Submitted by João Paulo Carvalho Aveiro (joaoaveiro@gmail.com) on 2013-03-04T21:54:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-04-03T17:56:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-04-03T17:56:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-25 / In this work, we studied the literature of the interbank market and how a central bank can improve its functioning. We developed a framework that could accommodate the different models of the interbank market and central bank intervention created from Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). With this we show that, in most cases, banks with access to the interbank market are unable to provide the efficient allocation for its consumers. In this environment we find a role for a central bank that, by intervening in the interbank market, is able to induce banks to offer the same allocations that would be provided by a social planner, that is, efficient allocations. / Neste trabalho, estudamos a literatura de mercado interbancário e como um banco central pode melhorar o seu funcionamento. Criamos um framework que pudesse acomodar os diferentes modelos de mercado interbancário e intervenção do banco central criados a partir de Bryant (1980) e Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Com isso mostramos que, em grande parte dos casos, os bancos com acesso ao mercado interbancário são incapazes de prover a alocação eficiente para os seus consumidores. Nesse ambiente, encontramos uma função para um banco central que, ao intervir no mercado interbancário, é capaz de induzir os bancos a oferecerem as mesmas alocações que seriam providas por um planejador central, ou seja, alocações eficientes.

Final qualification work (the master thesis) is devoted to a research of the market of interbank crediting in the Russian Federation at the present stage. An object of research is the set of the economic relations arising between participants of a banking system in the market of interbank crediting. The purpose of the master thesis – on the basis of studying and the analysis of theoretical and practical aspects of the market of interbank crediting in the Russian Federation to reveal the problems characteristic of the credit relations of this type and to develop recommendations for improvement of a system of crediting of commercial banks both from the Central bank of the Russian Federation, and from other credit institutions. / Выпускная квалификационная работа (магистерская диссертация) посвящена исследованию рынка межбанковского кредитования в Российской Федерации на современном этапе. Предметом исследования является совокупность экономических отношений, возникающих между участниками банковской системы на рынке межбанковского кредитования. Цель магистерской диссертации – на основе изучения и анализа теоретических и практических аспектов рынка межбанковского кредитования в Российской Федерации выявить проблемы, характерные для данного вида кредитных отношений, и разработать рекомендации для улучшения системы кредитования коммерческих банков как со стороны Центрального банка Российской Федерации, так и со стороны других кредитных организаций.

[pt] Esta dissertação desenvolve um modelo tratável de formação endógena de redes do mercado interbancário. Devido a choques de liquidez, bancos enfrentam um trade-off entre investir seus recursos num ativo líquido e num ativo ilíquido de alto retorno. O mercado interbancário é modelado como uma rede. Um link estendido por um banco a outro é interpretado como uma linha de crédito da qual o primeiro banco pode tomar emprestado ativos líquidos do segundo para cobrir fluxos de saída de recursos. O Banco Central, através de linhas financeiras, empresta recursos aos bancos com saldos negativos e toma emprestado de instituições com saldos positivos a taxas por ele estabelecidas. Essas taxas definem um corredor no qual a taxa cobrada em empréstimos interbancários deve estar contida. Nesse contexto, caracterizamos o equilíbrio (único) nas decisões de investimento dos bancos para qualquer rede. Em seguida, endogenizamos a rede, através da decisão dos bancos de linhas de crédito, e mostramos que toda rede em equilíbrio é uma rede de núcleo-periferia completa. Esse resultado é consistente com redes empiricamente observadas. Ademais, introduzimos um trade-off para Bancos Centrais ao decidir o corredor de juros: um corredor mais estreito dá mais controle ao Banco Central sobre a taxa interbancária, o que é importante para a condução de política monetária. No entanto, se considerarmos as decisões de links dos bancos, isso pode levar a um equilíbrio com uma rede mais esparsa, onde o investimento total no ativo líquido é maior, o que representa um custo implícito, já que esses recursos poderiam ser investidos no ativo mais produtivo. No geral, nossa análise ressalta o importante papel que redes endógenas têm na transmissão de política monetária. / [en] This paper develops a tractable endogenous network formation model of the interbank market. Due to liquidity shocks, banks face a trade-off between investing their resources in a liquid asset and a high-yield illiquid asset. The interbank market is modeled as a network. A link extended by one bank to another is interpreted as a credit line from which the former bank can borrow a share of the latter s liquid assets to cover liquidity outflows. The central bank, by means of its standing facilities, lends resources to banks that are short in liquidity and borrows from institutions with liquidity surpluses at predetermined rates. These rates establish a corridor in which the rate that banks charge for interbank loans must lie. In this setting, we characterize the unique equilibrium of banks liquidity holdings for any network. We then endogenize the network, via banks decision of credit lines, and provide a sharp equilibrium characterization: every equilibrium network is a complete core-periphery graph. This characterization is consistent with empirically observed networks. Moreover, we introduce a trade-off for central banks when choosing the corridor rate: a narrower corridor implies more precise targeting of the interbank rate, which is important for the conduct of monetary policy. However, if we account for banks linking decisions, this may lead to an equilibrium with a sparser network, where total liquidity holdings are higher, incurring an implicit cost since these funds could be invested in the more productive illiquid asset instead. More generally, our analysis highlights the important role that endogenous networks play in the transmission of monetary policy.

Compte-tenu du degré de complexité des interconnexions au sein du système financier mondial, mis en avant pendant la crise financière 2007-2009, l'adoption des modèles de réseaux, comme paradigme d'analyse et d'amélioration de la robustesse du système, paraît particulièrement pertinent, sinon nécessaire. Les institutions financières sont vues comme des nœuds d'un réseau où les transactions interbancaires constituent les liens au travers desquels la propagation des chocs se matérialise. En outre, la crise a également mis en évidence le rôle d'un rationnement de la liquidité comme canal majeur de transmission des chocs. Cette thèse examine les interactions entre les tensions sur le marché monétaire, la contagion interbancaire et la structure du réseau, avec une application au marché interbancaire européen et au système de paiement. La contribution de cette étude à la littérature sur les réseaux financiers s'articule autour de trois axes. Le premier est un modèle intégrant trois canaux de propagation des chocs, à l'œuvre durant la crise 2007-2009, à savoir les expositions à un facteur de risque commun, aux risques de contrepartie et, enfin, au risque de liquidité. Le deuxième axe est une application de ce modèle étudiant les expositions interbancaires dans le système financier européen entre 2008 et 2012, et ce, au niveau individuel des agents, i.e. de banque à banque; constituant ainsi, et à notre connaissance, l'unique contribution académique dans ce domaine. Cette étude souligne notamment le rôle de la structure du réseau dans la propagation des chocs et reproduit la fragmentation du marché européen observée en 2011-2012. Enfin, la troisième contribution porte sur la propension des banques à retarder leurs transactions sur la base des données du système de paiement TARGET2. Cette étude souligne une divergence des comportements des banques au niveau de leur gestion de la liquidité intra-journalière. En effet, deux types de comportements se distinguent à cet égard : le premier consiste à fixer un niveau de liquidité initiale suffisant pour répondre aux besoins de la journée et un second qui a tendance à gérer cette liquidité en flux tendus. Les banques adoptant ce deuxième type de comportement sont à l'origine de la majorité des retards de paiements constatés au niveau du système financier. L'ampleur des retards de paiement est par ailleurs fortement corrélée au niveau des tensions sur le marché, constituant de ce fait un indicateur avancé d'une éventuelle crise à venir.Le résumé substantiel n'a pas été fourni par l'auteur / Given the extent and importance of financial interconnectedness in recent years that were particularly underlined by the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the adoption of the network paradigm to analyze and improve robustness of a financial system appears to be fully relevant. Financial institutions are viewed as nodes of a network and their short- or long-term loans extended to each other as links or exposures through which a shock may propagate. Moreover, the same crisis accentuated the role of funding shortage as a channel of shock transmission. This dissertation focuses on the interplay of liquidity stress, interbank contagion and a network structure with application to the European interbank market and payment system. The contribution of this research to the literature on financial networks is threefold. The first develops a model that allows analyzing three contagion channels that happened to be at play during the financial crisis: exposures to a common risk factor; exposures to credit and counterparty risk in the interbank market; exposures to short-term liquidity risk. The second contribution is the unique analysis of cross-border contagion in the European banking system from 2008 to 2012 at the bank level using the developed model. Overall, the study finds the importance of the network structure for the extent of contagion propagation and captures the fragmentation of the market observed in 2011-2012. The third contribution consists of analysis of payment delays in the European payment system TARGET2. More specifically, this chapter provides evidence that banks differ in the way they manage their daily liquidity and can be split into two groups in this regard: those which put enough initial liquidity into the system, and those which economize on liquidity and rely on incoming payments to make outgoing transactions. The second group is responsible for the majority of the delayed payments, particularly during the period of low liquidity in the market, which constitutes an early warning indicator of stress.

Submitted by Weichao Wang (weichao.wang@fgv.edu.br) on 2018-05-11T16:03:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618673 bytes, checksum: dc1254edf6febf9dacf740dc3f7d48a8 (MD5) / Rejected by Diego Andrade (diego.andrade@fgv.br), reason: A ordem dos documentos está errada. on 2018-05-14T18:11:37Z (GMT) / Submitted by Weichao Wang (weichao.wang@fgv.edu.br) on 2018-05-14T18:24:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2018-05-15T16:30:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-18T12:30:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-09 / I investigate how the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) affected the stressed interbank money market trading during the recent financial crisis via a difference-in-difference (DiD) design. I find that the TARP capital injection significantly enlarged the interbank exposure for the TARP recipients relative to others, particularly for banks in smaller size, with lower level of interbank trading and located in relatively poor economic conditions. I further test whether the distorted interbank liquidity position of the TARP recipients stimulated their credit risk appetite. I find that TARP recipient banks with larger interbank exposure also significantly shifted to riskier credit portfolios than others after the TARP implementation, suggested by estimates on forward- and backward-looking risk measures. Results are robust to the instrumental variable analysis, the sample self-selection model, the propensity score matching analysis, various placebo experiments and alternative econometric models. My results are most consistent with the “capital spillover” hypothesis that banks used the TARP capital to develop more interconnected interbank relationships, and the moral hazard effect that higher future bailout expectation and increased systemic relevance jointly construct a “new government safety net” for the TARP beneficiaries to take excessive credit risks under the implicitly perceived “too interconnected to fail” protection.

Depuis son éruption en septembre 2009, la crise de la zone euro a été au centre de l'attention des économistes et des décideurs politiques. L'objectif principal de cette thèse est de développer des modèles théoriques pertinents afin d'analyser les facteurs à l'origine de la crise jumelle des banques et de la dette souveraine dans une union monétaire avec une architecture institutionnelle globalement similaire de l'Union économique et monétaire avant 2012. Tout en mettant l'accent sur la vulnérabilité financière, nous explorons la relation entre le secteur bancaire, l'économie réelle et le budget du gouvernement dans le contexte d 'une union monétaire. Cette thèse se compose de quatre modèles théoriques de la crise bancaire, avec le premier illustrant la crise financière qui avait éclaté en 2008 dans les petites économies européennes en dehors de l 'UEM et les trois modèles suivants élucidant la situation de crise dans la zone euro en2009 jusqu'en 2012. / In this Ph. D. thesis, we analyze the conditions for the emergence and the aggravation of the recent crisis in Europe from 2008 to 2012. The major objective of this Ph. D. thesis is to develop theoretical models which will be effective in investigating the twin banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union with a broadly similar institutional design to the EMU before 2012. Different from 'traditional' financial crisis models that shed light on the role of the central bank in crisis policy response, the models developed in this thesis investigate and underline the importance of fiscal crisis management. White accentuating financial vulnerability, we explore the relationship between the banking sector, the realeconomy and the public budget in the context of a monetary union. This thesis consists of four theoretical models of the banking crisis, with the first framework depicting the financial crisis which burst in 2008 in small European economies outside the EMU and the next three models elucidating the crisis situation in the Eurozone from early 2009 until August 2012.

L'obiettivo della tesi è lo sviluppo e nell'analisi di un modello macro-finanziario con aspetti reali e finanziari dell'economia, nell'ottica di ottenere un quadro comprensivo per l'analisi del rischio sistemico e delle instabilità. Il primo capitolo verte sulla costruzione di un modello ad agenti che si caratterizza per la presenza del mercato dei beni, del credito, del lavoro e interbancario. Il modello riproduce fluttuazioni endogene ed è in grado di replicare alcuni fatti stilizzati riguardanti i cicli economici e creditizi, mentre il mercato interbancario ha un ruolo importante dal punto di vista della stabilità e dell'efficienza. In particolare la regolazione prudenziale combinata con le aspettative adattive può esacerbare il comportamento precauzionale delle banche durante una recessione, inducendo a trattenere liquidità anche le banche solide. Inoltre la connettività del mercato interbancario ha un duplice effetto: da un lato favorisce l'accesso al credito nell'economia reale, dall'altro accresce l'accumulo di liquidità. Il secondo capitolo si concentra su un insieme di esperimenti condotti tramite il modello precedentemente sviluppato. Lo scopo è di confrontare tra loro politiche macro-prudenziali in cui le banche sono soggette a requisiti minimi di capitale derivati da misure di rischio sistemico. Nello specifico gli indicatori di rischio sistemico sono suddivisi in misure di mercato e di rete. Ogni categoria è ulteriormente scomposta in misure di vulnerabilità e misure di impatto. I risultati rivelano che le politiche costruite su indicatori di vulnerabilità sono migliori di quelle basate sull'impatto, dato che riducono i fallimenti da contagio senza peggiorare la performance macroeconomica. / The purpose of the thesis is to develop and analyse a macro-financial model with real and financial aspects of the economy to obtain a comprehensive framework for the analysis of systemic risk and instabilities. The first chapter concerns the construction of an agent-based-model, whose characteristic is the presence of goods, credit, labour and interbank markets. The model reproduces endogenous business cycles and it is able to replicate some stylized facts about business and credit cycles, while the interbank market has an important role for stability and efficiency. In particular prudential regulation, combined with adaptive expectations can exacerbate the precautionary behaviour of banks during a recession, inducing liquidity hoarding by sound banks. Furthermore connectivity of the interbank market has a twofold effect: on one side it supports credit to the real economy, on the other it increases liquidity hoarding. The second chapter is focused on a set of policy experiments performed performed on the model previously developed. The aim is to compare different macroprudential policies where banks are subject to minimum capital requirements derived from systemic risk measures. In detail systemic risk indicators are divided in market-based and network based measures. Each class is further decomposed in measures of vulnerability and measures of impact. The results reveal that policies based on vulnerability indicators perform better than those based on impact, reducing contagious defaults without worsening the macroeconomic performance.

Il y a quatre chapitres dans cette thèse.Dans le premier chapitre, nous analysons les intéractions entre le marché interbancaire et le risque de défaut souverain dans un modèle d’équilibre général à deux pays, en focalisant sur la transmission de la crise financière récente et la politique monétaire non conventionnelle.Dans le deuxième chapitre, les effets de la dévaluation fiscale sur les indicateurs macroéconomiques et le bien être sont analysés en utilisant un modèle à deux pays en union monétaire o`u les variétés de biens et le commerce sont endogènes.Dans le troisième chapitre, l’impact du facteur démographique sur la croissance du secteur des services à long terme est mis en exergue.Dans le quatrième chapitre, on étudie les effets de la mobilité des travailleurs et de la mobilité du capital dans une union monétaire. / This thesis studies challenges for modern developped economies, including the structural change toward services, population ageing, weak labor mobility in the EMU and unconventional monetary policies after the 2008 financial crisis. The manuscript is divided into four chapters.In the first chapter, we analyze the interaction between interbank markets and default risk using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model, with a focus on the transmission of the recent financial crisis and unconventional monetary policies.In the second chapter, we investigate the effects of fiscal devaluations on key macroeconomic aggregates and welfare using a two-country monetary-union model with endogenous varieties and endogenous tradability.In the third chapter, we study the impact of demographic factor and the growth of service sector by using a multi-sectoral OLG model, and effectuate counterfactual experiments in which the annual growth rate of young generation is ±1pp than the actual growth rate.In the fourth chapter, we study the potential interactions between financial integration and labor mobility in a currency union facing asymmetric shocks, and simulate the impacts of 2008 financial crisis under different mobility costs.

Cette thèse est composée de trois articles d’économie bancaire empirique. Le premier article traite de l’impact des conditions d’octroi de crédit sur l’accession à la propriété et les prix immobilier. Il propose une stratégie d’identification d’effets de causalité utilisant la politique du Prêt à Taux Zéro. Il conclut qu’un relâchement des conditions d’octroi de crédit permet à des ménages au revenu relativement plus faible de devenir propriétaire mais augmente significativement les prix immobilier. Le second article traite de l’effet des exigences en capital sur l’octroi de crédit des banques aux sociétés non financières. Il isole la composante des exigences en capital exogène aux conditions macroéconomiques grâce au système de notation du superviseur bancaire français. Il montre que les mesures de la qualité de la gouvernance et de la stratégie des établissements sont des contributeurs importants aux exigences en capital. En traçant l’effet de celles-ci sur les ratios de capital des établissements puis sur l’octroi de crédit, il montre qu’augmenter les exigences en capital réduit l’offre de crédit. Le troisième article analyse la prise en compte du risque de crédit sur le marché interbancaire européen entre 2011 et 2015 et comment celle-ci est modifiée par les ajustements de la politique monétaire sur la période. Il se concentre sur le risque inhérent à la détention d’actifs situés dans les pays périphériques de la zone euro. Il montre que l’accès au marché et les taux d’intérêt payés par les emprunteurs réagissent à cette détention. La nature et l’importance de cette réaction dépendent des interventions de politique monétaire. / This thesis is made up of three empirical essays in banking economics. The first paper analyses how credit supply conditions impact access to homeownership and real estate prices.We propose an identification strategy of causal effects based on the French Interest-Free Loan policy. We find loosenning credit conditions allows households with a relatively lower income to access homeownership but significantly increases real estate prices. The second paper looks for the effect of capital requirements on credit supply to non-financial companies.We identify movements in capital requirements exogenous to the macroeconomic environment thanks to the French banking supervisor rating system. We show governance and strategy quality measures significantly contribute to capital requirements setting. Followingtheir effects onto banks capital ratios and credit supply, we show raising capital requirementsreduces credit. The third article analyses credit risk management on the European interbankmarket between 2011 and 2015 and how it is modified by monetary policy adjustments overthe period. We focus on credit risk associated with holdings of assets located in peripheral Europe countries. We show market access and interest rates served to borrowers react to their holdings of such assets. The direction and size of this reaction depends on monetary policy interventions.

This dissertation collects four essays on banks, firms and real effects of bank lending. Owing to the appliance of different econometric methods on several datasets, insights in the behav-ior of and the impacts from financial markets and market participants are generated. In the first chapter, our results uncover a so far undocumented ability of the interbank market to distinguish between banks of different quality in times of aggregate distress. We show empirical evidence that during the 2007 financial crisis the inability of some banks to roll over their interbank debt was not due to a failure of the interbank market per se but rather to bank-specific shocks affecting banks’ capital, liquidity and credit quality as well as revised bank-level risk perceptions. Relationship banking is not capable of containing these frictions, as hard information seems to dominate soft information. In detail, we explore determinants of the formation and resilience of interbank lending relationships by analyzing an extensive da-taset comprising over 1.9 million interbank relationships of more than 3,500 German banks between 2000 and 2012. The second chapter examines the relationship between central bank funding and credit risk-taking. Employing bank-firm-level data from the German credit registry during 2009:Q1-2014:Q4, we find that banks borrowing from the central bank rebalance their portfolios to-wards ex-ante riskier firms. We further establish that this effect is driven by the ECB’s maturi-ty extensions and that the risk-taking sensitivity of banks borrowing from the ECB is inde-pendent of idiosyncratic bank characteristics. Finally, we show that these shifts in bank lend-ing are associated with an increase in firm-level investment and employment, but also with a deterioration of bank balance sheet quality in the following year. Once we analyze the relationship of banks as lenders vis-à-vis banks as borrowers and banks as lenders vis-à-vis non-financial companies as borrowers, we enlarge the understand-ing of non-financial companies not only in terms of being simply borrowers, respectively sub-jects exhibiting of credit risks. Instead, we try to understand the inner working of those com-panies more generally and analyze their quality not only in terms of a bank’s risk assessment but also in terms of the overall market assessment. However, this in turn can generate infor-mation useable to assess the quality of a bank’s credit portfolio in dimensions that so far are not taken into account by the current regulatory framework. Moreover, a better understanding of banks and non-banks beyond the standard lens of the banking and corporate finance litera-ture might promote new scopes for future research connecting those discrete subjects. In this regard, the third chapter analyzes the dependence of price reactions to corporate insider trad-ing on several measures of corporate governance quality. Our results strongly support the view that first, higher corporate governance levels seem to prevent or discourage insiders from engaging in insider trading as means of opportunistic rent extraction. Second, results confirm the notion of buy and sell trades not being just two sides of the same coin. That is, a higher level of corporate governance leads to a better pre-event information environment which results in less positive abnormal returns after insider buy trades as the incremental posi-tive information revealed by the trade is smaller. In contrast, sell trades in firms with better corporate governance are perceived to convey more valuable and most importantly negative information to the capital market so that prices adjust more for companies with better govern-ance schemes. Third, we show that institutional ownership even on an aggregate level is a sufficient measure to proxy a company’s corporate governance level. Hence, as information on companies’ bylaws and on investors’ investment dedication and type for example are scarce, respectively associated with higher costs because one has to gather that information one can refrain from that and instead proxy the governance level with the aggregate measure of institutional ownership. The latter result is important for carrying out future analyses merg-ing and extending the findings of the first two chapters. Last, the fourth chapter abstracts from borrowers as subjects of credit risk, as well, and most importantly extends the analysis of banks, firms and their interactions effecting each other by a macroeconomic perspective of the real effects of bank lending. That is, as capital flows and real estate are pro-cyclical, and real estate has a substantial weight in economies’ income and wealth Chapter 4 studies the role of real estate markets in the transmission of bank flow shocks to output growth across German cities. In this regard, real sector firms play a central role in the transmission mechanism we uncover. More specifically, the empirical analysis relies on a new and unique matched data set at the city level and the bank-firm level. To measure bank flow shocks, we show that changes in sovereign spreads of Southern Eu-ropean countries (the so-called PIGS spread) can predict German cross-border bank flows. To achieve identification by geographic variation, in addition to a traditional supply-side varia-ble, we use a novel instrument that exploits a policy assigning refugee immigrants to munici-palities on an exogenous basis. We find that output growth responds more to bank flow shocks in cities that are more exposed to tightness in local real estate markets. We estimate that, during the 2009-2014 period, for every 100-basis point increase in the PIGS spread, the most exposed cities grow 15-2 basis points more than the least exposed ones. Moreover, the differential response of commercial property prices can explain most of this growth differen-tial. When we unpack the transmission mechanism by using matched bank-firm-level data on credit, employment, capital expenditure and TFP, we find that firm real estate collateral as measured by tangible fixed assets plays a critical role. In particular, bank flow shocks in-crease the credit supply to firms and sectors with more real estate collateral. Higher credit supply then leads firms to hire and invest more, without evidence of capital misallocation.