana pode servir como fator de auxílio na investigação do papel desses sujeitos no referido contexto. / This paper deals with the behavior of managers and controlling shareholders in hostile tender offer context, with the main goal of analyse it in the light of the “proper role of the companies” and the fiduciary duties, aiming, finally, to prove that Brazilian law is able to rule those situations, as well that American experience could serve as a helpful instrument in the search for directors and officers “proper role” in the related situations.
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Proteção de acionistas e credores nas operações de incorporação envolvendo sociedades anônimas / Protection of shareholders and creditors in mergers involving corporationsCarla Mosna Tomazella Nicolau 24 March 2011 (has links)
Este estudo busca aprofundar a análise dos mecanismos de proteção disponíveis no direito pátrio para a proteção dos interesses de acionistas não controladores e credores, inclusive aqueles titulares de debêntures, bônus de subscrição e partes beneficiárias, das sociedades envolvidas em uma operação de incorporação. Para tanto, são abordados os dispositivos legais, as interpretações jurisprudenciais e as posições doutrinárias no direito pátrio e no direito comparado. A primeira parte do trabalho apresenta o instituto da incorporação envolvendo sociedades anônimas e a sua importância no contexto econômico brasileiro. A segunda parte do trabalho expõe um panorama sobre os mecanismos utilizados para a proteção dos interesses dos acionistas não controladores, com relação a eventuais abusos por parte da administração ou da acionista controladora, nas operações de incorporação envolvendo sociedades anônimas. A terceira parte do trabalho aborda os mecanismos utilizados para a tutela dos credores nas operações de incorporação de sociedades anônimas, com relação aos arbítrios da administração e dos acionistas da companhia. / This paper aims to deepen the analysis of the mechanisms provided by Brazilian Law to protect non-controlling shareholders and creditors, including those who are holders of bonds, warrants and share certificates, of companies involved in a merger transaction. For this purpose, this work examines the legal provisions, case law understandings and doctrinal positions in Brazilian Law and Comparative Law. The first part of this paper presents the merger institute involving corporations and its importance in the current Brazilian economy. The second part of this paper provides an overview of the mechanisms used to protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders, with respect to possible abuses by the management or the controlling shareholder in mergers. The third part of this paper deals with the mechanisms used to protect creditors in the mergers of corporations against the whims of the companys management and shareholders.
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Limites à vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas / Limits to bind managers to shareholders agreement.Thiago José da Silva 29 April 2014 (has links)
Esta dissertação analisa os limites e a conveniência da vinculação de administradores a acordo de acionistas. Com a promulgação da lei nº 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, foram incluídos os §§ 8º e 9º, ao art. 118 da lei nº 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 (LSA), que indisputavelmente passaram a vincular os administradores de companhias aos termos dos acordos de acionistas arquivados em suas sedes. Desde então, inexiste consenso doutrinário e jurisprudencial acerca dos limites de tal vinculação. A dissertação analisa, pois, as principais posições doutrinárias que variam desde a vinculação genérica, até a vinculação relativa. A primeira é capaz de abranger todos os atos da administração; a segunda, por sua vez, limita a possibilidade de vinculação da administração apenas com relação aos atos que não sejam de sua competência privativa previstos em lei ou pelo estatuto e, ainda, preserva o poder (dever) finalístico do administrador, previsto no art. 154 da LSA, de buscar e privilegiar o interesse da companhia. A dissertação tece, ainda, diversos comentários e posicionamentos sobre a conveniência de se vincular administradores. / This dissertation analyses the limits and the convenience of binding administrators to the shareholders\' agreement. With the promulgation of law nº 10,303, of October 31, 2001, §§ 8º and 9º were included to the article 118 of law nº 6,404, of December 15, 1976 (LSA), which indisputably began to bind companies administrators to the terms of the shareholder agreements filed in their headquarters. Since then, there is no consensus in the doctrine or the precedents about the limits of such binding situation. The dissertation analyses, thus, the main doctrinal positions ranging from the generic binding form until the relative one. The first is able to cover all acts of the administration; the second, on it turn, limits the possibility of binding the administration only with respect to acts that are not part of its competence provided for by law or by companies by-laws, and also preserves the finalistic power (duty) of the administrator provided for in article 154 of the LSA, of pursuing and giving priority to the companies interest. The dissertation also weaves several commentaries and positions on the desirability to bind administrators.
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Fiduciary duties of company directors with specific regard to corporate opportunitiesHavenga, Michele Kyra 06 1900 (has links)
South African company law is currently the object of comprehensive review. One o f the areas under
scrutiny is that of corporate governance. Control over management is vital in the interests of the
company itself, its shareholders and its creditors. Effective accountability should be balanced
against the need to allow those who manage a certain measure of freedom and discretion in the
exercise of their function.
Company directors are subject to various duties. This thesis concentrates on their fiduciary
obligation. It is suggested that this sui generis obligation is owed to the company as a separate
entity. Interests of other groups may sometimes merit con sideration.
Against the background o f a com parative investigation, a "corporate opportunity" is
defined as any property or economic opportunity to which the com pany has a claim. South African
law protects a company’s claim to an opportunity if it is in the company’s line of business and if
the company has justifiably been relying upon the director(s) to acquire it or to assist in its
acquisition for the company. The application of established fiduciary principles suffice to resolve
corporate opportunity matters. Essentially the application o f these rules amount to a
determination whether the director has complied with his fundamental duty to act in the company’s
best interests. There seems to be no need for a separate doctrine of corporate opportunities.'
A director should only be absolved from liability on account of the company’s inability to pursue
an opportunity or its rejection by the company if there was no real conflict of interest. The
appropriation of corporate opportunities should not be ratifiable, both because the ratification
constitutes a fraud on the minority, and because the decision to ratify cannot be regarded as being
in the interests of the company.
The relationship between the appropriation of corporate opportunities, misuse
of confidential information and competition is investigated. These aspects fre quently overlap,
but should be distinguished because their bases, and accordingly their appropriate remedies, may
differ.
Effective control may benefit by a restatement of directors’ fiduciary duties in
the Companies Act. To this end certain amendments to the Act are recommended. / Mercantile Law / LLD
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What role should the financial planners of ABSA Brokers play when ABSA Business Bank extends credit facilities to its SME customers?Roos, Jacques Thomas 12 1900 (has links)
Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Small and medium enterprises have an important role to play in the South African
economy. The success of SME’s will lead to economic growth, that will play a major role
in reducing unemployment in South Africa. It will also be the main driver for black
economic empowerment.
As elsewhere in the world one of the main problems that SME’s face is the need for
finance and access to finance. Banks play a major role in providing finance to SME’s by
providing different forms of finance to SME’s.
The finance that the shareholders / directors can access in their personal capacity plays a
critical role in the provision of finance to SME’s. Banks will require security when
advancing credit facilities and the security that is offered by the shareholders / directors
play an important role in the decision of banks to advance credit.
The risk that the banks carry when granting credit facilities to SME’s is reduced when
personal suretyships of the directors / shareholders are required. The personal assets of
the shareholders / directors are used as security to obtain credit facilities for the SME’s. If
the SME’s should fail, the banks will liquidate the personal assets of the directors /
shareholders to settle the credit facilities that were granted to the SME’s.
Customers are not aware of the dangers when signing surety. Banks have fiduciary
duties towards their customers to inform them of any risks and what possible solutions
might exist that will minimize the adverse financial effect of such risk consequences.
If the surety should die, the bank will have the option to liquidate the assets of the
sureties to settle the debts of the entities for which the surety has signed personal surety.
Life cover can be affected on the lives of the sureties that will provide the necessary
liquidity to settle the debts of the entities without the bank having to liquidate the
personal assets of the sureties.
Consumer protection has become widespread where the phrase caveat emptor has been
replaced by caveat vendor – let the seller be aware. In addition to this the South African
Government has also enacted legislation that banks have to adhere to that will lead to
customers making informed decisions. The National Credit and the Financial Advisory
and Intermediary Services Acts have been introduced to afford the customer more
protection. The banking industry has adopted the Code of Banking Practice which places
responsibility on the banks to fully disclose all risks to their customers.
It is especially the surety, the person that provides security for the debts of others that
now enjoys increased protection. The National Credit Act affords a surety the same
protection as the principal debtor and the Code of Banking Practice also contains very
specific references with regards to sureties.
Banks have become a business and the traditional notion that holds that business ethics
and absolute adherence to legislation, industry codes and its own code of ethics will have
an adverse effect on business, no longer holds.
Many reasons have been given by ABSA Bank as to why the financial planners of ABSA
Brokers should not be part and parcel of each transaction where credit facilities are
extended to their customers. The reality however is that the Financial Planners must be
made part of the process when credit facilities are extended. The Financial Planners must
provide a financial needs analysis to the customer that will enable the customer to make
an informed decision as to whether to implement life cover or not.
By making the financial planners part of the process ABSA Business Bank will ensure
adherence to legislation, industry codes and most importantly, it will fulfill the fiduciary
duty that it has towards its customers. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Klein en medium ondernemings (KMO’s) speel ‘n belangrike rol in die Suid-Afrikaanse
ekonomie. Die sukses van klein en medium ondernemings sal lei tot ekonomiese groei,
wat sal bydra tot ‘n afname in werkloosheid in Suid Afrika. Dit sal ook die hoof drywer
wees van swart ekonomiese bemagtiging.
Soos elders in die wêreld is een van die hoofprobleme wat deur KMO’s in die gesig
gestaar word die behoefte aan finansiering en die toegang tot finansiering. Banke speel ‘n
belangrike rol in die verskaffing van finansiering deurdat finansiering in verskeie vorme
aan KMO’s beskikbaar gestel word.
Die finansiering wat aandeelhouers / direkteure in hulle persoonlike hoedanigheid kan
bekom speel ‘n kritieke rol in die verskaffing van finansiering aan KMO’s. Banke vereis
sekuriteit wanneer kredietfasiliteite beskikbaar gestel word en die sekuriteit wat deur die
aandeelhouers / direkteure aangebied word speel ‘n belangrike rol in die banke se besluit
om krediet te verskaf.
Die risiko’s wat banke loop wanneer kredietfasiliteite aan KMO’s beskikbaar gestel
word, word verminder wanneer persoonlike borgskappe van aandeelhouers / direkteure
vereis word. Die persoonlike bates van die aandeelhouers / direkteure word gebruik as
sekuriteit om kredietfasiliteite vir KMO’s te bekom. Indien die KMO’s sou misluk, sal
die banke die persoonlike bates van direkteure / aandeelhouers te gelde maak om die
kredietfasiliteite wat aan die KMO’s beskikbaar gestel was af te los.
Kliënte is nie bewus van die gevare wat hulle loop wanneer hulle borgskappe verleen nie.
Banke het fidusiêre pligte teenoor hulle kliënte om hulle in te lig aangaande enige risiko’s
en watter moontlike oplossings daar bestaan wat enige nadelige finansiële gevolge sal
beperk. Indien die borggewer tot sterwe sou kom, het die bank die opsie om die bates van die borggewer te gelde te maak om die skulde te delg van die entiteite waarvoor die
borggewers persoonlike sekuriteite verskaf het. Lewensdekking kan aangegaan word op
die lewe van die borggewers wat die nodige likiditeit sal verskaf om die skulde van die
entiteite te delg sonder dat die persoonlike bates van die borggewers te gelde gemaak
hoef te word.
Verbruikersbeskerming geniet hedendaags voorrang waar die frase 'caveat emptor' - laat
die koper op sy hoede wees - vervang is deur 'caveat vendor' – laat die verkoper bedag
wees. Hiermee saam het die Suid-Afrikaanse regering ook wetgewing in plek gestel
waaraan banke moet voldoen wat daartoe sal lei dat kliënte ingeligte besluite kan neem.
Die Nasionale Kredietwet en die Finansiële Adviseurs- en Tussengangerswet is in
werking gestel om meer beskerming aan die verbruiker te verleen. Die bank industrie het
ook die Kode van Bankpraktyk aanvaar wat groter verantwoordelikhede op banke plaas
om alle risiko’s ten volle aan hulle kliënte te openbaar.
Dit is veral die borggewer, die persoon wat sekuriteit verskaf vir die skulde van ander
persone / entiteite wat groter beskerming geniet. Die Nasionale Kredietwet bied aan die
borggewer dieselfde beskerming as die hoofskuldenaar en die Kode van Bankpraktyk
bevat ook spesifieke verwysing na die regte van borggewers.
Bankwese het ‘n besigheid geraak en die tradisionele siening dat sake etiek en streng
onderworpenheid aan wetgewing, industrie kodes en banke se eie etiese kodes ‘n
negatiewe effek op besigheid sal hê, dra nie meer water nie.
Verskeie redes is al deur ABSA Bank aangevoer oor hoekom die finansiële beplanners
van ABSA Makelaars nie deel moet wees van elke transaksie waar krediet aan kliënte
verleen word nie. Die realiteit is egter dat die finansiële beplanners deel van die proses
gemaak moet word. Die finansiële beplanners moet ‘n finansiële behoefte ontleding aan
die kliënt beskikbaar stel wat die kliënt in staat sal stel om ‘n ingeligte besluit te neem om
lewensdekking te implementeer al dan nie.
Deur die finansiële beplanners deel van die proses te maak verseker ABSA
Besigheidsbank nakoming aan wetgewing en industrie kodes. Wat egter meer belangrik
is, is dat die bank dan ook sy fidusiêre plig wat die bank teenoor sy kliënte het, sal
nakom.
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O Estado como acionista controlador / The state as controlling shareholderPinto Junior, Mario Engler 23 June 2009 (has links)
O presente trabalho acadêmico procura construir um referencial teórico baseado no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro para definir o papel da empresa estatal no mundo contemporâneo. Trata-se do ponto de partida para compreender a atuação do Estado como acionista controlador e as regras de convivência com acionistas privados em posição minoritária e com outros grupos de interesse afetados pela atividade empresarial. A abordagem do tema apóia-se na idéia central de que toda empresa estatal está investida de uma missão pública, explícita ou implicitamente incorporada no objeto social, que varia conforme a natureza da atividade exercida e está sujeita a adaptações ao longo do tempo. A missão pública coexiste com a finalidade lucrativa inerente ao modelo de companhia e serve para condicionar a ação do Estado enquanto acionista controlador e dos administradores, dando conteúdo a seus deveres fiduciários. / This dissertation aims at establishing a theoretical framework according to Brazilian law to identify the role of state-owned enterprise in contemporary world. This is the first step to understand what the governments behavior should be as a controlling shareholder and the legal rules applied to its relationship with equity investors and others stakeholders. The approach is based on the assumption that every state-owned enterprise has a public mission implicitly or explicitly included in its bylaws objectives. The public mission varies according to the nature of the business and should be redefined from time to time to keep adherence to the external environment. The public mission coexists with the companys profit scope and guides the States actions, as well as those of directors and officers. For that reason the public mission is embedded in their fiduciary duties.
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Valdybos narių atsakomybė: ypatumai ir teismų praktikos analizė / Liability of Board members: peculiarities and jurisprudenceKakurinas, Olegas 27 January 2014 (has links)
Teisės doktrinoje teigiama, kad juridinis asmuo yra išvestinis civilinės teisės subjektas, įgyjantis civilines teises, prisiimantis civilines pareigas ir jas įgyvendinantis per savo organus, kurie sudaromi ir veikia pagal įstatymus ir juridinių asmenų steigimo dokumentus. Atsižvelgiant į ribotą darbo apimtį, darbe nagrinėjami valdybos, kaip kolegialaus valdymo organo, narių civilinės atsakomybės labiausiai Lietuvos Respublikoje paplitusiai privačiųjų juridinių asmenų rūšiai – bendrovei taikymo ypatumai. Turint omenyje, kad teisinė atsakomybė kyla nevykdant ir/ar netinkamai vykdant asmeniui nustatytas teisines pareigas, visų pirma, darbe yra identifikuojamos valdybos narių pareigos bendrovei, šių pareigų turinys, aptariama valdybos teisinė prigimtis.
Pagrindinis darbo tyrimas yra nukreiptas į valdybos narių teisinės atsakomybės prigimties, jos taikymo prielaidų ir pagrindų nustatymą. Šiuo tikslu darbo autorius nagrinėja ir apibrėžia teisinį santykį, susiklostantį tarp bendrovės ir valdybos narių. Darbe analizuojama kokia civilinės teisinės atsakomybės rūšis yra taikoma valdybos nariams – sutartinė ar deliktinė. Siekiant nustatyti valdybos narių civilinės teisinės atsakomybės taikymo prielaidas, analizuojama koks iš civilinės teisinės atsakomybės valdybos nariams modelių – individualus ar kolektyvinis, yra taikomas Lietuvos Respublikoje. Taip pat darbe yra nagrinėjami civilinės teisinės atsakomybės valdybos nariams taikymo sąlygų probleminiai aspektai.
Darbe plačiai... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Legal doctrine holds that a legal entity is a derivative subject of the Civil law which acquires civil rights, assumes civil obligations and implements it through their bodies which are formed and act in accordance with the laws and documents of incorporation. Considering the limited scope of work, this thesis analyzes the peculiarities of civil liability of Board members as a collegial body to the most widespread type of private legal entities in the Republic of Lithuania - companies. Taking into account that the civil liability arises due to a failure to perform or improper performance of civil duties, thesis defines the duties of Board members to the company, the scope of such duties, as well as discusses the legal nature of the Board.
The main focus of the study is to determine the nature of legal liability of Board members, its assumptions and bases. To achieve this goal the author examines and defines the legal relationship between the company and Board members. Thesis analyzes which kind of civil liability - contractual or tort - applies to the members of the Board. In order to determine the assumptions of civil liability of the members of the Board, it is analyzed whether individual or collective model of civil liability of Board members is applied in the Republic of Lithuania. Moreover, thesis covers the problematic aspects of the conditions of civil liability applied to Board members.
Thesis extensively relies on jurisprudence of the courts of the Republic of... [to full text]
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Fomento de ofertas públicas iniciais de ações reflexões jurídicas sobre alocação de deveres fiduciários e conflito de interesse das instituições intermediáriasCruz, Cristine Basseto 08 December 2016 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2016-12-08 / This paper intends to discuss the legal adequacy of loan arrangements among shareholders, companies offering shares in initial public offer and their underwriters pre-initial public offer. These transactions – known as 'equity kickers' – became popular during 2004 – 2007 Brazilian capital markets’ IPO wave, when several Brazilian corporations went to public offering their shares after borrowing pre-IPO money from their underwriters. Taking into account the usual arrangements among those agents and a few researches made afterwards, we examine the economic and social consequences to the issuer and to the securities market, the legal role of the underwriter under the Brazilian securities exchange legal environment and discuss the fiduciary duty imposed to financial intermediaries in capital. Further on, we discuss the potential conflict of interest arising from credit relationship between underwriters and issuing companies and the adequacy of mandatory information provided in IPO information memorandum (prospecto) for the purpose of warning potential conflict that may arise from such credit relationship. Finally, we conclude our legal analysis and suggest a review of security exchange commission (CVM) current regulation in order to address fiduciary duties to financial intermediaries and improve disclosure standards on conflict of interest to potential investors during securities public offers. / Este trabalho pretende discutir a legalidade dos arranjos contratuais e empréstimos firmados entre acionistas, companhias ofertantes e instituições intermediárias previamente à realização de ofertas públicas iniciais. Esses arranjos – conhecidos como 'equity kickers' – foram largamente utilizados por companhias brasileiras que ofertaram suas ações durante os anos de 2004 a 2007. Tendo por base o formato usualmente utilizado nessas transações e os resultados trazidos por algumas pesquisas realizadas após a realização dessas ofertas, analisamos as consequências econômicas e sociais observadas e sua pertinência para o contexto do mercado de capitais, o papel das instituições intermediárias sob a ótica da regulamentação Brasileira e seu dever fiduciário perante os demais agentes de mercado. Ademais, discutimos o potencial conflito de interesse inerente ao papel simultâneo de distribuidor e credor desempenhado pelo coordenador nessas ofertas e a comunicação desse conflito ao mercado através da divulgação das informações pertinentes no prospecto de distribuição da oferta. Por fim, apresentamos uma análise jurídica e sugerimos a revisão da regulamentação da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários no sentido de tratar expressamente o tema do dever fiduciário das instituições intermediárias no mercado de captais e aumentar a exigência de informações acerca de transparência das situações de conflito ao mercado na realização de ofertas públicas de valores mobiliários.
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Fiduciary duties of company directors with specific regard to corporate opportunitiesHavenga, Michele Kyra 06 1900 (has links)
South African company law is currently the object of comprehensive review. One o f the areas under
scrutiny is that of corporate governance. Control over management is vital in the interests of the
company itself, its shareholders and its creditors. Effective accountability should be balanced
against the need to allow those who manage a certain measure of freedom and discretion in the
exercise of their function.
Company directors are subject to various duties. This thesis concentrates on their fiduciary
obligation. It is suggested that this sui generis obligation is owed to the company as a separate
entity. Interests of other groups may sometimes merit con sideration.
Against the background o f a com parative investigation, a "corporate opportunity" is
defined as any property or economic opportunity to which the com pany has a claim. South African
law protects a company’s claim to an opportunity if it is in the company’s line of business and if
the company has justifiably been relying upon the director(s) to acquire it or to assist in its
acquisition for the company. The application of established fiduciary principles suffice to resolve
corporate opportunity matters. Essentially the application o f these rules amount to a
determination whether the director has complied with his fundamental duty to act in the company’s
best interests. There seems to be no need for a separate doctrine of corporate opportunities.'
A director should only be absolved from liability on account of the company’s inability to pursue
an opportunity or its rejection by the company if there was no real conflict of interest. The
appropriation of corporate opportunities should not be ratifiable, both because the ratification
constitutes a fraud on the minority, and because the decision to ratify cannot be regarded as being
in the interests of the company.
The relationship between the appropriation of corporate opportunities, misuse
of confidential information and competition is investigated. These aspects fre quently overlap,
but should be distinguished because their bases, and accordingly their appropriate remedies, may
differ.
Effective control may benefit by a restatement of directors’ fiduciary duties in
the Companies Act. To this end certain amendments to the Act are recommended. / Mercantile Law / LLD
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O Estado como acionista controlador / The state as controlling shareholderMario Engler Pinto Junior 23 June 2009 (has links)
O presente trabalho acadêmico procura construir um referencial teórico baseado no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro para definir o papel da empresa estatal no mundo contemporâneo. Trata-se do ponto de partida para compreender a atuação do Estado como acionista controlador e as regras de convivência com acionistas privados em posição minoritária e com outros grupos de interesse afetados pela atividade empresarial. A abordagem do tema apóia-se na idéia central de que toda empresa estatal está investida de uma missão pública, explícita ou implicitamente incorporada no objeto social, que varia conforme a natureza da atividade exercida e está sujeita a adaptações ao longo do tempo. A missão pública coexiste com a finalidade lucrativa inerente ao modelo de companhia e serve para condicionar a ação do Estado enquanto acionista controlador e dos administradores, dando conteúdo a seus deveres fiduciários. / This dissertation aims at establishing a theoretical framework according to Brazilian law to identify the role of state-owned enterprise in contemporary world. This is the first step to understand what the governments behavior should be as a controlling shareholder and the legal rules applied to its relationship with equity investors and others stakeholders. The approach is based on the assumption that every state-owned enterprise has a public mission implicitly or explicitly included in its bylaws objectives. The public mission varies according to the nature of the business and should be redefined from time to time to keep adherence to the external environment. The public mission coexists with the companys profit scope and guides the States actions, as well as those of directors and officers. For that reason the public mission is embedded in their fiduciary duties.
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