O tema central da tese é o projeto arquitetônico e a constatação de que há uma lacuna epistemológica entre a ação projetual e sua atualização como objeto arquitetônico. A tese delineia um quadro teórico de cunho explicativo que visa estabelecer a base para a compreensão do estatuto epistêmico do processo projetual, do ponto de vista do pensamento arquitetônico. Para tal recorre à interpretação de textos de fontes da teoria e história da arquitetura, da epistemologia e da filosofia que são cotejados, revelando relações que lançam luz sobre o problema. A investigação identifica no surgimento da tradição projetual herdada do Renascimento a origem do distanciamento entre as bordas daquela lacuna, que de resto é inerente à separação entre concepção (teórica) e execução (prática) da arquitetura, portanto à própria atividade projetual. O desenvolvimento dos sistemas de representação em favor do ideal arquitetônico como “cosa mentale” propiciou a relativa autonomia do projeto em relação ao objeto arquitetônico, que, guiado no primeiro momento pelo balanço entre a invenção moderada e a convenção garantida pelos tratados como o de Vignola, paulatinamente orientou-se na direção do esgotamento das possibilidades da representação, ao ponto de tornar a viabilidade de execução do projeto dependente do desenvolvimento de programas de computador voltados à modelagem e representação digitais. A tese identifica a insuficiência das teorias do projeto como resolução de problemas para dar conta do aspecto epistemológico projetual de forma compreensiva, recorrendo como alternativa à epistemologia da prática de Schön e à filosofia da linguagem de Wittgenstein, em especial ao conceito de jogo de linguagem desse último. Este modelo explicativo e operativo é que permite avançar na construção de “pontes” entre as duas margens da lacuna, com a ressalva de que a lacuna é inevitável em função da natureza da atividade projetual. Esta tese se encerra não com a pretensão da resposta definitiva, mas com a problematização que qualifica e ilumina a questão. / The main topic of this thesis is architectural design and the observation that there is an epistemological gap between the act of designing and its concrete realization as an architectural object. The thesis presents a theoretical framework that aims at setting the grounds for understanding the epistemology of the design process from the standpoint of architectural thinking. In order to do so, explores, by interpreting, texts on theory and history of architecture, comparing them with others on epistemology and philosophy; by doing this, tries to uncover connections among such sources, especially connections that may shed light on that issue. The investigation identifies the origin of that gap in the emergence of western tradition, in the Renaissance, of an architectural design in which there is an inherent separation between the concept (theory) and the execution (praxis); thus, this gap is inherent to the activity of designing. The development of representation systems in favor of the ideal of architectural practice as "cosa mentale" produced a relative autonomy of the architectural design in relation to the architectural object. Initially guided by the balance between moderate invention and convention, assured by treaties like Vignola's, the act of designing has gradually oriented itself towards the exhaustion of possibilities of representation. It has reached the point where feasibility of execution of a design relies greatly on the development of computer softwares designed both for modeling and producing digital representation. The thesis claims that design theories are insufficient to account for the epistemological aspect of designing, and alternatively proposes a model based on Donald Schön's epistemology as well as on Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, in particular on his concept of language games. This explanatory and operative model allows us to move forward in the construction of “bridges" over the gaps, though some gap is inevitable given the nature of the act of designing. This thesis does not claim to have answered the issue definitely, but it has the intention of having contributed in shedding light on it.

O stress é um articulador fundamental para a compreensão da ação do homem no mundo, em sua integralidade e subjetividade, mas também em seus aspectos sociais de adaptação. Da mesma forma, a linguagem, condição de estruturação do fenômeno humano, apresenta-se como condição imprescindível para se conhecer o fato humano em sua totalidade, na comunicação e na simbolização do mundo, nas medidas explicativas e representativas da realidade. A interação do sujeito com o mundo dá-se fundamentada e dependente das formas como as significações são marcadas na estrutura do psiquismo de cada um, na forma de símbolos, marcas ou, do ponto de vista desta tese, de regras de atuação. Tais regras, de acordo com a perspectiva analítica da filosofia de Wittgenstein, estruturam uma visão de mundo, uma Weltanschauung que ordena a lógica da articulação do pensamento com a realidade, as condições de verdade das proposições e, nossa hipótese, as escolhas de mecanismos de enfrentamento das situações de stress. O objetivo desta tese centra-se em investigar e correlacionar as estruturas gramaticais de organização da linguagem, ou regras gramaticais, em relação à descrição da ideia de Eu e do mundo, bem como correlacioná-las com as regras que orientam as escolhas e as saídas de enfrentamento, os mecanismos de coping. Para tanto, analisou-se a narrativa de 10 sujeitos envolvidos em uma rede representacional afim, a Igreja Católica, sobre como se descrevem, como creem que os outros os vejam, suas visões sobre o mundo e a sua atuação nele, bem como a descrição de situações de stress e enfrentamento, tanto de forma negativa, o distress, quanto em seu aspecto positivo, o eustress. A pesquisa empírica desenvolveu-se por meio de uma metodologia de análise gramatical de análise de discurso, a fim de extrair dos pronunciamentos mais significativos suas regras constitutivas, abrindo mão dos aspectos qualitativos ou quantitativos, e centrando-se na estrutura das regras subtextuais presentes nos enunciados. Após a transcrição das entrevistas, a análise permitiu selecionar passagens enfáticas na descrição dos conteúdos, articulá-las com seus advérbios, adjetivos e tempos referenciais mais correspondentes e, depois, extrair-lhes as regras fundamentais de construção da narrativa, ou seja, o jogo de linguagem eficaz no qual se inserem as assertivas verdadeiras em relação à avaliação e ao enfrentamento de stress. A amostra demonstrou uma homogeneidade entre os discursos, aproximando os resultados entre homens e mulheres, e observando uma construção positiva de mundo, imperativa das ações como algo necessário, que deve ser feito, e com significado sobrenatural, bem como uma visão positiva também do acesso e da eficácia dos mecanismos de coping utilizados. Em relação à visão do Eu, a maioria tem uma posição em primeira pessoa, referencial e adequada aos atos da vida, do trabalho e dos sentimentos, de forma descritiva, como eu sou... eu faço..., e em certos aspectos reflexiva como eu me sinto... eu me considero.... Quanto à visão de mundo, pode-se experimentar uma posição constante de otimismo, vendo o mundo de forma boa e com significado sobrenatural, como ... uma missão perante Deus.... Em relação ao stress, foi relevante perceber que a falta de controle ou de sentido dos fatos leva ao sofrimento, enquanto o sentido e a sensação de fazer o que se deve aparecem ligados à felicidade. Uma condição bastante comum, a visão de que há algo de imperativo nas ações, algo necessário e que deve ser feito, sobretudo por ter uma função sobrenatural no desejo divino, marcou as narrativas dos entrevistados / Stress is a fundamental articulator for understanding of man\'s action in the world, in his integrality and subjectivity, but also in his social aspects of adaptation. In the same way the language, condition of structuring the human phenomenon, presents itself as an essential condition for knowing the human fact in its totality, in the communication and symbolization of the world, in the explanatory and representative measures of reality. The interaction of the subject with the world is based on and depends on the ways in which significations are marked in the structure of the psyche of each one, in the form of symbols, marks or, from the point of view of this thesis, rules of action. Such rules, according to the analytical perspective of Wittgenstein\'s philosophy, frame a world view, a Weltanschauung that orders the logic of the articulation of thought with reality, the truth conditions of propositions, and, our hypothesis, the choices the mechanisms of Coping to stress situations. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and correlate grammatical structures of language organization, or grammatical rules, with respect to the description of the idea of the Self and the world, as well to correlate them with the rules that guide the choices and outputs, the mechanisms of Coping. In order, we analyzed the narrative of 10 subjects involved in a related representational network, the Catholic Church, about how they describe themselves, how they believe others see them, their visions about the world and their role in it, as well the description of stress and coping situations, both in a negative way, the distress, and in its positive aspect, the eustress. The empirical research was developed through a methodology of grammatical analysis of discourse analysis, in order to extract from the most significant pronouncements, their constitutive rules, giving up the qualitative or quantitative aspects, and focusing on the structure of the present subtextual rules Statements. After the transcription of the interviews, the analysis allowed to select emphatic passages in the description of the contents, articulating them with their adverbs, adjectives and reference times, and then extracting the basic rules of narrative construction. The sample demonstrated a homogeneity between the discourses, bringing the results closer together between men and women, and observing a positive world construction, imperative of actions as something necessary, that must be done, and with supernatural meaning, as well a positive view also of access and effectiveness of the coping mechanisms used. In relation to the vision of the Self, most have a first-person position, referential and appropriate to the acts of life, work and feelings, in a descriptive way as \"I am ... I do ...\", and in certain aspects reflective Like \"I feel ... I consider myself ...\". Concerning for the world view, can experience a constant position of optimism, seeing the world in a good way and with supernatural meaning, as \"... a mission before God ...\". In relation to Stress, it was relevant that the absence of control or sense of the facts leads to suffering, while the sense and the feeling of doing what should appear connected to happiness. Quite common condition, the view that there is something imperative in the actions, something necessary and that must be done, above all by having a supernatural function in the divine desire marked the narratives of the interviewees

In the recent decades, alternative notions regarding the role of symbols in intelligence in natural and artificial systems have attracted significant inter- est. The main difference of the so-called situated and embodied approaches to cognitive science from the traditional cognitivist position is that symbolic repre- sentations are viewed as resources, similar to maps used for navigation or plans for activity, instead of as transparent stand-ins in internal world models. Thus, all symbolic resources have to be interpreted and re-contextualized for use in concrete situations. In this view, one of the primary sources of such symbolic resources is language. Cognitivism views language as a vessel carrying informa- tion originally located in the processing mechanisms of the individual agents. Situated approaches, on the other hand, view language both as a communicative mechanism and as a means for the individual agents to enhance and extend their cognitive machinery, by e.g. better utilizing their attentional resources, or mod- ifying their perceptual-motor means. Taking inspiration from these ideas, and building on multi-agent models developed in other fields, the field of language evolution developed models of the emergence of shared resources for communi- cation in a community of agents. In these models, agents with various means of categorization and learning engage in communicative interactions with each other, using shared signs to refer either to pre-given meanings or entities in a situation. In order to avoid falling into the same mentalist pitfalls as cognitivism in the design of these models, such as the stipulation of an inner sphere of mean- ings for which communicative signs are mere labels, the role of communication should be viewed as one of the social coordination of behavior using physically grounded symbols. To this end, an experimental setup for language games, and a robotic model for agents which engage in such games are presented. The setup allows the agents to utilize shared symbols in the completion of a simple task, with one agent instructing another on which action to undertake. The symbols used by agents in the language games are grounded in the embodied choices presented to them by their environment, and the agents can further use the symbols created in these games for enhancing their own behavioral means. The learning mechanism of the agents is similarity-based, and uses low-level sensory data to avoid the building in of features. Experiments have shown that the establishment of a common vocabulary of labels depends on how well the instructors are trained on the task and the availability of feedback mechanisms for the exchanged labels.

<p>Autumn 2021</p>

An important capacity that is still lacking in intelligent systems such as robots, is the ability to use concepts in a human-like manner. Indeed, the use of concepts has been recognised as being fundamental to a wide range of cognitive skills, including classification, reasoning and memory. Intricately intertwined with language, concepts are at the core of human cognition; but despite a large body or research, their functioning is as of yet not well understood. Nevertheless it remains clear that if intelligent systems are to achieve a level of cognition comparable to humans, they will have to posses the ability to deal with the fundamental role that concepts play in cognition. A promising manner in which conceptual knowledge can be acquired by an intelligent system is through ongoing, incremental development. In this view, a system is situated in the world and gradually acquires skills and knowledge through interaction with its social and physical environment. Important in this regard is the notion that cognition is embodied. As such, both the physical body and the environment shape the manner in which cognition, including the learning and use of concepts, operates. Through active partaking in the interaction, an intelligent system might influence its learning experience as to be more effective. This work presents experiments which illustrate how these notions of interaction and embodiment can influence the learning process of artificial systems. It shows how an artificial agent can benefit from interactive learning. Rather than passively absorbing knowledge, the system actively partakes in its learning experience, yielding improved learning. Next, the influence of embodiment on perception is further explored in a case study concerning colour perception, which results in an alternative explanation for the question of why human colour experience is very similar amongst individuals despite physiological differences. Finally experiments, in which an artificial agent is embodied in a novel robot that is tailored for human-robot interaction, illustrate how active strategies are also beneficial in an HRI setting in which the robot learns from a human teacher.

Este trabalho apresenta uma análise wittgensteiniana de alguns problemas ligados ao ensino de filosofia. Tomando como ponto de partida a difícil relação entre a formação inicial do professor e a cultura escolar, esta dissertação trata as transformações a que a filosofia é submetida na passagem da academia à escola como mudanças nos usos da linguagem filosófica. Esta mudanças são esclarecidas à luz dos conceitos de jogos de linguagem e formas de vida, desenvolvidos na filosofia tardia de Ludwig Wittgenstein, como alternativa a teorias linguísticas referenciais e metafísicas. Examinando os limites das explicações que fundamentam os jogos de linguagem em geral, torna-se compreensível o aspecto do aprendizado dos jogos linguísticos da filosofia que, irredutível à compreensão de razões, reside na vontade do aprendiz que, como tal, só pode ser persuadida. Este é o viés pelo qual será enfrentada a questão didática da motivação dos alunos. Ademais, o problema da persuasão e a atenção aos usos da linguagem filosófica animam, se não um método, uma estratégia de uso da história da filosofia no ensino médio, na qual a história da filosofia se torna uma ocasião para o aluno afrontar os limites do sentido de sua forma de vida. / This work presents a Wittgensteinian analysis of some problems linked to the teaching of philosophy. Taking as starting point the difficult relationship between initial training teachers and school culture, this dissertation deals with the transformations that philosophy is subjected in passing the academy to school as shifts in the uses of philosophical language. The shifts are explained in the light of the concepts of language games and forms of life developed in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein as an alternative to referential language and metaphysical theories. Examining the limits of the reasons that base the language games in general, it becomes understandable the aspect of the linguistic games of philosophy learning that, irreducible to the understanding of learning reasons, lay on the willingness of the learner, as such, can only be persuaded. This is the bias by which will be faced the didactic issue of student motivation. Moreover, the problem of persuasion and attention to the uses of philosophical language animate, if not a method, a strategy of using the history of philosophy in high school, in which the history of philosophy becomes an opportunity for the student to confront the limits of sense of their way of life.

Orientador: Pedro Ângelo Pagni / Banca: Lúcio Lourenço Prado / Banca: Marcus Vinícius da Cunha / Resumo: Ao analisar o funcionamento da linguagem, Wittgenstein, nas Investigações Filosóficas, problematizou, por um lado, os sistemas filosóficos modernos, que se apoiaram em um ideal de racionalidade unidimensional, pois consideraram a razão, o único meio de se alcançar o conhecimento verdadeiro e, por outro lado, colocou em dúvida a linguagem como estrutura de representação firmemente estabelecida e seu uso instrumentalizado. Nessa análise, o filósofo descreveu a categoria jogos de linguagem e seus usos nas mais diversas formas de vida em contraposição ao ensino ostensivo assegurado na concepção agostiniana de linguagem. Wittgenstein considerou que a teoria referencial compreendia a linguagem como um sistema logicamente estruturado, reduzido ao exercício da designação, enquanto que os jogos de linguagem permitiam, à linguagem, uma infinidade de funções. Dessa forma, ao invés de nos atermos a uma única forma de expressão dos pensamentos, podemos utilizar inúmeras maneiras de pensar os problemas que nos afligem. Embora Wittgenstein não tenha elaborado uma Filosofia da Educação, suas críticas ao ensino ostensivo e a caracterização da categoria jogos de linguagem parecem evidenciar a complexidade da linguagem, quando nos remetemos à discussão de seus limites. Essas críticas e categoria, depreendidas de sua filosofia, ao nosso ver, fornecem elementos para que os educadores se contraponham à unidimensionalidade da razão e do uso na linguagem pelas teorias e práticas pedagógicas, no presente, levando-os a refletir sobre os seus limites e, quem sabe, a possibilidade de pensá-las em sua multiplicidade. / Abstract: Analyzing the language working, Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, put in doubt the modern philosophical systems, that based on a model of unidimensional reason because it considers the reason the only way to reach the true knowledge and, otherwise, he placed in doubt the language as structure of representation firmly fixed and how its is used. In this study of facts, the philosopher related the category language games and its uses in differents life forms in contraposition to the ostensive teaching insured on the agostiniana's conception of language. Wittgenstein considered that the referential theory had comprised the language as a structured system, reduced to exercise of designation, and the language games let, to the language, an infinity of functions. This way, opposite to cling to the only form of expression of the thoughts, we can use many ways of thinking about the problems we have fear. Although Wittgenstein hadn't elaborated a Philosophy of the Education, his discernments about the ostensive education and the characterization of the category language games look to evidence the language complexity, when we refer to the discussion of his limits. Those discernments and category, deduced of his philosophy, in our point of view, give elements for the teachers compare to the unidimensionality of the reason and of the use in the language by theories and pedagogic practices, at the present time, taking them to think about their limits and, maybe, the possibility of thinking about its multiplicity. We can, in this dissertation, to think about the own questions of the education when we relate the referential language to the possibilities of communication limited to the transmission of formulated knowledges and, the language games, to the condition of plural possibilities, that consider the differents uses of the language in the educative activity. / Mestre

Esta pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar os jogos de linguagem em formas de vida de crianças ditas portadoras de altas habilidades, evidenciando aqueles valorizados pelos processos escolares de seleção e enriquecimento educativo. Para isto, fez-se uso de ferramentas teóricas foucaultianas – discurso, relações de poder, e governamentalidade – e wittgensteinianas – jogos de linguagem e formas de vida – e, a partir destas, criou-se a noção de jogos de poder-linguagem, que veio a constituir as análises propostas na tese. A pesquisa foi desenvolvida a partir de um movimento analítico-descritivo com centralidade na linguagem, buscando compreender a forma como os discursos das altas habilidades circulam nas escolas da RME hoje e capturam esses sujeitos. Também se fez uso de técnicas de traços etnográficos pósmodernos, com o intuito de conhecer as formas de vidas das crianças ditas portadoras de altas habilidades. Buscando explorar a problemática que se apresenta, esta tese foi organizada em duas grandes seções, sendo que o arranjo das mesmas se propôs a abordar as altas habilidades em matemática de um âmbito macro, relacionado ao modo de pensar da sociedade, para um âmbito micro, relacionado às questões de sala de aula e ao espaço escolar. Os movimentos analíticos empreendidos na primeira seção da tese possibilitaram a identificação de uma mudança da ênfase das altas habilidades em matemática, de um âmbito científico-cognitivo, para um âmbito comportamental em relação ao social e econômico. Também foi possível verificar que o dito sujeito de altas habilidades não se constitui a partir de uma simples atualização de nomenclatura, mas se produz pela observação atenta e criteriosa dos agentes escolares, sendo tais observações também embasadas em critérios comparativos de desempenhos, onde ganham destaque aqueles valorizados pela escola. Também foi possível observar, a partir do trabalho de campo, como os jogos de poder-linguagem, mobilizados pela escola, valorizam e põem em evidência certos tipos de conduta, dando visibilidades àquelas que passarão a constituir o sujeito portador de altas habilidades em matemática na escola. Desta forma, na segunda seção da tese se sobressaiu a forma com que as práticas escolares contemporâneas promovem a existência de semelhanças de família – no sentido wittgensteiniano – entre os saberes constituintes de outras práticas com os saberes constituintes das práticas matemáticas. / This research aims to analyze the language games in the forms of life of children with high abilities, highlighting those valued by the school processes of selection and educational enrichment. For this, the theoretical tools of Foucault – discourse, power relations, and governmentality – and Wittgenstein – language games and forms of life – were used, and based on that, the concept of power-language games was created, thus constituting the analyzes proposed in the thesis. The research was developed based on a descriptive-analytical movement focusing on language, seeking to understand how the discourses of high abilities circulate in the schools of the Municipal Education System (RME) today and capture these subjects. Postmodern ethnographic traits techniques were also used, aiming to understand the forms of life of children with high abilities. Seeking to explore the current problem, this thesis was organized into two major sections, and the arrangement thereof aims to address the high abilities in mathematics from a macro framework, related to the society’s way of thinking, to a micro framework, related to issues involving the classroom and the school environment. The analytical movements employed in the first section of the thesis enabled the identification of a change in the emphasis of high abilities in mathematics, from a scientific-cognitive scope to a behavioral scope relative to social and economic. Also, it was possible to verify that the high abilities nowadays are not only in an update in the terminology, but is produced by attentive and careful observation of school agents, such observations are also grounded in comparative criteria of performances, which are highlighted those valued by the school. It was also possible to note, from the field work, how the power-language games, deployed by the school, value and highlight certain types of behaviors, giving visibility to those who will be the guy carrying high ability in mathematics school. Therefore, in the second section of the thesis, it was highlighted the way as the contemporary school practices promote the existence of similarities of family – in the sense wittgensteinian – between the constituent knowledge of other practices and the constituent knowledge of mathematics practices.

Jogos de verdade na constituição do bom professor de matemática é uma dissertação de mestrado que tem como objetivo de estudo discutir a relação estabelecida entre sujeitos licenciandos/estagiários de matemática e as verdades pedagógicas que os constituem como sujeitos morais. Como material investigativo, são tomados os ditos e os escritos de alunos do curso de licenciatura em matemática da UFRGS, capturados da dissertação de mestrado de Lenzi (2008), intitulada “Prática de ensino em educação matemática: a constituição das práticas pedagógicas de futuros professores de matemática”, com foco nos estágios de docência da formação inicial de professores e que evidencia os efeitos das relações de poder e verdade, através de discursos pedagógicos, na constituição e regulação de práticas pedagógicas. A análise desses ditos e escritos é realizada entendendo o sujeito como constituído discursivamente, através da clave foucaultiana, tendo a noção de jogos de verdade, perpassada pelo conceito wittgensteiniano de jogos de linguagem, como principal ferramenta para uma analítica discursiva dos modos de dizer-se e ver-se como bom professor de matemática, no espaço interinstitucional universidade-escola e na educação matemática contemporânea. Como possibilidades composicionais de um professor de matemática ético, são discutidas as maneiras pelas quais prescrições de caráter moral podem ser transformadas em condutas de caráter ético com efeitos estéticos no modo de conduzir-se do futuro professor de matemática. / Truth games on the composition of a good mathematics teacher is a master dissertation which aims to discuss the relation between the mathematics students/trainee teachers and the pedagogical truths that constitute them as moral subjects. As research material, the students’ statements and writings from the teaching course in mathematics at UFRGS are analyzed, taken from Lenzi (2008) masters dissertation entitled "Practical learning in mathematics education: the constitution of the pedagogical practices of future math teachers." with a focus on teaching practice in the graduation course and that make evident the effects of the alliance between power and truth through pedagogical discourses in the constitution and regulation of pedagogical practices. The analysis of these statements and writings is made considering this subject as a discourse composition, through foucaultian clef, having the notion of truth games, over wittgensteinian concept of language games, as the main tool for a discourse analysis of the ways one says or sees him/herself as a good mathematics teacher in the university-school ambient and in the contemporary mathematical education. As compositional possibilities of an ethical mathematics teacher, it is discussed the ways in which prescriptions of moral character can be transformed in conducts of ethical character with esthetic effects in the way the math teacher to be can guide him/herself.

Dans ses Remarques mêlées, Wittgenstein écrivait : « Qui enseigne aujourd’hui la philosophie ne choisit pas pour son élève une nourriture à son goût, mais celle qui est capable de changer son goût. »Et nous avons mauvais goût manifestement : notre palais n’est sensible qu’aux schèmes verticaux. Il n’affectionne que ce qui s’y apparente. Ce « nous » auquel nous nous référons n’englobe pas que les étudiants. Il désigne avant tout les professionnels de la philosophie, et ceux des sciences humaines. La cible de Wittgenstein, c’est finalement l’universitaire. Celui, du moins, qui en a adopté le langage et les codes, et qui, à travers eux conçoit ce qu’est un résultat et les moyens d’y parvenir.Adopter ce langage et ces codes en philosophie résulte d'un malentendu, d'une ambition qui ne peut que manquer ce qu'elle voudrait atteindre, car cette méthode ne lui est pas propre : elle se calque sur celle des sciences. Elle édifie quand elle devrait décrire, elle démontre quand elle devrait étaler.La philosophie ne devrait être qu’horizontalité. C’est là le « message wittgensteinien », nous semble-t-il. C’est en tout cas comme cela que nous nous permettons de le formuler. Il est présent en chaque point de son œuvre, de manière plus ou moins perceptible, il est vrai. La forme de celle-ci se déroule, se dessine peu à peu à partir de ce précepte. C’est la raison pour laquelle il n'est pas évident pour le lecteur de s’y retrouver. Rien ne lui est livré comme de coutume, dans les emballages desquels il est familier. Le message est distillé à chaque instant, par touches succinctes, peu importe le tableau. C’est en cela qu’on peut parler d’ubiquité de la pensée wittgensteinienne. / In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein wrote: ‘Someone who teaches philosophy nowadays gives his pupil foods, not because they are to his taste, but in order to change his taste.’We obviously have bad taste: our palate is only sensitive to vertical schema. It only likes what it is similar to it. This ‘us’ we refer to, does not only include students. It mostly designates the professionals of philosophy, and those from Human Sciences. Wittgenstein's aim is, after all, the academic. Or at least, the one who uses its language and its codes, and through them, knows what a result is and the means to reach it.Use this language and these codes in philosophy, is the result of a misunderstanding, of an ambition that is only able to miss what it wants to reach, because this method is not its own: it models itself on the scientific one. It edifies when it should be describing and demonstrates when it should be spreading.Philosophy should only be horizontality appears to be the ‘Wittgensteinian message’, it seems to us. We allow ourselves to express it as so anyway. We can find this message, in a more or less discernible way, that is true, all along his work. The shape of Wittgenstein's work appears bit by bit from this precept. This is the reason why it is not easy for the reader to find his way through. Nothing is given to him as usual, in the packages he is used to receive it. The message is disclosed, in every instant, by succinct touches, no matter the picture. We can therefore talk about the ubiquity of Wittgensteinian thought.