„We need to defend culture – source of resilience and resistance, of belonging and identity – as a wellspring to rebuild and restore normality in societies in crisis” – mit diesem Aufruf forderte die ehemalige UNESCO-Generaldirektorin Irina Bokova eine Reaktion der internationalen Gemeinschaft auf die Schändungen materieller und immaterieller Kulturgüter durch die Terrormiliz IS im Irak und Syrien. So besteht Palmyra – Symbol kultureller Vielfalt und interkulturellen Dialogs – zwar in seinen Grundfesten fort, die Zerstörung von Statuen, Vandalismus an prähistorischen Tempeln und Sprengungen des Triumphbogens lassen Experten jedoch schlussfolgern: „Palmyra remains, but its legacy is forever transformed“. Die Zerstörung materiellen Kulturerbes bildet längst nicht alle Schandtaten der Terrormiliz ab; gleichzeitig trachtet sie nach der Zerstörung der distinkten Kultur ganzer Volksgruppen. In ihren Angriffen auf die Jesiden blieb es nicht bei der Zerstörung heiliger Schreine. Auch immaterielle Ausdrucksformen von Kultur sind Gegenstand systematischer Angriffe. Durch Zerstörung materieller und immaterieller Kulturgüter zeichnete der IS verantwortlich für „unprecedented cultural eradication“. Irina Bokova folgerte, „we are witnessing what can be described as ‚cultural cleansing‘ on an unprecedented scale.“ Eine wichtige Rolle in der Bestrebung, die Kulturen der Welt vor solchen Gräueltaten zu schützen, kommt der strafrechtlichen Ahndung letzterer zu. Vor diesem Hintergrund hält der Terminus kultureller Genozid Einzug in die Debatten. Die vorliegende Abhandlung führt zunächst in das Konzept kulturellen Genozids ein und analysiert seinen Status nach geltendem Recht. Daraufhin erfolgt eine Analyse der neueren Völkerrechtspraxis, um festzustellen, inwiefern im Hinblick auf die rechtliche Behandlung des kulturellen Genozids Reformbedarf besteht. Sodann werden Reformmöglichkeiten vorgestellt und bewertet. Am Ende dieses Beitrages soll ein Überblick über den Mehrwert eines potenziellen Straftatbestands kulturellen Genozids und zukünftige Schritte in Reaktion auf die derzeit von Extremisten begangenen Verbrechen an Kultur stehen.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:26:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2010-06-22Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:54:40Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 volz_mb_me_fran.pdf: 1042789 bytes, checksum: 27834998d1188adf6946bf0bc52272bc (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O objetivo desta pesquisa reside na análise dos motivos que explicam a criação do Tribunal Penal Internacional ter ocorrido apenas na década de 1990, precisamente em 1998, sendo que desde o início do século XX já existiam propostas para instauração de uma organização internacional semelhante a essa. Para tanto, são analisados, inicialmente, as origens do processo de internacionalização dos direitos humanos e os antecedentes, tanto institucionais quanto sob a perspectiva dos princípios jurídicos, do Tribunal Penal Internacional. Considerando que as Nações Unidas só voltaram a deliberar sobre este projeto após o término da Guerra Fria, são investigados, também, de que maneira o encerramento desse peculiar conflito, bem como as suas repercussões no âmbito das relações internacionais, influenciaram na retomada e no desenvolvimento das negociações sobre a proposta do Tribunal. Esclarecidos esses motivos, procede-se a uma análise sobre as três fases que compuseram o processo político para a elaboração do Estatuto do Tribunal e culminaram na instauração dessa corte internacional: a inicial, no âmbito da Comissão de Direito Internacional; a intermediária, coordenada pelo Comitê Preparatório, e a final, ocorrida na Conferência de Roma. Encerra-se esta pesquisa discutindo-se os aspectos mais atuais acerca do Tribunal Penal Internacional e os limites da sua criação / This research intends to explain the reasons why the International Criminal Court establishment took place just in the nineties, precisely in 1998, but since the begin of the twentieth century there were already proposals for the creation of a international organization like this. In order to accomplish this objective, are analyzed, initially, the origins of the human rights internalization process, and the background, both institutional and from the perspective of legal principals, to the International Criminal Court. Considering that the United Nations just come back to deliberate about this project after the end of the Cold War, are investigated, furthermore, how the end of this particular conflict, including its consequences in the international relations, influenced the resume and the development of the negotiations about the Court proposal. Clarified these reasons, the research is developed with the analysis of the three phases that made up the political process for the elaboration of the Court Statute, and that culminated in the establishment of the International Criminal Court: the first within the International Law Commission, the intermediate, coordinated by the Preparatory Committee, and the final, held at the Rome Conference. This research is concluded by discussing the most current aspects regarding the International Criminal Court and the limits of its creation

[pt] O presente trabalho realiza uma investigação da (des)igualdade soberana como um fenômeno que se manifesta nos diferentes níveis de instituições da sociedade internacional. A análise é desenvolvida a partir do estudo de caso do processo contra Omar Al Bashir, presidente em exercício do Estado do Sudão, no Tribunal Penal Internacional. Esse caso evoca uma discussão acerca da autoridade desempenhada pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas nas instituições do pós-1945, em especial, no direito internacional penal. Considerando que normas e regras possuem um papel social nas múltiplas relações existentes em meio a agentes e a estrutura, ou seja, elas transformam as relações no sistema internacional, o trabalho investiga as disposições e princípios presentes tanto no âmbito do Tribunal Penal Internacional, quanto também da Organização das Nações Unidas, que autorizam uma discriminação entre os Estados. Essa distinção implica a imposição de regras internacionais para alguns atores e, ao mesmo tempo, a manutenção de certas prerrogativas soberanas para outros. Mais especificamente, a justiça internacional penal é caracterizada pela seletividade nos julgamentos, uma vez que é conferida a alguns países certa autoridade sobre o regime. Nesse sentido, defende-se que a (des)igualdade soberana que está presente no direito internacional penal é, simultaneamente, manifestação e condição de possibilidade da hierarquia na arquitetura social, e portanto normativa institucional, e política do sistema internacional. Argumenta-se, assim, que a presença dessa (des)igualdade soberana pode ser identificada nos diferentes níveis das instituições da sociedade internacional, na medida em que elas influenciam umas às outras, de sorte que as características de uma refletem-se nas demais. / [en] This work carries out an investigation of sovereign (in)equality as a phenomenon that manifests itself in the different levels of institutions of the international society. The analysis departs from the case study of the process against Omar al-Bashir, acting President of the State of Sudan, at the International Criminal Court This case evokes a discussion about the authority exercised by the United Nations Security Council over post-1945 institutions, especially international criminal law. Considering that rules and norms have a social role in the multiple relations existing between agents and the structure, that is, they transform the relations in the international system, the work investigates the dispositions and principles present both in the scope of the International Criminal Court, as well as of the United Nations, which authorize a discrimination between States. This distinction implies the imposition of international rules for some actors and, at the same time, the maintenance of certain sovereign prerogatives for others. More specifically, international criminal justice is characterized by selectivity in judgments, as some countries are given certain authority over the regime. In this sense, it is defended that the sovereign (in)equality, which is present in international criminal law is simultaneously a manifestation and condition of possibility of hierarchy in the social, and therefore institutionalnormative, and political architecture of the international system. It is argued, therefore, that the presence of this sovereign (in)equality can be identified at different levels of the institutions of international society, insofar as they influence each other, so that the characteristics of one are reflected in the others.

I och med Romstadgan för den internationella brottmålsdomstolen (nedan Romstadgan) finns nu, för första gången, en juridiskt bindande definition av begreppet aggression, vilken baseras på Förenta Nationernas stadga (nedan FN-stadgan) artikel 2(4). Romstadgan utgör grunden för att Internationella brottmålsdomstolen (nedan ICC), i efterhand, ska kunna utkräva ansvar av en fysisk person för aggressionsbrott. Förenta Nationerna (nedan FN) har till uppgift att bevara freden, genom att agera mot staters aggressionshandlingar, framför allt i preventivt syfte och efter beslut av säkerhetsrådet. Det är intressant att jämföra FN-stadgan och Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp för att på så sätt förstå hur begreppet aggression behandlas i internationell rätt, både i relationer mellan stater och då fysiska personer ska hållas rättsligt ansvariga för aggressionsbrott. Det är också värdefullt att förstå hur de två definitionerna kan påverka varandra och vad det kan föra med sig för fördelar och nackdelar.                       I denna uppsats behandlas FN-stadgans och Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp i en komparativ studie, en viktig slutsats är att det finns skillnader mellan  de båda stadgorna.                       I uppsatsen ges inledningsvis en historisk inblick i aggressionsbegreppets utveckling, som underlag för den efterföljande behandlingen, där FN-stadgans och Romstadgans begrepp aggressionshandling utreds.                       Därefter behandlas begreppet aggressionshandling enligt FN-stadgan. Utredningen följer Wienkonventionen om traktaträttens allmänna tolkningsregel. Först görs en tolkning av begreppet aggressionshandlings ordalydelse, i enlighet med FN-stadgans systematik. Sedan redogörs för hur begreppet tolkats av relevanta FN-organ och i staters praxis. Generalförsamlingens aggressionsdefinition, i resolution 3314, gås igenom och kritiseras till viss del, då den inte ger en tydlig avgränsning av vad aggressionsbegreppet innefattar. Generalförsamlingens resolution 3314 är dock central och används därmed, som grund för vidare behandling i uppsatsen där resolutionen också jämförs kritiskt med andra FN-organs praxis och med FN-stadgans lydelse. Uppsatsen visar att begreppet aggressionshandling har givits en vag formulering i FN-stadgan och att vad som anses innefattat i begreppet också skiljer sig något mellan de olika FN-organen. Hos FN-organen finns dock den gemensamma kärnan att, som aggressionshandling anses den första våldsanvändningen i en stats internationella relationer genomförd med ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt.                        Uppsatsen utreder sedan kritiskt Romstadgans aggressionsbegrepp och dess olika delar varvid viktiga skillnader mot FN-stadgan behandlas. Ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt saknas i Romstadgan och kan inte heller läsas in i denna, då det skulle gå emot Romstadgans ordalydelse och systematik. Romstadgan ser därmed inte heller ett specifikt aggressivt uppsåt, som en försvårande omständighet, utan Romstadgan ser enbart till det använda våldets allvar och omfattning. Vidare så innehåller Romstadgan en tröskel, i syfte att utesluta en legal gråzon från ICCs jurisdiktion, vilken saknar motsvarighet i FN-stadgan. Romstadgan utesluter därmed genom sin lydelse våldshandlingar, som inom delar av den folkrättsliga doktrinen, anses befinna sig inom en gråzon av jus ad bellum.                       I slutsatserna sammanställs sedan de huvudsakliga skillnaderna mellan aggressionsbegreppen enligt FN-stadgan, FN-organen och Romstadgan och en utredning görs av de fördelar respektive nackdelar och risker, som dessa skillnader medför samt hur skillnaderna påverkar varandra. Författaren finner att det föreligger betydande skillnader då specifikt aggressivt uppsåt saknas i Romstadgan samt då Romstadgans tröskelvärde syftar till att utesluta den legala gråzonen inom jus ad bellum. Vidare anser författaren att dessa skillnader riskerar att urholka FN-stadgans våldsförbud och således i framtiden riskera att gynna starka våldsbenägna stater på svaga staters bekostnad. / The Rome Statute for The International Criminal Court (henceforth The Rome Statute) now provides, for the first time, a legally binding definition of the concept of Aggression. The definition is based on the United Nations Charter (henceforth The UN Charter) article 2(4). The Rome Statute is the foundation on which the International Criminal Court (henceforth ICC) can prosecute individuals on crimes of aggression post the events. The United Nations (henceforth UN) has the charter to sustain the peace through acting against the acts of aggression of nations, primarily preventively and based on resolutions by the Security Council. It is interesting to compare the UN Charter and the Rome Statute definition to understand how the concept of aggression is used in international law, both in relations between nations and when individuals shall be held accountable for crimes of aggression. In addition, it’s valuable to understand how the two definitions can impact each other and what the implications might be of similarities and differences.   Hence, this thesis is a comparative study of the concept of aggression in the UN Charter and the Rome Statute. One key conclusion is that there are significant differences in how the aggression is defined in the two documents.   The use and development of the concept Aggression is first accounted for in a historic context as a foundation for the comparative study.   Then, acts of aggression in the UN Charter is thoroughly investigated in three steps. The investigation is carried out in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Firstly, through an interpretation of acts of aggression in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term in the context of the UN Charter. Secondly through an investigation of the interpretation in relevant UN bodies and in the practice of nations. Thirdly, the definition of the UN General Assembly, resolution 3314, is investigated and criticised as it does not offer a sufficiently clear delimitation of the concept of aggression.  Resolution 3314 is, however, of key importance and is used subsequently as an element of comparison. The resolution is also compared with the practice of other UN bodies and the wording of the UN Charter. The thesis proves the that aggression has a vague definition in the UN Charter and that the scope of the concept is different in different UN bodies. However, common to all UN Bodies is to define aggression as the first use of force with a specific aggressive intent in international relations.    Following on UN, the thesis provides a critical investigation of the concept of aggression in the Rome Statute where key differences relative to the UN Charter are accounted for. The Rome Statute lacks specific aggressive intent and such cannot be made part of the interpretation as it would the statutes wording and systematics. Thus, the Rome Statute does not regard a specific aggressive intent aggravating but looks solely to the gravity and scale of the force used. In addition, the Rome Statute includes a threshold with the purpose of excluding a grey zone from the jurisdiction of ICC. Such grey zone does not exist in the UN Charter. The implication of this is that the Rome Statute excludes acts of violence that, among some international lawyers, are regarded to be in a grey zone of jus ad bellum.   The conclusions include a summary of the main differences across the UN Charter, different UN Bodies and the Rome Statute. That leads into a discussion on the potential advantages and drawbacks that come out of these differences plus potential effects of the reciprocal influence. The key element of this discussion is that aggressive intent is missing in the Rome Statute and that the statute’s threshold aims to exclude the legal grey zone in jus ad bellum. The thesis concludes that these differences risk to weaken the prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter and, as a consequence, that this may favour strong and aggressive nations at the expense of smaller and weaker nations.

The present work intends on analyzing the collection of communications and general data employed by public as well as private actors sustained during times of war on terror . In that regard, the issue of this research consists on conceiving an approach to account for those actors responsibility Nation-States along with private companies, both of which, in the context of law s internationalization and aided by the new information and communications technologies, violate Human Rights while claiming them to constitute antiterrorism strategies and policies. Concerning the methodology, classified as phenomenological-hermeneutical, it proceeds with a critical analysis of the International Criminal Court, Regional Justice Systems, and corresponding bibliography, aiming to diagnose what led the war on terror policies to shift towards the antagonist sentiment of a terror of war . Drawn from conclusion, the observed deviation seems to derive from the violations acted upon by the United States of America and its National Security Agency (NSA) which, while maintaining the pseudo-argument of war on terror , tampered communications between not only its own citizens and chiefs of government but also the ones from allied great powers. In accordance with that, and further critics that permeate the International Criminal Court since its creation, accused of being an eminently political entity in its decisions, ineffective in regards to the absence of coercion elements for its determinations, and even lacking in suitable answers to matters of global interest such as terrorism, drug traffic, and new rights transgressions derived from the internet network a revision of the Rome Statute is proposed upon the purpose of, if not to establish new crimes, provide a more autonomous concept of crimes against humanity against the ones of common violence. To that extension, the war on terror has been confirming some human rights freedom of communication and expression, and the right to privacy are also passive to non-violent restrictions. Therefore, it seems imperative to promote the dilation of the concept of crimes against humanity, howbeit being a juridical category, with the purpose as to encompass clandestine or covert violations which, in turn, are consistently promoted by the previously mentioned actors, Nation-States and private companies, namely Facebook and Google that respectively explore the social medias market and web search engines, just as well as VASTec, AT&T, and Amesys, specialized in mass communications interception. / A presente dissertação tem por escopo analisar o escrutínio de informações e comunicações praticado por atores públicos e privados em tempos de guerra ao terror . O problema de pesquisa se resume a pensar como é possível responsabilizar esses atores Estados-Nação e empresas do setor privado que, usando das facilidades técnicas proporcionadas pelas novas tecnologias de informação e comunicação, no contexto da internacionalização do direito, violam direitos humanos sob a justificativa de constituírem estratégias de políticas e práticas antiterror. No que diz respeito à metodologia, a pesquisa se classifica como fenomenológico-hermenêutica, procedendo-se com a análise crítica do Tribunal Penal Internacional e os Sistemas Regionais de Justiça, revisão e análises bibliográficas, no sentido de diagnosticar por que as políticas de guerra ao terror acabaram por se transvestir no antagônico sentimento de terror à guerra . Como efeito, a migração de um extremo a outro, ao que se concluiu, deriva especialmente das ações de violação praticadas pelos Estados Unidos da América e sua Agência Nacional de Segurança (NSA), que se valendo da pseudo-justificativa de guerra ao terror, violaram as comunicações de muitos cidadãos e chefes de Estado, inclusive os de potências aliadas. Em razão disso, bem como pelas demais críticas que, desde sua criação, ostenta o Tribunal Penal Internacional, acusado de ser um órgão eminentemente político, do ponto de vista de suas decisões, inefetivo, se analisada a ausência de elementos coercitivos ao cumprimento de suas determinações, e mesmo a falta de respostas adequadas a questões como de interesse global o terrorismo, tráfico de drogas e as novas formas de violação de direitos por meio da rede de computadores, por exemplo , é que se propõe a revisão do Estatuto de Roma para o fim de, senão criar novas espécies de tipos penais, ao menos autonomizar o conceito de crimes contra a humanidade de ações de violência típica. A política de guerra ao terror tem provado que alguns direitos humanos, tais qual o direito a comunicação e expressão e mesmo o direito à privacidade, também são passíveis de sofrerem restrições não violentas. Portanto, é fundamental que se promova o alargamento do conceito de crimes contra a humanidade enquanto categoria jurídica, para o fim de englobar também as violações ocorridas de maneira clandestina ou a paisana, diuturnamente executadas por atores tais como os Estados-Nação e mesmo empresas como Facebook e Google, que exploram, respectivamente, o mercado de redes sociais e de provedores de pesquisa, ou a VASTec, AT&T e Amesys, especializadas na interceptação de comunicações em massa.

Magister Legum - LLM / Hybrid Courts are the latest innovation in the prosecution of international crimes after the era of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Examples include; the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Regulation 64 Panels in the courts of Kosovo and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The hybrid court model at its inception was believed to be the panacea for the short comings of purely international tribunals. The characteristic location of the tribunals in the locus of the atrocities and the participation of local judicial officers alongside their international counterparts was expected to promote legitimacy and foster capacity building for conflict ravaged transitional states. Despite the criticisms of the model today, a new hybrid court has recently been inaugurated to prosecute Hissène Habré the former President of Chad, for international crimes committed during his presidency. The promulgation of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Senegal suggests that the model continues to be useful, especially for Africa. This is of particular significance since international criminal justice has lately come under attack on the continent. The on-going feud between the African Union and the International Criminal court is only the most prolific example of this. This research paper explores the dimensions of the challenges facing the legitimacy of international criminal justice in Africa and the extent to which the hybrid court model can provide a solution for them. In order to do so, the study begins by addressing the meaning of legitimacy within the African context. A general discussion of hybrid tribunals, as well as the specific manifestations of the model in Africa so far, follows. The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of Senegal are distinguishable from each other in structure and are thus juxtaposed in order to illuminate possible improvements on the hybrid court model for the future.

This thesis aims at description and analyses of the position of diplomatic immunities and human rights in international law, focusing on areas where these two sets of international rules clash. One objective of this work is an attempt to establish a hierarchy between norms granting diplomatic immunities and those protecting fundamental human rights, which could possibly resolve the collision. This solution, however, narrows down to one of most general principles of diplomatic relations, the principal of reciprocity. Mentioned are also some alternative approaches suggested for resolution of this conflict together with the obstacles, which prevent them from use. The thesis further looks at possible remedies against abuse of diplomatic immunity.

Around the world, the armed conflicts of recent years have been characterized by including the participation of child soldiers. Children, due to the vulnerability of their short age, suffer in a special manner of the war effects, and often their human rights are violated irreversibly. International Law has a duty to provide effective answers to tackle this situation, ensuring that children can be protected against those risks and that their rights can be guaranteed. / A nivel mundial, los conflictos armados de los últimos años se han caracterizado por incluir la participación de niñas y niños soldados. Estos, por la vulnerabilidad propia de su corta de edad, sufren de manera diferenciada de los efectos de la guerra y ven afectados sus derechos humanos, algunas veces de manera irreversible. El Derecho Internacional tiene el deber de brindar erspuestas a esta situación, velando en otdo momento porque niños y niñas puedan ser protegidos frente a tales riesgos y que sus derechos puedan ser garantizados.

Doctor Legum - LLD / It is rare in law and in other disciplines for a word or a phrase to appear to mean what it does not. This is, however, true when it comes to life imprisonment or life sentence. I Unlike sentences like the death penalty, there have been instances where even those who are expected to know the meaning of the sentence of life imprisonment have misunderstood it.2 This misunderstanding is compounded by the fact that even dictionaries that have always helped us to understand the meaning of the words are of little help when it comes to the definition of life imprisonment. The Oxford Advanced Leamer's Dictionary, for example, defines life sentence to mean 'the punishment by which [some body] spends the rest of their life in prison." It goes ahead to define a 'lifer' as 'a person who has been sent to The ambiguity of life imprisonment could partly explain why the campaign prison for their whole life. The ambiguity of life imprisonment could partly explain why the campaign to abolish the death penalty and substitute it with life imprisonment has option to choose between the death penalty and life-imprisonment, many been successful in many parts of the world. When people are given the option to choose between the death penalty and life-imprisonment, many would oppose the former and favour the latter for various reasons. This is because, inter alia, many people think that an offender sentenced to life imprisonment will be detained for the rest of his natural life. This is of course not true in some cases, and, as Lord Mustil held, The two tribunals that were established after the World War III, the Nuremberg Tribunal and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Tokyo Tribunal, were empowered to impose the death penalty and indeed, as will be discussed later in detail, some offenders were sentenced to death." Although these tribunals were not expressly empowered to 2 sentence offenders to life imprisonment, they did sentence some of the offenders to life imprisonment. However, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) all have jurisdiction to sentence offenders to life imprisonment. At the time of writing, the ICC had not completed any case and therefore had no jurisprudence on life imprisonment." The ICTR has sentenced more offenders to life imprisonment and imprisonment for the remainder of their lives than the ICTY. This thesis reviews cases on life imprisonment in international criminal tribunals in order to examine the theories of punishment that these tribunals considered in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. There are cases where the ICTR has sentenced offenders to imprisonment for the rest of their natural lives. From a human rights perspective the thesis argues that imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life is inhuman punishment. The statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC provide for circumstances where an offender sentenced by any of those tribunals could be released before the completion of his or her sentence. It is on that basis that it is argued that even offenders sentenced to 3 imprisonment for the remainder of their lives by the ICTR could be released.

"Although the United Nations (UN) has often been pivotal in forging the international response to serious human rights crimes in such settings, the justice gap in countries such as the Democratic Republic [of] Congo (DRC) (the focus of this study) underscores the need for more systematic UN efforts. The war in the DRC has resulted in one of the world's worst humanitarian crisis with over 3.4 million displaced persons scattered throughout the country. An estimated 3.5 million people have died as a result of the war. The armed conflict has been characterised by appalling widespread and systematic human rights violations, including mass killings, ethnic cleansing, rape and the destruction of property. The most pressing need to be addressed is the question of justice and accountability for these human rights atrocities in order to achieve a durable peace in the country and also in the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Angola and the DRC, to name just a few). In this respect, this study will address the grave human rights violations committed in the DRC and the mechanisms for dealing with them. It is particularly true in post-conflict situations where justice systems have been either partially or completely destroyed, that national courts are not capapble of arriving at a uniform stance, or willing to provide justice for atrocities in the immediate future. As a result, international justice seems to be a crucial and last resort that must continue to be fortified against efforts to undermine it. ... Chapter one will set out the content of the research, identify the problem and outline the methodology. Chapter two will discuss the state obligations in international law to prosecute gross violations of human rights and gives a summary of the human rights violations situation during the Congolese war. Chapter three will discuss the available naitonal mechanisms for accountaiblity in the DRC. It will discuss if national courts and TRC are able to deal with these atrocities committed in the DRC. Chapter four will analyse the extent to which the ICC could deal with the Congolese case and challenges. Chapter five will discuss the trends towards accountability in the DRC and the way forward. Chapter six will draw a conclusion on how to break the cycle of impunity in the DRC." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2004. / Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Boukongou Jean Didier and Dr. Atangcho Akonumbo at the Catholic University of Central Africa, Yaounde, Cameroon / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM