Este trabalho tem por objetivo verificar a procedência de uma hipótese sobre a origem da simbolização à luz dos dados do caso clínico de Nair, considerada como psicótica e autista em situações escolares e clínicas anteriores ao tratamento que embasou a tese. Segundo esta hipótese, o sujeito constitui o objeto antes de se auto-constituir como eu. A primeira parte do trabalho resume o caso clínico-institucional de Hermes, abordado anteriormente no mestrado, a partir de cuja reflexão surgiu a hipótese que se busca verificar à luz do caso clínico de Nair. Após contrastar detalhadamente a teoria lacaniana do simbólico e a ciência aristotélica do universal com a teoria espinosana da essência singular, o estudo volta-se à apresentação de um apanhado das sessões constitutivas do caso clínico de Nair. Na seqüência, o trabalho procede a reflexão teórica e metapsicológica sobre a condição psíquica singular revelada pela paciente, no contexto da psicanálise freudiana. É também considerado o psiquismo do analista, tal como se revelou na interação com a paciente. Finalmente, no último capítulo, procura-se refletir sobre o significado e a função metapsicológica dos instrumentos teóricos e técnicos acionados ao longo do tratamento de Nair. Tais instrumentos constituíram-se a partir de dois conceitos colhidos junto a filosofia de Merleau-Ponty. Concernentes a uma fundamentação corporal da intersubjetividade, as noções de co-percepção e reflexão em ordem, apropriados técnica eteoricamente ao contexto da prática psicanalítica do autor, tomam parte, no último capítulo, de Lima reflexão sobre a física da luz pressuposta na holografia. ) A conclusão da tese é a de que a hipótese de que o sujeito constitui o objeto antes de se auto-constituir como eu pode ser plenamente confirmada à luz do caso clínico e, além disso, ampliada em sua significação gnoseológica e ontológica, no campo teórico formado pela confluência entre a física da luz (ou óptica) e a psicologia profunda (ou metapsicologia). O campo teórico e prático assim configurado, o autor chamou de Psicologramática, vindo a propô-lo como um novo campo científico / This thesis aims to verify a hypothesis about the origins of symbolization through clinical data obtained from case of Nair. Nair was diagnosed as psychotic and autist in school and clinical settings before starting the treatment that originated the present thesis. According to this hypothesis, the subject constitutes the object before constituting itself as an I. The first part of the thesis summarises the institutional and clinical case of Hermes (Calderoni, 1994) from where the hypothesis being presently investigated was derived. A detailed review of Aristotle\'s science of the universal, Lacan\'s theory of the symbolic and Spinoza\'s theory of singular essence is followed by the presentation of a sample of clinical sessions constitutive of Nair\'s case. The theoretical and metapsychological reflection on the unique psychological condition expressed by Nair is then developed in the context of Freudian psychoanalysis. The psyche of the analyst, as it was revealed in the interaction with the patient, is also considered. The last chapter reflects on the meaning and metapsychological function of the theoretical and technical tools used along the treatment of Nair. Such tools find their origins in two concepts found in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Referring to the corporeal underpinnings of intersubjectivity, the notions of co-perception and reflection in the other were appropriated theoretically in tire context of the psychoanalytical practice of the author andused in a reflection about the physics of light embedded in holography. The thesis concludes by showing that the clinical case of Nair confines the hypothesis that the subject constitutes the object before constituting itself as an I. It also shows that this hypothesis can be extended in its epistemological and ontological meaning in the theoretical field formed by the confluence of optics (the physics of light) and depth psychology (or metapsychology). The thesis proposes that this theoretical and practical field should be called psychologrammatic and, as such, it constitutes a new scientific field

No description available.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 1997. / Bibliogr.: f. 165-171. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Notre projet vise à suivre et reconstruire, de l’intérieur de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty, le concept de « personnel » dans sa relation avec ceux d’« impersonnel » et de « généralité », les trois étant impliqués dans la notion de « chair » et faisant partie de la reformulation du sujet et de l’identité. Selon nous, négliger la connexion existante entre les aspects les plus « personnels » de chaque individu et ceux plus « généraux », qui soutiennent une conception aussi bien du sujet que de la société, donne lieu à une lecture partielle de l’auteur. Cela risque, de surcroît, de rendre difficile la compréhension de la dimension qui en est la synthèse la plus avancée chez Merleau-Ponty, à savoir sa dimension « charnelle ». Étudier la relation qui entrelace le « personnel » au « général », en passant par l’analyse du concept d’« anonymat », revient à chercher une clef d’intelligibilité majeure de la pensée merleau-pontienne, qui respecte l’ampleur de sa réflexion, pour en entrevoir les raisons de départ et en justifier les points d’arrivée, grâce à l’approfondissement de ses textes encore inédits. / Our project aims to reconstitute, from the inside of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical thought, the concept of « personal » in relation to the concepts of « impersonal » and « generality ». Those three concepts are involved in the notion of « flesh » and are part of the reformulation of the terms of subject (person) and identity. According to us, neglecting the bond between the more « personal » aspects of an individual and those more « general », aspects which support a conception of both subject and society, would lead to a « partial » interpretation of our author. In addition, it would make difficult the understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s most advanced synthesis, namely the dimension of the flesh. Studying the relation that intertwines the « personal » with the « general », through the examination of the importance of the notion of « anonymity » for our author, would mean instead looking for a central key of reading in the merleau-pontian thought, that would respect the whole amplitude of its reflection, so to sense the starting reasons and justify the arriving points, thanks to the in-depth study of its still unpublished texts.

Théoriciens et praticiens de la danse contemporaine recourent fréquemment à la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty. Pourtant ce philosophe n’a jamais pris la danse pour objet de pensée. Afin d’évaluer la pertinence et la fécondité et d’éclairer les modalités de cette paradoxale rencontre, cette recherche la met à l’épreuve de descriptions de pièces chorégraphiques dites contemporaines. Elle a abouti à la thèse suivante : non seulement la philosophie merleau-pontyenne constitue un étayage efficace pour penser la danse contemporaine mais cette confrontation s’avère également éclairante pour relire et comprendre les textes du phénoménologue. Ce travail a effectivement permis de mettre en exergue la fonction charnière de la notion merleau-pontyenne de porte-à-faux jusqu’ici peu remarquée et commentée. / Theorists and practitioners of contemporary dance frequently use the Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. However, this philosopher has never used dance as an object of thought. In order to assess the relevance and the fertility, and to clarify the terms of this paradoxical encounter, this research examines descriptions of choreographic called contemporary. It has resulted in the following thesis: not only the Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is an effective support to think contemporary dance but this confrontation is also illuminating for reading and understanding texts of the phenomenologist. This work has effectively highlighted the pivotal function of the Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the “porte-à-faux”, slightly noticed and commented on so far.

This paper seeks to show the proximity between the phenomenologicalreflection that Merleau-Ponty presents in the article “The War Has Taken Place” (1945), and the stories of Jose Carlos Agüero, in his book, Los rendidos (The Surrendered) (2015). From a phenomenological perspective (pre-reflective), both authors describe the experience of pain, shame and forgiveness as the pursuit of freedom and justice. The text is divided into two parts. In the first part, we present discourses of justice which were established after the Peruvian armed conflict (1980-2000) and the need of exercising the phenomenological “epochè” in order to describe the feelings of terror and shame that underlie as background of this shared experience. In the second part, supported by Merleau Ponty’s concepts of intersubjectivity and historicity, we define freedom as the pursuit of justice, which can only be understood at the primordialaction of being in relation with others, from which we give meaning to the past. / El presente artículo quiere mostrar la proximidad entre la reflexión fenomenológica que Merleau-Ponty elabora en el artículo La guerra tuvo lugar (1945), y los relatos de José Carlos Agüero, en su obra, Los Rendidos (2015). Desde una perspectiva fenomenológica (pre-reflexiva), ambos autores describen la experiencia del dolor, la vergüenza y el perdón como la búsqueda de libertad y justicia. El texto se divide en dos partes. En la primera parte, describimos los discursos de justicia instaurados luego del conflicto armado interno y la necesidad de realizar la “époje”, para describir los sentimientos de terror y vergüenza, que subyacen como fondo de esta vivencia compartida. En el segunda parte, apoyados en el conceptos de intersubjetividad e historicidad de Merleau-Ponty, definimos la libertad como la búsqueda de justicia, que solo puede comprenderse en la acción primordial de relación con los otros, a partir de la cual le damos sentido al pasado.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 4157.pdf: 2904242 bytes, checksum: dbaf93c398d3df686194c9877f64eae8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-28 / ABSTRACT This work takes its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty s Philosophy, centered in the notion of Crisis of Reason , basing itself on the presupposition that this is a fundamental concept of contemporary phenomenology. In the Cartesian thought, already it was possible to find the idea of the crisis, however, it was the finding of a crisis of sciences . Something similar was also in Valery, especially when he speaks of a crisis of spirit . The novelty of Husserl was exactly in showing that the crisis, as he lived it, was deeper, shook the Reason itself. This work assumes the task of showing that, not limiting to a crisis of sciences, of the spirit or of Reason itself, Merleau-Ponty discusses a present crisis in the man himself, or rather, in the diverse points of view that has about him. In this sense, his philosophical project is based, primarily, on the attempt to establish a dialogue with the points of view of the philosophy and of the science. Therefore, an inquiry of the divergence of these points, is warranted, elucidating not only the scenario in which the conflict is, but also its genesis. Likewise, starting from a Merleau-Pontian understanding of the crisis, finally, this study also assumes the task of asking about the repercussions of this crisis in the relation of philosophical knowledge to itself, then, in the way of his own philosophy to understand its history, being, therefore, the importance of this incursion in the desire to explain what, according to Merleau-Ponty, would be a possible way of overcoming. / Este trabalho parte de uma leitura da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty centrada na nocao de Crise da Razao , fundamentando-se no pressuposto de que se trata de um conceito fundamental da fenomenologia contemporanea. No pensamento cartesiano, ja era possivel encontrar a ideia de crise, porem, tratava-se da constatacao de uma crise das ciencias . Algo semelhante havia tambem em Valery, especialmente ao se falar de uma crise do espirito . A novidade de Husserl estava justamente em mostrar que a crise, tal como ele a vivia, era mais profunda, abalava a propria Razao. Este trabalho assume a tarefa de mostrar que, nao se limitando a uma crise das ciencias, do espirito ou da propria Razao, Merleau-Ponty discute uma crise presente no proprio homem, ou antes, nos diversos pontos de vista que se tem a seu respeito. E neste sentido que o seu projeto filosofico se fundamenta, em primeiro lugar, na tentativa de estabelecer um dialogo entre os pontos de vista da filosofia e da ciencia. Por conseguinte, justifica-se uma investigacao da divergencia destes pontos, procurando elucidar nao so o cenario no qual o conflito se encontra, mas tambem a sua genese. Do mesmo modo, partindo de uma compreensao merleau-pontiana da crise, por fim, este trabalho assume tambem a tarefa de se indagar acerca da repercussao desta mesma crise na relacao do saber filosofico consigo mesmo, logo, no modo da propria filosofia entender a sua historia, estando, pois, a importancia desta incursao no ensejo de explicitar o que, para Merleau- Ponty, seria uma possivel via de superacao.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissHJM.pdf: 736012 bytes, checksum: 0f33030b5c15024825637a981a06158a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-09 / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / This dissertation is based the relationship between Phenomenology and Metaphysics, one of the pillars of contemporary French Philosophy. If, in that context, there seems to be a consensus according to which the metaphysical is originary, we, on the other hand, aim at investigating its place and its origins. This work focuses on one of the aspects over which that relationship has developed, and which, at the same time, characterize one novelty of contemporary Philosophy, namely, the concern with language and with writing. When the phenomenological discourse unveiled what it first denied, the Being, when it neutralized itself in this incapability of expression, it brought the metaphysical, which thereafter needed to be seen as originary. What characterizes the metaphysical in discourse is, thus, a rational cohesion without a concept, that is, the absence of abstract and objective categories and of pure meanings given a priori, for a thought which could possibly be prior to language. With this rearrangement of the metaphysical concerning language, and taking it as a Philosophical theme, we return to the origins and to the inauguration of Philosophy. Finally, we analyze this surpassing of Phenomenology through the return to language phenomenon, which meant having another encounter with Philosophy after Phenomenology. This re-visitation meant the narrative of a new beginning. As we proceeded in this process, the importance of language for the whole ontological project of Merleau-Ponty became more and more clear, especially concerning the initial moments of a Phenomenology of perception, when it was not in the center of our analysis, and when it was not discussed. This silence was revealing to us. / Essa dissertação ganha vida na relação entre fenomenologia e metafísica, que é um dos pilares da filosofia francesa contemporânea. Se, neste contexto, parece haver o acordo de que o metafísico é o originário, procuramos investigar o seu lugar e a sua proveniência. Essa dissertação toma um dos aspectos sobre os quais se desenvolveu aquela relação, e que caracteriza, ao mesmo tempo, uma novidade da filosofia contemporânea, a saber, a preocupação com a linguagem e com a escritura. Quando o discurso fenomenológico desvelou o que o negava, o Ser, quando ele neutralizou-se nessa incapacidade de expressão, ele trouxe o metafísico para o discurso, que precisava ser, doravante, sempre originário. O que caracteriza o metafísico no discurso é, pois, uma coesão racional e sem conceito, isto é, a ausência das categorias abstratas e objetivas e das significações puras dadas a priori por um pensamento anterior à linguagem. Com esse remanejamento do metafísico para a linguagem, tomando-a como tema filosófico, voltamos às origens e à inauguração da filosofia. Restavanos analisar esse ultrapassamento da fenomenologia através do retorno ao fenômeno da linguagem, o que significou reencontrarmos a filosofia depois da fenomenologia. Reencontro que foi a narrativa de um começo. Ao longo desse caminho de volta foi se nos desvelando a importância da linguagem para o projeto ontológico de Merleau-Ponty, sobretudo, nos momentos iniciais de uma Fenomenologia da Percepção em que ela não estava no centro das análises, em que não se falou dela. Esse silêncio foi-nos revelador.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-04T12:50:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1466014 bytes, checksum: bfa0417a544782d7cfb24f364fc2280d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-04T12:50:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1466014 bytes, checksum: bfa0417a544782d7cfb24f364fc2280d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-07 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The Merleau-Ponty phenomenology’s, with the desire not to put the subject or the world as precedence to understand the relationship of being and living world, splits with the main philosophical currents of modernity, namely: intellectualism and empiricism. To overcome this, Merleau-Ponty resorts to notion of body lived and presents an approach about the perception always from the point of view of the perceiver. Thus, the being-in-the-world, located in their surrounding world, is constantly in relationship with this without distinguishable ever. The cogito, therefore, elevated to absolute by Descartes, reverts to “worldly” in this phenomenological philosophy, given that the thought no longer has the power to all “swallow” separate from the world. Being-in-the-world, in short, is to be in an experiential effectiveness, in which subject and world intertwined in a mutuality that form the unique experience possible. Finally, our work will focus on overcoming this phenomenology front of the egoic absolutism left by the intellectualism of Descartes. / A fenomenologia merleau-pontyana, com a preocupação de não pôr o sujeito ou o mundo como precedência para compreendermos a relação do ser e do mundo vivido, cinde com as principais correntes filosóficas da modernidade, a saber: intelectualismo e empirismo. Para esta superação, Merleau-Ponty lança mão da noção de corpo próprio e faz uma abordagem acerca da percepção sempre do ponto de vista daquele que percebe. Com isso, o ser no mundo, situado em seu mundo circundante, está em relação constante com este, sem distinguir-se nunca. O cogito, portanto, elevado a absoluto por Descartes, volta a ser “mundano” nesta filosofia fenomenológica, tendo em vista que o pensamento não detém mais o poder de tudo “deglutir” apartado do mundo. Ser no mundo, enfim, é estar situado numa efetividade vivencial, na qual sujeito e mundo entrelaçam-se numa mutualidade que forma a única experiência possível. Por fim, nosso trabalho versará sobre esta superação da fenomenologia frente ao absolutismo egoico deixado pelo intelectualismo de Descartes.

La thèse se préoccupe de la nature d’expérience que le moi percevant fait avec les autres étants et des conditions qui rendent leur rencontre possible. L’attention est centrée sur le rôle de la spatialité qui représente un caractère distinctif des étants sensibles corporels. La thèse s’inscrit dans le courant de la philosophie néo-phénoménologique. Dans les paragraphes d’introduction, les directives méthodiques de l’approche phénoménologique sont formulées, ainsi que la spécificité de la néophénoménologie,caractérisée comme une pensée qui se distancie de l’égocentrisme dominant la phénoménologie classique, notamment husserlienne. L’exposé part de l’esquisse d’une théorie phénoménologique de la perception (chap. I) et saisit les caractéristiques ontologiques élémentaires des étants donnés (chap. II). Le chapitre suivant traite brièvement les questions concernant la nature du champ phénoménal, caractérisé comme structure de donations possibles des étants (chap. III). Les chapitres suivants décrivent le mode spatial de l’être des étants qui se donnent au moi (chap. IV) et la spatialité propre au moi qui fait expérience (chap. V). L’attention est portée notamment à la liaison essentielle entre l’étant et son contexte ; ce motif est suivi jusqu’à l’insertion de l’étant dans le tout spatial du monde. Quant à la spatialité du moi, son corps est caractérisé comme un corps percevant et perçu,donné du dedans et du dehors à la fois. Le rôle des différences spatiales pour la constitution et la distinction de l’expérience du moi et des autres étants est élucidé. Le chapitre final montre que la spatialité du monde partagé implique aussi les autres moi possibles, ce qui fonde la valeur intersubjective de l’expérience sensible (chap. VI). / Phenomenological Conception of Space. The thesis focuses on the nature of experience which a perceiving self has with other beings and on the conditions which make such an encounter possible. It emphasises the role of the spatiality, which is seen as a defining characteristic of corporeal sensible beings. Broadly speaking, the work belongs to post-phenomenological philosophy. The Introduction summarises the main methodological principles of a phenomenological approach and presents post-phenomenology as a specific discourse which rejects the egocentrism typical of classical, especially Husserlian phenomenology. The exposition proper starts with an outline of a phenomenological theory of perception (Chapter I) and continues by offering an outline of the basic ontological characteristics of sensibly given entities, especially of their trans-empirical nature (Chapter II). The following chapter briefly treats some issues related to the nature of a phenomenal field, which is described as a structure of possible ways in which beings can manifest themselves (Chapter III). The subsequent chapters form the main core of the thesis. They deal with the spatial manner of being of entities which manifest themselves (Chapter IV) and of the self which experiences them (Chapter V). The main emphasis is on the essential bond which connects the given entities with their context,whereby this idea is generalised to the level of situating them within the spatial unity of the world. Regarding the spatiality of self, the main focusis on investigating the bipolar nature of one’s own body as bothperceiving and perceived, an entity which manifests itself internally andexternally, and the role of spatial distinctions in the formation and differentiation of the experience which a self has with itself and withother beings. The concluding chapter implies that a possible other self may be an integral part of the spatially differentiated shared world, thus establishing an intersubjective validity of sensory experience (Chapter V). / Předkládaná práce se zabývá povahou zkušenosti, kterou vnímající já činís jinými jsoucny, a podmínkami, za jakých je takové setkávání možné.Vyzdvihuje přitom zejména roli prostorovosti, která je určujícím znakemtělesných smyslových jsoucen. Práce se řadí do proudu postfenomenologickéfilosofie. V úvodní části jsou vystižena hlavnímetodologická vodítka fenomenologického přístupu a zároveň jeodstíněna post-fenomenologie jako typ myšlení, které se odklání odegocentrismu typického pro klasickou, zejm. husserlovskoufenomenologii. Vlastní výklad vychází od náčrtu fenomenologické teoriesmyslového vnímání (kap. I) a pokračuje vystižením základníchontologických charakteristik smyslově daných jsoucen, zejména jejichtransempirické povahy (kap. II). V následující kapitole se výklad krátcedotýká otázek spojených s povahou fenomenálního pole, jejžcharakterizuje jako strukturu možných daností jsoucen (kap. III). Následujíkapitoly, které tvoří vlastní jádro práce a týkají se prostorového způsobubytí dávajících se jsoucen (kap. IV) a já, jež činí se jsoucny zkušenost (kap.V). Podtržena je zejména bytostná vazba jsoucna na kontext, přičemžúvaha je vedena až k zasazení jsoucna do prostorového celku světa.V případě prostorovosti já je rozvíjena zejména dvojpólovost vlastníhotěla jako vnímajícího i vnímaného, daného zevnitř i zvenčí, a roleprostorových diferencí pro utváření a rozlišení zkušenosti já se sebousamým a s jinými jsoucny. Závěrečná kapitola naznačuje, žek prostorovosti sdíleného světa patří i možná druhá já, což zakládámožnost intersubjektivní platnosti zkušenosti (kap. VI).Klíčová slova: fenomenologie, ontologie, prostor, prostorovost, MauriceMerleau-Ponty, Jan Patočka.