Partant du constat que les écrivains, dans leur quasi-totalité, se sont intéressés à la nature sous la forme très spécifique et très conditionnée du paysage, cette thèse cherche à situer l’originalité de l’œuvre de J. L. Trassard dans le fait que la vision de celui-ci refuse cette fatalité du devenir-image de la nature, en littérature. En se fondant sur une distinction phénoménologique essentielle entre image et perception, il s’agit de montrer que l’écriture de Trassard se situe du côté de cette seconde modalité intentionnelle. Or les conséquences d’un tel parti pris sont décisives, dans la manière qu’a l’écrivain d’appréhender l’espace : non pas à distance, mais au plus près, au plus ras ; non pas en surplomb sur le réel, mais dans un rapport de chiasme et d’empiètement ; non pas dans l’immobilité, mais dans l’embarquement et le mouvement ; non pas dans l’extase de la contemplation esthétique, mais dans une relation de transitivité (qui est celle du travail). Trassard, écrivain du travail de la nature, et non écrivain de la nature. Toutes ces caractéristiques d’une écriture de la perception se laissent au mieux approcher à l’aide d’une lecture attentive et serrée de l’œuvre de Merleau-Ponty. Et c’est sur les conséquences stylistiques d’un tel parti pris de la perception qu’il s’agit de se pencher finalement, à hauteur de la phrase même de l’écrivain. Enfin, cette thèse réfléchit à la singularité de l’apparition d’une telle œuvre dans la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, alors même qu’on assiste à un événement historique décisif : la sortie hors du néolithique, c’est-à-dire aussi la fin d’une certaine manière de se rapporter à la terre, aux bêtes, à la matière, à l’espace. / Starting from the observation that almost all writers are interested in nature under the very specific and highly conditioned form of the landscape, this thesis attempts to situate the originality of the work of Jean-Loup Trassard in his vision, which rejects the fate of nature to become image in literature. Based on an essential, phenomenological distinction between image (Bild or Phantasie) and perception (Wahrnehmung), this thesis aims at showing that Trassard’s writing lies on the side of the latter intentional modality. The consequences of this assumption are decisive, in the ways the writer has to capture space: not at a distance, but nearer, closer; not hanging over the real, but in a relationship of chiasm and encroachment ; not motionless, but involved and dynamic; not in the ecstasy of aesthetic contemplation, but in a relationship of transitivity and transformation (represented by work). Trassard is a writer of the work of nature, not a writer of nature. These characteristics of writing focussed on perception are best approached with the help of a close reading of Merleau-Ponty’s works, from The Structure of Behaviour to the manuscripts of The Visible and the Invisible. The stylistic implications of this primacy of perception lead us to finally turn to the level of the writer’s sentence itself. In a last part this dissertation reflects on the specific meaning of the appearance of such work in the second half of the 20th century, just when a decisive historical event is witnessed, i.e. the emergence from the Neolithic period, i.e. also the end of a certain way to relate to the earth, animals, matter, space...

Obwohl die Theatralisierung der Musik ein entscheidender Aspekt der Neuen Musik ist, der im Szenario nach 1945 noch mehr an Bedeutung gewinnt, kann die aber auch als Ausdruck einer musikalischen Wende zum Leib verstanden werden. Um von einer Wende zum Leib in der Musik zu sprechen, muss man auch eine Form des Dualismus zu überwinden. Durch die Werke avantgardistischer Komponisten wird in dieser Arbeit versucht, ein Verständnis der Musikwahrnehmung aufzubauen. / It is our thesis that, even though the theatricalization of music is a crucial aspect of the Neue Musik – one that gain even more prominence on the post-1945 scenario –, it is also an expression of a corporeal turn in music. To speak of a corporeal turn in music also means an attempt to overcome a form of dualism. It is an attempt to unify music making and music perception. This is what will be attempted here. Through the works of avant-garde composers, an attempt to build an understanding of music perception in the context of a corporeal turn in music will be made. From the perception of the body and corporeity to the move from “listening” to “perceiving” and, finally, in the concept of the work of music as a phenomenal field, a physiological perception of the avant-garde will be developed.

Med sitt ofullbordade verk Le Visible et l’invisible påbörjade Maurice Merleau-Ponty formulerandet av en poetisk ontologi – en filosofi som sätter konsten i centrum för erfarenheten av Varat och som därmed går att förstå som en estetik. Uppsatsen undersöker Merleau-Pontys Le Visible et l’invisible som en estetik i den dubbla bemärkelsen av en teori om sinnlighetens relation till tänkandet och vilken betydelse konsten har för denna relation. I fokus är sinnlighetens öppenhet gentemot en värld bortom det enskilda subjektet, som detta subjekt står i kontakt med genom sin kroppslighet. Här undersöks hur konstens sinnliga idéer indirekt frambringar en erfarenhet av Varats osynliga lager, de latenta samband mellan Varats framträdelser som följer och bär upp det synliga, och hur konsten därmed kan sägas frambringa en ny sanning. Här undersöks hur dessa sinnliga idéer kommer till uttryck, vilka former de antar. Med det aktiveras frågan om konstverkets form och innehåll, uttryck och mening. Sinnligheten förstås som samtidig gräns och öppning, som plats för den händelse som skapar världen. / With his unfinished work Le Visible et l’invisible Maurice Merleau-Ponty began to formulate a poetic ontology – a philosophy that places art in center of the experience of Being, and which is therefore possible to understand as an aesthetics. The essay examines Le Visible et l’invisible as an aesthetics in the double sense as a theory of how perception relates to cognition and what impact the arts has to this relation. It focuses on the perception’s openness towards a world beyond the subject, a world that the subject is connected to through its corporeality. It examines how the sensuous ideas of the arts indirectly brings forth the experience of the invisible layers of Being, the latent connections that lines and supports the visible, and how the arts therefore can be said to bring forth a new truth. It examines how these sensuous ideas come into expression, which forms they take. With that the question about form and content, expression and meaning, of the art work is activated. Perception is understood as the simultaneous limit and opening, as the place of the event that creates the world.

Denna vetenskapliga essä utforskar danslärares förhållande till kroppen, till smärta och fysiska förluster. Den diskuterar hur undervisningen påverkas och förändras på grund av skador och smärta. Undersökningen baseras dels på egna upplevelser, dels på intervjuer med danslärare med liknande erfarenheter. De teoretiska perspektiven hämtas främst från filosofer inom den fenomenologiska inriktningen, huvudsakligen Maurice Merleau-Ponty och andra som har tänkt i hans efterföljd och med utgångspunkt i hans teorier. Dessutom kommer texter av dansare och danslärare till tals när det gäller undervisning och förhållandet till kroppen som rörelse. För att komma närmare den mångbottnade smärtupplevelsen förs också en dialog med några verk inom bildkonst och litteratur. Resultatet visar att smärtupplevelsen är komplex och dubbeltydig för en danslärare. Vad gäller undervisningen kan det finnas sätt att arbeta med språk, med eleverna som centrum och med en justering av lärarrollen som gör att lärandet inte påverkas negativt utan tvärtom kan stärkas. Dock förefaller det finnas en gräns där de fysiska hindren blir så stora att det inte längre är möjligt att fortsätta undervisa. / This scientific essay explores dance teachers’ relation to the body, to pain and physical losses. It discusses how teaching is affected and how it changes because of injuries and pain. The research is based on personal experience as well as on interviews with dance teachers with similar experiences. The theoretical perspectives come first and foremost from philosophers of the phenomenological school, mainly from Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others who have thought and written with his theories as a starting point. Moreover, writings by dancers and dance teachers concerning teaching and the relation to the body as movement are used. To come closer to the multi-dimensional experience of pain, a dialogue takes place with some works of art and literature. The result shows that the dance teacher’s experience of pain is complex and ambiguous. Regarding teaching, there can be ways to work with language, the pupils as centres and an adjustment of the role of the teacher which can prevent learning from being negatively affected. However, there seems to be a limit where the physical barriers become so great that it is no longer possible to continue teaching.

This thesis is about meaning, expression and language in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, and their role in the phenomenological project as a whole. For Merleau-Ponty, expression is the taking up of a meaning given either in perception or in already acquired forms of expression, thereby repeating, transforming or congealing meaning into gestures, utterances, artworks, ideas or theories. Contrary to the predominant view in the literature, the relation of expression to meaning, and in particular the problem of expressing new meanings, was of fundamental importance to Merleau-Ponty from the very beginning, in that it was intrinsically related to the overcoming of what he termed “objective thought”. Admittedly, there is an evolution of his philosophy in this respect: from the early stance where the recasting of certain basic categories is taken as pivotal for the development of a new form of thinking, with arguments drawn also from various empirical and social sciences, to what appears to be an effort at an all-pervading reformulation of philosophical language during his last years. But the remoulding of categories was never for Merleau-Ponty a matter simply of finding a few, better adapted concepts, but from the outset an endeavour to think philosophical arguments through to a point where they reveal their inherent inconsistencies. Recasting philosophical expression is thus a risky enterprise, and this is a point I explore further in Essay 1, that focuses especially upon creative expression in painting and to some extent in literature. In Essay 2 I discuss the notion of Gestalt and how it serves this general project, whereas Essay 3 deals with verbal language, on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure’s linguistics. Essay 4 examines bodily expression from the point of view of feminist phenomenology and in particular Judith Butler’s early reading of Merleau-Ponty, and finally Essay 5 discusses expression in the art of dance. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 4: Accepted. Paper 5: Accepted.</p>

L'amitié entre Jacques Lacan et Maurice Merleau-Ponty est le fil rouge de ce travail comparatiste qui suit chronologiquement le dialogue ininterrompu entre les deux penseurs. L'étude des deux corpus est orientée par la question de l'autre, à entendre dans les deux sens du terme : question commune aux deux auteurs des possibilités de l'émergence d'autrui et, pour chacun, importance des questionnements et de la place de l'autre pour ses propres avancées. Comment psychanalyse lacanienne et phénoménologie merleau-pontienne ont-elles traité de la rencontre d'autui ? Comment ont-elles fait rupture avec les apories des conceptions philosophiques classiques et lutté contre l'impérialisme d'un positivisme objectivant ? Quelles sont les influences, les confluences et les divergences entre les deux auteurs ? Un lien est-il possible, pertinent, entre visibilité du monde et structure du langage, entre voir et dire ? Un rythme commun dans l'évolution des pensées est ainsi mis en évidence et après le tournant effectué par chacun à partir de la nouvelle référence à la linguistique saussurienne, c'est le primat de la dimension symbolique pour l'être au monde qui va être démontré. Le croisement, nécessaire chez les deux auteurs, de l'ontologie et de la topologie va actualiser les antinomies du continu et du discontinu, et réinterroger la genèse et la validité du couple sujet-objet. Les travaux de Lacan et de Merleau-Ponty invitent à une pensée renouvelée du sujet, perçu comme un être désirant toujours déjà engagé dans un environnement partagé, dont l'existence, incarnée par le chiasme de la Chair (du monde) et de la Chose (irrémédiablement perdue), devra affirmer son style entre contrainte de la structure et expression du sens

La présente étude vise à dégager les paramètres élémentaires d’une analyse phénoménologique de la danse. D’emblée, la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty s’impose comme cadre privilégié pour révéler l’expérience vécue de cet art qui met en scène un savoir corporel complexe. À partir de sa théorie de la perception, dont découlent les phénomènes relatifs au corps moteur, à l’espace et à l’intersensorialité, notre étude aménage les contours d’une analyse existentielle du geste dansé. Ce faisant, nous nous heurtons à un constat : le phénomène de la danse se présente comme un élément perturbateur de la pensée merleau-pontienne. En effet, il incite à en questionner les aspects fondamentaux, voire à en constater certaines limites. Informée par les études de Rudolf Laban, instigateur de la « danse libre » allemande et par les celles des philosophes contemporains Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Michel Bernard, Laurence Louppe et Renaud Barbaras, notre étude démontre en effet que la thèse merleau-pontienne de la perception empêche de cibler le travail kinesthésique du corps propre dans l’empire du « sentir » qui l’anime et de reconnaitre sa constitution profondément dynamique. Pour combler cette carence, nous invitons à une phénoménologie de la danse qui puisse embrasser sa nature poétique, la sensibilité créatrice qu’elle requiert et le travail sensible qu’elle habilite. Nous envisageons alors, avec le philosophe de la sensation Renaud Barbaras, de nous inspirer d’une heuristique aux traits vitalistes pour réhabiliter certaines notions battues en retraite par la tradition phénoménologique. En nous tournant vers les concepts de force, de désir, d’intensification, nous tentons de retrouver dans la logique de la sensation elle-même un dynamisme fondamental que l’expérience esthétique amplifie. La recherche nous montre que la danse est l’art qui, mieux que nul autre, rend compte de ce phénomène complexe. / In the present essay, we intend to establish and describe fundamental parameters apt to form the basis of a phenomenology of dance. The lived experience of this art, which flourishes via complex corporeal knowledge, can be approached through the Phenomenology of Perception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The latter’s phenomenology, from which derive recognizable behaviors linked to the moving body, space and intersensoriality, will guide us in outlining the existential elements of the dancing body. In pursuing our study of Merleau-Ponty, we will further show that the philosopher’s system proves incapable of sustaining the requirements intrinsic to the qualitative dimensions of dance. In fact, our study shows that Merleau-Ponty’s “body consciousness” is one that ontologically fails to reach the qualia that compose the dynamics specific to the movements of dance. Conversely, we adumbrate herein a phenomenology of dance forms that embraces its poetical nature, the creative sensibility that they require, and the sensuous “work” that they unfold.

of Ph.D. Thesis Phenomenological Conception of Space Eliška Luhanová The thesis focuses on the nature of experience which a perceiving self has with other beings and on the conditions which make such an encounter possible. It emphasises the role of the spatiality, which is seen as a defining characteristic of corporeal sensible beings. Broadly speaking, the work belongs to post-phenomenological philosophy. The Introduction summarises the main methodological principles of a phenomenological approach and presents post-phenomenology as a specific discourse which rejects the egocentrism typical of classical, especially Husserlian phenomenology. The exposition proper starts with an outline of a phenomenological theory of perception (Chapter I) and continues by offering an outline of the basic ontological characteristics of sensibly given entities, especially of their trans- empirical nature (Chapter II). The following chapter briefly treats some issues related to the nature of a phenomenal field, which is described as a structure of possible ways in which beings can manifest themselves (Chapter III). The subsequent chapters form the main core of the thesis. They deal with the spatial manner of being of entities which manifest themselves (Chapter IV) and of the self which experiences them (Chapter V). The...

Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / This dissertation takes up Maurice Merleau-Ponty's unfinished project of developing an ontology of nature whose concepts are drawn from the phenomenon of life, rather than from human techne. I argue that the question of life has been hopelessly obscured by the collapse, in the Modern era, of the distinction between nature and artifice. We cannot hope to understand the difference between life and non-life until we understand the difference between the living body and the machine. Merleau-Ponty's constant aim was to show that the living body is not a blind mechanism, and that the body has its own endogenous sense which is not projected onto it by a disembodied consciousness. Central to these efforts were the phenomena of learning and development, and the concept of form or Gestalt. Development is what distinguishes the living body, which is an open-ended process of becoming, from the machine, whose possibilities are determined in advance by its creator. In order to conceptualize the phenomenon of development, Merleau-Ponty appropriated from psychology the concept of form (Gestalt): a dynamic, self-organizing whole that cannot be decomposed into independent parts. Where the conception of nature as mechanism implies that everything is determined in advance, Merleau-Ponty's conception of nature as Gestalt allows for the genesis of genuinely new phenomena through nature's own self- organizing movement. We would thus be able to understand the genesis of sense in nature as a process of morphogenesis--the genesis of form. However, Merleau-Ponty struggled to clarify the ontological status of form. He lacked the conceptual resources to explain form in its own terms, rather than by contrast with the decomposable wholes of human artifice. This dissertation attempts to locate these conceptual resources in the science of complexity that has emerged since Merleau- Ponty's death, and whose descriptions of complex systems are uncannily anticipated in Merleau-Ponty's writings. I take from this new science the conception of form as asymmetry or difference, and of morphogenesis as symmetry-breaking or self-differentiation. In order to investigate how meaning emerges out of form, I turn to recent work in biology and psychology that applies the concept of symmetry-breaking to the phenomena of anatomical growth and motor development. By studying the development of the living body and its behavior, I show how nature articulates itself into perceiver and perceived. In the movement of the living body, form folds back upon itself, giving rise to a new kind of meaning: a pre-reflective, motor significance that is neither mechanism nor mental representation. In Chapter One, I distinguish the living body from a machine or artifact by distinguishing between manufacturing and growth. This distinction, which seemed obvious to the Ancients, has been obscured by Modern science's pivotal decision to treat nature as if it were a product of human artifice. This decision has committed us to an atomistic ontology, which takes nature to be a synthetic whole composed of mutually indifferent parts. However, this ontology faces a basic problem, which I call the problem of form: how to explain the synthesis of indifferent atoms into the complex, harmonious wholes we observe in nature, without appealing to an intelligent designer. Nowhere is this problem more acute than in the phenomenon of anatomical development or embryogenesis. I argue that biology has been unable to explain this phenomenon in mechanical or atomistic terms: the Neo-Darwinist view of the living body as a synthetic whole determined in advance by a genetic blueprint or program has succeeded not by explaining development, but rather by ignoring it. In Chapter Two, I argue that the problem of form--and of living form in particular--can only be resolved by abandoning our atomistic ontology, and with it our synthetic understanding of form as a shape imposed on an indifferent material. Recent developments in the science of complexity have yielded a new definition of form as asymmetry or difference. On this view, the genesis of form in nature is not the synthesis of wholes out of pre-existing parts, but the self-differentiation of wholes into parts through symmetry-breaking. In order to understand how natural wholes become less symmetrical over time, I introduce three further concepts from the science of complexity: nonlinearity, stability, and instability. With these concepts in hand, I return to the problem of embryogenesis, in order to show how complex living forms can develop reliably and robustly without being determined in advance by a design or program. In Chapter Three, I turn from anatomical development to the development of behavior, in order to see how the genesis of form becomes a genesis of sense. I begin by criticizing three mechanistic theories of behavior--Behaviorism, Cognitivism, and Connectionism--which suffer from the same problem of form that plagues mechanistic theories of anatomical development. Behavior grows like an organ: by symmetry-breaking, not by synthesis. Learning is not a matter of association, but of differentiation: the perception of increasingly subtle asymmetries in the body's environment through increasingly asymmetrical movements. It is the world that teaches the organism how to move--but a world that is only revealed to the organism by its own movements. Thus the living body and its world grow together dialectically, each driving the other to become more determinate through its own increasing determinacy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-04-06T12:48:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Nilce Cappoccia.pdf: 1959497 bytes, checksum: 8fda26309350204ca71d468e05b93e6b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-06T12:48:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nilce Cappoccia.pdf: 1959497 bytes, checksum: 8fda26309350204ca71d468e05b93e6b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-08 / This study contemplates a reflection on the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose main texts and triggers were The Doubt of Cézanne and The Eye and the Spirit, which articulated the theme of expression, mainly pictorial expression, as a form of sensitive creative manifestation. The painting is presented as a visible manifestation of any effort developed by the painter in contact with his object of study, in a meditative process. The artist experiences and makes use of the body, finding in the gestures and in the perception all the lived experience. The philosopher takes up painting as a path and theme for reflection / Este estudo contempla uma reflexão sobre a filosofia de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cujos textos principais e desencadeadores foram A Dúvida de Cézanne e O Olho e o espírito, que articularam a temática da expressão, principalmente da expressão pictórica, como forma de manifestação criativa sensível. A pintura é apresentada como manifestação visível de todo esforço desenvolvido pelo pintor em contato com seu objeto de estudo, num processo meditativo. O artista vivencia e faz uso do corpo, encontrando, nos gestos e na percepção, toda a experiência vivida. O filósofo retoma a pintura como caminho e tema para a reflexão