Vetandets gräns är en epistemologisk fråga om vilken kunskap människan kan få och ha om allt runt omkring oss. Alla dessa ting som finns omkring oss, men även se på självet1 som objekt. Immanuel Kant skriver om kunskapens gräns i sin bok Kritik av det rena förnuftet och den 1400-tals Juris doktorn Nicolaus Cusanus2 skriver även han om vår vetandets gräns i sin bok ”Gudsseendet”.Det uppsatsen vill söka efter hos Kant och Cusanus är om människans tänkande har någon gräns. Det studiet söker är en större kunskap om vårt egna tänkande, vilket visar på en större kunskap om vår inre värld. ”Den primära världen” som påverkar allt handlande som människan gör i ”den sekundära världen”. Relevansen med detta studium är att människan kan få en mer detaljerad och fördjupad syn på människans tänkandes gränser.Under hela mitt vuxna liv har jag burit på frågan ”varför gör jag det jag gör?”. Under mitt första år som teologistuderande fick jag höra att Immanuel Kant anser att människan inte kan tänka utan tid och rum. Min naturliga reaktion blev att fråga, ”varför inte det?” och fick till svar att ”Det går men det är svårt”. Sedan den dagen har denna tanke varit ämne för reflektion.Detta studium vill se om det kan finna den bortre gräns som människans tänkande har, sin egna förståelse om sig själv och i slutändan kanske få en större kunskap om vad det är att vara en människa i denna tid och rum.

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Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2016-11-16T17:05:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Danton Guilherme Oestreich_.pdf: 658443 bytes, checksum: d5f5339cace57449e1ae2d5125e7c3d7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-16T17:05:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Danton Guilherme Oestreich_.pdf: 658443 bytes, checksum: d5f5339cace57449e1ae2d5125e7c3d7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-08-30 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Gadamer desenvolve sua ontologia da obra de arte recorrendo ao conceito de jogo para expressar o modo de ser obra da arte, salientando a importância de libertar o conceito do significado subjetivo que, desde a estética de Kant, prevaleceu para a abordagem da arte bela. A julgar pela natureza hermenêutica da sua investigação, ele parece ter em vista a intenção de contrapor a necessidade de uma mediação histórica do conteúdo da arte diante da noção estética que privilegia a simples distinção formal da arte. De fato, isto sugere um confronto com a noção de jogo livre das faculdades da imaginação e do entendimento de Kant que se refere ao estado ideal do ânimo quando este está inclinado a reconhecer algo como belo e que é autônomo de questões de conteúdo na perspectiva de uma distinção formal. Além disso, para Kant, no caso das obras de arte, a possibilidade de ajuizamento da beleza seria mediada pelo conceito de forma da arte em questão, onde a música acaba sendo definida como o “belo jogo das sensações do ouvido”. Cabe perceber, desta forma, que na música encontramos uma confluência das dimensões estética, hermenêutica e formal através do mesmo conceito de jogo, o que permite considerar a leitura gadameriana do juízo estético sob as peculiaridades da arte musical. Assim, o propósito deste estudo é averiguar a tensão existente entre uma consideração do belo musical enquanto dependente de uma autonomia estética ou enquanto dotado de questões de conteúdo para o qual a forma tem que ser referente. Esta situação problema será apresentada a partir da forma musical de um exemplo específico – a saber: o final da primeira sonata Royal Winter Music de Hans Werner Henze – para mostrar como aspectos da teoria kantiana e gadameriana podem ser significativos para a compreensão da experiência musical. / Gadamer develops its ontology of the artwork using the play concept to express the mode of being of the work of art, stressing the importance of freeing the concept from the subjective meaning that, since Kant's aesthetics, prevailed in the approach the beautiful art. Judging by the hermeneutic nature of his research, he seems to have in mind the intention of counteracting the need for a art content's historical mediation on the aesthetic notion that favors simple formal distinction of art. In fact, this suggests a confrontation with Kant's notion of free play of the faculties of imagination and understanding, referred to the ideal state of mind when it is inclined to recognize something as beautiful and autonomous from content issues in a perspective of formal distinction. Moreover, for Kant, in the case of works of art, the possibility of beauty judgment would be mediated by the concept of art form in question, where the music ends up being defined as the "beautiful play of ear sensations”. In this way, it should be noted that in music we find a confluence of aesthetic, hermeneutics and formal's dimensions through the same play concept, what allowing the consideration of Gadamer's reading of aesthetic judgment under the peculiarities of musical art. Thus, the purpose of this study is to ascertain the tension between a consideration of the musical beautiful as dependent on an aesthetic autonomy or as endowed with content issues for which the musical form has to be related. This problem situation is presented from the musical form of a specific example – namely: the end of the Hans Werner Henze's Royal Winter Music first sonata – to show how aspects of the theories of Kant and Gadamer can be significant for understanding the musical experience.

<p>Keywords: Immanuel Kant (</p><p>narratives in European naturalism and political anatomy. Yet the concept surfaces in gender historical research on the period in foot notes and cursory remarks. This paper interrogates why epigenesis has been eradicated from the historical consciousness of today’s scholarship on gender politics. By honing in on the weirdness, a term borrowed from Lorraine Daston, in and of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) theory on animal generation I show how an alertness it requires a re-evaluation of views on "political anatomy" taken-for-granted in scholarship, but also of Kant’s philosophy itself. The endeavour is divided into three main sections.</p><p>In the first, I situate the failure of Kant-scholars to, in the words of John H. Zammito, "stabilize" epigenesis by exploring the hitherto unacknowledged peculiarity of Kant’s use racial hybridity to ‘prove’ the theory. In the second, the analysis departs from the notion ‘modern sex difference’ and show that a reading of epigenesis requires a re-thinking of sexed bodily identity in terms of conflict and contradiction. The third section reads this strife in light of Kant’s experience of "astonishment", a cognitive mode, I argue, designed to resolve both physiological and ideological inconsistencies. The antinomy of sex differentiation is in a concluding section juxtaposed with Kant’s phrase "eloquent speechlessness" in which the gender practice activated in the writing of, about, and on epigenesis is compared to the structure informing moral philosophy’s definition of lies.</p>

Keywords: Immanuel Kant ( narratives in European naturalism and political anatomy. Yet the concept surfaces in gender historical research on the period in foot notes and cursory remarks. This paper interrogates why epigenesis has been eradicated from the historical consciousness of today’s scholarship on gender politics. By honing in on the weirdness, a term borrowed from Lorraine Daston, in and of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) theory on animal generation I show how an alertness it requires a re-evaluation of views on "political anatomy" taken-for-granted in scholarship, but also of Kant’s philosophy itself. The endeavour is divided into three main sections. In the first, I situate the failure of Kant-scholars to, in the words of John H. Zammito, "stabilize" epigenesis by exploring the hitherto unacknowledged peculiarity of Kant’s use racial hybridity to ‘prove’ the theory. In the second, the analysis departs from the notion ‘modern sex difference’ and show that a reading of epigenesis requires a re-thinking of sexed bodily identity in terms of conflict and contradiction. The third section reads this strife in light of Kant’s experience of "astonishment", a cognitive mode, I argue, designed to resolve both physiological and ideological inconsistencies. The antinomy of sex differentiation is in a concluding section juxtaposed with Kant’s phrase "eloquent speechlessness" in which the gender practice activated in the writing of, about, and on epigenesis is compared to the structure informing moral philosophy’s definition of lies.

In this Study, the empiricist ethical system of Epicurus and idealist ethical system of Kant will be compared. Kant maintains that as Epicurus&rsquo / ethics regards morality as a means for the attainment of happiness, it is nothing but a self-love ethics. He, for this reason, calls Epicurean morality &ldquo / selfishness.&rdquo / According to Kant, the maxims of happiness can be known only through experience but he says, experience can never produce a law which is universal and necessary. He contends that as Epicurean ethics has happiness as its ultimate goal (i.e., the highest good), it cannot be able to produce an objective morality, valid for all rational beings. Kant, on the other hand, tries to found his ethical system on an a priori moral law of pure reason which borrows nothing from experience. This Study would, in a sense, be a defense of Epicurean ethical system against Kant&rsquo / s claims. The main argument of the thesis is that Epicurean ethics is not a self-love ethics, but rather a system which propounds happiness for all. I will be arguing that for Epicurus, one&rsquo / s own happiness is necessarily bound up with the happiness of others, and that his system is sound and consistent. I will also try to show that Kant is not successful in deducing a transcendentally ideal (a priori) law of reason and that his system has some inconsistencies.

Thesis (doctoral)--Uppsala University, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-207) and index.

本研究旨在探究康德與孟子對於「道德判斷之根據」的論述。首先討論康德在前批判時期的道德思考歷程，發現其思考兼具理性主義和經驗主義之色彩。但到了〈論感性世界與智思世界的形式及其原則〉一文發表，康德已經確立兩重世界觀，將倫理學領域歸屬在智思世界。在批判時期，康德明確地以「道德法則」為核心，而將其視為倫理學上最後的評斷規準，其中，康德談論了諸多人類不同的心智狀態，俱是其論道德判斷之根據的不同說法。復次，在孟子哲學方面，本研究將其定位在「一接續人心與他者、萬物、天地間之歷程」。第三，關於康德與孟子之對比下，本研究以兩種模式作為對比之進路：一是「文化類型」；另一是「生活世界」，結果指出，可以「基督宗教倫理觀影響」和「存有的相契與連續性」作為兩者道德思考的關鍵性因素。基於以上所述，本研究嘗試說明康德與孟子哲學之道德教育意義及其限制性。 / This thesis studies the ground of moral judgment of Immanuel Kant and Mencius. I'll divide it into three parts. In the first part, I attempt to explicate the process of moral thinking of Immanuel Kant in his pre-critical period. In this period, it is proved that both idealism and empiricism are included in his thinking. After the paper On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (Kant, 1770) was presented, Immanuel Kant firmly established the theory, dualism of world, in which the sphere of ethics is classified under an intelligible world. After that, in his critical period, the moral law is much emphasized and considered the last standard for ethic judgment. Besides, it is also indicated that there are many different states of human mind underpinning the distinct statements of what the ground of moral judgment is. In the second part, the moral thinking of Mencius is under discussion. Mencius argues that there is a process of human mind connecting others, all things on earth and heaven and earth. In the third part, I try to compare Immanuel Kant with Mencius by two approaches: “cultural type” and “life-world.” The conclusion is drawn that the impact of ethical viewpoints of the Christian religion and the connection and continuity of being are the crucial factors in their moral thinking. Therefore, on the basis of the mentioned above, the implication and limitation of moral education of Immanuel Kant and Mencius are explained.

Zugl.: Regensburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2006.