Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary bioethics. In this thesis, I aim to provide a rationalist account of personal autonomy that avoids the philosophical flaws present in theories of autonomy that are often invoked in bioethics, and that can be usefully applied to contemporary bioethical issues. I claim that we can understand the concept of autonomy to incorporate two dimensions, which I term the 'reflective' and 'practical' dimensions of autonomy. I suggest that the reflective dimension pertains to the critical reflection that agents must carry out on their motivating desires, in order to be autonomous with respect to them. I begin by rejecting prominent desire-based and historical accounts of this dimension of autonomy, before going on to defend an account based upon a Parfitian analysis of rational desires. Following this analysis of the reflective dimension of autonomy, I argue that autonomy can also be understood to incorporate a practical dimension, pertaining to the agent's ability to act effectively in pursuit of their ends. I claim that recognising this dimension of autonomy more comprehensively reflects the way in which we use the concept of autonomy in bioethics, and makes salient the fact that agents carry out their rational deliberations in the light of their beliefs about what they are able to do. I go on to argue that this latter point means that my account of autonomy can offer a deeper explanation of why coercion undermines autonomy than other prominent accounts. Having considered the prudential value of autonomy in the light of this theoretical analysis, in the latter half of the thesis I apply my rationalist account of autonomy to a number of contemporary bioethical issues, including the use of human enhancement technologies, the nature of informed consent, and the doctor-patient relationship.

While the United Kingdom has a general commitment to religious freedom, there is currently very little written on what this commitment ought to mean for religious organizations. This thesis contributes to religious freedom literature by considering when United Kingdom law ought to apply to religious organizations. It answers this question by exploring certain potential conflicts between United Kingdom law and religious organizations paying particular attention to those that are under-examined and where the possibility of differential treatment is strongest. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One consists of Chapter One and sets out the doctrinal and theoretical foundations of religious freedom. Here the thesis accepts that autonomy is the liberal normative justification for religious freedom. Part Two consists of Chapters Two to Chapter Seven and examines the interaction between United Kingdom law and religious organizations in six contexts: employment; the provision of goods and services; membership admission; internal discipline, internal property disputes; and family matters. Each chapter in Part Two is divided into two parts. The first part considers the legal doctrine that applies to religious organizations in that context. It then considers whether that approach can be justified in light of the commitment to religious freedom and autonomy identified in Part One. Part Three consists of the final chapter, Chapter Eight. This chapter uses the conclusions from the preceding doctrinal chapters to suggest a general approach for determining when law should apply to religious organizations. The thesis concludes that a contextual approach, that considers the often competing interests involved, is the best way of determining when law should apply to religious organizations. Such consideration ought to pay special attention to the importance of the particular activity to ensuring that the option of a religious way of life is available.

This research examined several independent variables and their prediction of perceived freedom in leisure (PFL). Four instruments were utilized to collect data from research subjects regarding the independent variables of shyness, extroversion, gender and activity preference style and the dependent variable, PFL. Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients were calculated for each scale employed in the research. Reliabilities for the scales within this research were as follows: Stanford Shyness Survey (.78), Adult Short Form of the Leisure Diagnostic Battery (.92), three scales from the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire - Extroversion (.85), Neuroticism (.79), and LIE (.75), and the Activity Preference Style Scales - Active (.45), Group (.53), and Risk (.67). Due to the low alpha reliabilities of two of the Activity Preference Style Scales, Active and Group, factor analysis was performed in an attempt to construct new sub-scales with higher alpha reliabilities. This resulted in some of the new sub-scales, as well as the original Active and Group scales being used in the data analysis. The sample was comprised of 325 undergraduate students enrolled in a required history or English class. The age of the sample ranged from 17 to 50 with a mean age of 20.4. Questionnaires were given out during class time and students were instructed to complete them at home and return them to their instructor. Respondents were categorized into six non-independent groups: all subjects, not shy subjects, shy subjects, and three shyness sub-groups — shy now and in the past, shy now but not in the past and shy in the past. Stepwise multiple linear regression analysis was employed with four different sets of Activity Preference Style scales and sub-scales in the prediction of PFL for the six subject groupings. Regardless of a subject's level of shyness, extroversion, and in several other cases, one of the activity style variables were the only significant predictors of PFL. The best predictor of PFL for not shy subjects was risk.

L’angoisse est un état qui se distingue des autres sentiments en ce qu’elle ne survient devant rien de précis, mais plutôt devant notre vie en général. Mais que signifie-t-elle? Pourquoi fait-elle jour? Le présent mémoire vise à mieux comprendre le phénomène de l’angoisse à travers les conceptions de deux philosophes s’y étant attardé de façon importante : Søren Kierkegaard et Martin Heidegger. Il cherche à cerner ce que ces deux conceptions, malgré des divergences importantes, peuvent amener comme éclairage philosophique à ce phénomène proprement humain. En fait, leurs conceptions philosophiques respectives de l’angoisse transforment – permettent un autre regard -, sur la question. Ils ne font pas vraiment état des effets psychologiques de l’angoisse, mais plutôt de ce que cette dernière peut permettre d’ouvrir comme perspective de saisie de l’être humain. Effectivement, l’angoisse, comme situation affective, permet d’atteindre l’être humain d’une façon plus profonde et plus originaire que ne le ferait n’importe quelle science. Elle permet de se positionner au cœur de ce qui constitue l’être humain, qui est une synthèse entre deux éléments contraires (l’âme et le corps, l’ontique et l’ontologique, etc.), dévoilant ainsi l’existence de l’être humain d’une manière toute particulière. De plus, l’angoisse assure aussi le lien entre le possible et le réel, mettant ainsi l’être humain devant un enjeu fondamental de sa condition, à savoir son possible, son destin. / Anxiety differs from other feelings and states in that it is not directed at anything specific, but rather towards life in general. But what does anxiety mean? Why does it come about? The present dissertation seeks to understand anxiety through the works of two philosophers who dealt with these questions at length: Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Heidegger. By taking into account various similarities and differences between these two conceptions, we will come to a better understanding of how philosophy has clarified this peculiarly human phenomenon. In fact, one might say that these conceptions have served to transform — or to open a new perspective on — the question of anxiety. No longer is anxiety treated in terms of its psychological effects, but rather in terms of how it allows us to grasp something essentially human. Anxiety, qua affective situation, provides a privileged mode of access to the human being, deeper and more original than any purely scientific approach. Anxiety thrusts us into the heart of what is constitutive of the human being: a synthesis of two contrary factors (be it the soul and the body or the ontic and the ontological). Moreover, anxiety articulates the connection between possibility and reality, placing the individual before a fundamental feature of human existence: one’s own most possibilities, or destiny.

Standard statistical decision-making tools, such as inference, confidence intervals and forecasting, are contingent on the assumption that the statistical model used in the analysis is the true model. In linear mixed-effect models, ignoring model uncertainty results in an underestimation of the residual variance, contributing to hypothesis tests that demonstrate larger than nominal Type-I errors and confidence intervals with smaller than nominal coverage probabilities. A novel utilization of the generalized degrees of freedom developed by Zhang et al. (2012) is used to adjust the estimate of the residual variance for model uncertainty. Additionally, the general global linear approximation is extended to linear mixed-effect models to adjust the standard errors of the parameter estimates for model uncertainty. Both of these methods use a perturbation method for estimation, where random noise is added to the response variable and, conditional on the observed responses, the corresponding estimate is calculated. A simulation study demonstrates that when the proposed methodologies are utilized, both the variance and standard errors are inflated for model uncertainty. However, when a data-driven strategy is employed, the proposed methodologies show limited usefulness. These methods are evaluated with a trial assessing the performance of cervical traction in the treatment of cervical radiculopathy.

This grounded theory project researches and analyzes publications from 1990-2008 assessing the debate over aesthetics in/and VCAE in 21st century art education. Through a series of visual models, a working theory and its supporting evidence assess this contested subject. Within the context of Modern and Postmodern paradigm conflict, art educators’ debate over aesthetics in/and VCAE fundamentally deals with differing conceptions of identity and freedom. Although commonly sharing the goal of fostering the formation of student identity through the provision and exercise of freedom, art educators’ differing perspectives on identity and freedom result in differing prescriptions for 21st century art education. By presenting qualitative data analysis through grounded theory, I guide fellow art educators through this debate by providing snapshots of information as well as detailed portraits of the scholars and their multifarious rationales.

This thesis explores the intersection of freedom of expression (as protected in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)) and copyright in Canada. In this thesis, I argue that both lower Canadian courts and the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) should reconsider their approaches to this intersection. Lower Canadian courts have consistently rejected arguments that provisions of Canada's Copyright Act unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. The SCC, on the other hand, has consistently interpreted provisions of the Copyright Act in such a manner as to result in expanded protection for the expression interests of non-copyright owning parties. It has done so not by relying explicitly on the Charter right to freedom of expression, but through a process of statutory interpretation. I argue that both approaches merit reconsideration. Specifically, I argue that the approaches adopted by lower Canadian courts to the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright are based on now-invalidated approaches to both copyright and to freedom of expression, and are thus themselves invalid; that to the extent to which the SCC's approach to this intersection assumes that the Charter right to freedom of expression can be protected, in the context of copyright, through statutory interpretation alone, that it fails to adequately protect the Charter right to freedom of expression; that other leading national courts from which the SCC has previously sought assistance have explicitly engaged with this intersection, and that the SCC should follow suit; and that the SCC's own copyright and freedom of expression jurisprudence suggests that provisions of the Copyright Act may unjustifiably infringe the Charter right to freedom of expression. These four arguments, taken together, suggest that the time is ripe for reconsideration of this intersection.

Les réflexions au point de départ de Bergson nous donnent une forte impression. Maintenant, nous pouvons dire qu’il y a là la puissance intuitive de négation et le temps qui « agit ». Et quand nous promenons nos yeux sur les œuvres de Bergson, il nous semble qu’on ne peut pas les négliger. En premier lieu, Bergson aboutit déjà à une méthode de la connaissance autre que l’intelligence. Comme l’intuition est une méthode de la connaissance propre à Bergson, l’intuition qui porte la puissance de négation est une découverte qui fait époque. En deuxième lieu, cette intuition incite elle-même à se rendre vers l’intuition immédiate. Elle soutient l’intuition de la durée. En troisième lieu, le temps qui « agit » est une appréhension originelle de l’expérience. Un des fondements et un des contenus de la liberté proviennent de ce temps qui « agit » et de cette intuition. En quatrième lieu, Bergson souligne que l’illusion du « possible » fait méconnaître « la nouveauté radicale ». Et cette appréhension montre que l’acte libre et l’univers sont la création du nouveau. L’idée d’illusion du « possible » qui s’établit dans les dernières années de sa vie provient des réflexions au point de départ. Enfin, obtenir une appréhension originale par la puissance intuitive de négation, semble être une façon d’étudier chez Bergson. Il recueille les faits scientifiques ou académiques qui font l’objet de son étude. Et il trouve un problème par la puissance intuitive de négation. Il semble que nous pouvions imaginer que ce qui est profond chez Bergson revient à ces deux points. Dès lors, nous pensons que les réflexions au point de départ sont dignes d’être pris comme objet de réflexion. / We can say that the action of time and the intuitive power of negation are important aspects in Bergson’s reflections on his point of departure. And when we survey his works, it seems to us that they cannot be neglected. First, Bergson arrives already at a method of acquiring knowledge which differs from the intelligence. As intuition is a method of the knowlege proper to Bergson, intuition that has the power of negation is an important discovery. Second, this intuition urges itself to proceed to an intuition of the duration. And the former supports the latter. Third, his notion of the action of time is an original understanding of its experience. One of the foundations of the freedom and one of the contents of the freedom are derived from the action of time and this previously mentioned intuition. Fourth, Bergson emphasizes that the illusion of the « possible » leads us to misunderstand « the radical novelty ». And this understanding shows that the free act and the universe are both creations of novelty. The notion of the illusion of the « possible » that is established in his later years has its origin in his reflections on his point of de departure. Finally, it seems that to obtain an original understanding through the intuitive power of the negation is a Bergson’s way of studying his subject. He gathers scientific or academic facts. He identifies problems through the use of the intuitive power of the negation. In short, it seems that we can imagine that what is profound in Bergson’s thought comes from the action of time and the intuitive power of negation. So we think that the reflections on the point of departure is worthy of in-depth consideration.

À la fin des années 1980, trois adolescentes d’origine musulmane ont été exclues de leur collège parce qu’elles refusaient d’enlever leur voile en classe. Ce « fait divers » aurait pu passer inaperçu s’il n’avait pas été étalé de manière spectaculaire sur la scène médiatique. Les raisons invoquées pour justifier cet engouement tiennent en un mot : faire respecter le principe de laïcité au sein de l’école républicaine. Mais très vite, le débat a pris d’autres proportions avec l’intervention d’une grande partie d’intellectuels et l’on apprend soudainement que, derrière le foulard, se cache la soumission de la femme, si ce n’est une volonté affichée de « communautarisme », voire d’« intégrisme religieux ». La nation serait alors en danger et l’on comprend que la question du foulard rebondisse en 1994, avec cette fois-ci une détermination de la part des militants laïcs de mettre en échec le droit en vigueur, formulé par le Conseil d’État en des termes limpides : le port d’un signe religieux par les élèves ne saurait, en lui-même, constituer un motif d’exclusion, sauf cas avéré de « port ostentatoire et revendicatif ». Reste que dans un mouvement d’éternel retour, le problème du foulard resurgit brutalement en 2003, se politise et s’achève par la promulgation en mars 2004 d’une loi interdisant le port du voile dans les établissements publics.Sur le fond, cette évolution a mis en exergue un aspect essentiel : la crainte des « immigrés » et d’un islam devenu trop visible. Elle a également permis d’opposer la laïcité à la liberté religieuse. Notre travail consiste justement à comprendre comment on en est arrivé à rendre antinomiques deux principes fondamentaux sur lesquels repose, entre autres, la notion de démocratie en République française. Cette interrogation est d’autant plus légitime que la polémique autour du foulard avait explicitement ignoré le point de vue des femmes voilées, passant ainsi à côté des différentes significations que ce bout d’étoffe pouvait contenir. De fait, si l’objectif de notre recherche est de passer au crible la position de ceux qui ont oeuvré à l’interdiction du foulard dans l’espace scolaire, il s’agit aussi de donner la parole à ces femmes qui n’ont pas eu droit de cité. Dans cette optique, notre souci premier est de connaître comment elles vivent leur voilement. Quel sens donnent-elles au port du voile ? Quel regard jettent-elles sur un débat qui semble mettre en cause leur liberté d’expression confessionnelle ? Ces questions sont à la base de notre problématique. / At the end of the 80s, three girls of Moslem origin were excluded from their middle school because they refused to remove their veil in class. This «news item» would have been able to pass unnoticed, had not it been spread in a spectacular way over the media scene. The reasons called to justify this craze like are the will to make respect the principle of secularism within the republican school. But, very fast, the debate took other proportions with the intervention of many intellectuals who thought that behind the scarf hides the submission of the woman, if it is not a will posted by «communitarism» even of « religious fundamentalism ».Then, the nation would be in danger and we can understand that the question of the scarf bounces in 1994, with this time a determination on behalf of laic activists to put in check the current law, formulated by the Council of State in crystal clear terms: the bearing of a religious sign by the pupils does not constitute in itself a motive for exclusion, except in cases of «ostentatious and claiming bearing» . But in a movement of eternal return, the bearing of the scarf reappears brutally in 2003, politicizes, and ends with the promulgation in March, 2004 of a law forbidding the wearing of the veil in public institutions. In fact, this evolution highlighted an essential aspect: the fear of the «immigrants» and the Islam become too visible. It also allowed to set secularism against the freedom of religion. Our work consists in understanding how we managed to make paradoxical these two fundamental principles on which the notion of democracy in French Republic, among others, rests. This interrogation is all the more justifiable since the debate around the scarf had explicitly ignored the point of view of the veiled women, so passing next to the various meanings which this end of fabric could contain. Actually, if the objective of our research is to examine closely the position of those who intervened for the ban on the scarf in the school space, it is also a question of giving the floor to these women who have not been established. So, our first questions are: how do they live their buckle ? What sense do they give to the wearing of the veil ? What glance do they throw on a debate which seems to question their confessional freedom of expression ? These questions are on the base of our research

Cette thèse vise à dévoiler les obstacles à une libre circulation de l’information au Liban, un pays longtemps considéré comme une île de liberté par rapport à son entourage. Dans ce contexte, le confessionnalisme constitue l’obstacle le plus solide et le plus dangereux non seulement à la libre circulation de l’information au Liban, mais également à la construction d’un pays au vrai sens du terme. A côté du confessionnalisme, les obstacles à une libre circulation de l’information au Liban sont nombreux. Tout d’abord, les textes législatifs où nous trouvons de nombreuses limitations à la liberté d’expression dans la presse écrite et également dans l’audiovisuel, puis une jurisprudence qui ne met pas en avant le concept sacré de la liberté d’expression, une forte censure par l’Etat, et une autocensure dans un contexte de violence. La géopolitique du Liban n’aide pas non plus, d’un côté Israël un pays en état de guerre avec le Liban ou dans les meilleurs des cas en état de cessez le feu. Et de l’autre, la Syrie, un pays qui a toujours considéré le Liban comme l’un de ses départements. A cela s’ajoute une histoire sanglante d’un petit pays qui peu après son indépendance du mandat français tombe dans une guerre civile qui détruit ses institutions et met en question la légitimité de l’existence même de cet état nouveau et la possibilité d’une vraie coexistence entre ses dix-huit communautés. Cette guerre risque de se déclencher à nouveau même vingt ans après l’accord de Taëf qui était censé instaurer la paix dans le pays. / This thesis aims to uncover the barriers to the free circulation of information in Lebanon, a country long considered an island of freedom in relation to its surroundings. In this context, sectarianism is considered the greatest and most dangerous obstacle, not only to the free flow of information, but equally to the building of a country in the true sense of the term. In addition to sectarianism, the obstacles for the free circulation of information in Lebanon are numerous. These include legislative texts that place many restrictions on freedom of expression on the press and audiovisual media, a jurisprudence that does not advance the concept of freedom of expression, a strong censorship from the state, and the self censorship of the press in an environment of violence. The geopolitics of Lebanon does not help either. On the one side, it is bordered by Israel, a country at war with Lebanon or in the best cases, in a state of ceasefire. On the other side, it is bordered by Syria, a country that has always considered Lebanon as one of its territories. Added to this is a bloody history of a small country that shortly after independence from the French mandate, falls into a civil war that destroyed its institutions and called into question the legitimacy its existence. It also called into question the possibility of a true coexistence between its eighteen religious sects. This war may be triggered again even twenty years after the Taif Agreement that was supposed to bring peace to the country.