A presente tese investigou quais foram, como foram produzidas e quais os motivos para a produção das doutrinas jurídicas utilizadas pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal para decidir os habeas corpi relativos a casos políticos dos estados e distrito federal entre 1906, a partir da tensão surgida durante o governo Afonso Pena entre os correligionários de Pinheiro Machado e a base de sustentação do presidente no Congresso, e 1915, ano do assassinato do senador. Foi empregada a obra de Michael Stolleis como referencial teórico, que busca articular história, história do direito e história da ciência do direito, utilizando o termo “história” não apenas com o significado de mudanças fáticas e normativas, mas também com o de expressão, preparação e compreensão intelecto-linguística dessas mudanças, tratando-se sempre da interação entre a transformação histórica e um pensar que conceitua, podendo o pensamento preceder os acontecimentos ou segui-los, comentando-os e interpretando-os. A presente tese foi dividida em dois capítulos. No primeiro, trata-se do surgimento da primeira república, suas características básicas, instituições relevantes para a presente tese e a cultura jurídica do período, com análise das faculdades, livros, perfil dos juristas etc. Esse capítulo é importante para balizar os limites das discussões político-jurídicas, por exemplo, e para ver que a forma como os juristas decidiram os processos no STF no período investigado não constituiu uma “exceção”. No segundo capítulo, sendo realizada a divisão das seções de acordo com os governos do presidentes no período pesquisado, é analisada a relação do STF com a política no período pesquisado, mediante a análise dos processos de habeas corpus relativos a casos políticos dos estados e distrito federal. O auge da tensão foi durante o governo Hermes da Fonseca, durante a política das salvações e a posterior reação pinheirista, quando vários casos políticos foram judicializados e parte dos ministros do tribunal era identificada com o hermismo, outra parte identificada com o pinheirismo (ambos os grupos normalmente aliados), assim como parte era identificada com a oposição. Foi um claro momento de divisão do STF na primeira república. No contexto de uma formação superior distante da excelência, marcada pelo autodidatismo, muitos dos ministros eram bons juristas de acordo com aqueles padrões, tendo conhecimento das doutrinas e autores, nacionais e estrangeiros, relevantes naquele tempo e espaço, e eram capazes de elaborar doutrinas jurídicas de aparência sofisticada, convincentes, sem contradições lógicas grosseiras, a partir de um amplo e desconexo quadro de referências nacionais e estrangeiras, com o objetivo de defender suas posições. Eram os “jurisconsultos adaptáveis” (Seelaender) em ação. Para identificar a estratégia doutrinária adotada pelos ministros, entendeu-se que a análise isolada de doutrinas do habeas corpus, desconsiderando o contexto político da época e discussões jurídicas paralelas sobre teorias de intervenção federal, estado de sítio, controle de constitucionalidade e separação de poderes, seria muito despistadora. É fundamental compreender a interação entre essas teorias no pensamento jurídico dos atores pesquisados. Foi necessário compreender como essas teorias funcionavam de forma combinada nos votos proferidos pelos juízes em casos políticos para compreender a atuação dos ministros. Por exemplo, por um lado, pode-se ver que o hermista Enéas Galvão concomitantemente costumava atribuir ao habeas corpus um escopo mais amplo de proteção e de decidir que o Poder Judiciário não poderia controlar a constitucionalidade da intervenção federal e do decreto de estado de sítio emitido pelo Presidente da República. Por outro lado, pode-se ver que o perrepista Pedro Lessa concomitantemente atribuía ao habeas corpus um âmbito mais restrito de proteção, funcionando de forma semelhante a uma ação possessória, na forma como formulava o habeas corpus como meio apto para proteger “a liberdade-condição, a liberdade-meio, a fim de que se possa exercer a liberdade-fim”, e decidia que o Poder Judiciário poderia controlar a constitucionalidade da intervenção federal e do estado de sítio emitido pelo Presidente da República, e estabelecer limites, dando aos estados governados por oligarcas em oposição ao governo federal - com quem ele e sua facção estavam intimamente ligados - mais espaço para, ao mesmo tempo, evitar uma intervenção federal e lidar com oposicionistas locais nos estados. Claro, ao lado de juristas mais sofisticados, como Enéas Galvão e Pedro Lessa, havia outros menos sofisticados, que, além de adotar uma visão mais delimitadora do habeas corpus e do controle de constitucionalidade, e uma visão mais amplificadora da intervenção federal e do estado de sítio, tentavam resolver os casos de forma mais simples, com base exclusiva em questões processuais. Esse era o caso, e. g., do pinheirista Pedro Mibielli. / This PhD dissertation investigated which were, how they were produced, and what were the motives for the production of legal doctrines used by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court to decide the habeas corpora on political cases from the states and the federal district between 1906, from the arising tension during the Afonso Pena government between supporters of Pinheiro Machado and the president's support base in Congress, and 1915, the year of the senator's murder. It was employed as a theoretical framework the work of Michael Stolleis, which seeks to articulate history, legal history, and science of legal history, using the term “history” not only with the meaning of factual and normative changes, but also the meaning of expression, preparation, and intellectual and linguistic understanding of these changes, since it is always the interaction between historical change and conceptual thinking that conceptualizes, being the thought able to precede the events or follow them, commenting on them and interpreting them. This PhD dissertation has been divided into two chapters. In the first one, it is dealt with the emergence of the first republic, its basic characteristics, relevant institutions for this work, and the legal culture of the period, with the analysis of law schools, books, the lawyer’s profile, etc. This chapter is relevant to mark the boundaries of legal-political discussions, for instance, and to see that the way lawyers decided the cases in the Supreme Court in the researched period did not constitute an “exception.” In the second chapter, being held the division of sections according to the governments of presidents in the researched period, it is analyzed the STF's relationship with politics in the researched period by the analysis of habeas corpus procedures relating to political cases of states and district federal. The height of the tension was during Hermes da Fonseca’s government, during the politics of salvation and the subsequent pinheirista reaction when several political cases were judicialized and part of the judges of the court was identified with the hermismo, another part was identified with the pinheirismo (both usually allied groups) and part was identified with the opposition. It was a clear moment of STF’s division in the first republic. In the context of a higher education far from excellence, marked by self-education, many of the judges were good lawyers according to those standards, with knowledge of the doctrines and authors, national and foreigners, relevant at that time and space, and were able to create sophisticated legal doctrines, with a compelling appearance and without gross logical contradictions, from a broad and disjointed framework of national and international references, in order to defend their positions. They were the “adaptive lawyers” (Seelaender) in action. To identify the doctrinal strategy adopted by the judges, it was understood that the isolated analysis of the habeas corpus doctrines, disregarding the political context of the time and parallel legal discussions on theories of federal intervention, state of siege, constitutional review, and separation of powers, would be very misleading. It is essential to understand the interaction between these theories in the legal thinking of the researched actors. It was necessary to understand how these theories worked combined in the opinions cast by the judges in political cases to understand the actions of the judges. For example, on the one hand, one can see that the hermista Eneas Galvão concomitantly used to assign habeas corpus a broader scope of protection and decide that the judiciary could not review the constitutionality of federal intervention and state of siege decree issued by the President. On the other hand, one can see that the perrepista Pedro Lessa concurrently attributed to habeas corpus a narrower scope of protection, operating similarly to a possessory action, in the way he formulated the habeas corpus as a means able to protect “the freedom- condition, the freedom-means, so that it can be exercised the freedom-end,” and decided that the judiciary could review the constitutionality of federal intervention and the state of siege issued by the President, narrowing their scope, giving the states ruled by oligarchs in opposition to the federal government - with whom he and his faction were closely linked - more room to, at the same time, avoid federal intervention and deal with local opposition in the states. Of course, alongside more sophisticated lawyers, such as Eneas Galvão and Pedro Lessa, there were other less sophisticated, which, in addition to adopting a more bounding view of habeas corpus and judicial review, and a further amplifying vision of federal intervention and state of siege, tryed to solve the cases more simply, exclusively based on procedural matters. This was the case, e. g., of the pinheirista Pedro Mibielli.

Los Sueños de Quevedo es una obra satírica que contiene una incisiva crítica social, de la que no escapa la realidad jurídica de la época. Con la ayuda que prestan los puentes metodológicos generados con la combinación de las ciencias literaria y jurídica, en este trabajo de investigación interdisciplinar se analiza el componente jurídico presente de forma dispersa en esta narración ficcional de naturaleza satírica, estudiando su contenido y forma de presentación en base a la clasificación que se propone de los elementos de carácter jurídico. Mediante su comparación con fuentes documentales jurídicas de la época y con el filtro que proporciona el pensamiento pluridimensional filosófico y doctrinal del autor, se pretende además una aproximación a las circunstancias histórico-jurídicas de finales del siglo XVI y principios del XVII, así como, a la visión que tiene Quevedo de la misma y la valoración que otorga a la administración de justicia y a la justicia misma, contribuyendo con ello al mejor conocimiento de la obra literaria, de su creador y de la época en la que se escribió. / Sueños by Quevedo is a satirical work that contains an incisive social criticism, from which the legal reality of the time does not escape. This interdisciplinary research analyzes the legal component present in Quevedo’s fictional narrative with help from the methodological bridges built between the literary and legal sciences. In this paper a proposed classification of the legal elements is used as the basis for analysis of Sueños’ content and form. By comparing the results with legal documentary sources of the time and with the filter provided by the author's multidimensional philosophical and doctrinal thought, an approach to the historical-legal circumstances of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is also reached, as well as, Quevedo's view and assessment of the administration of justice and justice itself in his contemporary society. The analysis contributes to a better understanding of Sueños, its author and the time in which it was written.

This project uses Michel Foucault’s underdeveloped notion of “tolerated illegality” as a departure point for two converging inquiries. The first analyzes, and then critiques, dominant legal logics and values. This part argues that traditional legal philosophers exhibit a “disagreement without difference,” generally concurring that legal certainty and predictability enhance agency. Subsequently, this section critiques “formal legal” logic by linking it to science envy (specifically the desire for certainty and predictability), and highlighting its agency- limiting effects (e.g. the violence of law en-force-ment). The second part examines multiple dimensions of tolerated illegality, exploring the permutations of this complex socio-legal phenomenon. Here the implications of tolerated illegality are mapped across different domains, ranging from the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands, to the latent ideologies embedded in superhero shows. This section also examines the idea of liberal “tolerance,” as well as the themes of power, domination, politics, bureaucracy, and authority. Ultimately, this project demonstrates that it is illuminating to study legality and (tolerated) illegality in tandem because although analyses of “formal legality” provide helpful analytical texture, the polymorphous and entangled nature of tolerated illegality makes clear just how restricted and artificial strict analyses of legality can be. / Graduate

Les disciples de Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882) ont cherché, par la constitution d’écoles, àperpétuer l’oeuvre de leur maître. En matière juridique, ils tentent de refonder le droit sur l’espritsocial. Celui-ci, frontalement opposé à l’esprit classique des juristes, fait d’abstraction etd’idéalité, doit permettre de réinsuffler le social dans le droit, saturé par l’idéologie des Lumières.Cet objectif passe notamment par une réflexion méthodologique sur la science juridique, quidoit allier le classique procédé déductif à l’induction des sciences sociales. Une fois le droit assissur la neutralité du fait social, il peut enfin être assaini de l’idéologie rousseauiste qui l’imprègneet, somme toute, dépolitisé. Les leplaysiens en retrouvent in fine le fondement dans la tradition,mélange d’immanence et d’historicité. Les disciples de Le Play, qui entendent promouvoir desréformes en vue de l’avènement d’une société traditionnelle vectrice de paix sociale, utilisentalors les sources formelles du droit. Celles-ci apparaissent véritablement instrumentalisées : lesémules de l’ingénieur utilisent en effet, au gré de leurs besoins, tant la coutume et lajurisprudence que la loi pour faire aboutir leurs réformes. Il ressort de cette étude qu’ils ontsurtout exercé une influence méthodologique et intellectuelle sur la norme législative. / The followers of Frederic Le Play (1806-1882) sought by the establishment of schools, toperpetuate the work of their master. They indeed tried to reestablish social spirit as the true basisof legal science. The latter, frontally opposed to the classical spirit of Jurists, made of abstractionand ideality, must allow life to penetrate the field of legal science, saturated with the ideology ofthe Enlightenment. To achieve this objective, they develop a methodological reflection on legalscience, which must combine the classic deductive process to the induction of Social Sciences.Once seated on the neutrality of the social fact, legal science can finally be cleansed ofRousseau’s ideology and be, after all, depoliticized. The leplaysiens ultimately found the truebasis of law in tradition, defined as a mixture of immanence and historicity. The disciples of LePlay, who intend to promote reforms to the advent of a traditional society vector of social peace,then use formal sources of law. The latter appear truly manipulated : the followers of theengineer use indeed to suit their needs, both custom, jurisprudence and law to achieve theirreforms. It appears from this study that they have mostly influenced the Third Republiclegislation in a methodological and intellectual way.

Text in English and Arabic / In pre-colonial Africa, the Southwestern Sahara which includes Mauritania, Mali and Senegal belonged to what was then referred to as the Sudan and extended from the Atlantic seaboard to the Red Sea. The advent of Islam and the Arabic language to West Africa in the 11th century heralded an intellectual marathon whose literary output still fascinates us today. At a time when Europe was emerging from the dark ages and Africa was for most Europeans a terra incognita, indigenous African scholars were composing treatises as diverse as mathematics, agriculture and the Islamic sciences. A twentieth century Mauritanian, Arabic monograph, Irshād al- Muqallidīn ʿinda ikhtilāf al-Mujtahidīn1, written circa 1910/1332, by a yet unknown Mauritanian jurist of the Mālikī School, Bāba bin al-Shaykh Sīdī al- Shinqīṭī al-Ntishā-ī (d.1920/1342), a member of the muchacclaimed Shinqīṭī fraternity of scholars, is a fine example of African literary accomplishment. This manuscript hereinafter referred to as the Irshād, is written within the legal framework of Islamic jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh). A science that relies for the most part on the intellectual and interpretive competence of the independent jurist, or mujtahid, in the application of the methodologies employed in the extraction of legal norms from the primary sources of the sharīʿah. The subject matter of the Irshād deals with the question of juristic differences. Juristic differences invariably arise when a mujtahid exercises his academic freedom to clarify or resolve conundrums in the law and to postulate legal norms. Other independent jurists (mujtahidūn) may posit different legal norms because of the exercise of their individual interpretive skills. These differences, when they are deemed juristically irreconcilable, are called ikhtilāfāt (pl. of ikhtilāf). The author of the Irshād explores a corollary of the ikhtilāf narrative and posits the hypothesis that there ought not to be ikhtilāf in the sharīʿah. The proposed research will comprise an annotated translation of the monograph followed by a synopsis and commentary on its dominant themes. / Religious Studies and Arabic / D. Litt. et Phil. (Islamic Studies)