No presente estudo, propomos o exame do problema da função simbólica nos primeiros trabalhos de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Mais especificamente, trata-se de abordar a posição do problema n\' \"A estrutura do comportamento\", obra publicada em 1942, e sua retomada crítica na \"Fenomenologia da percepção\", publicada em 1945. Esse tema, pouco explicitado pelo filósofo, é também objeto de raros debates entre seus comentadores. Em seu primeiro trabalho, Merleau-Ponty, apropriando-se da semântica do símbolo advinda da neuropsiquiatria do início do século XX, caracterizara o nível de organização da corporalidade humana a partir da sua capacidade de ultrapassar o caráter imediato das situações vividas. A atitude categorial, ou simbólica, aparecia, então, como uma nova significação do comportamento, tendo em vista as formas sincrética e amovível do comportamento encontradas na escala zoológica. A atividade humana investiria o meio de virtualidade e, assim, redimensionaria a existência concreta que se denota no comportamento animal. Nos capítulos da \"Fenomenologia da percepção\" em que Merleau-Ponty trata da espacialidade, da motricidade e da expressividade do corpo próprio, do mesmo modo que o autor prescinde das explicações causais dos fenômenos patológicos utilizados à guisa de material de discussão, ele prescinde das explicações calcadas na função simbólica, doravante associadas a análises de cunho intelectualista. O filósofo combate, tanto na neuropsiquiatria representada especialmente por Gelb e Goldstein quanto na filosofia de Cassirer, o que considera representar uma autonomia crescente da ideação simbólica na dinâmica entre conteúdo e forma. Ao mesmo tempo, Merleau-Ponty nos faz ver que, nessa neuropsiquiatria e nessa filosofia do símbolo, é possível apreender análises fenomenológicas acerca da expressividade motora, gesticular e linguageira do corpo próprio. Tais análises revelam, nele, uma forma de saber que não se reduz nem à ordem do em si nem à ordem do para si, delineando, portanto, a noção de intencionalidade que interessa ao filósofo desenvolver, fundada na unidade sinérgica do corpo próprio. Daí a importância que um outro dispositivo teórico-antropológico adquire ao longo da \"Fenomenologia da percepção\": a noção de esquema corporal. / In this study, we aim to investigate the problem of the symbolic function in Maurice Merleau-Ponty\'s first works. More specifically, we address the position of that problem in \"The Structure of Behavior\", published in 1942, and its critical review in the \"Phenomenology of perception\", published in 1945. This theme, on which the philosopher provided few specifications, is also a source of rare debates among his commentators. In his first work, Merleau-Ponty, using the semantics of the symbol from early 20th-century neuropsychiatry, characterizes the organizational level of human corporality based on its ability to go beyond the immediate nature of the experienced situations. The categorial or symbolic attitude seemed to be a new signification of behavior, in view of the synchretic and movable forms of behavior found on the zoological scale. Human activity would imbue the environment with virtuality and, thus, redimension the concrete existence denoted in animal behavior. In those chapters of the \"Phenomenology of perception\" in which Merleau-Ponty discusses the spatiality, motricity and expressiveness of the own body, in the same way as the author does without the causal explanations of the pathological phenomena used as discussion material, he dispenses with the explanations traced in the symbolic function, hereafter associated with intellectualist analyses. The philosopher combats, both in the neuropsychiatry particularly represented by Gelb and Goldstein and in Cassirer\'s philosophy, what he considers to represent a growing autonomy of the symbolic idea in the dynamics between content and form. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty makes us see that, in this neuropsychiatry and philosophy of the symbol, phenomenological analyses can be apprehended about motor, gesture and language expressions of the own body. These analyses reveal a form of knowing that is reduced neither to the order of in itself nor to the order of for itself, thus outlining the notion of intentionality which the philosopher wants to develop, based on the synergical unit of the own body. This explains the importance another theoretical-anthropological device gains in the \"Phenomenology of perception\": the notion of body schema.

Sob o tema do comportamento o presente trabalho se propõe a estabelecer um diálogo entre dois autores, um representante da escola behaviorista, Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990), e outro representante da escola fenomenológica, Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). Para atingir esse objetivo foram escolhidas uma obra de cada autor como referência primária: Science and Human Behavior e La Structure du Comportement, respectivamente. A escolha desses livros e autores em específico foi propiciada, principalmente, pelos seguintes motivos: a) a generalidade com a qual o diálogo entre behaviorismo e fenomenologia é tratado na literatura pertinente gera muitos equívocos pela ausência da experiência dos comentadores com uma ou outra escola; b) Merleau-Ponty apresenta uma proposta para o estudo do comportamento e dialoga com uma perspectiva que também lida com os aspectos comportamentais, o behaviorismo; c) Merleau-Ponty apresenta uma crítica aos behaviorismos de Watson, Tolman e Tilquin, mas não discute com o behaviorismo de Skinner, permanecendo incerto o grau em que essas críticas o atingem, se é que o atingem, e as possibilidades de um diálogo positivo. A tese segue três momentos. No primeiro há uma contextualização da fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty. No segundo há uma contextualização do behaviorismo de Skinner. No terceiro momento há o diálogo entre os autores fundamentado na análise de suas obras e da literatura pertinente. Nesse diálogo foram examinadas a crítica merleau-pontyana ao behaviorismo e algumas aproximações entre a noção de comportamento em Skinner e a noção de comportamento em Merleau-Ponty. Como resultado vimos que, em ao menos uma interpretação possível, as noções de comportamento em Skinner e Merleau-Ponty tem alguns sentidos em comum: o afastamento do reducionismo biológico e do mentalismo; e a aproximação com o antidualismo, a fenomenologia, o naturalismo, o caráter dialético e o organismo como um todo. / This thesis aims to establish a dialogue between two authors, Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-1990), from a behavioristic point of view, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), from a phenomenologic point of view. To reach this subject-matter, it was choosen one book of each author as a primary reference : Science and Human Behavior and La Structure du Comportement. The chose of this authors and books, especifically, was mainly motivated by this reasons : a) the generality by the dialogue beetween behaviorism and phenomenology is treated in the pertinent literature produces several misconceptions about how this psychological or philosophical aproachs are treated ; b) Merleau-Ponty shows a proposal to study behavior and dialogues with behaviorism, a perspective that also study the behavior ; c) Merleau-Ponty shows a critique about the Watsons, Tolmans and Tilquins behaviorism, but dont deal with Skinners behaviorism, remaining uncertain the extent by which this critique reachs radical behaviorism, and the possibilities of a positive dialogue. This thesis follows three moments. First, contextualization of the Merleau-Pontys phenomenology. Second, contextualization of Skinners behaviorism. Third, shows a dialogue beetween the authors based upon their books analysis and the pertinent literature. In this dialogue was examined the Merleau-Pontyan criticism to behaviorism and some rapprochements between Skinners notion of behavior and Merleau-Pontys notion of behavior. We concluded by a comum core possibility between their notions of behavior: the deviation from the biological reductionism and from the mentalism ; and the rapprochement with antidualism, phenomenology, naturalism, dialetics, and the organism as a whole.

Trata-se da análise de três leituras do corpo fenomenal que se desenrolam nas duas primeiras partes da Fenomenologia da Percepção, tomando como fio condutor a motricidade, a sensibilidade e o desejo enquanto manifestações da atividade no corpo no mundo. Na primeira parte da Fenomenologia da Percepção, Merleau-Ponty descreve a faculdade motriz do corpo, que desemboca na atividade expressiva; na segunda, a sensibilidade surge como iniciação e contato com o mundo. Já a leitura através do desejo, localizada nos caps. V da primeira parte e IV da segunda, conecta as duas precedentes e as unifica sob o tema da liberdade. Para tanto, a pesquisa trabalhará com a reconstituição dos conceitos de comportamento, percepção, campo fenomenal e da relação sujeito-mundo presentes nas primeiras obras de Merleau-Ponty. / This is the analysis of three readings of the phenomenal body that take place in the first two parts of the Phenomenology of Perception, taking as a guide the motility, sensibility and desire as manifestations of bodys activity in the world. In the first part of the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty describes the motor power of the body, which flows in expressive activity ; in the second, the sensibility arises as initiation and contact with the world . Already the reading through desire, located in chapters V of the first part and IV of the seconds, connects the two preceding and unifies them under the theme of freedom. To this end, the research work with the reconstitution of the concepts of behavior, perception, phenomenal field and subject- world relationship present in early works of Merleau -Ponty .

Il est aujourd'hui possible d'affirmer que, depuis la publication de L'Être et le Néant, s'est imposée une interprétation dominante, fondée sur la lecture de cet ouvrage, de l'ontologie de Jean-Paul Sartre. Les traces les plus marquantes de cette lecture peuvent être attribuées au travail critique de Merleau-Ponty, dont la philosophie s'est développée en partie par affinité avec la pensée sartrienne et en partie en opposition avec elle. En fait, plutôt qu'une simple opposition, la critique merleau-pontyenne opère un questionnement approfondi des principes fondamentaux de l'ontologie sartrienne, en particulier ce qui concerne le problème du dualisme. La présente thèse met en question la lecture de Merleau-Ponty -et avec elle la vision dominante plus générale qui s'est constituée de L'Être et le Néant -, en proposant une autre lecture qui vise, non pas simplement à offrir des réponses aux apories posées par l'apparent dualisme de Sartre, mais à principalement rendre possible la reprise de cette pensée d'une manière originale. Ainsi, le passage par la critique de Merleau-Ponty a signifié non pas une défense unilatérale du texte, mais plutôt une exploration des propres ambiguïtés de Sartre par d'autres chemins, indiquant une richesse peu exploitée de sa philosophie. Il a fallu alors présenter en quoi consistent les problèmes inhérents à la division établie par Sartre entre les modes d'être du pour-soi et de l'en­soi, à partir d'un déplacement des argumentations de Merleau-Ponty, et rendre manifestes les impasses révélées à la reprise de la question du dualisme en termes d'être et de néant, subjectivité et objectivité. Notre travail a consisté à démontrer qu'il y a des éléments implicites dans le texte -ou même explicites, mais non exploités -qui permettent de dépasser les difficultés posées par le dualisme. Inspirée par certaines analyses de Jacques Derrida sur les spectres, nous appelons spectralité la couche implicite de l'œuvre qui, en surgissant, ébranle la base dualiste qui paraissait la soutenir. En faisant émerger la couche spectrale, nous révélons aussi l'omniprésence et le caractère essentiel des relations de hantise, à tel point que nous comprenons l'ontologie de Sartre comme une hantologie, pour souligner la pertinence et la prédominance de telles relations. A partir de cette perspective, il est possible de voir non seulement qu'un dualisme rigide entre pour-soi et en-soi ne rend pas compte d'une multiplicité de modes d'être dans le texte sartrien, ni non plus de l'importance des relations de hantise qui garantissent l'imbrication des régions ontologiques, parfois considérées comme incompatibles. Cette lecture démontre finalement qu'un mode de présence non intuitive des spectres ébranle la supposée "pureté" lumineuse de la conscience qui s'est établie comme paradigme du sujet sartrien, dans la mesure où la hantise démontre un type singulier d'opacité qui finalement inscrit le sujet dans le monde et obscurcit sa relation à soi. / Today, it's possible to affirm that, since the publication of Being and Nothingness (L 'Être et le Néant), a certain reading based on this work has consolidated and established itself as the dominant interpretative view over Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology. This reading's most remarkable traces can be attributed to Merleau-Ponty's critical work, whose philosophy has developed in part because of an affinity which, at the same time, claimed for an opposition to Sartre's thinking. Merleau-Ponty's critical view, however, cannot actually be described as a simple opposition, since it leads to the deeper questioning of aspects which form the groundwork of Sartre's ontology, specially concerning the problem of dualism. This thesis calls into question Merleau­Ponty's reading - as well as the more general dominant view that has formed about L 'Être et le Néant - while proposing another interpretation, which does not aim at simply offering answers to the resulting aporias of Sartre' s apparent dualism, but primarily at amplifying the possibility to return to such line of thought through an original path. Thus, going over Merleau-Ponty's critical view did not mean defending a text has a single meaning; though it did suggest that Sartre's ambiguities could be worked with in other ways, indicating a seldom explored depth in his philosophical thinking. It was then necessary to explain the division established by Sartre between the modes of being For-itself and Being- in-itself, and its inherent problems. Moreover, after the displacement of Merleau-Ponty's arguments, it was essential to highlight the impasses revealed when reconsidering the issue of dualism in terms of being and nothingness, subjectivity and objectivity. Our work consisted in demonstrating there are implicit - or even explicit, but unexplored - elements in the text which allow us to surpass the difficulties created by the dualism. By way of an inspiration caused by a few analyses of specters by Jacques Derrida, we refer to spectrality as the implicit layer, which might arise from the work, undermining the dualistic basis seemingly supporting it. By making the spectral layer emerge, we also reveal the omnipresence and the essential character of the haunting (hantise) relations, to the point of understanding Sartre's ontology as an hauntology, and stressing the significance and predominance of such relations. From this perspective, it is possible to observe not only that a rigid dualism between the For-itself and the in Being-in-itself cannot encompass the multiple modes of being present in Sartre 's work, but also the relevance of the haunting relations as those which guarantee the imbrication of the ontological regions, at times taken as incompatible. Finally, this reading demonstrates how a spectral mode of non-intuitive presence disrupts the supposed luminous "purity" of conscience which bas stablished itself as a paradigm of Sartre's view of the subject, insofar as the haunting shows a unique kind of opacity which ultimately inscribes the subject in the world and overshadows his relationship to himself.

Notre thèse présente le résultat de l’étude de quelques aspects de la phénoménologie, interprétés à travers l’œuvre de Merleau-Ponty servant de clef de lecture pour comprendre l’actuel développement biopolitique. L’étude est dirigée par la conviction selon laquelle, si chaque époque a sa préoccupation dominante propre, au cours des quarante dernières années l’irruption de la « vie », du bios, comme problème est venue agiter notre présent, devenant de plus en plus l’objet d’un savoir ample et précis. Cet aspect qui est devenu typique de notre époque est aujourd’hui communément désigné sous le nom de « biopolitique ». Toutefois, bien qu’il soit devenu central dans la réflexion contemporaine, la variété des acceptions conférées au terme « biopolitique » font émerger le fait qu’aucune unité de signification ne correspond à cette notion. C’est là le point de départ de notre travail, au croisement de la phénoménologie et de la biopolitique. Que signifie « vie » ? A quelles conditions serions-nous aptes à parler de « corps vivant » ? Qu’est-ce qui permet la naissance d’une « communauté » ? Voici quelques-unes des questions implicites qu’une lecture phénoménologique de la biopolitique devrait poser, en indiquant ce sans quoi cela n’aurait aucun sens de parler de vie, de corps, de communauté. / This dissertation investigates certain aspects of phenomenology from the point of view of Merleau-Ponty’s work, taken as a key to understand the current development in biopolitics. The investigation is guided by the following conviction: if it is true that each epoch has its dominant concern, then, over the past four decades, “life,” bios, has shaken our present, becoming the subject of an increasingly extensive and detailed knowledge. This character of our epoch has become known as “biopolitics.” Though crucial to contemporary thought, the variety of meanings conferred to the term “biopolitics” shows that it is not a unified notion. Here begins the present investigation, at intersection of phenomenology and biopolitics. What does “life” mean? In what ways are we willing to talk about a “lived body?” What generates a community? These are the questions that a phenomenological reading of biopolitics must ask, indicating that without which it would have no sense to talk about life, body, and community.

Ces travaux se proposent d'interroger l'articulation au cinéma de la narrativité et du sensible de son image. Cette réflexion prendra appui sur la notion de chiasme de la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty, comme tentative de résorption du principe de dualité d'un monde de l'expression, renvoyant dans sa radicalité aux significations, et d'un monde du sensible, renvoyant dans sa radicalité au monde réel lui-même.Dans un premier temps, sont reprises les similitudes opérées par Merleau-Ponty entre la phénoménologie de la perception et l'expérience de la vision au cinéma.Dans un second temps, les figures essentielles de la narrativité cinématographique (récit, personnage,diégèse, montage) seront à leur tour envisagées dans leur enracinement dans le phénoménologique.Des mesures d'apories et de révélations émergeront de ce parcours cinématographique en pays merleau-pontien ; tensions pugnaces au sein de la notion même de chiasme, d'une préoccupation sémiologique, parfois occultée, et d'une ambition ontologique, à l'inachevé souvent stigmatisé. Il s'agira d'en penser, si ce n'est la réconciliation, tout du moins la cohabitation.En cette occasion, le cinéma pourra se révéler opérant par là-même où il semblait pécher, par l'expressivité de son image et le sensible de son expression. / This work proposes to examine the articulation of narrative cinema and sensible picture. Thisdiscussion will be based on the notion of chiasm of the Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, asattempted reversal of the principle of duality to a world of expression, referring to meanings, and aworld of sensible, referring to the real world itself.At first, we will study the similarities between the phenomenology of perception and the experienceof cinematic vision .In a second time, the essential figures of narrative cinema (story, character, diegesis, editing) will beconsidered in their phenomenological roots.Aporias and revelations emerge from this cinematic trip of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. Tensionsremain within the chiasm between a semiotic concern, sometimes hidden, and ontological ambition,often considered unfinished.On this occasion, the film will be effective where it seemed faulty, by the expressiveness of itspicture and the sensitivity of its expression.

A tese versa sobre o problema da verdade em Merleau-Ponty e sua oposição à verdade como adequação, portanto, à ontologia clássica dualista e, nesta via, sobre a arte como acesso à verdade, no percurso desencadeado pelo filósofo, e o que daí decorre em relação à instituição de uma ontologia. A arte, pois, como expressão da trama do ser por dentro - não imitação, re-apresentação ou fuga e, neste sentido, testemunho e rebento de uma reversibilidade irredutível (do expresso e da expressão, do signo e do sentido, do corpo e do espírito, de mim e de outrem, da palavra e do silêncio) no que toca à experiência do ser. Traços estes que circunscrevem a verdade no crivo da abertura e da coexistência e, com isto, do inacabamento da linguagem, da ação e do pensamento, compreendida, em última instância, como coesão sem conceito e, deste modo, não adequação. Com este foco, voltamo-nos inicialmente para a reformulação do problema da verdade nos termos de uma efetiva conduta interrogativa cujo solo é a existência enquanto jogo de imanência e transcendência; em seguida, para a ontologia da obra de arte e a intersecção com a filosofia e, deste modo, para a expressão inacabada da verdade; e, por fim, para o mundo sensível e, neste sentido, para a verdade na instância pré-reflexiva. / This thesis deals with the problem of truth in Merleau-Ponty and his opposition to truth as adequacy, therefore, to the classical dualist ontology and, in this way, to art as access to the path opened up by the philosopher and what comes out from this in relation to the institution of an ontology. Hence, art as expression of the being´s weave inside itself not imitation or reapresentation or flight and, in that sense, a proof and a bud of an irreducible reversibility (of what is expressed and the expression, the sign and the meaning, the body and the spirit, the self and the other, the word and the silence) as far as the experience of the being is concerned. These traces circumscribe truth in the riddle of openness and coexistence and so the unfinishiment of language, of action and thought understood, in the last instance, as cohesion without concept and, in that way, no adequacy. On this view, we turn away initially towards the reformulation of the problem of truth in terms of an effective interrogative conduct whose ground is existence while a game of immanence and transcendancy; besides, of the ontology of the work of art and the intersection with philosophy and therefore the unfinished expression of truth; and, at last, to the sensitive world and, in that sense, to truth in the pre-reflective instance.

L’analyse phénoménologique de l’expérience que Maurice Merleau-Ponty commence à ébaucher dans La structure du comportement (1967) et qui donne forme à la Phénoménologie de la perception (1945) nous rapproche du monde de la vie depuis la perspective de ce que l’auteur lui-même appellera la chair du monde, d’un monde qui nous parle médiatisé par les formalisations abstraites et par la conceptualisation d’une expérience qui nous échappe toujours et qui nous montre le caractère sans cesse fuyant du temps. À travers la nécessité de décrire l’arôme d’un citron et l’acidité de son goût, à travers la nécessité de retourner à ce monde en portant sur lui un regard plus naïf et pétri de notre expérience, nous pouvons trouver la nécessité même d’une analyse phénoménologique de l’enfance. Dans ce retour presque spontané vers la récupération des mouvements libres, du regard surpris, de la synchronie harmonieuse avec la peau des autres, l’enfant semble être non seulement le sujet d’étude de la psychologie (fuyant, complexe, échappant au regard de l’adulte), mais aussi l’image presque métaphorique de la genèse de l’acte perceptuel même, du stade pur et idéal de l’organisation corporelle d’un sujet qui semble arriver au monde doté de quelques outils qui déterminent, avant tout, son aperturité. Psychologie et pédagogie de l’enfant. Cours de Sorbonne (1949-1952) (2001), réunit un ensemble de cours dans lesquels l’auteur s’occupe spécifiquement du problème de l’enfance. Dans cette œuvre (qui constituera le fil conducteur de ce travail), Merleau-Ponty aborde différents aspects liés au développement infantile et à l’interaction entre l’enfant et le monde qui l’entoure. L’acquisition du langage chez l’enfant, la structure de la conscience infantile, l’intelligence, la perception et la relation que l’enfant établit avec les adultes, sont quelques-uns des thèmes que Merleau-Ponty développera tout au long de ces cours et qui ne seront pas seulement l’objet d’une analyse centrée uniquement sur l’étude de la constitution psycho-sociale de l’enfant, mais soulèveront également un certain nombre de questions au sujet de la théorie de la perception pour ceux qui l’abordent.Donc, l'objectif de ce travail est d’analyser les processus qui interviennent dans la construction du schéma corporel pendant la petite enfance, pour ainsi reconstruire la genèse de l’appareil perceptif depuis une perspective phénoménologique. Pour quelle raison l’enfance est-elle importante dans la théorie de la perception de Merleau-Ponty ? Existe-t-il une différence entre la théorie formulée dans la Phénoménologie de la perception et l’ensemble de concepts qui, à propos de ce processus, est présenté dans les cours dédiés à l’enfance ? Le schéma corporel est-il un construit théorique qui s’organise et se redéfinit à partir de dynamiques similaires au processus historique lui-même ? La proprioception, l’imagination, le transfert postural et la construction des habitualités perceptives sont quelques-unes des dynamiques qui seront étudiées de façon critique au sein de sa théorie, pour expliquer l’appropriation et l’utilisation qu’en fait le philosophe français et pour les rapprocher, dans le même temps, de quelques-uns des débats actuels de la psychologie du développement. De la même manière, les processus de constitution et d’organisation perceptive seront mis en dialogue avec la dynamique que Merleau-Ponty décrit comme étant sous-jacente à la temporalité historique et expliqueront ainsi les ruptures et les similitudes entre la définition du corps propre et la relance de l’histoire elle-même. De cette manière, un des principaux objectifs du présent travail sera d’explorer, non seulement les possibilités que la conception de l’enfance de Merleau-Ponty offre pour l’analyse de certains problèmes actuels de la psychologie infantile, mais également d’étudier les voies politiques que semble habiliter sa théorie corporelle de la perception depuis sa définition même du corps. / The phenomenological analysis of the experience that Maurice Merleau-Ponty begins to outline in The Structure of Behavior and which shapes in Phenomenology of Perception brings us closer to the world of life from what he will call the flesh of the world, a world that speaks to us mediated by abstract formalizations and by the conceptualization of an experience that always slips away and that shows us the unattainable side of time. In the need to paint the aroma of a lemon and the acidity of its flavor, in the need to return to that world from a naive and entrenched look in our experience, is where we can find the very need of a phenomenological analysis of childhood. In this almost spontaneous shift towards the recovery of free movements, the surprised look, the harmonic synchrony with the skin of others, the child appears not only as the subject to be studied by psychology (elusive, complex, opaque to the gaze of the adult), but also as a quasi-metaphorical image of the genesis of the perceptual act itself, the pristine and ideal stage of the bodily organization of a subject that seems to arrive in this world provided with a few tools that determine, first of all, its openness. Psychologie et pédagogie de l'enfant. Cours de Sorbonne (1949-1952) (2001), brings together a series of courses in which this author deals especially with the problem of childhood. In this work (which will be the axis of the journey that will be made in this thesis) Merleau-Ponty addresses various aspects related to child development and the child's interaction with the surrounding world. The acquisition of language in the child, the structure of child consciousness, intelligence, perception and the relationship that the child establishes with adults are some of the issues that Merleau-Ponty will develop throughout these courses and that will be unfold not only as analysis confined to the study of the psycho-social constitution of the child, but also they throw us squarely into the midst of certain questions that their theory of perception opens to those who approach it.The aim of this work is to analyze the processes involved in the construction of the body schema during early childhood, in order to reconstruct the genesis of the perceptual apparatus from a phenomenological perspective. Why is childhood important in Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception? Is there any difference between the theory formulated in Phenomenology of perception and the conception that this process holds in the courses dedicated to childhood? Is the body schema a construct that is organized and redefined from dynamics similar to the historical process itself? The proprioception, the imagination, the postural transfer and the construction of the perceptual habitualities are some of the dynamics that will be critically compared in the heart of his theory, to elucidate the appropriation and the use that the French philosopher made of them in order to join them, at the same time, with some current debates in the psychology of development. Likewise, the processes of constitution and perceptual organization will be put in dialogue with the dynamics that Merleau-Ponty describes as underlying historical temporality, elucidating the breaks and similarities between the definition of one's own body and the relaunching of history itself. Thus, one of the main objectives of this work will be to explore not only the possibilities that the conception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's childhood offers to analyze some current problems of child psychology, but also to investigate the political paths that its body theory of perception seems to enable from its very definition of body. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy becomes, then, "towards the things themselves," to redefine them, to explain them, to make it clear that the construction of the subject of perception is in itself an intersubjective, cultural, historical and political act.

Monsalve, Carlos. (2010) Emotional skills of a high school teaching staff. Experiences from six teachers. Master in Pedagogy - final examination, 30 hp, Institute of Pedagogy, Stockholm University. This research will be conducted as a final examination for the Master in Pedagogy, which I am currently attending in the Institute of Pedagogy at the Stockholm University (Sweden). My interest on this research grew up from the moment in which I identified in my experience as a teacher, the importance of a good emotional management (own emotions and other's as well) by teachers at a high school in the city of Badajoz, Spain. This is so, because this educational institute is localized in a low socio-economical status (marginalized area), which causes the students to have specific emotional difficulties that affect their normal performance in their studies and outcomes. In the same way and as a consequence of the above, it became evident to me the conclusion that teachers should be properly prepared for an effective support that students with such difficulties required. As another main reason for this investigation, it should be pointed out the existing necessity of new input in the researching ground required within the Emotional Intelligence area and its relationship with education. Most of the concepts in this respect will be supported by the formulations of the American psychologist D. Goleman. (1996). In this work, I would also like to contribute with a different analysis, employing the phenomenological method of the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty for interview analysis. Within this research, six teachers from the mentioned institution were interviewed so as to find out about their personal experiences related to the emotional ambit. Such experiences were analyzed using the phenomenological method formulated by Merleau-Ponty as I mentioned before. After the respective conclusions derived from the analysis conducted on the interviews, they followed a confrontation with the Emotional Intelligence theory by Goleman, (1996), and finally, the formulation of a conclusion which enables a solution to the questions posed in the objectives, and consequently responds to the hypothesis conceived.   Key words: EQ, Emotional Intelligence (IE), Emotional Skills, Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenological Methodology of Merleau-Ponty. / Competencia Emocional del profesorado de un Instituto de Bachillerato. Experiencias de seis profesores. Máster en pedagogía – Examen final, 30 hp, Instituto de Pedagogía, Universidad de Estocolmo. Este estudio de investigación es realizado como examinación final del máster en pedagogía que actualmente curso en el instituto de Pedagogía de la Universidad de Estocolmo (Suecia). Mi interés en la investigación surgió al haber identificado y evidenciado, según mi experiencia como profesor, la importancia que tiene el buen manejo de las emociones (las propias y la de los demás) por parte de los profesores de un instituto de bachillerato de la ciudad de Badajoz, España. Ello, por encontrarse el instituto ubicado en un área social de estrato bajo (zona de marginación) por lo que los alumnos tienen especiales dificultades emocionales que afectan el desempeño normal de sus estudios y sus resultados. Así mismo y como consecuencia de lo anterior, me resulta clara la conclusión de que los profesores deben estar preparados adecuadamente para un apoyo efectivo que requieren dichos alumnos con ese tipo de dificultades. Como otro motivo primordial, cabe señalar la necesidad existente de nuevos aportes en el ámbito investigativo que requiere el ámbito de la Inteligencia Emocional y su relación con la educación. La mayoría de los conceptos al respecto, estarán apoyados en las formulaciones del psicólogo americano Goleman (1996). En este trabajo, deseo también aportar un análisis diferente, empleando el método fenomenológico del filósofo francés Merleau-Ponty para el análisis de las entrevistas. En la investigación se entrevistó a seis profesores de bachillerato del citado instituto para así indagar sobre sus vivencias o experiencias personales relacionadas con el ámbito emocional. Dichas vivencias fueron luego analizadas utilizando el método fenomenológico formulado por Merleau-Ponty como mencioné con anterioridad. Después de las respectivas conclusiones del análisis de las entrevistas, se procedió a confrontarlas con la teoría de la inteligencia emocional de Goleman (1996), para finalmente formular una conclusión y así llegar a una solución de  las preguntas formuladas en los objetivos y consecuentemente responder a la hipótesis planteada. Palabras claves: EQ, Inteligencia Emocional (IE), Competencia Emocional, Fenomenología, Metodología Fenomenológica de Merleau-Ponty.

Because Emmanuel Levinas distanced himself from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's philosophy for a more radical account of the self as primordially oriented by a radical passivity and asymmetrical ethical obligation to the other, few secondary sources have articulated the clear influence Merleau-Ponty had on the trajectory of Levinas's thought. Further, Levinas's more radical account of intersubjectivity raises three primary concerns: (1) Levinas resorts to a form of Platonic dualism when he depicts the other as beyond culture, history, and the physical appearance of the body; (2) there are questions as to whether the phenomena warrant his later view that the self is grounded in a radical passivity and an utter noncoincidence between self and other; (3) his ethics based on an infinite, asymmetrical obligation for the other conflates any kind of self-regard with egoism, thus creating a scenario in which my infinite concern for the singular other stands at odds with concerns of equality and justice. <br> Drawing on the work of Levinas and Merleau-Ponty, I develop a hybrid account of intersubjectivity. Echoing the work of Adriaan Peperzak, I depict the self-other relation as "chiastic asymmetry" that stresses that the asymmetry in Levinas's thought and the mutuality in Merleau-Ponty's must be seen as equiprimordial. Peperzak neither considers Merleau-Ponty's thought, nor does he provide a phenomenological description of chiastic asymmetry. The parent-child relationship provides this explanation by highlighting how ethics is cultivated simultaneously in both the child and the caregiver, and thus, both responsibility and mutuality constitute the self-other relation. In addition, the study of the parent-child relation (1) offers a phenomenological analyses of passivity and sensibility that decenter the autonomous, self-reflective cogito that is prioritized by Descartes, Kant, and Husserl and (2) stands in contrast to the predominant accounts of intersubjectivity that are grounded in self-interest, indifference, or shame, as represented by Hegel, Heidegger, and Sartre. This alternative account seeks to preserve the alterity of the other and unearths an originary posture toward the other that is peaceful and positive. <br> After considering Levinas's and Merleau-Ponty's respective roots in Husserl's thought (chapter 1), I respond to Levinas's criticisms of Merleau-Ponty in the areas of language, history, aesthetics, and embodiment (chapter 2). Then, I turn to their respective accounts of the parent-child relation, supplemented by current empirical research in child development, to establish my account of chiastic asymmetry (chapter 3). After explaining how chiastic asymmetry offers an alternative to the views set forth by Hegel, Heidegger, Sartre, and Hobbes (chapter 4), I conclude by considering how intersubjectivity as chiastic asymmetry might serve as a basis for a peaceful politics that reframes the use of violence and suggest its conceptual presence in the thought of Enrique Dussel, Desmond Tutu, and Miroslav Volf. <br> / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;