我國兵役制度從抗戰時期的「徵兵為主、募兵為輔」逐步走向「募兵為主、徵兵為輔」的募徵併行制，馬英九2008年當選總統，為落實競選政見，國防部規劃兵役制度轉型為募兵制，爰配合修正兵役法部分條文。 適逢立法院第七屆立法委員席次減半，由原本226席次減為113席次，委員自主性及影響力增強，執政黨組織行政院，亦掌握立院絕對多數席次，形成一致政府。 從公共政策過程理論來看，一個政策的推行，必須透過法律的制定、修正、廢止等方式，送請立機關完成政策合法化過程。本文從兵役法修法過程中，來探討國防部與立法委員互動關係，以提出加強其互動的具體建議。 基於以上的認知，本論文的發現如下： 一、法案草擬階段未讓立法委員有參與機會，使得政策規劃結果未能滿足立法委員的期許。 二、募兵制配套規劃尚未整合，法案先行送審，至國防部立論基礎薄弱，無法說服立法委員支持。 三、未公布政策影響評估，造成立法委員無法認同，讓立法委員對於募兵制無法成功產生的戰力空窗所造成的威脅感到質疑而無法認同法案。 四、與政策利害關係人的溝通不足，成為政策推動的阻力。 五、政策規劃評估不足，考量範圍不夠，形成爭議，造成立委抗拒。 六、立法委員對國防政策專業程度不足，需加強政策溝通。 七、挾持法案的議價協商，實際上係以其他利益交換為目的。 八、立法委員為貫徹黨紀，必要時，個人政治理念須妥協，國防部在政策溝通上，除了立法委員個人意見外，亦須積極遊說黨團。 / The military service system in Taiwan, or the Republic of China (R.O.C) Military Service System, has been gradually heading from a predominantly-conscription mode of recruitment, first adopted during the Period of the Second Sino-Japanese War, toward a predominantly-voluntary recruitment plan. To intiate such a transition and to keep the promises he gave before the 2008 presidential election, the president of the Taiwan (R.O.C.) Ma Ying-jeou urges that the Ministry of National Defense in Taiwan contrive a plan for the necessary modifications in the Taiwanese (R.O.C) law regarding the military service system. Also relating to this, it is to note that a 50% reduction of the number of the seats in the Legislative Yuan in the 7th general election of legislators, from 226 to 113 seats, granted each legislator more autonomy and opportunity to extend his/her personal influence than before, and that Taiwan was hence led by a government whose executive and legislative power came hand in hand becuase the ruling party not only able to organize the Executive Yuan but it also comprised the absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan, after the 2008 election. All taken into considertations, this dissertation aims to provide concrete suggestions as to the enhancement of the quality of the interactions between the Ministry of National Defense and legislators, from the analysis of such modifications. theoretically speaking, have to undergo the due processes to be implemented: the codification of law, a modification period, the abrogation of the inappropriate items of law, and a final evaluation by the Legislative Yuan. The findings are as follows: 1.The legislators' complaints about the unsatisfactory results of military policymaking may arise from a lack of opportunity for them to participate in the early processes. 2.Failure in establishing complementary measures for voluntary military recruitment before it reaches the Legislative Yuan, as well as a flimsy theoretical basis on which the Ministry of National Defense argues for it, make it difficult to persuade legislators that they should implement the new policies. 3.Legislators’ common worries about an imminent though transient threat, of a laspe of national armed force, which is deemed to be highly likely to result from such a change, have not been officially accounted for by the Ministry of National Defense. This prevents the legislators from agreeing to it. 4.The lack of effective communication among stakeholders of the policy impedes its implementation. 5.The lack of careful evaluations and an inclusive framework, make it controversial and legislators hate it. 6.Legislators are not proficient in the policymaking in terms of national defense, so the need more communication. 7.Negotiations are sometimes based on other commercial purposes. 8.Individual legislators, if necessary, are coerced to conform to the ideology upheld by their greater political party. The Ministry of National Defense has also to take into accounts the benefits of political parties.

Cette thèse s’intéresse aux choix institutionnels des législateurs. Elle propose une analyse diachronique et comparative du développement des Chambre Nationale des Députés argentines et chiliennes des années 1940 aux années 2000. Inspiré de la théorie du Cartel (Cox et McCubbins, 1993), ce travail se concentre sur le rôle des partis politiques dans ce développement institutionnel. Il montre qu’en dépit de leurs différences, les partis uniques, coalitions, forces majoritaires ou minoritaires qui ont dirigé ces chambres ont adopté un large éventail de règles et de normes organisationnelles qui les avantagent. Ils se sont, en un mot, comportés comme des coalitions procédurales. L’analyse des modifications des règles de fonctionnement de ces chambres et de leurs systèmes de direction et de commissions montre que les partis et coalitions au pouvoir ont, pendant cette période, renforcé leur pouvoir, contrôlé l’agenda législatif, structuré les systèmes de commission et adopté des règles qui leur ont profité. Les résultats obtenus suggèrent en particulier que les coalitions qui ont dirigé la chambre Chilienne ont installé certains de leurs membres à plusieurs postes comme les présidences d’assemblée et de commissions. Ils montrent l’existence d’un pouvoir de véto sur l’agenda législative plus importante au Chili qu’en Argentine. L’étude du cas argentin montre que les partis au pouvoir ont, en particulier depuis les années 1960, conservé le contrôle de la chambre, non seulement en modifiant les règles et les structures du système de commissions, mais également en créant et distribuant à l’opposition des postes permanents mais sans réel pouvoir. Cette analyse confirme également les résultats obtenus par de récentes études concernant ce champ de recherche, notamment le professionnalisme du système de commission chilien et le caractère amateur des législateurs argentins. A l’inverse, elle met à jour des différences, négligées jusqu’alors, entre l’Argentine et le Chili concernant le contrôle de l’agenda législatif. Cette thèse est divisée en sept chapitres. Le premier introduit le sujet, l’hypothèse générale et les questions posées par la thèse, en expliquant également pourquoi les choix institutionnels des législateurs importent. Le chapitre II présente la théorie et la méthodologie. Il propose une définition du développement institutionnel et explicite les prédictions et critères permettant de tester l’hypothèse générale. Les chapitre III et IV, qui concernent respectivement l’Argentine et le Chili, décrivent le système politique de chaque pays et l’organisation des chambres durant la période étudiée. Les chapitre IV et VI, respectivement pour l’Argentine et le Chili, analysent les réformes des règles régissant les chambres, l’évolution de l’autorité qui les dirige et celle du système de commission. Ces chapitres se concluent par un résumé des différents schémas mis en évidence et une évaluation préliminaire de l’hypothèse générale. En conclusion, le chapitre VII résume les découvertes, donne un verdict global sur la fécondité de la théorie et suggère de nouvelles pistes de recherche. / This thesis is about the institutional choices of legislators. It provides a comparative and diachronic analysis of the institutional development of the National Chambers of Deputies of Argentina and Chile from the 1940s to the 2000s. Based on Cartel Theory (Cox and McCubbins 1993), it focuses on the role played by parties in this institutional development. It demonstrates that despite their differences, the various majorities and pluralities, single-parties and coalitions that ruled these Chambers have maintained and adopted a constellation of organizational rules and norms that advantaged their interests. In other words, they have behaved as procedural coalitions. The analysis of the reforms to the rules of these Chambers and of their directing board and committee systems indicates that ruling parties and coalitions have increased their power during the period, controlled the legislative agenda, structured the committee system, and adopted rules that benefit them on the floor. In particular, the results suggest that Chilean ruling coalitions have endowed several offices, such as the Presidency, the Chairs of committees, the committee on Finance (Hacienda) and on Rules, with negative agenda-setting power, and that some of them are more powerful than their Argentine’s counterparts. In the case of the Argentine Chamber, specifically since the 1960s, ruling parties have kept control of the Chamber not only by reforming the rules and structuring the committee system but also creating and distributing powerless but permanent positions to the opposition. The analysis also confirms previous findings made by recent studies in the subfield, specially the professionalism of the Chilean Committee system and the amateur character of Argentine legislators. By contrast, it shows differences in the agenda control between the Argentine and Chilean Chambers that were overlooked. The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the general hypothesis, the purposes and main questions of the thesis, and explains why the institutional choices of legislators matter. Chapter II presents the theory and the methodology. It provides the definition of institutional development and the criteria and predictions used to test the general hypothesis. Chapters III (Argentina) and V (Chile) offer an account of each country’s politics and a description of the Chambers’ organization during the period. Chapters IV (Argentina) and VI (Chile) analyze the reforms to the rules of the Chambers, and the evolution of the directing board and committee systems and conclude with a summary of the patterns found and a preliminary assessment of the general hypothesis. Chapter VII concludes. It sums up the findings, provides a final assessment of the theory, and suggests further avenues of research.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:14:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3502.pdf: 1102426 bytes, checksum: 050d52b959eb607cdc62096f379640c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-01 / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / The interaction between the Executive and the Legislative in the Brazilian presidential system has been ruled by two antagonistic approaches. The first one examines that the relations between both powers would be ruled by confronting each other and by irreconcilable interests. This is because a combination of the presidential system, multipartidarism, open-list proportional representation system and federalism would induce to the formation of a clientelistic Congress, which would be undisciplined and dominated by weak political parties. The second perspective reinforces the high level of cooperation in the relations between those powers due to the centralization which rules the legislative work, and due to the executive and the partisan leaders´ preponderance in the ruling process, allowing the establishment of an enduring coalition. From these considerations, this study analyzes how the Brazilian presidential system was run during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva government (2003-2010) by two main aspects: firstly, the notable cooperation between the Executive and the Legislative powers visualized in the formation of coalitions, in the allocation of ministry positions and in the election for the main legislative positions, such as the presidencies of the House of Representatives, Federal Senate and Permanent Committees; and, secondly, the evident participation of the political parties of the situation and the opposition through reports by the legislators of the National Congress Committees, as well as the action throughout amendments and replacements. Thus, it has been proved that Lula government was supported by enduring and disciplined coalitions which, then, had the main executive and legislative positions. Furthermore, it has been verified that the Legislative power does not ratify all the propositions derived from the Executive power, because it has actuated in the committees by altering them. Consequently, cooperation was constant in the ruling process, but the negotiation and conflict were also indispensable factors for a better performance of the system official duties. / A interação entre Executivo e Legislativo no presidencialismo brasileiro é pautada por duas abordagens antagônicas. A primeira abordagem observa que as relações entre os poderes seriam pautadas pelo confronto e por interesses irreconciliáveis, pois a combinação de presidencialismo, multipartidarismo, sistema proporcional de lista aberta e federalismo induziria à formação de um Congresso clientelista, indisciplinado e dominado por partidos políticos fracos. Por sua vez, a segunda perspectiva ressalta o elevado grau de cooperação nas relações entre os poderes devido à centralização que pauta os trabalhos legislativos e à preponderância do Executivo e dos líderes partidários no processo decisório, permitindo o estabelecimento de uma coalizão estável. A partir destas considerações, o estudo analisa o funcionamento do presidencialismo brasileiro durante o governo de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) através de dois aspectos principais: em primeiro lugar, destacando a cooperação entre Poder Executivo e Poder Legislativo, visualizada na formação de coalizões, na distribuição de pastas ministeriais e na eleição para os principais cargos legislativos, como as presidências da Câmara dos Deputados, do Senado Federal e das Comissões Permanentes; e, em segundo lugar, evidenciando a participação dos partidos políticos da situação e da oposição nas relatorias das Comissões do Congresso Nacional, assim como a atuação por meio de emendas e de substitutivos. Com isso, ficou constatado que o governo Lula foi apoiado por coalizões estáveis e disciplinadas que, por sua vez, obtiveram os principais cargos executivos e legislativos. Ademais, verificou-se que o Poder Legislativo não foi um mero ratificador de proposições oriundas do Poder Executivo, pois atuou nas comissões por meio de alterações nas proposições. Por conseguinte, a cooperação foi uma constante do processo decisório, mas a negociação e o conflito também foram fatores imprescindíveis para o bom-funcionamento do sistema.

Submitted by Fernanda Montenegro Calado (fernandacalado@hotmail.com) on 2012-10-24T02:52:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_FernandaMCalado.PDF: 1386107 bytes, checksum: ae128e1a91925c5d8d6dfacfc98647bb (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2012-10-29T15:44:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_FernandaMCalado.PDF: 1386107 bytes, checksum: ae128e1a91925c5d8d6dfacfc98647bb (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2012-10-30T18:49:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_FernandaMCalado.PDF: 1386107 bytes, checksum: ae128e1a91925c5d8d6dfacfc98647bb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-30T18:53:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_FernandaMCalado.PDF: 1386107 bytes, checksum: ae128e1a91925c5d8d6dfacfc98647bb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-04 / O objetivo desta pesquisa foi analisar como conselheiros municipais e vereadores do Recife reconhecem o direito à participação na gestão pública e o direito à representação eleitoral e às funções daí decorrentes. Deste modo, podem-se observar os impactos ocasionados pela instância de participação em uma instituição tradicional de representação política, de modo a aperfeiçoar o modelo de Gestão Social. A análise foi realizada à luz da teoria do reconhecimento, especificamente as ideias de Axel Honneth. Para tanto, foram aplicados questionários e realizadas entrevistas com conselheiros e vereadores do Município, assim como foram analisados documentos da Câmara. Observou-se que ambos os grupos mostram-se favoráveis ao diálogo entre as instâncias, apesar dos conflitos que ainda precisam ser vencidos. Vereadores têm assento nos conselhos, apesar de que a participação não acontece na prática. Concluiu-se que o reconhecimento não ocorre em sua integralidade, sendo uma luta em construção. / The purpose of this research was to analyze how members of municipal popular councils and municipal legislators from the city of Recife recognize the right that society has to participation in public administration and the right that legislators have to electoral representation. In this way, we can observe impacts caused by councils on a traditional political institution, in order to improve the model of Social Management. The analysis was based on recognition theory, particularly on the ideas of Axel Honneth. In order to achieve goals, questionnaires were administered, interviews were made and documents from Legislative Chamber were analyzed. It was observed that both groups have favorable opinion of the dialogue between authorities, despite conflicts that still must be overcome. Councils reserve seats to legislators, although participation does not occur in practice. We concluded that recognition does not occur entirely, it is an ongoing struggle.

This paper will explore further the process of selection of majority party leaders in the United States House of Representatives. It will seek to show that there were certain common denominators that existed among those who were selected for leadership positions between 1962 and 1976, and that these common denominators were not present in those individuals who challenged the leaders and lost. Additionally, it will be argued that those certain qualities were particularly important to the style of leadership during that period, and that their importance to that style allowed the development of an institutionalization of the selection process during that period.

Within the literature devoted to the study of political parties, scholars have recently directed more attention towards intraparty dynamics. The ‘party as a unitary actor’ assumption seems to have withered away in the last decades. The party is increasingly viewed as a heterogeneous entity, in which dissenting attitudes are frequent. Yet the causes of intraparty dissensions remain quite obscure. This dissertation aims at providing a better understanding of the causes of dissent within parties, especially within parliamentary party groups. <p><p>Intraparty conflicts, dissent or ‘voice’ phenomena have been studied through different literatures that have developed independently from each other: studies dealing with party factionalism, social-psychological and economic theories of organizations (e.g. Hirschman’s trilogy of exit, voice and loyalty), and legislative studies dealing with parliamentary party voting unity. The dissertation attempts to (re)conciliate these separate literatures, and shows how legislative studies, factionalism literature and theories of organizations can help to rethink the concept of dissent, and to grasp why parliamentarians are more or less likely to dissent from their party line. <p><p>The dissertation defines dissent in the parliamentary party as a two-dimensional concept, and operationalizes it as the MP’s frequency of disagreement with her/his party and the MP’s attitude of (non)loyalty in case of such disagreement. At the theoretical level, the dissertation draws on several theoretical approaches –institutional, rational and sociological– and formulates a broad set of hypotheses linking system-, party- and individual-level factors to these two dimensions of dissent. At the empirical level, the dissertation analyzes the causes of dissent within parliamentary parties in a comparative perspective. The analysis examines parliamentarians’ attitudes across 15 European national parliaments and tests the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical part by using the PARTIREP MP Survey dataset. <p><p>The results first show that, while European parliamentary parties are usually viewed as united blocks in terms of voting behavior, looking at MPs’ attitudes provides a more nuanced picture: European parliamentary parties show important variations in their MPs’ frequency of disagreement and attitudes of non-loyalty. Among the factors that explain these variations, both institutional (electoral rules, state structure, effective number of parties, intraparty organization) and sociological (gender, age, socialization, ideological preferences) factors need to be considered. In addition, the research shows that the two dimensions of dissent, though they are connected by a sequential relationship, should be studied distinctly, as different factors affect them respectively. The frequency of disagreement is best explained by the MP’s gender and previous elected office at a lower level than the national one, by the ideological distance between the MP and her/his party’s position in interaction with the party ‘family’, and by intraparty organizational factors (candidate selection procedures and EPO-PPO power balance). Non-loyalty depends more on the institutional structure (multilevel vs. unitary state, ENP) and on the candidate-centeredness of the electoral system; but is also affected by individual-level factors (age and length of incumbency) and by the party ‘family’. On the whole, by contrast to what is usually argued, ‘the party’ matters’ in determining the level of intraparty cohesion: the impact of intraparty organizational structure and party ideology or family is determinant, but more research is definitely needed in order to disentangle the ‘organizational’ vs. the ‘ideological’ effects.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Although the main emphasis of this study is Lane and his part in the Republican Party, another important part to this thesis is the examination of Indiana and national politics in the 1850s. This thesis studies the development of the Hoosier Republican Party and the obstacles the young organization experienced as it transformed into a major political party. Party leaders generally focused on states like New York and Pennsylvania in national elections but Indiana became increasingly significant leading up to the 1860 election. Though Hoosier names like George Julian and Schuyler Colfax might be more recognizable nationally for their role in the Republican Party, this thesis argues that Lane played a guiding role in the development of the new third party in Indiana. Through the study of primary sources, it is clear that Hoosiers turned to Lane to lead the organization of the Republican Party and to lead it to its success in elections. Historians have long acknowledged Lane’s involvement in the 1860 Republican National Convention but fail to fully realize his significance in Indiana throughout the 1850s. This thesis argues that Lane was a vital leader in Hoosier politics and helped transform the Republican Party in Indiana from a grassroots movement into a powerful political party by 1860.

Floor crossing was an unknown phenomenon in Malawi until the re-emergence of multiparty politics in 1994. Since then the number of MPs crossing the floor in the Malawi National Assembly has steadily increased from around twelve in 1994 to more than sixty in 2005. This practice has continued even today. However, the biggest incident of floor crossing took place in 2005 when the State President, Dr Bingu wa Mutharika, under the United Democratic Front (UDF) decided to abandon the party that sponsored him into office to form his own, the Democratic Progressive Party in February, 2005. Following him were several opposition MPs, a move which sparked a lot of tension in the National Assembly. The purpose of this study was to investigate political factors contributing to this phenomenon, and it was established that, among other factors, institutional weaknesses of political parties and gaps in the Constitution contributed significantly to floor crossing. / Political Science / M.A. (African Politics)

Alors qu’une riche littérature se concentre sur l’euroscepticisme au sein des arènes politiques nationales, les oppositions à l’Europe au niveau supranational restent largement négligées. Afin de contribuer à combler cette lacune, cette recherche s’interroge sur la façon dont les députés eurosceptiques conçoivent et exercent leur mandat représentatif au sein du PE. Fondée sur l’approche motivationnelle des rôles, il s’agit, d’une part, d’appréhender les rôles joués par les eurosceptiques au sein de l’assemblée et, d’autre part, d’expliquer l’hétérogénéité des rôles endossés par ces élus. Mobilisant une pluralité de données, cette recherche repose sur une méthodologie mixte, combinant méthodes qualitative et quantitative ainsi qu’approches inductive et déductive. L’analyse s’articule autour de deux séquences. La première propose une typologie d’idéaux-types de rôles permettant de rendre compte des pratiques et conceptions du mandat développées par les parlementaires eurosceptiques. La seconde explique la variation des rôles au sein de cette typologie et teste l’hypothèse selon laquelle le rôle dépend d’une combinaison de facteurs institutionnels et individuels. L’étude démontre que les eurosceptiques peuvent endosser quatre rôles, correspondant à une stratégie de défection ou de prise de parole, et que le rôle qu’ils jouent dépend à la fois des règles régissant le fonctionnement du PE et de leurs préférences relatives à l’intégration et à l’architecture institutionnelle de l’UE. Ce faisant, la recherche constitue une réflexion sur deux enjeux très distincts. Premièrement, alors que l’on assiste, dans de nombreux pays européens, à l’émergence de revendications d’acteurs contestant les structures institutionnelles en place, cette thèse permet de contribuer à l’étude, encore restreinte, de l’opposition antisystème au sein d’institutions parlementaires, le PE servant ici de laboratoire privilégié pour l’étude des stratégies de ces acteurs antisystème. Deuxièmement, à l’instar des travaux de sociologie de l’intégration européenne, cette recherche repose sur le postulat qu’analyser de façon microscopique un groupe restreint d’acteurs permet de s’interroger, de façon différente, sur le déficit démocratique et de légitimité du régime européen, en déplaçant la focale du niveau institutionnel au niveau individuel. Il s’agit alors d’appréhender les défis de légitimation de l’UE en se concentrant sur les acteurs hostiles à la construction européenne. Une analyse de leurs pratiques concrètes au sein de l’assemblée représentative permet de dégager des pistes de réflexion quant à leur capacité de légitimation du régime politique. <p><p>While an abundant literature focuses on Euroscepticism in the national political arenas, oppositions to Europe at the supranational level remain largely under-studied. In order to contribute to fill this gap, this research examines how Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) conceive and carry out their representative mandate in the European Parliament (EP). Inspired by the motivational approach of role theory, the study aims first at understanding the roles played by Eurosceptics within the assembly and second at explaining the heterogeneity of the roles played by these actors. Using a plurality of data, this research is based on mix-methods, combining qualitative and quantitative methodologies as well as inductive and deductive approaches. The analysis proceeds in two steps. The first proposes a typology of ideal-types of roles that allows understanding the ways Eurosceptics conceive and carry out their parliamentary mandate. The second explains the variation between the roles and tests the hypothesis that the role played by an actor depend on the combination of institutional and individual factors. The study demonstrates that Eurosceptics may assume four roles, corresponding to an exit or voice strategy, and that the role they play depends both on the EP’s rules and MEP’s preferences concerning European integration and the EU’s institutional design. The research contributes to on-going debates on two very different issues. First, while we witness in many European countries, the emergence of anti-system actors, this thesis can contribute to the study of the anti-systemic opposition within parliamentary institutions, the EP being here a special laboratory for the study of the strategies of anti-system actors. Second, like recent studies focusing on the sociology of European integration, this research is based on the premise that analysing a small group of actors allows to question in a different way, the democratic and legitimacy deficit of the EU, moving the focal from the institutional to the individual level. The aim is then to understand the challenges of legitimacy of the EU by focusing on actors hostile to the European project. An analysis of their actual practices in the EP allows us to reflect on their ability to legitimize the political system.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished