<p>Uppsatsens syfte är att utreda huruvida tioårsregeln i 3 kap. 19 § IL strider mot EG-rätten. Vidare undersöks konsekvenserna utav den utvidgade regeln i förhållande till den internationella skatteavtalsrätten.</p><p>Avsaknad av total harmonisering inom skatteområdet i EU resulterar i att praxis från EGD är vägledande och av stor vikt för medlemsstaterna. Skatteregler i intern rätt får inte utformas på ett sätt att de strider mot någon av de grundläggande rörelsefriheterna i EG-fördraget.</p><p>Tioårsregeln innebär i grova drag att kapitalvinster som uppstår vid avyttring av tillgångar, skall beskattas i Sverige under de tio nästföljande åren efter utflyttning från Sverige. Tioårsregeln i dess tidigare lydelse har inte fungerat ändamålsenligt. Numera omfattar tioårsregeln utländska andelar och delägarrätter om dessa förvärvades under tiden den skattskyldige var obegränsat skattskyldig i Sverige. Tioårsregelns syfte är att hindra skattskyldiga att undandraga den svenska staten skatteintäkter vid utflyttning.</p><p><em>Exitbeskattning</em> är en synonym till <em>utflyttningsbeskattning</em>. Exitskatt avseende kapital innebär att beskattning sker på en orealiserad latent vinst på grund av att den skattskyldige flyttar ut från staten. Tioårsregeln kan sägas vara en typ av exitskatteregel eftersom den grundas på en utsträckt hemvistprincip.</p><p>Bestämmelser om exitskatter avseende kapitalvinster är generellt sett svåra att rättfärdiga eftersom en mängd krav ställs för att sådana regler skall betraktas förenliga med EG-rätten. EGD har genom praxis stadgat vissa krav avseende utformning av exitskatteregler. Exitskatter i sig har inte ansetts strida mot EG-rätten, vilket kan utläsas från <em>Lasteyrie</em>-domen. I det senare avgjorda <em>N</em>-målet konstaterades att regler om exitskatt i form av uppskovsbeskattning måste anses godkända av EGD, i alla fall då de inte är förenade med alltför hårda krav för den skattskyldige. För att inte strida mot EG-rätten bör värdenedgångar efter utflyttning beaktas samtidigt som krav på säkerhet och dylikt inte får ställas på den skattskyldige.</p><p>Artikel 13 i OECD:s modellavtal gällande kapitalvinster reglerar inte problematiken kring olika staters bestämmelser <em>om </em>kapitalskatt skall tas ut eller på vilket <em>sätt</em> kapitalvinst skall beskattas. Artikeln reglerar i stället <em>hur</em> skatteanspråket avseende kapitalvinst skall fördelas mellan staterna. Det är inte alltför ovanligt att de svenska skatteavtalen skiljer sig från OECD:s modellavtal i vissa avseenden.  Begränsningarna i Sveriges beskattningsrätt innebär ofta en inskränkning i de antal år som Sverige har rätt att beskatta kapitalvinster och/eller att svenska delägarrätter samt andelar endast omfattas av den svenska beskattningsrätten.</p><p>Utvidgningen av tioårsregeln är verkningslös eftersom de svenska skatteavtalen är formulerade på ett sätt som leder till att Sverige förhindras att utöva sin beskattningsrätt enligt tioårsregeln, som avtalen föreskriver. Tioårsregeln har inte effektiviserats med hjälp av utvidgningen till att även omfatta utländska andelar på grund av skatteavtalens neutraliserande effekt. Skatteavtalen leder till att tioårsregeln är verkningslös och för att syftet med den utvidgade tioårsregeln skall uppnås måste Sverige omförhandla sina skatteavtal.</p><p>Om en skattskyldig person vid utflyttning behandlas negativt av tioårsregeln i jämförelse med en skattskyldig person som fortsätter vara bosatt i Sverige, kan regeln fungera hindrande. Eftersom beskattning av kapitalvinst enligt tioårsregeln sker på samma sätt för den utflyttade personen som för den i Sverige kvarvarande personen föreligger ingen negativ särbehandling, vilket innebär att regeln är förenlig med EG-rätten.</p><p>Tioårsregeln bör ersättas av ett system bestående av exitbeskattning med möjlighet till uppskov, vilket vi betraktar som en mer ändamålsenlig lösning. Vår utredning påvisar att förslaget uppnår samma syfte som tioårsregeln strävar efter samtidigt som det framstår förenligt med EG-rätten. Problematiken avseende skatteflykt och skatteundandragande som tioårsregeln kan medföra är dock inte löst i sin helhet i och med det framställda förslaget. Problematiken med skatteflykt och skatteundandragande vid utflyttningssituationer kvarstår så länge Sveriges skatteavtal inte omförhandlas.</p> / <p>The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether the ten-year-rule in chapter 3 section 19 of the Income Tax Law is contrary to EC-law. The consequences of the extended rule in connection with international contract law regarding taxation agreement are furthermore investigated.</p><p>The lack of complete harmonization within tax law in the EU brings case law from the European Court of Justice into a position of great importance since it serves as guidance for the member states. Tax rules in national law may not be constructed in a way that is contrary to the right of free movement in the EC-treaty.</p><p>A general explanation of the ten-year-rule is that capital gains which arise from disposal of assets shall be subject to Swedish tax during a ten-year period following emigration from Sweden. The former wording of the ten-year-rule has not been working appropriately. The present outline of the ten-year-rule also comprises foreign shares if they were acquired during a period when the taxpayer was liable to unlimited taxation in Sweden. The aim of the ten-year-rule is to hinder taxpayers avoiding paying governmental taxes after emigration.</p><p>Exit tax is a synonym for emigration tax. Exit tax regarding capital leads to taxation of gains that has not yet been subject to realization due to the taxpayer’s emigration. The ten-year-rule can be regarded as an exit tax since it is based on an extended domicile principle.</p><p>Rules regarding exit tax of capital gains are generally difficult to justify because of the various requirements to be fulfilled in order to comply with EC-law. ECJ has through case law enacted certain requirements regarding construction of exit tax rules in national law. From the judgment of the <em>Lasteyrie</em>-case it can be understood that exit taxes per se is not contrary to EC-law. The later ruled <em>N</em>-case established that exit tax rules supplemented with a possibility of tax deferral has to be considered approved by ECJ, at least when not combined with far too strict requirements for the taxpayer. In order for exit tax rules in national law not to be contrary to EC-law shall rate decrease be considered after emigration and security requirements cannot be demanded.</p><p>Article 13 of the OECD's Model Tax Convention regarding capital gains does not regulate <em>if</em> capital gains shall be taxed or in <em>what way</em> capital gains shall be taxed. Instead the article regulates <em>how</em> the tax claim regarding capital gains shall be divided between the contractual parties. It is not uncommon that the Swedish taxation agreements are in some aspects different from the Model Tax Convention. Limitations of the Swedish tax claim often leads to restriction in the time period in which Sweden has the right to confer taxation of capital gains and/or that Swedish shares only are included in the Swedish tax claim.</p><p>The extension of the ten-year-rule is ineffective since the Swedish taxation agreements are constructed in a way that leads to Sweden being prevented from practicing the tax claim according to the ten-year-rule which the agreement prescribes. The extension to also include foreign shares in the ten-year-rule has not made the rule more efficient due to the neutralizing effect of the taxation agreements. The Swedish taxation agreements affect the ten-year-rule to become inoperative and in order for the extended rule to be effective, Sweden has to renegotiate the agreements.   </p><p>If an emigrating taxpayer is treated in a less favorable manner in comparison with a taxpayer keeping its residence in Sweden due to the ten-year-rule, the rule can be considered as a hindrance. Since taxation of capital gains in accordance with the ten-year-rule is conducted in the same manner for the emigrating person as for the person remaining in Sweden, no derogatory treatment exists which means that the rule is compatible with EC-law.</p><p>The ten-year-rule should be replaced by a system consistent of exit tax rules combined with an opportunity for tax deferral, which we consider to be an appropriate solution. Our investigation demonstrates that this solution achieves the same purpose as the ten-year-rule is striving for at the same time as it seems to be in compliance with EC-law. The difficulty regarding tax avoidance and tax evasion that the ten-year-rule might contribute to is however not completely solved by this presented solution. The problem regarding tax avoidance and tax evasion remains as long as Swedish taxation agreements are not renegotiated.</p>

BEPS är ett projekt påkallat av G20 som bedrivs i OECD:s regi. Projektet syftar till att förhindra erosion av nationers skattebaser, på grund av upplägg där vinster genom koncerninterna transaktioner flyttas till länder med låg beskattning. Denna uppsats behandlar specifikt BEPS action 8, vilken rör interprissättning av immateriella tillgångar. Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda om OECD:s rapport angående BEPS action 8 ger förutsättningarna för att uppfylla, de i rapporten angivna målen, samt vilka problem som kan påverka måluppfyllelsen. Målet med BEPS action 8 är att se till att internprissättning av immateriella tillgångar, inte används för att separera beskattningsbara inkomster från värdeskapande aktiviteter. Därmed fokuserar BEPS action 8 på att se till att utförande av funktioner, användande av tillgångar och risktagande kompenseras på ett korrekt sätt, då detta anses bidra till värdeskapande. Därmed ska BEPS action 8 se till att bolag inte kompenseras endast på grund av att de är den legala ägaren av immateriella tillgångar. Transaktioner innehållande immateriella tillgångar ska prissättas med den metod som ger det mest tillförlitliga priset. Vid sidan av de traditionella prissättningsmetoderna medger OECD i rapporten, användandet av alternativa prissättningsmetoder baserade på exempelvis ekonomiska beräkningar. Uppsatsförfattarna anser att det trots uttalade problem finns förutsättningar att uppnå uppsatta mål. Detta på grund av ökade möjligheter till vinstallokeringar baserade på bidragande till värdeskapande. Den kritik som uppsatsförfattarna presenterar baseras på en risk för en ökad börda och osäkerhet för koncerner då bedömningarna vad som krävs för att skapa värde, är subjektiv och även på grund av den osäkerhet som uppstår vid tillämpningen av alternativa prissättningsmetoder. / BEPS is an OECD project, initiated by G20. The purpose of the project is to prevent base erosion and profit shifting through tax structures where profits are shifted to low tax jurisdiction. More specifically this thesis addresses BEPS action 8 and its work on transfer pricing aspects of intangibles. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate if the prerequisites exist to achieve the stated goals within action 8 and also to investigate problems that can affect the achievements. The goals of OECD with action 8 are ensure that transfer pricing of intangibles is not used to separate taxable income from the value creation activities. To achieve this OECD wants to ensure that the performance of functions, the use of assets and risk-taking is compensated since this is deemed to create value. Therefore OECD sets out to ensure that companies are not compensated only because of the fact that they are the legal owner of an intangible asset. Transactions with intangible assets shall be priced with the transfer pricing method that results in the most reliable arm’s length price. In addition to the traditional transfer pricing methods OECD states that alternative methods can be used if they result in the most reliable arm’s length price. The authors of this thesis consider that prerequisites exist to achieve the stated goals within BEPS action 8. This is primarily based on increased possibilities to ensure that profit allocations are made based on value creation. The criticism that the authors presents is based on the risk of increased burdens and an increased insecurity for MNEs since the assessments regarding what MNEs need to create value is subjective. Criticism is also based on the insecurity that arises when the alternative transfer pricing methods are used.

The United States’ Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) changed a 30-year-old definition of the term “intangible property” and added assessment requirements for two different types of “intangible income”, both of which deviate from the newly changed general definition of “intangible” and most common understandings of the meaning of the word.  While it may appear unlikely that a change in meaning of a single word in a large tax code could have a drastic effect on international taxation, the differing definitions of “intangible” create far-reaching tangible consequences.   The TCJA affects the international taxation of US-based corporations for cross-border transactions, among many ways, by employing different definitions of the word “intangible” in three different provisions.  First, it modifies the general statutory definition of “intangible” to specifically include goodwill, workforce in place, and going-concern value will be examined.  Second, it uses an unusually broad definition of “intangible” in the new tax category of global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI); and third, the meaning of “intangible” as used in assessing so-called foreign-derived intangible income (FDII) essentially creates a broad export subsidy.  Each use of the term will also be assessed on how it ties into the TCJA’s intended purpose for the provision in which it appears.  Additionally, they will be assessed on how they compare with established international tax standards provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Plan.   By explicitly changing the definition of “intangible property”, it becomes apparent that the TCJA has increased the scope of potential tax liability for US corporations and has brought the US in line with the OECD’s use of the phrase as used in its model convention.   In examining how the GILTI tax is calculated, it will become evident that the tax can be applied to income that is not connected to intangibles despite the seemingly limited scope implied by its name.  Furthermore, a limitation on foreign tax credit means that GILTI might allow at least some continuation of the old worldwide tax system.  While potentially overly-burdensome, GILTI seems to be broadly in line with the BEPS goal towards reducing profit shifting.   As a result of how “intangible” is defined for purposes of determining FDII, two effects become apparent. First, for tax categorization, it encompasses income from both tangible and intangible assets.  Second, it permits deductions that can be construed as an export incentive.

O controle dos preços de transferência está amparado no princípio da plena concorrência, que representa espécie de dogma no direito tributário internacional. Para a sua concretização, há duas espécies de metodologias distintas: os métodos tradicionais, apoiados na comparação dos preços ou margens brutas de lucro das transações, e os métodos baseados na comparação de lucros operacionais entre as transações cotejadas. Não obstante a existência desta gama de métodos, há exemplos nos quais o princípio da plena concorrência não propicia mecanismos suficientes para o adequado controle dos preços de transferência, porquanto inexistem dados para a comparação dos preços, margens brutas ou lucros operacionais. As negociações globais de instrumentos financeiros intra-grupo, praticadas de forma integrada entre instituições de um mesmo conglomerado bancário, estão entre as situações que mais apresentam desafios ao aludido princípio. Como alternativa, parte da doutrina internacional tem defendido a adoção do método da partilha de lucros segundo fórmulas predeterminadas ou formulary apportionment. Os principais argumentos destes teóricos são a constatação de que o princípio da plena concorrência, ao se amparar no critério da entidade segregada, ignora os ganhos de eficiência e escala gerados no âmbito dos grupos econômicos; ademais, a aplicação deste princípio mostra-se complexa, dada a sua abertura e amplitude. No direito brasileiro, as regras para o controle dos preços de transferência, a despeito de inspiradas nos métodos tradicionais disponíveis para a aplicação do princípio da plena concorrência, são simplificadas a tal ponto que os métodos envolvendo margens brutas tornaram-se semelhantes aos métodos envolvendo fórmulas predeterminadas. Esta simplificação é desejável, em especial com vistas ao atendimento da praticabilidade, legalidade, eficiência administrativa etc.. Idealmente, a melhor estratégia de política tributária a ser adotada seria aquela baseada na edição de normas que, de um lado, (i.) prevejam margens predeterminadas de lucros por setor de atividade e região, ou definam outros critérios objetivos, razoáveis sob a perspectiva econômica, para o cálculo dos preços parâmetro, mas, de outro, (ii.) admitam que estas simplificações representam safe harbours, sendo garantido ao contribuinte o direito de apresentar quaisquer argumentos ou provas admitidos em direito para comprovar sua situação peculiar. O exame das discussões envolvendo a negociação global de instrumentos financeiros auxilia na conclusão de que, para serem justas, as normas para o controle dos preços de transferência precisam ser abrangentes, possibilitando-se a adequação dos métodos às especificidades de cada caso concreto; para o adequado funcionamento do sistema tributário, contudo, é imprescindível a instituição de diversas espécies de safe harbours, aptos a abranger a maioria das situações, reservando-se às transações realmente peculiares o exame detalhado dos preços. / Transfer pricing control rests on the arms length principle, one of the international consensus of international tax law. Control takes place under either of two methodologies: one comprising the Traditional Transaction Methods based on the comparison of prices and/or gross margins, and the other comprising Transactional Profits Methods based on the comparison of operating incomes from the relevant transactions. Notwithstanding the several methods in existence, the arms length principle may sometimes fail as a mechanism for adequate control of transfer pricing, insofar as data for the comparison of prices, gross margins or operational income are not available. The integrated global trading of financial instruments between units of a same banking group is an example of challenging situation for the effective application the arms length principle in transfer pricing control. Seeking an alternative approach, recent studies make the case for apportioning profits in accordance with preset formulas the so-called formulary apportionment. The main arguments behind this proposal revolve around the arms length principle ignoring economies of scale and other efficiency gains that normally breed within an economic group, as well as it being overly complex and open-ended. Although inspired by the Traditional Transactional Methods, Brazilian transfer price rules are simplified to such extent, that the gross margin comparison methods have become similar to a preset formula. Simplification is desirable from the standpoint of practicability, legal strictness, administrative efficiency, and so on. The ideal tax legislation policy would include rules that (i.) either pre-set gross margin parameters by industry and geographic location, or set forth objective, economically reasonable criteria for determination of parameter prices; but also (ii.) acknowledge such simplifications as no more than safe harbours and offer the taxpayer an opportunity to demonstrate deviation from the norm in a given peculiar situation. An analysis of the discussions on global trading of financial instruments fosters the conclusion that in order to be fair, transfer pricing rules must be all-encompassing; efficiency of the tax system, however, cannot forego the use of safe harbours that cover the majority of cases, thus restricting detail analysis to transactions that are actually peculiar.

The overall aim of this article is to analyse the taxpayers' rights in relation to the emerging standard of transparency with specific reference to Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and Uruguay. Exchange of information between tax authorities is increasing rapidly all around the world. This global development is largely the result of the introduction of the standard of transparency by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") with the political mandate of the G20 and more recently, in 2013, the introduction of the global standard of automatic exchange of information. Governments have agreed that exchange of information is necessary to prevent tax evasion and to tackle tax avoidance including aggressive tax planning. All surveyed countries have accepted the standard of transparency including the standard of automatic exchange of information. Furthermore, it is evident that the development of such standards appears to have taken place in a coordinated manner, led mainly by international organizations comprising governmental officials. This article has first provided a comparative overview of the rules that Brazil, Colombia, South Africa and Uruguay have introduced to protect the taxpayers' rights in the exchange of information process being the right to access to public information, the right to confidentiality, the right to privacy, and the procedural rights (right to be informed, the right to be notified and right to object and appeal). Thereafter, this article has assessed whether the rules introduced by the surveyed countries to protect these rights are consistent with the fundamental taxpayers' rights that belong to the rule of law of these countries and with the principles of good governance and fiscal transparency. The main conclusion is that the countries have introduced to some extent similar rules to protect the right to confidentiality, right to privacy and the procedural rights in the exchange of information. However, some differences may be found in the detail level of protection of confidentiality in South Africa and in respect of the procedural rights in Uruguay. One of the drawbacks of these rules is that the rules introduced by the surveyed countries do not ensure that the protection of the right to confidentiality and the right to privacy is effectively guaranteed. The results of the analysis show that these rules do not protect the taxpayer in case of breach of confidentiality or misuse of the information exchanged. This article argues that the differences among rules and the lack of protection for taxpayer information may hinder the effective protection of the taxpayer and the tax administration should guarantee the protection of the taxpayer rights as part of the rule of law. Therefore, this article provides in Section 4 three recommendations addressing the right to confidentiality, the right to privacy and the taxpayers' procedural rights. These recommendations may be extended (as best practices) to other developing countries on a similar economic and legal scale. However, further research will be needed to see whether the conclusions of this article are also applicable to (other) developing countries. / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Les Etats membres de l'Union européenne, sont soumis à un certain nombre d'obligations résultant de leur adhésion à l'Union européenne. Ils sont notamment obligés de se conformer au droit de l'Union européenne. Dans le même temps, ces Etats ont conclus un certain nombre de conventions internationales dans différents domaines avec d'autres Etats, notamment des conventions fiscales, dans le cadre de l'élimination des doubles impositions et de la lutte contre l'évasion et la fraude fiscale internationale. L'application de ces conventions fiscales par les Etats membres de l'Union européenne, de manière simultanée avec leurs obligations au regard du droit de l'Union européenne vont engendrer des conflits de normes. Ces conflits de normes surviendront notamment du fait, de certaines incompatibilités des conventions fiscales au regard du droit de l'Union européenne. Par conséquent, les Etats membres de l'Union européenne seront dans l'incapacité de pouvoir honorer simultanément leurs obligations à l'égard de ces deux normes, car du fait de ces incompatibilités, il est impossible de les appliquer simultanément. L'Etat membre ne pourra appliquer qu'une seule de ces normes, ce qui entraînera de ce fait, une violation de l'autre norme, et potentiellement engagera la responsabilité de l'Etat membre. Il s'agit par conséquent de déterminer quels sont ces conflits de normes entre conventions fiscales et Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne et comment ils peuvent être résolus. L'étude du droit de l'Union européenne au travers du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne, montre que son apport à la résolution des conflits de normes est très limité. En outre, l'étude du droit international notamment au travers de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités, nous montre que son apport à la résolution des conflits de normes est assez inefficace.Ainsi, les solutions traditionnellement présentées dans le cadre de la résolution des conflits de normes apparaissent fort désuètes au regard de la complexité et de l'évolution des conflits de normes contemporains.Par conséquent, on essaie d'apporter à travers cette étude un certains nombres de solutions innovantes pouvant résoudre ces conflits de normes, d'une part dans un cadre général et d'autre part dans des cadres spécifiques. / Members States of the European Union are subject to a number of obligations arising from their accession to the European Union. They are especially obliged to comply with the law of the European Union. At the same time, these States have concluded a number of international conventions in different fields with other states, including tax treaties, through the elimination of double taxation and the fight against tax avoidance and international tax evasion. The application of these treaties by members States of the European Union, simultaneously with their obligations under the law of the European Union will lead to conflicts of norms. These conflicts of norms occur especially because of some incompatibilities tax treaties under the law of the European Union. Therefore, members States of the European Union will not be able to be able to meet their obligations with respect to these two norms as a result of these inconsistencies simultaneously, it is impossible to apply simultaneously. The Member State may apply one of these norms, resulting thus a violation of other norms, and potentially be the responsibility of the Member State. It is therefore to determine what these normative conflicts between tax treaties and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and how they can be solved are. The study of the law of the European Union through the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shows that its contribution to conflict resolution of norms is very limited. In addition, the study of international law, particularly through the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, shows that its contribution to conflict resolution of norms is quite inefficient.Thus, the solutions traditionally presented in the context of conflict resolution of norms appear very outdated in terms of the complexity and evolution of conflicts of contemporary norms.Therefore, we try to bring through this study a certain number of innovative solutions to solve these conflicting norms, first in a general framework and the other in specific settings.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alessandra de Souza Okuma.pdf: 2067533 bytes, checksum: fb2d17d87e735a3f03a1c33e12624ab6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-10-09 / The purpose of this paper is the analysis of anti-avoidance rules in the Brazilian law, as well as these provided by international treaties executed by Brasil, regarding the corporate income tax. Our opinion on the extension of the general anti-avoidance provision contained in domestic law is based on the following premises: (i) the theory of autopoietic systems by Niklas Luhmann; (ii) tax principles; (iii) concepts of civil Law on fraud, simulation and abuse. It reveals that the general anti-avoidance rule provided by Brazilian law should be applied exclusively in order to disregard transactions without a legal cause or structures presenting incompatibilities between form and substance, underling a tax avoidance purpose and lacking of a business rationale. We will define the extension of specific anti-avoidance rules contained in Brazilian law, namely: special tax regime for transactions involving residents in tax haven jurisdictions; transfer pricing and CFC legislation. We will point out situations which these provisions might possibly conflict with the benefits granted by a tax treaty executed by Brazil. Each case, we should suggest criteria and legal basis for interpretation of these rules, towards resolving conflicts, considering the pacta sunt servanda principle and domestic Brazilian rules. Notwithstanding, we will analyse anti-avoidance provisions contained in the tax treaties, in view of OECD s statements regarding the improper use of the treaties amended in 2003, suggesting an interpretation in accordance with the Vienna Convention for reconciling these provisions with the domestic rules provided by the Brazilian law system / O objeto deste trabalho é a análise das normas anti-elusivas veiculadas por leis brasileiras e pelas Convenções Internacionais para evitar a dupla tributação ( CIT ), no que concerne ao imposto sobre a renda da pessoa jurídica. Partiremos da teoria dos sistemas de Luhmann, dos princípios constitucionais tributários e das normas de direito privado para construir a norma geral anti-elusiva doméstica, tal como delineada pelo art. 116, parágrafo único do CTN. Demonstraremos que a aplicação dessa norma deve considerar critérios discriminantes precisos e adequados para distinguir elisão, elusão e evasão fiscal, quais sejam: a presença da causa jurídica e a compatibilidade da estrutura negocial. Utilizaremos estas premissas para construir o conteúdo de cada norma anti-elusiva específica com efeito internacional veiculada pelas leis brasileiras, notadamente: o regime fiscal especial para uso de países de tributação favorecida; o controle de preços de transferência e o regime de transparência fiscal internacional. Apontaremos situações que hipoteticamente podem representar conflitos entre as normas anti-elusivas específicas e o regime tributário veiculado pelas CITs celebradas pelo Brasil. Para cada caso, indicaremos uma proposta hermenêutica adequada para, quando possível, conjugar esta normas domésticas, com as normas internacionais, observando o princípio pacta sunt servanda e o art. 98 do Código Tributário Nacional. Interpretaremos também as normas anti-elusivas eivadas de fonte internacional, de acordo com o método de interpretação próprio das normas internacionais previsto na Convenção de Viena e construiremos seu conteúdo de forma compatível com o sistema jurídico brasileiro

Den svenska CFC-lagstiftningens förenlighet med internationella åtaganden i form av skatteavtal baserade på OECD:s modellavtal har varit ett omdiskuterat ämne inom svensk lagstiftning under mer än ett decennium. Tvistigheten kring CFC-lagstiftningens förenlighet med skatteavtal förekommer också i andra medlemsstater av OECD. Den svenska CFC-lagstiftningen tillämpas sedan 1 januari 2004. Rättsföljden av lagstiftningen framgår av 39 a kap. 13 § IL. Syftet med CFC-lagstiftningen är att förhindra en erosion av den svenska skattebasen. Utan CFC-lagstiftning skulle en skattebetalare kunna etablera företag i lågbeskattde jurisdiktioner enbart i syfte att minska den totala skattebördan. Genom att tillämpa CFC-lagstiftningen beskattas en delägare löpande för sitt innehav i den utländska juridiska personen. Enligt förarbeten är CFC-lagstiftningen förenlig med de svenska skatteavtalen. Lagstiftaren lägger stor vikt vid ordalydelsen i kommentarerna till OECD:s modellavtal. OECD rekommenderar medlemsstaterna att tillämpa lagstiftningen. Uppsatsen visar att CFC-lagstiftningen är förenlig med skatteavtal baserade på OECD:s modellavtal. Syftet med skatteavtal är att förhindra juridisk dubbelbeskattning. CFC-lagstiftningen ger upphov till ekonomisk dubbelbeskattning. Diskussionen gällande CFC-lagstiftningens förenlighet med skatteavtal beror på kommentarernas rättsliga verkan samt därtill framställda anmärkningar. / The Swedish CFC legislation and its compatibility with international commitments in form of tax treaties based on OECD Model have been disputed in the Swedish legislation for more than a decade. Whether CFC legislation is compatible with tax treaties is also disputed in many other Member States of the OECD. The Swedish controlled foreign company legislation entered into force on 1 January 2004. The legal effect of the legislation is covered in chapter 39 a, section 10 of the Swedish Income Tax Act. The basic purpose of CFC legislation is to prevent an erosion of the Swedish tax basis. Without CFC regulations a taxpayer would be free to establish companies in low-tax jurisdictions for the sole purpose of reducing the overall tax burden. By applying the legislation a Swedish resident shareholder will be taxed on all the income that is attributed from a foreign subsidiary, regardless of when the income is distributed. In the preparatory works the government argues that the CFC legislation is compatible with Sweden’s tax treaties, based on OECD Model. The government’s opinion is mostly based on the statement in the Commentary to the OECD Model. The legislation is recommended by the OECD. This thesis concludes that the CFC legislation is compatible with tax treaties based on the OECD Model. The purpose with tax treaties is to avoid juridical double taxation. The CFC-legislation gives rise to economic double taxation. Therefore the legislation can be justified. The discussion of the CFC legislation compatible with tax treaties depends of the relevance of the Commentary but also on observations given to the Commentaries.

<p>Den svenska CFC-lagstiftningens förenlighet med internationella åtaganden i form av skatteavtal baserade på OECD:s modellavtal har varit ett omdiskuterat ämne inom svensk lagstiftning under mer än ett decennium. Tvistigheten kring CFC-lagstiftningens förenlighet med skatteavtal förekommer också i andra medlemsstater av OECD.</p><p>Den svenska CFC-lagstiftningen tillämpas sedan 1 januari 2004. Rättsföljden av lagstiftningen framgår av 39 a kap. 13 § IL. Syftet med CFC-lagstiftningen är att förhindra en erosion av den svenska skattebasen. Utan CFC-lagstiftning skulle en skattebetalare kunna etablera företag i lågbeskattde jurisdiktioner enbart i syfte att minska den totala skattebördan. Genom att tillämpa CFC-lagstiftningen beskattas en delägare löpande för sitt innehav i den utländska juridiska personen.</p><p>Enligt förarbeten är CFC-lagstiftningen förenlig med de svenska skatteavtalen. Lagstiftaren lägger stor vikt vid ordalydelsen i kommentarerna till OECD:s modellavtal. OECD rekommenderar medlemsstaterna att tillämpa lagstiftningen.</p><p>Uppsatsen visar att CFC-lagstiftningen är förenlig med skatteavtal baserade på OECD:s modellavtal. Syftet med skatteavtal är att förhindra juridisk dubbelbeskattning. CFC-lagstiftningen ger upphov till ekonomisk dubbelbeskattning. Diskussionen gällande CFC-lagstiftningens förenlighet med skatteavtal beror på kommentarernas rättsliga verkan samt därtill framställda anmärkningar.</p> / <p>The Swedish CFC legislation and its compatibility with international commitments in form of tax treaties based on OECD Model have been disputed in the Swedish legislation for more than a decade. Whether CFC legislation is compatible with tax treaties is also disputed in many other Member States of the OECD.</p><p>The Swedish controlled foreign company legislation entered into force on 1 January 2004. The legal effect of the legislation is covered in chapter 39 a, section 10 of the Swedish Income Tax Act. The basic purpose of CFC legislation is to prevent an erosion of the Swedish tax basis. Without CFC regulations a taxpayer would be free to establish companies in low-tax jurisdictions for the sole purpose of reducing the overall tax burden. By applying the legislation a Swedish resident shareholder will be taxed on all the income that is attributed from a foreign subsidiary, regardless of when the income is distributed.</p><p>In the preparatory works the government argues that the CFC legislation is compatible with Sweden’s tax treaties, based on OECD Model. The government’s opinion is mostly based on the statement in the Commentary to the OECD Model. The legislation is recommended by the OECD.</p><p>This thesis concludes that the CFC legislation is compatible with tax treaties based on the OECD Model. The purpose with tax treaties is to avoid juridical double taxation. The CFC-legislation gives rise to economic double taxation. Therefore the legislation can be justified. The discussion of the CFC legislation compatible with tax treaties depends of the relevance of the Commentary but also on observations given to the Commentaries.</p>

Submitted by Morgana Silva (morgana_linhares@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-09-13T16:56:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 2227911 bytes, checksum: 2235d971a0dbc124711517cf57d7a9d7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-13T16:56:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 2227911 bytes, checksum: 2235d971a0dbc124711517cf57d7a9d7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-05-05 / This master’s thesis has as its theme the aggressive tax planning of multinational companies, through the use of technical differences between different legal systems (hybrid mismatch arrangements). The perspective adopted will be entirely new, by submitting an understandable canon of international tax law, which is the social adequacy of tax. This proposed solution is intended to harmonize the principle of legality and tipicity, with fairness and tax education. It is, above all, a legal system response to formal crisis that hit in tax matters, especially about the unfair distribution of the tax burden arising from aggressive tax planning of multinationals, both foreign and Brazilian. This type of taxpayer behavior generates a number of negative effects on the human right to development, especially in the global financial crisis times. However, this does not mean that this work disregards the importance of formalism of the tax law, which is a legal area of expertise that values certainty and security. The central issue is the popular growth of a sense of injustice that needs to be properly considered. At this point, it appears that the pure positivist model does not have a structure to take care of the dangers resulting from the expansion of globalization and the speed with which everything happens in the XXI century. There is also the great influence of globalization, which makes markets operate in a dynamic way and complex than ever observed. Thus, it can be stated that the justification for the construction of this text is precisely the importance of the fight against the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS): taking into account that all rights have a financial cost as less resources are available for national governments, the most affected are the public policies. That said, I must highlight the difficulties of trying to harmonize the social adequacy of a broad discussion that permeates the relationship between tax law and justice. Even today, this relationship between law and morality is still a field without a definitive answer. And if Hans Kelsen is correct, this may be an academic challenge for which there is no final answer. Maybe just ask a little better. In this line, it should be noted, as wisely emphasized Castanheira Neves, which is given to men who speak and take risks, the right to make mistakes. We will talk and therefore accept the risk. / Essa dissertação de mestrado tem como tema o planejamento tributário agressivo de companhias multinacionais, através do aproveitamento de disparidades técnicas entre diferentes ordenamentos jurídicos (hybrid mismatch arrangements). O viés adotado será inteiramente novo, na forma da apresentação de um cânone compreensivo para o direito tributário internacional, que é a adequação social tributária. Essa proposta de solução visa harmonizar o princípio da legalidade e tipicidade, com a igualdade tributária e a educação fiscal. Trata-se, antes de qualquer coisa, de uma resposta do ordenamento jurídico à crise formalista que se abate sobre o campo dos tributos, mormente diante da injusta divisão da carga tributária decorrente do planejamento agressivo de multinacionais, tanto estrangeiras quanto brasileiras. Esse tipo de comportamento do contribuinte gera uma série de efeitos negativos sobre o direito humano ao desenvolvimento, notadamente em tempos de crise financeira mundial. Entretanto, isso não significa que este trabalho esteja desconsiderando a importância do formalismo para o direito tributário, que é uma área do conhecimento jurídico onde se valoriza muito a certeza e a segurança. A questão central é que cresce na população um sentimento de injustiça que precisa ser devidamente considerado. Nesse momento, parece que o modelo positivista puro não dispõe de estrutura para cuidar dos perigos advindos da expansão da globalização e da velocidade com que tudo acontece no século XXI. Também é posto na balança a globalização que faz com que os mercados operem em uma dinâmica e complexidade nunca antes vista. Dessa forma, pode-se afirmar que a justificativa da construção deste texto está justamente na importância da luta contra a erosão das bases tributáveis dos Estados (BEPS): tendo em conta que todos os direitos possuem um custo financeiro, quanto menor forem os recursos à disposição dos governos nacionais, mais prejudicadas estarão as políticas públicas. Dito isto, necessário ressaltar as dificuldades dessa tentativa de harmonização pela adequação social, em uma discussão ampla que perpassa as relações entre direito tributário e justiça. Até hoje esta relação entre direito e moralidade ainda é um campo sem uma resposta definitiva. E se Hans Kelsen estiver correto, pode não ser um desafio acadêmico ao qual se possa encontrar uma resposta final. Talvez apenas perguntar um tanto melhor. Nessa linha, há de se reconhecer, como sabiamente o pediu Castanheira Neves, que seja concedido aos homens que falam e arriscam, o direito ao próprio erro. Falaremos e, portanto, admitimos o risco.