This paper attempts to determine the theoretical requirements for a non-state actor to give peacekeepers to a Member state of the United Nations, who would in turn give those peacekeepers to the United Nations. The paper examines two case studies, specifically the contract between Blackwater and the United States Department of State and the SHIRBRIG series of treaties. The paper finds that there is some overlap between a Member state’s needs and a non-state actor’s needs and that there is a theoretical possibility of the donation stated above taking place.

With its national strength, the United States is, more often than not, a major State initiating the making of important international multilateral treaties and shaping the final outcome by wielding its influence in the negotiation processes. Nevertheless, three major international multilateral treaties concluded in three different domains all appear the same situation in which the U.S. participated actively in the negotiations but ended up rejecting to sign or ratify due to their inconformities with American ¡§national interests.¡¨ The purpose of this thesis is to examine the American proposals and interventions made in the negotiating processes of three important international multilateral treaties, i.e., the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Kyoto Protocol and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, so as to understand American negotiation stances as well as the issues to which the U.S. attached importance to and the derive the substantive contents of the ¡§national interests¡¨ that the U.S. held dear. Furthermore, this thesis takes one step further to analyze who were the actors that shaped and defined the ¡§national interests¡¨ which the U.S. valued and held tight.

Die jüngste Einrichtung der Weltbankgruppe befasst sich - in Ergänzung zum Internationalen Zentrum für die Beilegung von Investitionsstreitigkeiten (ICSID) - mit dem Schutz grenzüberschreitender (Direkt-)Investitionen durch Garantien gegen Auslandsrisiken. Dabei wirkt sie nicht nur als Abrundung des Schutzes durch bilaterale Investitionsschutzverträge und nationale Investitionsversicherungen, sondern kann auch als Katalysator für eine bessere Kooperation im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis bedeutsam werden.

Il existe actuellement des différends frontaliers entre les États circumpolaires-Nord qui entravent la bonne gouvernance de la région. Afin d'identifier des pistes de solution pour améliorer la gouvernance en Arctique et faciliter la coopération, nous analysons le processus qui a mené, à l'autre pôle, à la création du Traité sur l’Antarctique de 1959. Nous utilisons une approche néolibérale institutionnelle comme cadre théorique ainsi qu’une méthodologie basée sur le traçage de processus. Nous avons identifié quatre variables (les intérêts des États, le contexte politique, le leadership, et l’Année géophysique internationale [AGI]) que nous avons étudiés au cours de trois périodes historiques et dont l’évolution a contribué à la formation du régime antarctique. Les étapes menant à l'élaboration d'un régime identifié dans la théorie institutionnaliste dynamique de Frischmann s'appliquent aux différentes périodes que nous avons déterminées. La première période historique correspond à l'identification du problème d'interdépendance. Les États ont d’abord tenté d’assouvir leurs intérêts particuliers envers le continent antarctique par l’intermédiaire de stratégies individuelles. Le statut imprécis du continent antarctique caractérisé par des revendications territoriales conflictuelles, la volonté des superpuissances d’effectuer d’éventuelles revendications territoriales et le leadership exercé par les États-Unis ont toutefois permis de faire évoluer les États vers des stratégies coopératives. La deuxième période historique correspond à l'étape de la négociation de l’entente. Le leadership d’un groupe de scientifiques et des États-Unis ainsi que le contexte politique de la Guerre froide ont favorisé la cohésion des États intéressés par les affaires antarctiques et leur investissement dans une coopération multilatérale souple dans le cadre d’un événement ponctuel, l’AGI. La troisième période correspond à la mise en oeuvre de l’entente, soit l’AGI. Lors de cet événement, une entente tacite, un engagement d’honneur, qui suspendait les considérations territoriales en Antarctique, a été respectée par les parties. La coopération dans le cadre de l’AGI s’est avérée un succès. Les États se sont montrés satisfaits des gains que comportait la coopération scientifique dans un environnement pacifique. L’AGI a permis aux États d’expérimenter la coopération multilatérale et d’observer le comportement des autres participants au sein de l’institution. En raison de la satisfaction des États vis-à-vis la coopération dans le cadre de l'entente souple, l'élaboration du traité de 1959 a été facilitée. Notre étude nous a permis d’identifier des éléments clefs qui ont favorisé la formation du régime antarctique et qui pourraient servir d’inspiration pour l'élaboration de futurs régimes. La présence d’un leadership tout au long du processus a permis de promouvoir les avantages de la coopération sous différentes formes et de renforcer les relations entre les États présents dans les affaires antarctiques. La réalisation d'une entente souple dans le cadre de l'AGI, centrée autour des intérêts communs aux parties, comprenant un engagement d’honneur, permettant de mettre de côté les points de discorde, ont aussi été des points centraux dans la réussite et la poursuite de la coopération au-delà de l’AGI. Cette approche graduelle allant du droit souple vers le droit contraignant est sans aucun doute l’élément le plus important ayant facilité le rapprochement des différentes parties et éventuellement la création du Traité sur l’Antarctique. / There are currently border disputes between North circumpolar states that impede the good governance of the region. In order to identify possible solutions for improving the governance in the Arctic and to facilitate cooperation, we analyze the process that, at the other pole, led to the creation of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. We use a neoliberal institutional approach as a theoretical framework and a methodology based on the process tracing. We identified four variables (states' interests, the political context, leadership, and the International Geophysical Year [IGY]) that we studied through three historical periods and whose evolution has contributed to elaborating the Antarctic regime. The steps leading to the development of a regime, identified in Frischmann’s dynamic institutionalism theory, apply to the three periods that we have identified. The first historical period corresponds to identifying an interdependency problem. States first tried to satisfy their particular interests pertaining to the Antarctic continent through individual strategies. The unclear status of the Antarctic continent characterized by conflicting claims, the will of the superpowers to potentially make territorial claims, and the leadership of the United States, however, facilitate the states to move to more cooperative strategies. The second historical period corresponds to negotiating the agreement. The leadership of a group of scientists and the United States in addition to the political context of the Cold War facilitated the cohesion of states interested in Antarctic affairs and their investment in a soft multilateral cooperation, the IGY. The third period corresponds to implementing the agreement, that is IGY. During this event, the parties have respected a tacit agreement, a gentlemen’s agreement, which suspended territorial considerations in Antarctica. The cooperation during the IGY proved to be a success. States were satisfied with their gains from the scientific cooperation in a peaceful environment. The IGY has allowed states to experiment multilateral cooperation and to observe the behavior of other participants within the institution. Due to the satisfaction of the states vis-à-vis the cooperation, the development of the 1959 Treaty was facilitated. Through our study, we identified key elements that led to the creation of the Antarctic regime and could serve as an inspiration for the development of future regime. The continuous of leadership throughout the process helped to promote the benefits of cooperation and to strengthen relations between the states involved in Antarctic affairs. The accomplishment of a soft agreement, during the IGY, centered around the parties common interests, and of a gentlemen’s agreement, which put aside divisive issues were also central points in the success and the extension of the coopération after the IGY. This gradual approach from soft law to hard law is undoubtedly the most important element that facilitated the cohesion of parties and the creation of the Antarctic Treaty.

<p> <p>&nbsp / </p> </p> <p align="justify">At the heart of this study is the topic of small economies in the Multilateral Trade System (MTS). The study examines the World Trade Organisation&rsquo / s (WTO) legal framework and policy objectives in order to develop a comprehensive definition of small economies as a group of WTO members with specific needs. Particular attention is given to the determination of the specific characteristics of small economies, as well as the issues and constraints they are facing in the MTS. The study explores solutions proposed in order to tackle the constraints to the effective integration of small economies in the MTS, with specific reference to the policy reasoning of small economies. More importantly, the study explores the impact of the size factor, which is certainly not only a burden on the growth and development perspectives of the considered entity, but which may also become an advantage and promotes the trade performance of a small economy. Hypotheses are then made relating to the relevance of the economic and political environments in the determination of a successful (or not) integration, and participation, of a small economy in the MTS. A crucial argument developed is that the differences observed between countries sharing similar characteristics of smallness, vulnerability and remoteness/landlockedness, illustrates the fact that what ultimately matters is the interplay of factors related to the economic and political environments, the effect of which is to promote or constrain (depending on the case) successful integration of the small economy in the MTS.</p>

No description available.

In recent years, the multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle has been promoted as a potential mechanism for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The multilateral approach has the potential to gain international favour over what has become traditional practice – the indigenous development and control of nuclear facilities. This thesis explores the way in which four states have responded to the revived attention on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, within the framework of the norm life cycle. The varying levels of support reflect broader international opinion on this issue, as many developing states remain concerned that they may be required to forgo not only the “inalienable right” to peaceful nuclear energy, but also the prospective economic and technological benefits of indigenous development in order to participate. However, as the risk of further proliferation and nuclear terrorism comes to the fore of international agendas, facilitating multilateral control of the most sensitive aspects of peaceful nuclear energy may be the key to strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the 21st century.

Foreign Direct investment (FDI) has been recognized as a vital source of development for African countries, which are mainly capital importing countries. This has led to a quest for effective regulation of the activities of foreign investors in a country while considering the profit making goals of the investors as well. As there is a need to strike a balance between the need to regulate entry and activities of investors and reaping the immense benefits of FDI such as growth and development. The regulation of FDI thus becomes important. However, there is no universal multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) that binds most states oft the world. What we have is attempts at regional levels to regulate Investment uniformly. This quest has led to debates with many developing countries (Africa Inclusive) resisting attempts to formulate a MAI. This paper will start with an introduction of the importance of FDI as well as the various attempts that have been made to regulate FID on a multilateral level. Then the paper will go on to examine two Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Botswana-China BIT on Promotion and Protection of Investments 2000,Czech-Tunisia BIT for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 1997, and two Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) - Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1990 and the investment provisions of the U.S &ndash;Morocco Free Trade Agreement 2004, to identify those trends that are common to these agreements that have been entered into by African countries. It will examine these provisions in line with the rights and obligations they create for the investors as well as the host countries. / Magister Legum - LLM

Maintaining rapid economic growth and protecting national sovereignty have been immovable national aims expressed in Chinese foreign policy behaviour since economic reforms were introduced in the late 1970s. Climate change, for its part, is a global concern and monetarily expensive issue which necessitates collective action. At face value, encouraging economic expansion and guarding national sovereignty could easily be viewed as conditions which oppose national actions to mitigate climate change and its potential effects. However in recent years, China has adopted a positive foreign policy tone expressing interest in mitigating climate change through the multilateral United Nations (UN) climate regime. Hence, China is a curious and perhaps contradictory participant in the UNFCCC regime’s institutions. This thesis seeks to answer the following research question: “Why is Chinese foreign policy able to balance supporting national economic development objectives and protect its sovereignty while also increasing UNFCCC multilateral cooperation to abate climate change?” In the course of answering this question, China’s foreign policy motivations in the climate regime are scrutinized using economic nationalism. Briefly, economic nationalism is applied here as an economically oriented ideological construct which incorporates sovereignty and national interests together with diverse economic policies, including interdependence. Supporting this thesis’ research is the three-fold argument which remarks that: First, China’s multilateral climate change engagement is consistent with established foreign policy goals to sustain national economic development and preserve national sovereignty. Second, China has redefined its foreign policy to accommodate the ideological construct of economic nationalism, embodied in the course of its international economic and image-status benefits. Third, as a consequence, comprehending Chinese climate foreign policy consistency will contribute to improving general knowledge and understanding of the climate regime and the methods it uses to encourage developing countries to increase their respective participation in mitigating climate change. This thesis studies China’s strategic cooperation with the climate regime using three climate-related cases, as well as a contrast case which compares contemporary climate mitigation with the abatement of ozone depleting substances (ODS), a precursor environmental issue to climate change. The four cases include: the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Multilateral Fund (MLF), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and the Group of 77 (G77). On the first, the GEF is the climate regime’s original redistributive funding mechanism and China receives the largest quantity of GEF funding. Moreover, China’s experience with the GEF on climate change is contrasted with its earlier experience in combating ODS using the MLF financial redistributive mechanism. Second, the CDM is the foremost financial redistributive mechanism to pay for climate mitigation and clean development projects in developing countries. China, for its part, is host for the largest share CDM projects and the economically valuable GHG Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) they issue. Third, China is the de facto leader for developing countries in climate negotiations through the G77 negotiating bloc. The conclusions reached show that while China’s tone has changed through increased openness and participation, fundamentally, Chinese climate policy is based upon maintaining the continuity of its national interests. Modern economic nationalist ideology has deepened China’s foreign policy engagement on climate change by reconceptualising the global environmental issue as an economic development and image-status growth opportunity. Essentially, for China which is a country that prides itself on high rates of economic growth and whose foreign policy staunchly defends its national sovereignty, embracing forces of globalization through the act of multilaterally engaging on climate change is by no means a contradiction and is rather fully consistent with supporting its longstanding foreign policy objectives.

This security study attempts to explain the dynamics of international conflict management of an intrastate conflict, through a combination of three theoretical frameworks. The conflict in Syria is shown to be managed mainly through strategies using coercive diplomacy, and some main contributions within the research field relating to strategies of coercion are used for guidance, to important factors which could affect coercive international conflict management, as well as to additional theories which could enhance the study’s explanatory power through a combined theoretical framework. The two added theoretical frameworks are Power Balancing and a Multidimensional concept of Power. With the aid of analytical tools derived from this combined framework the conflict management is analysed within both a multilateral and unilateral setting, offering some explanation as to why international conflict management (practiced by UNSC multilaterally and USA unilaterally) has shown so little progress in regard to the conflict, as well as why one significant, though limited, result could be achieved regarding the destruction of the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons arsenal.