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La place de Jean-Jacques Rousseau dans la philosophie kantienne de l'éducationSarbazevatan, Sourena 03 1900 (has links)
No description available.
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La place de Jean-Jacques Rousseau dans la philosophie kantienne de l'éducationSarbazevatan, Sourena 03 1900 (has links)
En vue de saisir la pensée kantienne dans toute sa virulence, on ne peut jamais faire abstraction de la place éminente de Jean-Jacques Rousseau dans cette philosophie qui ne cesse pas à marquer, à définir et à poser des jalons de la pensée moderne. À cet égard, si le Genevois communique les grandes leçons de sa théorie de l’homme sous la guise d’une éducation, il s’agit ici non pas d’une philosophie de l’éducation mais bien plus d’une philosophie comme éducation.
C’est effectivement cette thèse que Kant reprend, suit et enrichie d’une manière sui generis pour renverser l’ordre théorique mais surtout pratique de religion-moralité-devoir et libérer une fois pour toutes la morale des dogmes théologiques et finalement pour édifier une philosophie pratique comme l’éducation de l’espèce humaine. Le but de cette étude est de jeter quelques lumières sur la place sans pareille de Jean-Jacques Rousseau dans la philosophie kantienne de l’éducation. / The decisive influence of Immanuel Kant in the course of modern philosophy is incontrovertible. In a sense, had it not been for this monumental figure of the 18th century, philosophy would have never reached the flair to convey the existential, analytical and phenomenological questions of modernity.
However, if Kant set the agenda for any posterior thought, he was not himself Kantian until Jean-Jacques Rousseau disenchanted him. In this regard, if the Genevois philosopher communicated his philosophy in the guise of an education, philosophy in itself is defined by the education of humanity. It is indeed this perspective of Rousseau that put the German philosopher on the right track to find the ultimate goal of philosophy in the moral education as the sum and substance of the practical philosophy. The objective of this study is to shed some lights on the unparalleled role of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Kant’s philosophy of education as the harbinger of the universal ethics beyond the dogmas of a blind theology: the question which still remains crucial today.
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Το ηθικό, το νόμιμο, το πολιτικό : θεμελιώσεις και διακρίσεις, ανεξαρτησία και σύνδεση της ηθικής, του δικαίου και της πολιτικής, με βάση τη Θεωρία του Δικαίου του Καντ και σε προβολή προς τις θεωρίες δικαίου του νομικού θετικισμού / The ethical, the rightful, the politicalΧατζηνάσου, Ευθυμία 04 May 2011 (has links)
Στην εργασία παρουσιάζεται η Θεωρία Δικαίου του Καντ, σε συνδυασμό με την Ηθική και Πολιτική Φιλοσοφία του φιλοσόφου προκειμένου να αναδειχθεί η κοινή θεμελίωσή τους στον ηθικό νόμο που ενυπάρχει στον ανθρώπινο Λόγο και ελευθερία..
Η σύνδεση πολιτικής, δικαίου και ηθικής διατυπώνεται ρητά από τον Καντ, και επίσης υπό την ανάλυση του σύγχρονου φιλοσοφικού στοχασμού (Τίμμονς, Βίλλασεκ, ΜακΝτάουελ) τεκμηριώνεται η ανεξάλειπτη ηθική διάσταση εντός του δικαίου και της πολιτικής μέσα από την πραγμάτευση των σύγχρονων αντιλήψεων, όπως η περιγραφικότητας, η εξωτερικότητα και η επιτακτικότητα, και μέσα από την απόρριψη των επιμέρους θέσεων της ανεξαρτησίας και της εξωτερικότητας του δικαίου. / In this paper, the Kant’s Doctrine of Right is presented in combination with his Moral and Political Philosophy, in order to display; their common foundation on the moral law that prevails on the human Reason and freedom.
Kant has explicitly expressed the connection between politics, law and morality, and additionally in the modern philosophical thought (Timmons, Willaschek, McDowell) the ineffaceable moral dimension of right and politics is validated through the modern concepts of descriptivity, externality and prescreptivity, by the refutation of Independence and Externality Theses.
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O território do conceito : lógica e estrutura conceitual na filosofia crítica de KantFonseca, Renato Duarte January 2010 (has links)
A concepção kantiana da lógica é marcada pela distinção entre dois níveis de reflexão: à lógica geral concernem as regras que governam o pensamento como tal, em abstração da origem e do conteúdo de nossos conceitos e juízos, e atendo-se exclusivamente às formas de suas relações recíprocas; à lógica transcendental, por sua vez, concernem as condições sob as quais seria possível uma cognição de objetos independentemente da experiência. Não obstante, a despeito de seus escopos distintos, os princípios da lógica geral e da lógica transcendental devem, por óbvio, ser mutuamente compatíveis. A pre-sente tese parte desse truísmo para investigar qual concepção da estrutura da representa-ção conceitual é capaz de satisfazê-lo. Em outras palavras, ela pretende elucidar que tipo de caracterização das dimensões próprias a qualquer conceito – sua extensão e seu conteúdo – pode adequar-se a uma imagem coerente do projeto de Kant, que abranja sua compreensão da forma lógica do juízo e seu tratamento da possibilidade de juízos sinté-ticos a priori. O primeiro capítulo examina a visão kantiana das funções lógicas do juí-zo como funções de subordinação extensional de conceitos e, com base nisso, reconstrói a questão transcendental da possibilidade dos juízos sintéticos a priori nos seguintes termos: como é possível justificar a necessária subordinação da extensão de um conceito à de outro, quando este não está entre as notas que perfazem o conteúdo daquele? Com vistas à clarificação desse problema e de sua pretendida solução, o segundo capítulo consiste na análise crítica de diferentes modelos interpretativos da concepção kantiana de extensão conceitual: o modelo ôntico, segundo o qual a extensão de um conceito é o conjunto de suas instâncias efetivas; o modelo nocional, segundo o qual a extensão de um conceito equivale ao complexo de seus inferiores por subordinação lógica; o modelo híbrido, que interpreta a extensão conceitual como um amálgama das duas dimensões previamente circunscritas, ou então atribui a Kant duas concepções distintas de extensão conceitual, cada qual correspondendo a uma daquelas dimensões. Esses três modelos interpretativos são rejeitados à luz dos compromissos teóricos das lógicas geral e trans-cendental, especialmente considerada a condição subjacente de sua consistência mútua. O terceiro capítulo articula um modelo alternativo da extensão conceitual que vai ao encontro dessa condição, de acordo com o qual a extensão de um conceito é seu campo de aplicação possível. Levando em conta a distinção crítica entre possibilidade lógica e possibilidade real, e explorando algumas metáforas da Crítica da Razão Pura e da Crí-tica do Juízo, a tese desenvolve esse modelo e mostra suas consequências para a com-preensão da concepção kantiana de conteúdo conceitual, particularmente em relação à doutrina do esquematismo. / Kant‟s conception of logic is marked by the distinction between two levels of reflection: general logic concerns the rules governing thought as such, in abstraction of the origin and content of our concepts and judgments, and attaining exclusively to the forms of their reciprocal relations; transcendental logic, in its turn, concerns the conditions under which it could be possible a cognition of objects independently of experience. Neverthe-less, in spite of their different scopes, the principles of general and transcendental logic must obviously be mutually compatible. The present thesis starts from this truism and sets to enquire what conception of the structure of conceptual representation is capable of satisfying it. In other words, it intends to elucidate what sort of characterization of those dimensions proper to any concept – its extension and its content – could fit a co-herent image of Kant‟s project, comprehending his construal of the logical form of judgment as well as his account of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. The first chapter examines Kant‟s view of the logical functions of judgment as functions of extensional subordination of concepts and, on that basis, reconstructs the transcendental question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in the following terms: how is it possible to justify the necessary subordination of one concept‟s extension to anoth-er‟s, when the later concept is not among the marks which comprise the content of the former? Aiming at a clarification of this problem and its purported solution, the second chapter consists of a critical analysis of different interpretative models of Kant‟s con-ception of conceptual extension: the ontic model, according to which the extension of a concept is the set of its actual instances; the notional model, according to which the extension of a concept amounts to the complex of its inferior concepts, i. e. those logi-cally subordinated to it; the hybrid model, which interprets conceptual extension as an amalgam of the two dimensions previously circumscribed, or else ascribes to Kant two distinct conceptions of conceptual extension, each corresponding to one of those dimen-sions. These three interpretative models are rejected in the light of the theoretical com-mitments of general and transcendental logic, especially considering the underlying condition of their mutual consistency. The third chapter articulates an alternative model of conceptual extension that meets this condition, according to which the extension of a concept is its field of possible application. Taking account of the critical distinction be-tween logical and real possibility, and exploring some metaphors found in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the thesis elaborates this model and shows its consequences to the understanding to Kant‟s conception of concep-tual content, particularly in relation to the doctrine of schematism.
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O território do conceito : lógica e estrutura conceitual na filosofia crítica de KantFonseca, Renato Duarte January 2010 (has links)
A concepção kantiana da lógica é marcada pela distinção entre dois níveis de reflexão: à lógica geral concernem as regras que governam o pensamento como tal, em abstração da origem e do conteúdo de nossos conceitos e juízos, e atendo-se exclusivamente às formas de suas relações recíprocas; à lógica transcendental, por sua vez, concernem as condições sob as quais seria possível uma cognição de objetos independentemente da experiência. Não obstante, a despeito de seus escopos distintos, os princípios da lógica geral e da lógica transcendental devem, por óbvio, ser mutuamente compatíveis. A pre-sente tese parte desse truísmo para investigar qual concepção da estrutura da representa-ção conceitual é capaz de satisfazê-lo. Em outras palavras, ela pretende elucidar que tipo de caracterização das dimensões próprias a qualquer conceito – sua extensão e seu conteúdo – pode adequar-se a uma imagem coerente do projeto de Kant, que abranja sua compreensão da forma lógica do juízo e seu tratamento da possibilidade de juízos sinté-ticos a priori. O primeiro capítulo examina a visão kantiana das funções lógicas do juí-zo como funções de subordinação extensional de conceitos e, com base nisso, reconstrói a questão transcendental da possibilidade dos juízos sintéticos a priori nos seguintes termos: como é possível justificar a necessária subordinação da extensão de um conceito à de outro, quando este não está entre as notas que perfazem o conteúdo daquele? Com vistas à clarificação desse problema e de sua pretendida solução, o segundo capítulo consiste na análise crítica de diferentes modelos interpretativos da concepção kantiana de extensão conceitual: o modelo ôntico, segundo o qual a extensão de um conceito é o conjunto de suas instâncias efetivas; o modelo nocional, segundo o qual a extensão de um conceito equivale ao complexo de seus inferiores por subordinação lógica; o modelo híbrido, que interpreta a extensão conceitual como um amálgama das duas dimensões previamente circunscritas, ou então atribui a Kant duas concepções distintas de extensão conceitual, cada qual correspondendo a uma daquelas dimensões. Esses três modelos interpretativos são rejeitados à luz dos compromissos teóricos das lógicas geral e trans-cendental, especialmente considerada a condição subjacente de sua consistência mútua. O terceiro capítulo articula um modelo alternativo da extensão conceitual que vai ao encontro dessa condição, de acordo com o qual a extensão de um conceito é seu campo de aplicação possível. Levando em conta a distinção crítica entre possibilidade lógica e possibilidade real, e explorando algumas metáforas da Crítica da Razão Pura e da Crí-tica do Juízo, a tese desenvolve esse modelo e mostra suas consequências para a com-preensão da concepção kantiana de conteúdo conceitual, particularmente em relação à doutrina do esquematismo. / Kant‟s conception of logic is marked by the distinction between two levels of reflection: general logic concerns the rules governing thought as such, in abstraction of the origin and content of our concepts and judgments, and attaining exclusively to the forms of their reciprocal relations; transcendental logic, in its turn, concerns the conditions under which it could be possible a cognition of objects independently of experience. Neverthe-less, in spite of their different scopes, the principles of general and transcendental logic must obviously be mutually compatible. The present thesis starts from this truism and sets to enquire what conception of the structure of conceptual representation is capable of satisfying it. In other words, it intends to elucidate what sort of characterization of those dimensions proper to any concept – its extension and its content – could fit a co-herent image of Kant‟s project, comprehending his construal of the logical form of judgment as well as his account of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. The first chapter examines Kant‟s view of the logical functions of judgment as functions of extensional subordination of concepts and, on that basis, reconstructs the transcendental question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in the following terms: how is it possible to justify the necessary subordination of one concept‟s extension to anoth-er‟s, when the later concept is not among the marks which comprise the content of the former? Aiming at a clarification of this problem and its purported solution, the second chapter consists of a critical analysis of different interpretative models of Kant‟s con-ception of conceptual extension: the ontic model, according to which the extension of a concept is the set of its actual instances; the notional model, according to which the extension of a concept amounts to the complex of its inferior concepts, i. e. those logi-cally subordinated to it; the hybrid model, which interprets conceptual extension as an amalgam of the two dimensions previously circumscribed, or else ascribes to Kant two distinct conceptions of conceptual extension, each corresponding to one of those dimen-sions. These three interpretative models are rejected in the light of the theoretical com-mitments of general and transcendental logic, especially considering the underlying condition of their mutual consistency. The third chapter articulates an alternative model of conceptual extension that meets this condition, according to which the extension of a concept is its field of possible application. Taking account of the critical distinction be-tween logical and real possibility, and exploring some metaphors found in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the thesis elaborates this model and shows its consequences to the understanding to Kant‟s conception of concep-tual content, particularly in relation to the doctrine of schematism.
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O território do conceito : lógica e estrutura conceitual na filosofia crítica de KantFonseca, Renato Duarte January 2010 (has links)
A concepção kantiana da lógica é marcada pela distinção entre dois níveis de reflexão: à lógica geral concernem as regras que governam o pensamento como tal, em abstração da origem e do conteúdo de nossos conceitos e juízos, e atendo-se exclusivamente às formas de suas relações recíprocas; à lógica transcendental, por sua vez, concernem as condições sob as quais seria possível uma cognição de objetos independentemente da experiência. Não obstante, a despeito de seus escopos distintos, os princípios da lógica geral e da lógica transcendental devem, por óbvio, ser mutuamente compatíveis. A pre-sente tese parte desse truísmo para investigar qual concepção da estrutura da representa-ção conceitual é capaz de satisfazê-lo. Em outras palavras, ela pretende elucidar que tipo de caracterização das dimensões próprias a qualquer conceito – sua extensão e seu conteúdo – pode adequar-se a uma imagem coerente do projeto de Kant, que abranja sua compreensão da forma lógica do juízo e seu tratamento da possibilidade de juízos sinté-ticos a priori. O primeiro capítulo examina a visão kantiana das funções lógicas do juí-zo como funções de subordinação extensional de conceitos e, com base nisso, reconstrói a questão transcendental da possibilidade dos juízos sintéticos a priori nos seguintes termos: como é possível justificar a necessária subordinação da extensão de um conceito à de outro, quando este não está entre as notas que perfazem o conteúdo daquele? Com vistas à clarificação desse problema e de sua pretendida solução, o segundo capítulo consiste na análise crítica de diferentes modelos interpretativos da concepção kantiana de extensão conceitual: o modelo ôntico, segundo o qual a extensão de um conceito é o conjunto de suas instâncias efetivas; o modelo nocional, segundo o qual a extensão de um conceito equivale ao complexo de seus inferiores por subordinação lógica; o modelo híbrido, que interpreta a extensão conceitual como um amálgama das duas dimensões previamente circunscritas, ou então atribui a Kant duas concepções distintas de extensão conceitual, cada qual correspondendo a uma daquelas dimensões. Esses três modelos interpretativos são rejeitados à luz dos compromissos teóricos das lógicas geral e trans-cendental, especialmente considerada a condição subjacente de sua consistência mútua. O terceiro capítulo articula um modelo alternativo da extensão conceitual que vai ao encontro dessa condição, de acordo com o qual a extensão de um conceito é seu campo de aplicação possível. Levando em conta a distinção crítica entre possibilidade lógica e possibilidade real, e explorando algumas metáforas da Crítica da Razão Pura e da Crí-tica do Juízo, a tese desenvolve esse modelo e mostra suas consequências para a com-preensão da concepção kantiana de conteúdo conceitual, particularmente em relação à doutrina do esquematismo. / Kant‟s conception of logic is marked by the distinction between two levels of reflection: general logic concerns the rules governing thought as such, in abstraction of the origin and content of our concepts and judgments, and attaining exclusively to the forms of their reciprocal relations; transcendental logic, in its turn, concerns the conditions under which it could be possible a cognition of objects independently of experience. Neverthe-less, in spite of their different scopes, the principles of general and transcendental logic must obviously be mutually compatible. The present thesis starts from this truism and sets to enquire what conception of the structure of conceptual representation is capable of satisfying it. In other words, it intends to elucidate what sort of characterization of those dimensions proper to any concept – its extension and its content – could fit a co-herent image of Kant‟s project, comprehending his construal of the logical form of judgment as well as his account of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. The first chapter examines Kant‟s view of the logical functions of judgment as functions of extensional subordination of concepts and, on that basis, reconstructs the transcendental question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in the following terms: how is it possible to justify the necessary subordination of one concept‟s extension to anoth-er‟s, when the later concept is not among the marks which comprise the content of the former? Aiming at a clarification of this problem and its purported solution, the second chapter consists of a critical analysis of different interpretative models of Kant‟s con-ception of conceptual extension: the ontic model, according to which the extension of a concept is the set of its actual instances; the notional model, according to which the extension of a concept amounts to the complex of its inferior concepts, i. e. those logi-cally subordinated to it; the hybrid model, which interprets conceptual extension as an amalgam of the two dimensions previously circumscribed, or else ascribes to Kant two distinct conceptions of conceptual extension, each corresponding to one of those dimen-sions. These three interpretative models are rejected in the light of the theoretical com-mitments of general and transcendental logic, especially considering the underlying condition of their mutual consistency. The third chapter articulates an alternative model of conceptual extension that meets this condition, according to which the extension of a concept is its field of possible application. Taking account of the critical distinction be-tween logical and real possibility, and exploring some metaphors found in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the thesis elaborates this model and shows its consequences to the understanding to Kant‟s conception of concep-tual content, particularly in relation to the doctrine of schematism.
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Eveline Goodman-Thau/George Y. Kohler (Hg): Nationalismus und ReligionBerek, Mathias 19 January 2021 (has links)
No description available.
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The conception of God as expounded by or as it emerges from the writings of great philosophers: from Descartes to the present dayLembede, Anton Muziwakhe 06 1900 (has links)
Bibliographical references at end of each chapter / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)
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Kant och papegojan : Om exemplen i Kritik av omdömeskraftenEnström, Anna January 2011 (has links)
This essay is an examination of the examples in Kant’s Critique of Judgement. The examples which I have focused on all converge in an idea of wildness. These examples of the beautiful are illuminated by a culture-historical perspective, where the literary and scientific travelogue genre is of great importance. Apart from being exegetic and culture historical, my method is also analytic. The general ambition is to answer the question; what is the parrot doing in the third Critique and what makes it a better example of a free beauty than a jackdaw? Taking as point of departure Jacques Derrida’s notion of parergonality, the example is primarily understood as formative for the thesis, not only as illustrative. By analysing Kant’s use of the wild, exotic and colourful objects as examples the essay intends to show how imagination and understanding operates in the beautiful. The parrot thus corresponds with the role of imagination in its relation to understanding in aesthetic judgement. The examples manifest the strength of the imagination and how it dominates understanding through its wildness. The aim is to present a way to approach the restful contemplation that Kant ascribes to the mind in the experience of the beautiful as bearer of a movement with considerable importance. Rodolphe Gasché’s emphasis on the wild examples as a precognitive minimum for understanding and Hannah Arendt’s view on imagination as an ability of intuition without the presence of the object, have also been essential for my argument.
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國族的肚臍:一項關於國族建構的哲學性闡釋李國維 Unknown Date (has links)
國族是什麼?國族主義又是什麼?
面對許許多多歧異又紛雜的關於國族與國族主義的論述,本論文嘗試另闢蹊徑,從哲學層面來闡釋這一問題。本文區分國族之形成的主觀條件與客觀條件,認為國族不同於國家與民族,不能單純以客觀條件作為依據,而是必須以主觀條件作為依據。本文又進一步區分形式條件與實質條件,認為主觀條件中必須同時包括形式條件與實質條件,也就是說,一群人若要組成一個國族共同體,這些人必須是出於各自之自由意志,決定共同組成一個不同於其他之團體的共同體,而且要尋找並形成某種歸屬核心,當做共同體之根本質素,使之成為維繫共同體之長久存續的道德基礎。
本文以羅爾斯的政治自由主義與民族觀點作為論述根基,由此開展一種新的國族觀點,一種特殊的、只在自由主義式的民主政治體制中存在的政治共同體。並認為,人類理性必然要求人類朝這樣的政治共同體邁進,使每個人的自由都夠有最合理的、最和諧的發展,而不致釀成戰爭衝突。 / What is “nation”? And what is “nationalism”? There are many diverse and conflicting theories about nations and nationalism. We look into these theories and then abandon them because there are too many definitions. We believe that the nation is a special and unique political community and it accrues only in the liberal constitutional democracy of the modern period. There are two kinds of conditions for the construction of a nation: the subjective condition and the objective conditions. The former is an inner characteristic, while the later are external features. Unlike a state or a people, a nation must be founded the subjective condition as much as the objective conditions. In other words, the subjective condition, human beings’ free will, is the essential bedrock for the construction of a nation. In this perspective, we further distinguish the formal condition from the substantive condition. The formal condition has no content; its only function is pure decision-making. If a group of people is willing to associate together and form a community, it’s necessary for them not only to make a decision but also to decide what community they want to be. Furthermore, they have to search for and fashion their own defining core as the underlying element of the community as well as the moral foundation for the continuance of the community.
Based on John Rawls’ political liberalism and his views about peoples, this paper evolves a new viewpoint of the nation as a unique political community that exists only in the liberal democracy. We also assume it is required by human reason that mankind should move forward to such a political community, enabling everyone to develop his or her liberty in the most reasonable and harmonious way without leading to wars and conflicts.
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