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This dissertation is the first ever written Institutional Ethnography (IE) of the Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social, or "AUH" [Universal Child Allowance], Argentina's CCT (conditional cash transfer) program. CCTs are one of international development's favourite and fastest-growing anti-poverty initiatives. Through the AUH, the State transfers cash to the poor attaching certain conditions that refer to the health and education of their children. Most CCT programs target women, and the AUH is no exception, as the overwhelming majority of legal recipients of the AUH are poor mothers. CCTs have been praised for contributing to human capital accumulation and empowering women. Using IE, a feminist socio-legal methodology drawn from Canadian sociologist Dorothy Smith,† I conducted research with a total of fifty-eight informants: thirty-nine AUH recipient women - through in-depth semi-structured individual interviews, focus group discussions, and narrative photovoice - and nineteen professionals working at diverse corners of the AUH institution. I use the findings to answer two main questions: (1) What are AUH recipients' experiences with and attitudes toward the program? and (2) How do both State and non-State legal regimes work to influence the lives of the most vulnerable women in Argentina? In other words, how does the AUH play within a system of rules - formal and informal - that have traditionally exerted control over poor women? Following IE and Social Reproduction Feminism (SRF), I found that while the AUH program indicates women's decision-making roles within their families and communities, this policy initiative serves to entrench rather than rectify inequalities. The problematic that I have found through this study is administrative and obstetric violence against AUH recipient women. Discussion about the administrative and obstetric violence that AUH recipient women suffer while doing AUH work has remained at the margins of legal and social policy debates, generally underdeveloped in policy and scholarship conversations about the realities of Argentina's most vulnerable people. Recipient women depicted diverse acts of violence they suffered while doing AUH work: they were mistreated, dismissed, neglected, humiliated, and discriminated against by State agents; recipient women were treated as ignorant or infantilized; recipient women had their stipend partially stolen by bureaucrats; had to wait countless hours in unsafe conditions; were not heard by health actors when expressing concerns about their health; had no opportunity to give prior informed consent; and they faced barriers to accessing health services and contraception. I have found a disjuncture between women's lived experiences and the broader ruling relations that organize "AUH work." The findings show a disconnection between women's experiences of violence, bureaucratic actors' experiences and knowledge of the AUH, and a misalignment between bureaucrats' knowledge and the black-letter law. These disjunctures enable and facilitate violence against recipient women through fragmentation, invisibilization, rationalization, minimization, standardization, and objectification of women's experiences. In sum, the AUH facilitates violence against women and systematically obscures that violence. Following a legal pluralist approach, I show the complex role of the law: at times, it problematically excludes recipient women's actual experiences from the AUH legal framework; at others, it fails to protect recipient women against violence. I identify the formal legal regimes interacting and immersed in the AUH institution: human rights and constitutional law, administrative law, and the violence against women (VAW) legal framework. Despite an outstanding formal repertoire of rights, there is a gap between the formal laws and their effective translation into women's lives. The law is fragmented, complex, and sometimes contradictory. It cannot be limited to State-enacted formal laws; informal laws substantially impact people's lives, such as the rule to avoid retaliation from State actors by avoiding complaining. I argue that IE and legal pluralism can provide a more nuanced understanding of the law's complex institutional hierarchy and of the myriad ways by which recipient women's voices continue to be ignored and discredited within the law in the hope that the law can better respond (or at least stops interfering) with their needs. Ultimately, nothing less than the transformation of the socioeconomic order will achieve gender equality. Rather than "empowerment," we should strive toward emancipation, abolishing the structural colonial, patriarchal, and capitalist foundations of exploitation and oppression instead of integrating women into existing institutions and "empowering" them with shallow cash transfers.

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No description available.

Denna uppsats hade som syfte att undersöka religionsfriheten som lag och rättighet baserat på hur den framställts i artikeln ”Avskaffa lagen om religionsfrihet”. Undersökningen utgick ifrån tre frågeställningar. Den första handlade om huruvida religionsfrihet medför att religiöst troende har större friheter än icketroende. Det visades på att religionsfriheten erbjuder samma frihet för alla och envar, individens frihet att ha den relation till religion som eftersträvas av densamme. Lagen om religionsfrihet visades syfta till att i möjligaste mån tillgodose denna frihet. Att det skulle medföra större friheter för religiöst troende visade sig vara en feltolkning av begreppets innebörd och struktur. Den andra frågeställningen behandlade huruvida lagen om religionsfrihet är logiskt inkonsekvent. Undersökningen visade att så inte är fallet, utan religionsfrihetens logiska konsekvens ansågs inte vara tillräckligt verklighetsförankrad för att kunna ge ett tydligt svar på hur frågan bör ses. Tre modeller för hur man kan förstå religionsfrihet i samspelet barn-föräldrar presenterades. En variant av livstolkningsmodellen underströks och argument för att huvudansvaret måste ligga hos föräldrarna lades fram. Den tredje och avslutande frågeställningen behandlade huruvida begreppet religionsfrihet bidrar med någon mänsklig rättighet som inte redan är skyddad av övriga rättigheter, i artikeln utgjorda av tanke-, mötes- och föreningsfriheten. Undersökningen visade att religionsfrihet inte kunde reduceras till summan av några av dess komponenter. Efter en genomgång av olika perspektiv på frågan konstaterades att även om religionsfrihetens tillämpning kan vara svår att precisera, så utgör den en form av helhetsbegrepp som inte är reducerbart till tankefrihet, mötesfrihet och föreningsfrihet.

Public apprehension about religious diversity has pervaded Canadian headlines at an increasing pace, particularly during the past fifteen years. Urban centres and suburban and rural communities alike have seen clashes over the manifestation of diverse belief systems in daily life. From immigrant ‘codes of conduct,’ a ‘charter of values,’ controversy over the wearing of the Sikh kirpan in school, to bans on religious vestments and symbols worn by public servants including teachers, conflict and socially divisive misunderstandings are often the unfortunate fruits of ignorance about the ‘other.’ Many religious actors at the center of these stories have seen their cases ultimately adjudicated in Canada’s highest court, reinforcing the perception that religious difference is a source of conflict and division in Canadian society. In this era of global conversations about how liberal democracies approach diversity, this dissertation expands the conversation on education about religion, beliefs and worldviews in Canadian classrooms. With public education situated as a primary site for constructing democratic citizenship, the question of how this evolving dynamic of diversity is taught in schools is symbolically and practically linked to broader debates about government and societal responses to pluralism. This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by interweaving thinking from the literature on pluralism, xenosophia and deep equality as a conceptual framework, with empirical work investigating what parents and educators thought Canadian public-school (primary and secondary) students should learn in order to best prepare them for living and thriving in a diverse society. Triangulated data gathered from semi-structured interviews with parents and educators (n=22), responses from a national online survey (n=190), and a textual analysis of secondary student manuals from Quebec’s Ethics and Religious Culture Program (n=5), provided a holistic vantage point from which to consider the central research questions. Analysis and interpretation of findings revealed that learning about diversity and difference were of central importance, however, there were fundamental concerns regarding indoctrination, rejection of majority religious privilege and even-handedness in the presentation of religious and nonreligious belief systems. Existing discourse on religious and worldview literacy education in Canada tends to focus on teaching and learning in the context of a discrete curriculum such as the Ethics and Religious Culture program. However, findings from this research suggest that increased public awareness about the religious entanglements of colonization, combined with the significant rise in the number of Canadians who hold non-religious worldviews, contribute to a rethinking of how such literacy endeavours may be better integrated into other subject areas such as civics, citizenship, history or social studies.

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This study draws on the theories of pluralism and solidarism from the English School to analyze the approaches of Security Council members towards the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya and Syria. Using Stephen Toulmin's model of argumentation analysis, the study also provides a normative critique of these arguments. The study illuminates the divergent positions taken by the permanent members of the UN Security Council in the context of R2P during the crises in Syria and Libya. The analysis uncovers two starkly different approaches. On one side, representatives from Great Britain, France, and the United States advocate for the protection of human rights, democracy, and freedom. On the other side, representatives from Russia and China prioritize state sovereignty and the maintenance of order and stability. This stark contrast underscores the complexity and challenges inherent in implementing R2P. The study also highlights the concrete arguments and approaches taken by the Security Council’s permanent members. This provides a detailed understanding of how these differences manifest in practice and how they affect decision-making in the Security Council.  Based on the normative analysis, The study found that the normative frameworks of pluralism and solidarism offer distinct perspectives on human rights and state sovereignty, influencing the strength of the permanent members' arguments. Pluralism emphasizes state sovereignty and non-intervention, showing skepticism towards R2P, while solidarism highlights the protection of human rights and supports international interventions, aligning with R2P principles. In practice, examples like Libya and Syria have demonstrated the complexity and challenges of implementing R2P. In the case of Libya, NATO's intervention led to significant loss of life and destabilization, questioning the legitimacy and effectiveness of the actions. This situation has underscored the difficulty of balancing the protection of human rights with respect for state sovereignty. The integration of Responsibility While Protecting is proposed in R2P's third pillar to ensure responsible and effective humanitarian interventions.

Alors que la société, notamment le grand public et les décideurs politiques, compte sur les experts pour lui fournir des connaissances scientifiques fiables, ceux-ci sont régulièrement en désaccord les uns avec les autres. Pourquoi, alors, faudrait-il leur faire confiance et se fier à leur jugement ? Pour y répondre, j’explore différentes causes des désaccords entre experts à travers le concept du pluralisme scientifique – le pluralisme explicatif et méthodologique, ainsi que la variété de normes épistémiques et non-épistémiques qui influencent la production de la connaissance scientifique – et les dynamiques sociales et politiques dans lesquelles le savoir expert est créé. J’argumente que les désaccords sont, dans le cadre de la recherche scientifique dite « académique », épistémiquement bénéfiques sur le long terme. Avec l’exemple du processus de l’élaboration des politiques publiques, j’explique ensuite comment l’utilisation du savoir scientifique à des fins pratiques crée des problèmes susceptibles d’exacerber les désaccords entre experts, mais que souvent, cela est dû en grande partie à des facteurs hors de leur contrôle. Enfin, j’argumente que cette utilisation particulière du savoir scientifique contribue à la méfiance du public envers les experts lorsqu’ils sont en désaccord, et je présente des conditions sous lesquelles il est justifié de leur faire confiance. / While society, notably the general public and policy makers, count on experts to provide it with reliable scientific knowledge, the latter regularly disagree with each other. Why, then, should we trust them and rely on their judgements? To answer, I explore different causes of disagreements between experts through the concept of scientific pluralism – explanatory and methodological pluralism, and the variety of epistemic and non-epistemic norms that influence the production of scientific knowledge – and the social and political dynamics in which expert knowledge is made. I argue that disagreements are, in the context of so-called “academic” scientific research, epistemically beneficial in the long term. With the example of the policy-making process, I then explain how the use of scientific knowledge for practical purposes creates problems that can exacerbate disagreements between experts, but that often, this is due in large part to factors beyond their control. Finally, I argue that this particular use of scientific knowledge contributes to public mistrust of experts when they disagree, and I present some conditions under which it is justified to trust them.

Vorherrschende Meinungsmacht ist das in wenigen Händen liegende Potential, auf die Meinungsbildung einzuwirken. Sie behindert die Gewährleistung eines vielfältigen Rundfunkangebotes, das im Interesse der freien Meinungsbildung steht. Sie kann entstehen, wenn von Anfang an nur wenige Anbieter auf dem Markt sind oder bei anfänglicher Vielfalt kleinere Anbieter ausscheiden, die restlichen zusammenschmelzen oder ein Veranstalter mehrere Programme ausstrahlt. Doch auch die Einflußnahme eines Unternehmens auf verschiedenen Märkten oder die Bildung eines Informationsmonopols können zu vorherrschender Meinungsmacht führen. Daher stellt der Rundfunkstaatsvertrag Antikonzentrationsregelungen auf. Deren Ziel ist es, freie Meinungsbildung durch eine Vielfalt von Programmangeboten zu gewährleisten. Vermutet wird eine Gefährdung der Vielfalt im Fernsehen, wenn ein Veranstalter mehr als 30 % der Zuschaueranteile auf sich vereinigt. Diese Regelung gestattet eine recht hohe Konzentration von Rundfunkveranstaltern, die gleichwohl nicht verfassungswidrig ist. Zu verhindern ist aber, daß starke Unternehmen die vor- und nachgelagerten Märkte und die anderer Medien derart kontrollieren, daß Neueinsteigern der Zugang dazu verwehrt oder unverhältnismäßig erschwert wird. Das auf Zuschauermarktanteilen basierende Modell muß so ergänzt werden, daß die Cross-ownership umfassend berücksichtigt wird. Dies kann nur mit einer methodenpluralistischen Vorgehensweise bei der Messung des Einflusses erreicht werden. Mit dem Zuschauermarktanteilsmodell wurde ein neues Verfahrensrecht eingeführt. Vergleichbar dem Recht der Wirtschaftsaufsicht wurde ein System aus Überwachungsmitteln, Eingriffsmitteln und Sanktionen geschaffen, das die Unternehmen stärker zur Mitwirkung verpflichtet. Die Aufklärung konzentrationsrechtlicher Sachverhalte dient dem Schutz der freien Meinungsbildung und kann daher mit einigen Ausnahmen als Umsetzung der Anforderungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts an den Grundrechtsschutz durch Verfahren aus dem Rundfunkgebührenurteil verstanden werden. / A multifarious broadcasting sypply is an essential requirement/ prerequisite for a free shaping of public opinion in a democracy. Predominance on the opinion market endangers or hinders this opinion-forming. Therefore it has to be avoided by looking first of the mechanism dominance can be developed. It occurs by acting of only a few provider on this market or the impeding of the access of new companies to the relevant market. Further on by merging of the big players or the concentration of several programs in the hands of one supplier dominance can arise. The instrument that states rules of media ownership to guarantee pluralism and diversity in the opinien market is the German Interstate Treaty of Broadcasting (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag). Hereafter a dominant position of a company is assumed by holding more than 30% of the recipients. Holding this high figure in one hand is not unconstitutional. Nevertheless this high market share must not erase competition on the opinion market? To identify an abuse of dominant positions you have to look at the behavior of the respective company, whether it is building up control over the adjacent markets and impeding of competing companies to enter the respective markets. This can only be done by looking at possible cross-ownership of the involved companies through a multi-tasking measuring system. A new procedure was introduced that is comparable to the general competition-rules. It consists of supervision, intervention and sanctions to bring the companies to stick to the rules. The thoroughly and strict enforcement of anticoncentration serves to shelter and enforce the free shaping of public opinion and meets -a few exceptions aside- all requirements given by the Federal Constitutional Court.