Submitted by Liliane Ferreira (ljuvencia30@gmail.com) on 2018-09-17T11:25:00Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Antônio Henrique Paz do Amaral - 2018.pdf: 1077489 bytes, checksum: 0387588d425738ba53ea8d493aa80499 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Rejected by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com), reason: Olhe as palavras chaves on 2018-09-19T12:36:39Z (GMT) / Submitted by Liliane Ferreira (ljuvencia30@gmail.com) on 2018-09-19T13:13:56Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertação - Antônio Henrique Paz do Amaral - 2018.pdf: 1077489 bytes, checksum: 0387588d425738ba53ea8d493aa80499 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2018-09-20T11:18:37Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertação - Antônio Henrique Paz do Amaral - 2018.pdf: 1077489 bytes, checksum: 0387588d425738ba53ea8d493aa80499 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-20T11:18:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Dissertação - Antônio Henrique Paz do Amaral - 2018.pdf: 1077489 bytes, checksum: 0387588d425738ba53ea8d493aa80499 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-17 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Martin Heidegger did not make a philosophy of history on the side of a philosophy of language, man or being. Nevertheless, the thematic of history was very relevant to his thought, which has always aspired to a unifying totality around the question of the meaning of being. What is the condition of possibility of history? What makes us historical beings? This question is the one that Heidegger calls in Being and Time, the question of the historicity of history. The starting point to think this question is found on the distinctive openness of Dasein to its proper temporality, articulated in three fundamental Ekstasis which unify themselves in the existential of care – in sequence of originality: advenient-future, essential-past and the instant-present. Assuming resolute in its Being-towards-death, the Dasein gives openness to the retrieval of past, as a repetition of utmost and most original possibilities buried by tradition. Another starting point is the questioning of history from the question of the meaning of nihilism and the death of God, which involve our epoch, through a attentive dialogue with Nietzsche’s work. So Heidegger understands our historicity since a essential remission to what that, in its late thinking phase, he calls “history of Being”. / Martin Heidegger não fez uma filosofia da história à parte de uma filosofia da linguagem, da homem, ou do ser. Não obstante, a temática da história foi de suma relevância a seu pensamento, que sempre aspirou uma totalidade unificante em torno da questão do sentido do Ser. Qual é a condição de possibilidade da história? O que faz de nós seres históricos? Esta pergunta é a que Heidegger chama, em Ser e Tempo, de a questão da historicidade da história. O ponto de partida para se pensar esta questão encontra-se na abertura distintiva do Dasein para a sua temporalidade própria, articulada em três ekstases fundamentais que se unificam no existencial do cuidado – em ordem de originariedade: o futuro-adveniente, o passado-essencial e o presente-instante. Pondo-se resoluto em seu ser-para-a-morte, o Dasein dá abertura para a retroveniência do passado, enquanto repetição das possibilidades derradeiras e mais originárias soterradas pela tradição. Outro ponto de partida, é o questionamento da história a partir da pergunta pelo sentido do niilismo e da morte de Deus, que envolvem nossa época, através de um diálogo atento com a obra de Nietzsche. Assim, Heidegger compreende a nossa historicidade desde uma remissão essencial àquilo que, em sua fase tardia de pensamento, ele nomeia de a “história do Ser”

Orientador: Oswaldo Giacoia Junior / Tese (doutorado) - - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T17:14:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Viesenteiner_JorgeLuiz_D.pdf: 2614332 bytes, checksum: 71473495c7840dbedcce5034892fde7a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: Esta pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar a fórmula nietzscheana 'tornar-se o que se é'. Ela é uma alteração da expressão de Píndaro feita por Nietzsche, que o preocupou desde os tempos de estudante até ser publicada como subtítulo de Ecce homo. Nossa hipótese é que a fórmula 'tornar-se o que se é' pode ser compreendida através do conceito de 'vivência' (Erlebnis). Vivência significa estar ainda presente na vida quando algo acontece, porém, nunca estamos conscientes da vivência quando ainda a atravessamos. Neste caso, a vivência é um contra-conceito da razão e, como tal, é compreendida como pathos. Trata-se de uma noção que, patheticamente, não pode ser conceitualmente sistematizada e nem sequer comunicada através de signos lingüísticos, pois tão logo a racionalizamos ou comunicamos, deixa de ser uma vivência. 'Tornar-se o que se é', porém, acontece unicamente na vida e precisamente através das Erlebnisse, de modo que 'tornar-se' se converte em um imenso processo de experimentação essencialmente fluido. Metodologicamente, a pesquisa está estruturada em três partes. No primeiro capítulo analisamos um conceito imediatamente relacionado à Erlebnis: a noção de experimento. Trata-se de um conceito essencialmente prático e que congrega em torno de si uma dimensão ético-estética no processo de 'tornar-se o que se é'. À base deste conceito, encontra-se o papel que a ciência ocupa em sua dupla variação semântica, sobretudo a partir de Humano, demasiado Humano até A Gaia Ciência: ciência como propedêutica - aquela que esvazia os erros ilusórios da razão e da ordenação moral do mundo - e como paixão do conhecimento - aquela em que o espírito livre aprende a considerar a si mesmo e o mundo esteticamente, em uma práxis efetiva de auto-formação. No segundo capítulo é abordado o conceito de vivência. Partimos da sua origem etimológica e a recepção feita por Nietzsche, passando pela desvinculação do seu caráter autobiográfico, em proveito da interpretação como genealogia das condições nas quais um pensamento emerge e se desenvolve, até sua interpretação como pathos. Vivenciar é atravessar patheticamente uma trajetória, cujo movimento é realizado para além da intencionalidade, mas que constrói no homem uma abundância de vida. A última parte da pesquisa trata da solução de dois problemas que se originaram das interpretações anteriores: um problema de linguagem e outro sobre a intencionalidade. Quanto à linguagem, trata-se de investigar como é possível resolver o problema da comunicação de uma vivência, através de três variantes: primeiro, a análise daquilo que denominamos como projeto crítico de inversão da compreensibilidade; depois uma interpretação do que Nietzsche nomeou como sua 'arte do estilo' e, por fim, em que medida Zaratustra corporifica as possibilidades de comunicação de uma tensão interna de pathos. Em relação à intencionalidade, trata-se de compreender o 'tornar-se o que se é' a partir de dois outros registros: por um lado, a idéia de destino, na medida em que, etimologicamente, também significa pathos; por outro lado, trata-se de compreender a fórmula 'tornar-se o que se é' sob o signo da fluidez (Fluktuanz). / Abstract: The objective of this research is to analyze Nietzsche's formula 'become who you are'. It is an alteration of Pindaro's expression made by Nietzsche, which has worried him since he was a student until being published with the subtitle of Ecce homo. Our hypothesis is that 'become who you are' formula can be understood through the concept of 'experience' (Erlebnis). Experience means to still be present in life when something happens, however, we are never aware of experience when we are still crossing it. In this case, experience is reason's counter-concept and, as such, it is understood as pathos. It is about a notion which, pathetically, it can not be conceptually systematized and not even be communicated through linguistic signs, since as soon as we rationalize it or we communicate it, it is not an experience any longer. 'Become who you are', however, happens once in a lifetime and precisely through the experiences (Erlebnisse), in a way that 'to become' is converted into a huge experimentation process essentially fluid. Methodologically, the research is structured in three parts. In the first chapter we analyze a concept immediately related to Experience (Erlebnis): the notion of experiment. It is about a concept essentially practical and which congregates around oneself an ethicalaesthetic dimension in the process of 'become who you are'. Based on this concept, one finds the role that science occupies in its double semantic variation, specially from Human, All Too Human up to The Gay Science: science as propaedeutic - the one which empties the illusory errors from reason and from the world's moral ordination - and like knowledge's passion - the one which the free spirit learns to consider himself and the world in an aesthetically, in an effective praxis of self-formation. In the second chapter we approach the experience (Erlebnis) concept. We start from its etymologic origin and the reception given by Nietzsche, passing through the autobiographical character separation, taking into account the interpretation as the condition's genealogy in which a thought emerges and it develops, up to its interpretation as pathos. To experience is to pathetically cross a range, which movement is done far beyond the intentionality, but which builds in men life abundance. The last part of the research tackles the solution of two problems which were originated from previous interpretations: a language problem and the other one is about intentionality. Regarding the language, it is investigated how it is possible to resolve the experience communication problem, through three variants: first, the analysis of which we call as the comprehensibility's inversion critical project; after an interpretation of which Nietzsche named as his 'style's art' and, finally, in what measure does Zarathustra materializes the communication possibilities of a pathos internal tension. Regarding intentionality, it is a question of understanding 'how one becomes what one is' starting from two other registers: on one side, the idea of destiny, in so far as, etymologically, it also means pathos; on the other hand, it is about understanding the 'become who you are' under the fluency's signal (Fluktuanz). / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Fernado Costa Mattos / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, São Bernardo do Campo, 2018. / Nesta dissertação abordamos a concepção de universidade desenvolvida pelo filósofo Martin Heidegger. Embora jamais tenha sido objeto de reflexão sistemática é possível detectar em diferentes momentos de seus caminhos de pensamento, antes mesmo de assumir a reitoria da Universidade de Freiburg em plena ascensão do movimento nazista, uma preocupação constante relativo à essência do ensino superior alemão. A leitura do discurso A Autoafirmação da Universidade Alemã, proferido na ocasião, não foi suficientemente capaz de explicitar a sua compreensão filosófica sobre o assunto. Por esse motivo, nos debruçamos tanto suas preleções da década de 1920, a começar por uma esquecida lição ditada logo após o término da guerra (Kriegsnotsemester, 1919), como até mesmo nas correspondências pessoais trocadas com Elfride Petri, Rudolf Bultmann e Karl Jaspers a preexistência de uma preocupação que sempre lhe acompanhou desde a sua juventude. Apesar de ser uma questão ignorada pela maioria de seus comentadores, quando se lança um olhar retrospectivo sobre a história da universidade verifica-se o quanto esta se constitui um verdadeiro problema para toda filosofia alemã desde finais do século XVIII. Para Heidegger, a preocupação com o ensino superior alemão não se resumia a um simples ideal de formação (Bildung) dos estudantes ou a um mero compromisso administrativo com a instituição, mas, fundamentalmente, diziam respeito a uma situação ou contexto vital na qual se encontrava em jogo tanto o destino da cultura alemã (Kultur) como a história da própria noção de verdade Ocidental (Aletheia). / In this dissertation we discuss the conception of university developed by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Although it has never been the object of systematic reflection, it is possible to detect at different times of its ways of thinking, even before taking over the rectory of the University of Freiburg in the full rise of the Nazi movement, a constant concerning the essence of German higher education. The reading of the speech the autoaffirmation of the German university, given at the time, was not sufficiently able to clarify its philosophical understanding on the subject. For this reason, we looked at both its lectures of the 1920s, beginning with a forgotten lesson dictated shortly after the end of the War (Kriegsnotsemester, 1919), as even in the personal correspondence exchanged with Elfride Petri, Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Jaspers the preexistence of a concern that has always accompanied you since your youth. Although it is an issue ignored by most of its commentators, when a retrospective look at the history of the university is observed, it is a real problem for all German philosophy since the late 18th century. For Heidegger, the concern with German higher education was not a simple ideal of training (Bildung) of the students or a mere administrative commitment to the institution, but, fundamentally, they concerned a vital situation or context in the Which was at stake both the fate of the German culture (Kultur) and the history of the very notion of Western truth (Aletheia).

This paper aims to analyze the philosophical implications of the atomic bomb in the thinking of three German post-war philosophers: Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt, and Karl Jaspers. Although they differ greatly in interest and philosophical perspective, the atomic bomb can be discerned as a problem of humanity's technological, ethical, and political conditions in the intersection of their authorships. In the examination of their ideas, they are situated within a diachronic tradition of philosophy of technology. Their common entanglement with phenomenological-hermeneutic philosophy is also considered, most notably in the form of the influence of Martin Heidegger. For Anders, the atomic bomb is the defining feature of the ethical and political conditions of post-war humanity, yet humans are unable to grasp its reality. In the thinking of Jaspers, the bomb necessitates a supra-political principle grounded in the faculty of reason. For him, politics in the nuclear age must rest upon the responsibility of the many individuals, in an ethical re-birth of humanity. Arendt primarily understands the bomb as a product of the increasing power of the thoughtless instrumentality of science. The destructive potential of atomic weapons solidifies to her a crisis in the meaning of politics, in which brute force has undermined political power. All three thinkers share the view that the atomic bomb must be understood in conjunction with a certain thought- and meaninglessness in the science and politics of their contemporary. The bomb also signifies to them a technological obscuring of human agency, the implications of which are exacerbated by the fact that it has also immensely improved the ability of one individual to commit heinous acts. In impairing the conditions for ethical action and meaningful politics for lasting peace, the bomb necessitates these very same principles. By threatening to make humanity as mortal as only individuals had been before, the bomb has made radical change in human thinking and activity urgent. However, to what extent sufficient adaptations are probable, or even possible, is a question in which the philosophers discussed in this paper diverge.

En analysant les processus dialectiques par lesquels l’art repense le passé, Between Truth and Trauma : The Work of Art and Memory work in Adorno traite du concept adornien de la mémoire. Je postule que l’œuvre d’art chez Adorno incarne un Zeitkern (noyau temporel). Je démontrerai que l’immanence réciproque de l’histoire dans l’œuvre d’art et l’immanence de l’œuvre d’art dans l’histoire permettent de repenser le passé. Le premier chapitre examine la manière par laquelle le passé est préservé et nié par l’œuvre d’art. Le deuxième chapitre montre comment, à l’aide du processus interprétatif, le passé est transcendé à travers l’œuvre d’art. Le dernier chapitre évoque la lecture adornienne d’écrits de Brecht et de Beckett dans le but d’illustrer la capacité de l’œuvre d’art à naviguer entre la vérité et le trauma. / Analyzing the dialectical processes through which art works through the past, Between Truth and Trauma: The Work of Art and Memory in Adorno examines Adorno’s concept of memory. I argue that, for Adorno, the work of art both has and is a Zeitkern (temporal nucleus). I demonstrate that the reciprocal immanence of history in the work and immanence of the work in history allows for the past to be worked through. The first chapter examines how the past is preserved and negated by the work of art. The second chapter examines how the past is transcended through the work of art via the interpretive process. The final chapter looks at Adorno’s reading of work by Beckett and Brecht in order to illustrate the ability of the work of art to navigate between truth and trauma.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-10-06T12:49:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Arlindo Antonio Araújo Barbosa.pdf: 1236498 bytes, checksum: afcdae872d4f0ca03c9f9fb2d91256a0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-06T12:49:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Arlindo Antonio Araújo Barbosa.pdf: 1236498 bytes, checksum: afcdae872d4f0ca03c9f9fb2d91256a0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation intends to delineate the task that Nietzsche gave himself and made the primary goal of presenting the “name” of Nietzsche. His act of rendering the project of transvaluation of all values effective, understood by the philosopher as the greatest demand yet made of humanity, considering that it provoked a deep cut in the history of Western man, was closely related to this approximation with the “name” of Nietzsche. Hence, the need for the philosopher to: make himself known. Still, how the author of Ecce homo “reveals” himself to humanity, fully distinguishing himself, is the way philosophers have presented themselves traditionally, in a type of presentation that distances itself from the idea of an autobiography. Thus, the author of Ecce homo presents himself through masks like the historian, the doctor and the psychologist, Nietzschean disguises that resonate with each other and are imbricated in the project of transvaluation of values. The thesis will demonstrate how some of the main aspects of his philosophy, such as forgetfulness, resentment, conscience, and values will be treated with these images, or by these masks put on by the philosopher / Nossa dissertação pretende esboçar a tarefa que Nietzsche atribuiu a si mesmo, a qual tinha como meta principal apresentar o “nome” Nietzsche. A efetivação do projeto de transvaloração de todos os valores, entendida pelo filósofo como a mais alta exigência já feita à humanidade, visto que provocava uma cesura na história do homem ocidental, perpassava por essa aproximação com o “nome” Nietzsche, daí, então, a necessidade do filósofo em: dar-se a conhecer. Todavia, o modo como o autor de Ecce homo se “revela” à humanidade, distingue-se, por completo, da forma como os filósofos se apresentavam tradicionalmente, isto é, trata-se de um tipo de apresentação que se aparta da ideia de uma autobiografia. Destarte, é a partir de máscaras como o historiador, o médico e o psicólogo, disfarces nietzschianos que ressoam entre si, e que estão imbricados ao projeto de transvaloração dos valores, que o autor de Ecce homo se apresenta. Tentaremos mostrar, ao longo do texto, como alguns dos aspectos principais de sua filosofia, como, por exemplo, o esquecimento, o ressentimento, a consciência, os valores, etc, serão tratados por essas imagens, ou por essas máscaras assumidas pelo filósofo

La critique feuerbachienne de la philosophie idéaliste de Hegel a beaucoup influencé ses contemporains et les matérialistes et humanistes du 19eme siècle. Cependant, les études françaises ne rendent pas compte de sa contribution à l'histoire de la philosophie autant qu'elles le devraient. Le but de ce travail est de présenter l'évolution de la pensée de Feuerbach de sa jeunesse hégélienne jusqu'à son matérialisme anthropologique et humaniste. Cette évolution est le résultat de la remise en cause progressive puis du renversement de la philosophie spéculative. Sa critique de la religion diffère profondément de celle des Lumières françaises dans le sens où loin de ne voir dans la religion qu'erreur, tromperie et fanatisme, il reconnaît que le religion exprime un trait anthropologique essentiel: l'essence de l'homme. La pensée de Feuerbach réside essentiellement alors dans une nouvelle interprétation du phénomène religieux en lui donnant une explication anthropologique. L'être humain est un mélange de rationalité et de sensibilité, d'affectivité et de passivité, qui doit être considéré en même temps en tant qu'individu et qu'être social. En opposition à l'interprétation de Marx, j'étudie plus particulièrement dans cette thèse, le rôle de la praxis sociale dans l'anthropologie feuerbachienne. Enfin, méthodologiquement, en plus d'une lecture attentive de l'ensemble du corpus feuerbachien, je re-contextualise sa pensée au sein du mouvement jeune-hégélien, et après la révolution de 1848. / Feuerbach's anthropological critique of Hegel's idealism has strongly influenced German materialists and humanists in the nineteenth-century as well as the following generations of thinkers. Even so particularly French scholars may still not recognize his contribution as central in the history of thought. The aim of my work is to present the development of Feuerbach's thought in particular how Feuerbach's early Hegelianism evolved into professing an empirical realism and materialist humanism, resulting in what was considered by Feuerbach himself as the negation of speculative German idealism. His critique of religion is fundamentally different from that of the French Enlightenment since according to him religion is not only fraudulent and deceptive, but also an essential anthropological feature. Essentially the thought of Feuerbach consists in a new interpretation of religion's phenomena, giving an anthropological explanation. For Feuerbach, the human subject was a complex weave of rationality and sensuality, affectivity and passivity, sociality and individualism. Contrasting with Marx's interpretation of Feuerbach, in this work 1 will study the role of the social praxis in Feuerbach's anthropology. Besides including a thorough reading of Feuerbach's work, my thesis will present a re-contextualisation of it in the Left Hegelian mouvement and after the March Revolution, as an additional rnaterial for my interpretation.

In the following study I reappraise the nineteenth century Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897). Burckhardt is traditionally known for having served as the elder colleague and one-time muse of Friedrich Nietzsche at the University of Basel and so his ideas are often considered, by comparison, outmoded or inapposite to contemporary currents of thought. My research explodes this conception by abandoning the presumption that Burckhardt was in some sense "out of touch" with modernity. By following and significantly expanding upon the ideas of historians such as Allan Megill, Lionel Gossman, Hayden White, Joseph Mali, John Hinde and Richard Sigurdson, among others, I am able to portray Burckhardt as conversely inaugurating a historiography laden with elements of insightful social criticism. Such criticisms are in fact bolstered by virtue of their counter-modern characteristic. Burckhardt reveals in this way a perspicacity that both anticipates Nietzsche's own critique of modernity and in large part moves well beyond him. Much of this analysis is devised through a genealogical approach to Burckhardt which places him squarely within a cohesive branch of post-Kantian thought that I have called heterodox post-Kantianism. My study revaluates Burckhardt through the alembic of a "discursive" post-Kantian turn which reinvests many of his outré ideas, including his radical appropriation of historical representation, his non-teleological historiography, his various pessimistic inclinations, and additionally, his non-empirical, "aesthetic" study of history, or "mythistory," with a newfound philosophical germaneness. While I survey the majority of Burckhardt's output in the course of my work, I invest a specific focus in his largely unappreciated Greek lectures (given in 1869 but only published in English in full at the end of the twentieth century). Burckhardt's "dark" portrayal of the Greeks serves to not only upset traditional conceptions of antiquity but also the manner in which self-conception is informed through historical inquiry. Burckhardt returns us then to an altogether repressed antiquity: to a hidden, yet internal "dream of a shadow." My analysis culminates with an attempt to reassess the place of Burckhardt's ideas for modernity and to correspondingly reexamine Nietzsche. In particular, I highlight the disparity between Nietzsche's and Burckhardt's reception of the "problem of power," including the latter's reluctance - which was attended by ominous and highly prescient predictions of future large-scale wars and the steady "massification" of western society - to accept Nietzsche's acclamation of a final "will to power." Burckhardt teaches us the value of history as an active counterforce to dominant modern reality-formations and in doing so, his work rehabilitates the relevance of history for a world which, as Burckhardt once noted, suffers today from a superfluity of present-mindedness.

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'interroger la manière dont Hegel conçoit la fondation absolue de la philosophie, c'est-à-dire la manière dont la philosophie fournit, à l'intérieur d'elle-même, la justification intégrale de la vérité absolue de son discours, justification qui, d'après Hegel, la caractérise en propre. Pour ce faire, après avoir brièvement replacé, à titre introductif, cette tentative hégélienne dans le cadre de la problématique de la fondation de la philosophie propre à la philosophie post-kantienne, nous étudions d'abord la manière dont Hegel rend compte de la genèse historique de l'exigence d'une auto-fondation absolue de la philosophie dans ses Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie, qui s'avèrent un espace hybride de position des problèmes philosophiques, à la fois historiquement donnés et toujours déjà philosophiquement construits. Nous interrogeons ensuite, à partir de la Doctrine de l'essence, le concept logique de fondement (Grund) dans ses tensions propres, pour montrer qu'il dégage l'espace des problèmes posés par la notion de fondation sans pouvoir leur apporter par lui-même une solution définitive : cette dernière nous paraît bien plutôt énoncée dans la Doctrine du concept, dont le mouvement d'ensemble (concept subjectif, objectivité, idée) fait l'objet d'une lecture permettant d'y faire ressortir à la fois l'Aufhebung interne du fondement et l'émergence de la notion d'auto-fondation, qui apparaît in fine dans la définition de l'idée comme processus de « développement progressif » et « fondation régressive » de soi. La fondation est alors définie comme un processus consistant à rendre raison de soi dans ses manifestations, ce que nous interprétons comme rupture avec le concept de fondement hérité de la métaphysique d'entendement, dont la logique hégélienne produit l'Aufhebung. L'idée ayant été ainsi définie, de manière formelle, comme processus de rendre raison de soi, nous étudions, dans une troisième partie, la manière dont la philosophie de la nature et la philosophie de l'esprit concourent au processus d'auto-fondation réelle de l'idée, c'est-à-dire, en dernière instance, à son effectuation comme esprit absolu ; à cette occasion, nous étudions plusieurs occurrences significatives de la notion de fondement dans la Realphilosophie, ainsi que le rapport du discours philosophique aux réalités dont il traite (rapport que Hegel nous semble prendre soin de distinguer d'une justification extérieure). Une quatrième partie vient alors étudier la manière dont la philosophie se pense elle-même comme fondation systématique de sa propre vérité : on soulève la question de savoir si le système a besoin d'un fondement externe pour garantir sa vérité (fondement que certains interprètes ont pu trouver dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit ou dans l'histoire de la philosophie), et on étudie les syllogismes finaux de l'Encyclopédie pour y lire une réflexion de la philosophie sur sa propre fondation systématique. La thèse que nous soutenons au terme de ce parcours est que le profond remaniement spéculatif du concept de fondement qui aboutit à l'idée d'une autofondation au sens de « rendre raison de soi » (en rupture donc avec tout principe ou fondement réel ou formel tel qu'on en rencontre dans l'histoire de la philosophie), converge avec une redéfinition de la philosophie comme savoir rendant absolument raison de sa propre vérité, et même, au sens strict, ne fondant que sa propre vérité comme système, ce qui lui permet en même temps de libérer le sens vrai des objets qu'il parcourt et ordonne dans son déploiement systématique. / This thesis aims at questioning the way Hegel conceives the absolute foundation of philosophy, that is to say the way philosophy provides, within itself, the integral justification of its discourse's absolute truth, which, according to Hegel, characterizes it in specific. To do so, after sketching the historical frame of Post-Kantian debates about the foundation of philosophy, we first study the way Hegel relates, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the historical genesis of the requirement of an absolute self-foundation of philosophy. We then question the logical concept of Grund within the Doctrine of Essence in order to show, that neither it or its subsequent specifications (e.g. cause) suffice to give an account of the process of foundation, whose truth we take to be stated instead in the Doctrine of the Concept ; we study Begriffslogik's overall movement (subjective concept, objectivity, idea) in order to bring out the notion of self-foundation (Selbstbegründung), which appears in fine in the definition of Idea as a process of “progressive development” and “regressive foundation” of itself. Foundation is thus defined as a process consisting in the justification of itself in its own moments, which we take to be a split from metaphysics' concept of foundation, of which the Hegelian Logic carries out the Aufhebung. In a third part, we try to study the way philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit contribute to the process of a real self-foundation of the Idea, that is to say its realization as Absolute Spirit ; on that occasion, we study multiple occurrences of “foundation” in the Realphilosophie, and also the connection between philosophical discourse and the realities it deals with, which Hegel seems to distinguish from an external justification. The fourth part then studies the way philosophy thinks itself as systematical foundation of its own truth : we raise the question of knowing if the system needs an external foundation to guarantee its truth (which could be provided by the Phenomenology of Spirit or the history of philosophy), and we read the “syllogisms of philosophy” as philosophy looking back at its own foundation. The thesis we support at the end of this demonstration is that the profound speculative reshuffle of the concept of foundation that leads to the idea of a self-foundation within the meaning of “justifying itself” (breaking thus with every real or formal principle or foundation as we know them in the history of philosophy), converges with a redefinition of philosophy as knowledge justifying its own truth in an absolute manner, and even, in a precise meaning, founding only its own truth as a system, which allows it meanwhile to free the true meaning of the objects that it browses and orders in its systematical deployment.

En analysant les processus dialectiques par lesquels l’art repense le passé, Between Truth and Trauma : The Work of Art and Memory work in Adorno traite du concept adornien de la mémoire. Je postule que l’œuvre d’art chez Adorno incarne un Zeitkern (noyau temporel). Je démontrerai que l’immanence réciproque de l’histoire dans l’œuvre d’art et l’immanence de l’œuvre d’art dans l’histoire permettent de repenser le passé. Le premier chapitre examine la manière par laquelle le passé est préservé et nié par l’œuvre d’art. Le deuxième chapitre montre comment, à l’aide du processus interprétatif, le passé est transcendé à travers l’œuvre d’art. Le dernier chapitre évoque la lecture adornienne d’écrits de Brecht et de Beckett dans le but d’illustrer la capacité de l’œuvre d’art à naviguer entre la vérité et le trauma. / Analyzing the dialectical processes through which art works through the past, Between Truth and Trauma: The Work of Art and Memory in Adorno examines Adorno’s concept of memory. I argue that, for Adorno, the work of art both has and is a Zeitkern (temporal nucleus). I demonstrate that the reciprocal immanence of history in the work and immanence of the work in history allows for the past to be worked through. The first chapter examines how the past is preserved and negated by the work of art. The second chapter examines how the past is transcended through the work of art via the interpretive process. The final chapter looks at Adorno’s reading of work by Beckett and Brecht in order to illustrate the ability of the work of art to navigate between truth and trauma.